EVALUATION

Evaluation of Finland's Development Cooperation Country Strategies and Country Strategy Modality

2016/3

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EVALUATION OF FINLAND'S DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION COUNTRY STRATEGIES AND COUNTRY STRATEGY MODALITY

Synthesis Report

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2016/3

Cover design and layout: Innocorp Oy/Milla Toro

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AfDF	African Development Fund
AgroBIG	Programme for Agro-Business Induced Growth (Ethiopia)
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CCO	Cross-Cutting Objective
CEP	Country Engagement Plan
CMP	Community Managed Project (Ethiopia)
COWASH	Community-led Accelerated Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (Ethiopia)
CS	Country Strategy
CSE	Country Strategy Evaluation
CSEF	Civil Society Environment Fund (Zambia)
CSM	Country Strategy Modality
CSP	Core Support Programme (Zambia)/Country Strategy Paper (Irish Aid)
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CTC	Country Team Coordinator
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of OECD)
DC	Development Cooperation
DCD	Development Cooperation Division (Ireland, also known as Irish Aid)
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Ireland)
DFONRMP	Decentralised Forest and Other Natural Resources Management Programme (Zambia)
DPC	Development Policy Committee
DPP	Development Policy Programme
DPSG	Development Policy Steering Group
EMT	Evaluation Management Team
EQ	Evaluation Question
ESIF	Ethiopia Strategic Investment Framework
EU	European Union
EUR	euro
FfA	Framework for Action
FLC	Fund for Local Cooperation
FLEGT	Forestry Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (Vietnam)
FORMIS	Forest Information Management Programme (Vietnam)
FRA	Forest Resource Assessment (Nepal)
GBS	General Budget Support
GEQIP	General Education Quality Improvement Programme
GNI	Gross National Income
GNP	Gross National Product

GOK	Government of Kenya
HDI	Human Development Index
HE-ICI	Higher Education International Cooperation Instrument
HQ	Headquarters
HRBA	Human Rights Based Approach
ICI	Institutional Cooperation Instrument
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IDA	International Development Association
IDCD	Inter-Departmental Committee on Development (Ireland)
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILUA	Integrated Land-Use Assessment (Zambia)
IPP	Innovation Partnership Programme (Vietnam)
IR	Inception Report
KESU	Advisory Board for Relations with Developing Countries (Finland)
LFA	Logical Framework Approach
LDC	Least Developed Country
LFA	Logical Framework Approach
LIMAS	Lindi and Mtwara Agribusiness Support Project (Tanzania)
LMIC	Lower Middle Income Country
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MFA	Ministry for Foreign Affairs
MIC	Middle-Income Country
MoDP	Ministry of Devolution and Planning (Kenya)
MSFP	Multi-Stakeholder Forestry Programme (Nepal)
MTE	Mid-term Evaluation
MTR	Mid-Term Review
n.d.	no date
NFBKP	National Forestry and Beekeeping Programme (Tanzania)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIS	National Innovation System (Vietnam)
OWOF	One World, One Future
PFG	People Participation in Improvement of Forestry Governance and Poverty Alleviation in Vietnam
PFMRP	Public Finance Management Reform Programme
PRBS	Poverty Reduction Budget Support
PSD	Private Sector Development
QAB	Quality Assurance Board
ODA	official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PFP	Private Forestry Programme (Tanzania)
PFMRP	Public Finance Management Reform Programme
PLARD	Programme for Luapula Agricultural and Rural Development (Zambia)

PPP	Public-Private Partnership
RBM	results-based management
REILA	Responsible and Innovative Land Administration in Ethiopia
RoLHR	Rule of Law and Human Rights Protection Programme (Nepal)
RVWRMP	Rural Village Water Resources Management Project (Nepal)
RWSSP-WN	Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project – Western Nepal
SAPP	Smallholder Agribusiness Promotion Programme (Zambia)
SCT	social cash transfers
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SEAM	Strengthening of Environmental Administration and Management at the Local Level (Nepal)
SECO	State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (Switzerland)
SIP	Small-scale Irrigation Project (Zambia)
SoS	Statement of Strategy
SME	Small and Medium Enterprise
SMOLE	Sustainable Management of Land and Environment (Zanzibar)
SSRP	School Sector Reform Programme (Nepal)
TA	Technical Assistance/Assistant
TALKE	Advisory Board for Economic Relations between Finland and Developing Countries
TANZICT	Tanzania Information Society and ICT Sector Development Project
TOC	Theory of Change
TOR	Terms of Reference
TTS	Operational and Finance Plan (Toiminta- ja taloussuunnitelma)
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USD	US dollar
VPA	Voluntary Partnership Agreement
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WB	World Bank
WPST	Sustainability Programme for Water and Sanitation for Small Towns (Vietnam)
ZSPEP	Zambia Social Protection Expansion Programme
ZNFU	Zambia National Farmers Union

TIIVISTELMÄ

Suomi otti käyttöön tulosperustaiset maaohjelmat vuonna 2012 ohjaamaan ulko-asiainministeriön kehitysyhteistyötä sen pitkäaikaisissa kumppanimaissa. Tässä evaluoinnissa arvioitiin maaohjelmatoimintamallin vaikutuksia maa-ohjelmien laatimisessa ja seurannassa. Maaohjelmien yhteydessä toteutettu-jen hankkeiden ja muiden kehitysinterventioiden saavutusten arviointi suh-teessa maaohjelmien tavoitteisiin sisältyi myös evaluointiin.

Maaohjelmien ja niiden alla olevien hankkeiden ja muiden kehitysinterven-tioiden todettiin evaluoinnissa olevan relevantteja kumppanimaille ja myös Suomen kehityspolitiikan näkökulmasta. Monet toteutetuista hankkeista ovat tuottaneet merkittäviä tuloksia, osa myös kestävästi. Suomen harjoittamalla poliittisella vaikuttamisella on ollut tärkeä osa tulosten saavuttamisessa.

Toteutuksessa on kuitenkin ollut usein viiveitä, mikä osaltaan on heikentä-nyt resurssien tehokasta käyttöä. Vaikka maaohjelmatoimintamallin todettiin olevan erittäin merkityksellinen ministeriölle, lähestymistavan ja mallin vai-kutukset kehitysyhteistyön tuloksellisuuteen ovat olleet vielä vähäisiä. Syynä tähän on se, että ohjelmat sisälsivät jo aikaisemmin aloitettuja hankkeita ja toimintatapoja, joihin maaohjelmointi ei voinut heti vaikuttaa. Maaohjelma-toimintamalli on kuitenkin terävöittänyt maaohjelmien hankeportfolioiden relevanssia, johdonmukaisuutta ja tuloksellisuutta. Evaluoinnissa havaittiin neljä keskeistä tekijää, jotka ovat vaikuttaneet kielteisesti maaohjelmoinnin tuloksellisuuteen: (1) Maaohjelmien strategisen suunnittelun malli ei ole täy-sin tukenut kumppanimaissa toteutettavien hankkeiden strategista hallin-taa; (2) Käytännössä tulosmittareissa tapahtuneet muutokset ja usein heikko tietojen saatavuus ovat vaikeuttaneet seurantaa. Tulosmittareiden valinta ei ole aina onnistunut, mikä on osaltaan johtunut maatiimien riittämättömistä tulosjohtamisen taidoista; (3) Maaohjelmien ja ministeriön talousarviomenet-telyjen välinen yhteensopivuus on ollut heikko; ja (4) Heikot tulosperustaiset menettelytavat ministeriössä ovat johtaneet siihen, että strategiaprosesseista saatuja tietoja tai oppeja ei ole vielä hyödynnetty parhaalla mahdollisella taval-la. Suositus on, että maatason tulosjohtamisen tulee jatkua, mutta maaohjel-matoimintamallia tulisi edelleen kehittää. Mallin kattavuutta tulisi avartaa; lähestymistapana tulisi käyttää lyhyempiä tulosketjuja ja identifioida selkeitä vaikutusväyliä Suomen toiminnalle; toimintamalleja pitäisi muokata niin, että ne ovat linjassa talousarviomenettelyjen kanssa; ja Suomen ulkoministeriön systeemejä ja maatoimistojen henkilökunnan taitoja tulisi kehittää tulospe-rustaisen johtamisen osalta.

Avainsanat: Suomen kehitysyhteistyö, maaohjelmat, maastrategiat,
tulosperustainen johtaminen (RBM)

REFERAT

Utrikesministeriet (UM) införde 2012 sitt landprogram modalitet (LPM) för att leda ministeriets egna programmerade interventioner inom utvecklingssamarbetet i de långsiktiga partnerländerna.

Denna evaluering utvärderar framgången av förfarandet i landprogrammen och utvecklar redskap för en uppföljning av dessa program. Även framgången av de åtgärder som vidtas medelst programmen utvärderas gentemot målsättningarna i programmen. Evalueringen kom fram till att de utvärderade åtgärderna var relevanta för respektive länder och för Finland. Då ett flertal åtgärder genomfördes i sex länder kunde goda resultat observeras, en del av dem även markant goda. Finlands strategiska påverkande hade en betydande inverkan på denna framgång. Ofta var dock resultaten försenade, vilket påverkade effektiviteten och kostnaderna. Fastän landprogrammen ansågs vara högst relevanta för ministeriet, så var åtgärdernas och modellens inverkan på resultatet rätt små. Detta grundar sig på historiska orsaker, som härstammat från tidigare påbörjade projekt och åtgärder; för dessa hade de introducerade åtgärderna ringa påverkan. Trots detta har det nya processen för landprogrammen redan nu skärpt relevansen, samstämmigheten och effektiviteten i de landspecifika programportföljerna. Utvärderingen identifierar fyra huvudsakliga faktorer, som hindrar styrningen av landprogrammen från att bli effektivare. För det första var programplaneringsmodellen inte helt förankrad i den strategiska ledningen av landsportföljerna. För det andra var valet av de indikatorer som blivit valda för uppföljning, datas stabilitet och tillgänglighet, förknippat med monitoreringsproblem, delvis p.g.a. svag resultatbaserad ledningsförmåga hos landsteamet. För det tredje var kopplingen mellan programmet och ministeriets budgeteringsförfarande svag. Till sist, så var en svag resultatbaserad styrprocess inom utrikesministeriet generellt, orsak till ett suboptimalt utnyttjande av den information och de lärdomar som programmet levererade. Rekommendationen är att den landspecifika mål- och resultatstyrningen bör fortsätta, men att man bör överväga en utveckling av angreppssättet och förfarandena. Landprogrammens omfattning bör breddas; den strategiska modellen bör använda en kortare resultatkedja, och den bör staka ut klara riktlinjer för Finlands medverkan och inflytande; modellerna för förfarandena måste omformuleras så att de bättre stämmer överens med budgeteringsprocessen; och inom utrikesministeriet bör bättre system och högre kunskapsnivå för en resultatbaserad ledning inom landsteamen byggas upp.

Nyckelord: Finlands utvecklingssamarbete, landprogram, mål- och resultatstyrning (RBM)

ABSTRACT

Finland introduced results-based country strategies in 2012 to manage development cooperation interventions programmed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs itself in its long-term partner countries. This evaluation assessed the performance of the country strategy modality in developing and monitoring the strategies. It also assessed the performance of the interventions managed through the strategies against the strategy objectives. The evaluation found the assessed interventions relevant to the partner countries and Finland's development policy objectives. When implemented, many interventions in the six countries delivered results, some sustainably. Finland's policy influence was a major factor in this performance. However, implementation was often delayed, so that the full allocation of Finnish resources to the strategies was not used efficiently to produce results over the strategy period. While highly relevant to the Ministry, given its commitment to results-based management of development cooperation, the strategy modality could influence this performance only marginally, having inherited interventions and modes of delivery set prior to its introduction. However, the evaluation found that modality processes have already sharpened the relevance, coherence and effectiveness of the country strategy portfolios. The evaluation identified four main factors that detract from making the modality more effective. Firstly, the strategic planning model used was not fully conducive to strategic management of country portfolios. It set out a result chain that was too long to provide useful results-based management information; the logic framework approach does not make clear how one level of results would translate into another, how Finland can influence this, and what the risks are; and it set the scope of analysis and result tracking too narrowly to facilitate complementarity between all Finland's resources or coherence with other non-development assistance interventions in partner countries. This made the modality also less relevant for countries where Finland is transitioning to other forms of partnership. Secondly, in practice indicator selection, stability and data availability created monitoring difficulties. A contributing factor to this was that results-based management skills were still emerging in country teams. Thirdly, weak linkages between strategy and MFA budget processes meant that strategy processes did not sufficiently influence intervention decisions taken through budget processes. Finally, weak results-based processes overall in the MFA meant that information and learning from strategy processes were not used optimally for better development policy management overall. The recommendations are that country level results-based management is showing enough promise to be continued, but that the modality itself needs to be rethought. The scope needs to be broadened with due consideration for how different instruments are managed; the strategy model used to target and achieve results must use a shorter result-chain and set out clear pathways for Finnish contribution and influence along this chain; modality processes must be reconfigured to align with budget processes; and Finland must invest in skills for results-based management in its country teams.

Keywords: Finland's development cooperation, country strategies, results-based management

YHTEENVETO

Suomen ulkoasiainministeriö (UM) esitteli maaohjelmatoimintamallin vuonna 2012 kehitysyhteistyön ohjaamiseen Suomen pitkäaikaisissa kumppanimaissa. Maaohjelmien on tarkoitus vahvistaa kumppanimaissa tapahtuvan kehitysyhteistyön suunnitelmallisuutta ja tulossuuntautumista. Niiden vuoden 2012 kehityspoliittisen ohjelman yhteydessä esitelty viitekehys perustuu tulosperustaiseen johtamiseen (RBM).

Evaluoinnin tarkoitus

Evaluoinnin tarkoitus on antaa näyttöön perustuvaa tietoa ja käytännön ohjeistusta maaohjelmien tulosperustaisen lähestymistavan sekä Suomen kehityspolitiikan maakohtaisen toteutuksen kehittämiseen kumppanimaissa. Evaluointi selvitti (i) maaohjelmien alaisuudessa toteutettujen kehitysyhteistyöprojektien ja -ohjelmien saavutuksia Etiopiassa, Mosambikissa, Nepalissa, Tansaniassa, Vietnamissa ja Sambiassa vuosien 2008 ja 2015 välillä; (ii) maaohjelmatoimintamallin käyttöä maaohjelmien suunnittelun tulosperustaisen johtamisen hallintoprosessina sekä viitekehyksenä. Seitsemännessä kumppanimaassa, Keniassa, tehtiin kevyempi katsaus hyödyntäen aikaisemmin tehtyä maaevaluointia; tämä antoi lisänäyttöä maaohjelmatoimintamallin evaluointiin.

Evaluointimenetelmät

Maaohjelmatoimintamalli ei saanut aikaan suurta muutosta maaohjelmaportfoliossa 2013 ja 2015 välisenä aikana, sillä hankkeet periytyivät pääasiassa ajalta ennen maaohjelmatoimintamallin esittelyä. Tämä muodosti haasteen maaohjelmatoimintamallin evaluoinnille. Lyhyt maaohjelmien esittelystä kulunut aika, pitkät maaohjelmien tulosketjut, vahvistetun tulosinformaation ja tilastotiedon rajoitettu saatavuus, sekä Suomen kehitysinterventioiden pieni koko suhteessa kehitystavoitteisiin loivat haasteita näyttöön perustuvan ohjeistuksen laatimiselle maaohjelmien hankeportfolioiden kehittämiseksi.

Näiden haasteiden ratkaisemiksi evaluointiin kehitettiin integroitu muutosteoria, joka koostuu kahdesta erillisestä, mutta toisiinsa liittyvästä muutosteoriasta. Toinen teoria validoi maaohjelmien logiikkamallien määrittämiä tulosketjuja, ja toinen maaohjelmatoimintamallin toimivuutta kehitysyhteistyön tulosjohtamisen näkökulmasta. Teoriapohjainen lähestymistapa oli tarpeellinen evaluoinnille, joka toteutettiin maaohjelmien ja maaohjelmatoimintamallin varhaisessa vaiheessa. Tämä lähestymistapa mahdollisti aiempien toimien saavutusten identifioinnin ja arvioinnin, sekä tulevien tulosten arvioinnin. Työ toteutettiin käyttäen erilaisia analyysimenetelmiä, kuten kontribuutioanalyysiä, loogista päättelyä, prosessianalyysiä, sekä asettaen mahdollisia syy-seuraus-mekanismeja asiantuntijoiden ja sidosryhmien edustajien validoitavaksi.

Muutosteorioita sekä integroituja evaluointikriteereihin linkittyviä evaluointikysymysmatriiseja käyttäen evaluointitiimi kykeni arvioimaan erikseen (i) olivatko maaohjelmien (hankkeiden ja ohjelmien) saavutukset maaohjelmien

tavoitteiden mukaisia; ja (ii) mitkä ovat maaohjelmatoimintamallin toteutuneet ja mahdolliset vaikutukset näihin saavutuksiin.

Toinen maaohjelmatoimintamallin tarkastelu toteutettiin puolestaan kahdella eri tasolla. Tämä tarkastelu selvitti mitä vaikutuksia maaohjelmoinnilla on ollut hankeportfolion sisältöön ja toteutukseen, sekä mikä on ollut maaohjelmatoimintamallin relevanssi, vaikuttavuus, tehokkuus, ja kestävyys tulosperustaisen johtamisen menetelmänä.

Evaluointiprosessi ja –tulokset

Evaluointi toteutettiin syyskuun 2015 ja kesäkuun 2016 välisenä aikana. Prosessiin kuului sekä maakohtaisia, että globaalin tason työvaiheita. Molempien vaiheiden aineisto kerättiin, analysoitiin ja validoitiin maatasolla. Validointi toteutettiin kahden työseminaarissa; yhdellä maakohtaisella työseminaarilla Suomen lähetystön ja ulkoisten sidosryhmäedustajien kanssa sekä yhdellä työseminaarilla Helsingissä UM:n edustajien kanssa. Maakohtaiset evaluointiraportit on julkaistu erillisinä dokumentteina, joiden tiivistelmät löytyvät liitteestä 8. Globaalin tason työvaiheessa kerättiin maaohjelmatoimintamalliin liittyvää aineistoa, sekä koottiin yhteen maaohjelmien ja maaohjelmatoimintamallien evaluoinneista kerätty aineisto tätä raporttia varten. Maaohjelmatoimintamallin evaluoinnin alustavia tuloksia arvioitiin työseminaarissa Helsingissä maaliskuussa 2016. Tiivistelmä tuloksista, johtopäätöksistä sekä suosituksista verrattuna maaohjelmaevaluointiin esitellään tässä raportissa.

Maaohjelmien saavutukset

Evaluoinnissa havaittiin maaohjelmien tavoitteiden ja arvioitujen kehitysinterventioiden olevan pääosin relevantteja kaikissa kohdemaissa kumppanimaiden ja Suomen kehityspolitiikan tavoitteiden näkökulmasta. Yksittäisissä tapauksissa hankesuunnittelu ja valitut toteutusmallit eivät kuitenkaan olleet täysin relevantteja ottaen huomioon erityiskontekstit. Vietnamissa ja Sambiassa maaohjelmien suhteellisen kapea fokus ei tukenut tehokkaasti Suomen tavoitteita siirtyä perinteisestä bilateraalisesta hankeyhteistyöstä kohti uusia kumppanuusmalleja. Kuitenkin, joissain tapauksissa Suomen hankkeet ja toimenpiteet täydensivät toisiaan ja edistivät maaohjelman tavoitteita.

Maaohjelman toteutus sai aikaan tuloksia kaikissa kuudessa maassa. Hankkeiden toteutus ja loppuunsaattaminen kuitenkin viivästyivät usein, jolloin Suomen kehitysyhteistyöresurssien käyttö tehokkaasti ohjelmien mukaisesti heikkeni. Vaikka maksatukset yleisesti paranivat seuranta-ajan kuluessa, budjetointi ei kunnolla reagoinut toimintaympäristöön, institutionaalisiin tai operatiivisiin maksatusta viivästyttäviin riskeihin. Joissain tapauksissa tämä johti jopa siihen, että interventiot eivät tuottaneet kaikkia suunniteltuja tuloksia, vaikka maksatukset toteutuivat.

Suomen panos politiikkavaikuttamisen puolella auttoi osaltaan monin paikoin Suomen maaohjelmien hankkeita ja ohjelmia saavuttamaan maaohjelmien tavoitteet. Tämä panos pitää sisällään muun muassa rahoituksen koordinoinnin, osallistumisen politiikkadialogiin eri sektorifoorumeilla, tai menestyksekkäiden pilottihankkeiden esilletuonnin ja kopioinnin. Politiikkavaikuttaminen ja koordinointi ovat siis näin edistäneet selvästi maaohjelmi-

en vaikuttavuutta. Evaluoinnissa ei löydetty näyttöä siitä, että maaohjelmien myötä johdonmukaisuus (sisäinen ja ulkoinen) ja täydentävyys maaohjelmaportfolion ja ei-maaohjelmakehitysyhteistyö-instrumenttien kanssa olisi selkeästi edistänyt kehitysyhteistyön vaikuttavuutta.

Saavutetut tulokset eivät olleet järjestelmällisesti kestäviä. Yli puolet kaikkien maiden maaohjelmainterventioista toteutettiin suorana teknisen avun hankkeina, Suomen maatiimit pyrkivät edistämään hankkeiden paikallista omistusta. Tämä oli usein menestyksekästä riippuen kuitenkin maasta ja sektorista. Kumppanimaiden institutionaalinen ja rahoituskapasiteetti vaikuttivat usein hankkeiden kestävyyteen. Maaohjelmat sisälsivät kuitenkin myös merkittäviä menestystarinoita, joissa paikalliset instituutiot, mukaan lukien hallitus, olivat ottaneet Suomen tukeman hankkeen tai ohjelman omakseen ja kehittäneet sitä edelleen.

Maaohjelmatoimintamallin saavutukset

Maaohjelmatoimintamalli on erittäin tärkeä UM:lle, etenkin ministeriön tavoitteiden näkökulmasta. Sen lisäksi, että se mahdollistaa ministeriötä saavuttamaan vuoden 2012 kehityspoliittisen ohjelman sitoumuksen vahvistaa maaohjelmointia tulosperusteisella lähestymistavalla, maaohjelmatoimintamalli on tarkoitettu myös parantamaan maakohtaisia valintoja tehden niistä yhtenäisempiä, strategisempia ja tulosperusteisempia. Ottaen huomioon pienenevän kehitysapubudjetin (maaohjelmien hankeportfolion yhteenlaskettu budjetti kaikkien kuuden maan osalta laski noin 40 prosenttia vuosien 2013 ja 2015 välillä), mahdollisuus tehdä parempia valintoja saatavissa olevilla varoilla on ministeriölle erittäin tärkeää ja hyödyllistä.

Koska maaohjelmatoimintamalli keskittyi kahdenvälisten kumppanimaiden kehitysyhteistyöhön, se ei ollut täysin relevantti maissa, kuten Vietnam ja Sambia, joissa ollaan siirtymässä muunlaiseen, esim. kaupalliseen yhteistyöhön. Maaohjelmatoimintamallin rajoittuminen vain osaan (vaikka hyvin tärkeään) UM:n kehitysyhteistyötä, merkitsee että se ei kyennyt tehokkaasti vaikuttamaan johdonmukaisuuteen ja täydentävyyteen ministeriön muiden kuin bilateraalisten kehitysapuinstrumenttien kanssa. Näin malli ei ole voinut tehokkaasti hyödyntää synergiaetuja ja parempia vaihtoehtoja.

Maaevaluointitiimit havaitsivat, että uudella maaohjelmoinnin mallilla ei vielä ole ollut suurta vaikusta maiden hankeportfolioihin. Maaohjelmoinnin muutosteoriassa tämä puute sijoittuu tulosketjun loppupäähän, missä tilivelvollisuus ja oppiminen tulosperusteisista maaohjelmoinnin prosesseista antavat tietoa ja palautetta maaohjelmien parantamiseksi. Maaohjelmien suunnittelussa keskeistä strategista päätöksentekoa – eli uusien strategisten interventioiden ja toteutustapojen valintaa – ei voitu pääosin hyödyntää, koska monet hankkeet olivat jo käynnissä. Kerätty aineisto antaa kuitenkin ymmärtää, että toinen vaikutusväylä – käynnissä olevan hankeportfolion parempi tulosjohtaminen – on validi. Maaohjelmoinnin muutosteorian kaksi varhaisempaa vaihetta toimivat ja lisäävät tilivelvollisuutta. Nämä ovat maakohtainen maaohjelmaraportointi sekä ministeriötason maaohjelmaprosessit ja palautteen keruu. Maakohtaiset evaluointiraportit sekä globaali kenttätyö tuottivat todisteita siitä, että nämä maaohjelmatoimintamallin prosessit saavat aikaan stra-

tegista reflektointia maa- ja sektoritason tuloksellisuudesta vähintään kerran vuodessa (mikä on enemmän kuin aiemmin). Tämä puolestaan auttaa päätöksentekijöitä sektoreiden ja kehitysinterventioiden vaikuttavuuden ja tehokkuuden parantamisessa.

Evaluoinnissa havaittiin, että tällä tavoin maaohjelmoinnin prosessit ovat jo terävöittäneet maaohjelmien hankeportfolioiden relevanssia, yhtenäisyyttä ja vaikuttavuutta. Reflektoinnin mahdollisuutta arvostetaan myös koko ministeriön tasolla, mutta erityisesti maatiimeissä.

On kuitenkin myös näyttöä siitä, että joskus syntyy päinvastaisia seurauksia. Tällöin tehdään päätöksiä, jotka vaikuttavat negatiivisesti hankeportfolion suorituskykyyn, vaikka maaohjelmatoimintamallin prosessien olisi pitänyt tuottaa tieto siitä, että kyseinen päätös on väärin. Prosessianalyysi osoitti myös, että kaikkia havaittuja positiivisesti vaikuttaneita päätöksiä ei voida puhtaasti linkittää maaohjelmoinnin prosesseihin liittyviksi päätöksiksi.

Aukot tulevat selvästi esiin verrattaessa aineistoa maaohjelmatoimintamallin tulosketjun kanssa:

Ensimmäiseksi, käytössä ollut strateginen suunnittelumalli ei ollut täysin maiden hankeportfolioiden strategista hallinnointia edistävä. Se aiheutti tulosketjun, joka oli liian pitkä antaakseen hyödyllistä tulosperusteista tietoa. Loogisen viitekehyksen lähestymistapa ei tee selväksi, kuinka yhden tason tulokset siirtyvät toiseen, kuinka Suomi voi vaikuttaa tähän, ja mitkä ovat riskit. Suunnittelumalli asetti myös analyysin ja tulosten seurannan laajuuden liian kapeaksi, jotta voitaisiin hyödyntää hyvin kehitysyhteistyöresurssien täydentävyyttä ja edistää johdonmukaisuutta ei-kehitysapuinterventioiden kanssa kumppanimaissa.

Toiseksi, käytännön tasolla indikaattoreiden valinta, vakaus, ja tiedon saatavuus aiheuttivat vaikeuksia seurannalle. Yhdenmukaisesti maatiimit mainitsivat, että heillä oli vaikeuksia raportoida tuloksista valittujen indikaattoreiden mukaisesti. Tämä johtui osittain siitä, että maatiimien osaaminen tulosperusteisessa johtamisessa ei ollut vielä riittävän vahvaa.

Kolmanneksi, heikko linkki strategisen suunnittelun ja UM:n budjettiprosessien välillä tarkoitti sitä, että strategiaprosessit eivät vaikuttaneet riittävästi kehitysyhteistyön budjettisuunnitteluun ja resurssien allokoimiseen. Tämän johdosta menetettiin mahdollisuuksia tulosperustaisen johtamisen vahvistamiseen esimerkiksi maaohjelmatoimintamallin avulla.

Viimeiseksi, heikot tulosperustaiset prosessit koko UM:ssä yleensä aiheuttivat sen, että tietoa ja oppimista strategiaprosesseista ei ole vielä käytetty parhaalla mahdollisella tavalla kehityspolitiikan hallinnoinnin kehittämisessä. Tämä mahdollisti maaohjelmia koskevan päätöksenteon ilman, että huomioitiin maaohjelmatoimintamallin kautta opittuja asioita.

Koska UM:n maatason tulosperustainen johtaminen on relevantti ja lupaava lähestymistapa evaluoinnin perusteella, on suositeltavaa, että sitä jatketaan. Mallia tulee kuitenkin kehittää edelleen ja laajentaa, huomioiden eri instrumenttien ominaispiirteet. Tuloksien asettamiseen ja saavuttamiseen käytetyn strategiamallin tulee ottaa käyttöön lyhyemmät tulosketjut sekä identifioida selvät

vaikutuskanavat Suomen kehityspanoksille ja politiikkavaikuttamiselle tässä ketjussa. Mallin prosessit tulee myös yhtenäistää budjetointiprosessien kanssa. Lisäksi Suomen tulee investoida tulosperustaisen johtamistaidon kehittämiseen ministeriössä mukaan lukien maatiimit.

Tärkeimmät tulokset, johtopäätökset ja suositukset

Tulokset	Johtopäätökset	Suositukset
Tulosperustainen maaohjelmointi ja -raportointi, eli ns. maaohjelmatoimintamalli – mahdollistaa Ulkoministeriön tulosten seurannan ja systemaattisemman kehitysyhteistyön sisäisen sekä sidosryhmäraportoinnin. Se tarjoaa keinon keskittyä maaohjelmointiin vähentäen sirpaleisuutta ja parantaen johdonmukaista toimintaa kohti yhteistä tavoitetta, ja sekä tehdä strategisia päätöksiä siitä mitä, miten ja miksi tarttua rajoitettuun määrään maakohtaisia kehitystavoitteita tilanteessa, jossa yhteistyömäärärahat vähenevät. Se mahdollistaa vahvemman UM:n sisäisen keskustelun toiminnan tuloksellisuudesta sektoreiden välillä tilanteessa, jossa henkilöstö työskentelee usein siiloissaan.	**1. Tulosperustainen johtamistyökalu (RBM) maatasolla on erittäin relevantti UM:lle tilanteessa, jossa vaaditaan kehitystuloksia budjettien pienentyessä.** Vaihtoehto – kehitysyhteistyön toteuttaminen kumppanimaissa ilman RBM-työkalua saattaisi aiheuttaa sirpaleisuuden palaamisen ja tehottomampaa, ja heikosti valvottua kehitysyhteistyön toteutusta.	**1. UM:n tulisi jatkaa tulosperustaisen järjestelmän/tuloskehikon käyttöä kehitysyhteistyön suunnittelussa ja johtamisessa kumppanimaissa.**

Tulokset	Johtopäätökset	Suositukset
Maaohjelmatoimintamalli esittää pitkän ja monivaiheisen tulosketjun toimenpiteistä maan kehitystavoitteen saavuttamiseen. Tulosten raportointi ja seuranta ylätasolla rajoittavat hyötyjä Suomen kehitysyhteistyöstä oppimisen ja tilivelvollisuuden suhteen. Tarkoituksenmukaisia indikaattoreita on vaikea suunnitella; ne ovat joko liian abstrakteja/kaukana Suomen toimenpiteistä, tai aikaan sidottua data on vaikea saada. Kokemukset muiden rahoittajien kanssa osoittavat, että yksinkertaisemmat puitteet ovat parempia tuloksellisille tulosjohtamisjärjestelmille. Se, miten tulostavoitteet määritellään maaohjelmatoimintamallissa, ei sinänsä aseta tulostavoitteita poliittiselle vaikuttamiselle. Politiikkavaikuttaminen on kuitenkin tärkeä osatekijä sille, että Suomi saavuttaa rahoitusosuuteensa nähden suhteettoman hyviä tuloksia. Heikko riskien hallinta aiheuttaa ohjelmien ja hankkeiden suhteen viiveitä ja leikkauksia, jotka tekevät ohjelmista tehottomia. Maaohjelmatoimintamalli ei ole parantanut tätä, erityisesti kun riskien arviointi ja niiden analyysi maaohjelmissa on pintapuolista, eikä niistä raportoida. Maaohjelmointi keskittyy strategiseen suunnitteluun tulevalle neljän vuoden jaksolle, mikä saattaa olla liian vähän ottaen huomioon, että jo tehdyt sitoumukset jättävät rajoitetusti varaa strategisemmille valinnoille. Tämä on erityisesti rajoittava tekijä silloin, kun kumppanimailla on pitkäaikaisia tavoitteita saavutettavanaan, kuten maissa, joissa Suomi on siirtymässä kumppanuuden uusiin muotoihin (Vietnam ja Sambia).	2. **Nykyinen tulosperustainen maaohjelmointi ja -raportointimalli ei sovellu kaikilta osiltaan UM:lle eikä paikoin myöskään maatason RBM:n tarkoituksiin.** • **Tuloskehikon ylemmät tasot ovat abstrakteja Suomen varsinaisiin toimenpiteisiin nähden.** • Loogisen mallin käyttö työkaluna tarkoittaa sitä, **ettei maaohjelma kuvaa vaikutuspolkuja, jotka johtavat tulosketjun tasolta toiselle,** erityisesti Suomen toimenpiteiden välittömien tulosten tasolta ketjun seuraavalle tasolle. Tämä tarkoittaa sitä, ettei ole kannustimia strategioille parantaa Suomen toimenpiteiden tuloksellisuutta. • **Maaohjelmatoimintamalli ei ole myötävaikuttanut parantuneeseen riskien hallintaan** ja se on itse asiassa vähentänyt riskienhallinnan tehokkuutta maaohjelmissa maastrategioiden heikon riskianalyysin vuoksi. • **Maaohjelmatoimintamalli ei suhteuta maaohjelmia** Suomen sitoumusten **pitkän aikavälin näkemykseen** kumppanimaassa, vaan asettaa horisontin tuloskehyksen neljän vuoden aikajänteeseen.	2. **UM:n tulisi uudistaa osittain maaohjelmatoimintamallin rakenne ja se, miten sitä käytetään** tuottamaan lisäarvoa Suomen kumppanimaaohjelmoinnin suunnitteluun ja johtamiseen. Tämä sisältäisi: • **siirtymisen muutosteorialähestymistapaan,** jotta saataisiin paremmin tuotua esiin poliittisen vaikuttamisen tuoma lisäarvo ja varmistettua, että valvonta ja raportointi myös sisältävät tämän ulottuvuuden. • **maaohjelman muutosteorian toivottujen tulosten asettamisen lähemmäs Suomen toimenpiteitä ja mitattavien tasojen yksinkertaistamisen.** Samalla tulisi tuoda esiin täsmällisemmin, miten Suomen toimenpiteiden välittömät tulokset johtavat toisiin tuloksiin (lisäarvo-oletusten avulla) sekä mitkä ovat tulosketjun taustaolettamukset ja riskit. • **sen selventämisen, miksi tuloksia kullakin tasolla valvotaan,** mukaan lukien keskittymisen maaohjelman tulosketjun alempien tasojen johtamiseen; sekä sen selventämisen, että valvonnan muutos korkeammilla tasoilla tähtää sen todentamiseen, että lyhytaikaiset toimenpiteet ovat linjassa pitkän aikavälin tavoitteiden kanssa. Lisäksi johtajia muistutetaan tarkistamaan, että oletukset siitä, miten Suomen panokset myötävaikuttavat laajempaan kehitysponnistukseen, ovat edelleen voimassa; • **seuraavan neljän vuoden toivottujen tulosten suhteuttamisen pitempiaikaiseen julkilausumaan** Suomen kehitysyhteistyön suunnasta, sekä kehitysyhteistyön, että muun toiminnan osalta.

Tulokset	Johtopäätökset	Suositukset
Maaohjelmatoimintamalli kattaa vain osan kahdenvälisistä kehitysapuvirroista kumppanimaihin. Näin ollen UM ei voi täysin keskittyä johdonmukaisempaan maaohjelmointiin, joka täydentäisi Suomen sitoumuksia kautta linjan, mikä taas olisi oleellista viimeaikaisten budjettileikkausten valossa. Maissa, joissa Suomi on siirtymässä kumppanuuden uusiin muotoihin, tämä rajaus "pakotti" maaohjelman keskittymään "traditionaalisiin" kehitysyhteistyön muotoihin ja tuloksiin. Maastrategiamallin tehokkuus ja kestävyys ovat myös kärsineet sen rajallisuudesta. Maaohjelmatoimintamallin laajuus ensimmäiselle ohjelmakierrokselle oli tarkoituksenmukainen, ottaen huomioon tulosjohtamiseen käytettävissä olevan kapasiteetin. Tämä piti maastrategiamallin suhteellisen yksinkertaisena. Maastrategiamallin laajentaminen tulee tuottamaan vaikeuksia johtamisessa, varsinkin kun vastuu eri kehitysyhteistyön instrumenteista on eri osastoilla ja yksiköissä; ei pelkästään alueosastoilla. Kysyntäperusteisiä Suomen kehitysyhteistyön instrumentteja ei voi täysin ohjelmoida. Jotkut, kuten esimerkiksi kansalaisjärjestöjen tuki, ovat perinteisesti liittyneet kansalaisjärjestöjen riippumattomiin omiin toimiin. Jotkut kansalaisjärjestöt ovat kuitenkin valmiita mukautumaan, erityisesti maatasolla. Suomi on tunnettu keskustelutaidoistaan ja sillä on paljon kokemusta muiden rahoittajien kanssa koordinoiduista ohjelmista maatasolla. Joidenkin muiden rahoittajien tulosjohtamiseen perustuva maaohjelmointi on kypsynyt lähetystö-/ maatason työkaluksi.	**3. Maaohjelmatoimintamallin rajaus vaikuttaa sen relevanttiuteen, tuloksellisuuteen, tehokkuuteen ja kestävyyteen negatiivisesti.** Rajaus ei ole edistänyt Suomen kehitysyhteistyö- ja muiden resurssisen ja toimenpiteiden käyttöä johdonmukaisesti ja toisiaan täydentävästi maatasolla. Maaohjelmatoimintamallin rajaus ensimmäisellä maaohjelmakierroksella oli tarkoituksenmukainen käytettävissä oleviin henkilöresursseihin nähden. Seuraavassa vaiheessa maaohjelmatoimintamallia tulisi laajentaa huolella, niin ettei sitä rasitettaisi liikaa yhteisen suunnittelun ja johtamisen aiheuttamilla korkeammilla transaktiokustannuksilla, varsinkin kun tulosperustaisen johtamisen kysyntä UM:ssä on vielä vähäistä.	**3. Maaohjelmatoimintamallin rajaus tulisi laajentaa kattamaan myös muita Suomen kehitysyhteistyön instrumentteja, mutta se tulisi tehdä huolella.** UM:n tulisi arvioida kahdenväliset instrumentit yksi kerrallaan sen mukaan, miten ne tulisi ottaa mukaan. Maaohjelmatoimintamallin laajentamisen tulisi kattaa vähintään institutionaalisen yhteistyön ja paikallisen yhteistyön määrärahojen tehokkaamman käytön. Lisäksi, maaohjelman toisen tason tulisi sisältää prosesseja, sääntöjä ja tiedonsaantivälineitä sen varmistamiseksi, että maaohjelma kattaa kaikki Suomen kahdenvälisen kehitysyhteistyön ja yksityissektorin instrumentit. Tähän kuuluu myös keskustelu Suomen rahoittamien kansalaisjärjestöjen kanssa maatasolla sekä maaohjelman laatimisen sekä vuosiraportoinnin yhteydessä. Maissa, joissa on merkittävää potentiaalia saavuttaa yhteisiä tuloksia, jotta toimen kustannukset/ transaktiokustannukset voidaan perustella, UM:n tulisi testata tapoja, joiden avulla kiinnostuneita Suomen rahoittamia avainkansalaisjärjestöjä kohdeltaisiin maaohjelman tavoitetasolla kehitysyhteistyön kumppaneina.

Tulokset	Johtopäätökset	Suositukset
Maaohjelmoinnin raportointiprosessit maatasolla – maatiimien sisällä ja maatiimeistä alueellisille osastoille ja yksiköille – toimivat hyvin. Maaohjelmatoimintamalli liittyy keskeisesti tulosjohtamisen parantumiseen.	4. UM **on onnistunut ottamaan käyttöön tehokkaita maaohjelmoinnin raportointiprosesseja,** jotka ovat tarpeeksi kevyitä. UM ei kuitenkaan ole täysin onnistunut hyödyntämään näiden maaprosessien arvoa kehityspoliittisen oppimisen ja tilivelvollisuuden näkökulmasta.	4. Tehokas maatason ohjelmointiprosessi tulisi nostaa eri maat kattavaksi oppimisprosessiksi **parantamalla synteesiraportteja sisällyttämällä niihin systemaattisen valvonnan ja analyysin sekä säännöllisen maidenvälisen ohjelmoinnin ja johtamisen arvioinnin.**
Maaohjelmatoimintamallin arviointiprosessit toimivat myös hyvin.	Nykyiset prosessit, joissa otetaan käyttöön **maaohjelmatoimintamallin tuottamaa tietoa käyttävä tulosraportointi, ovat edistystä** ja tukevat maaohjelmointia, mutta eivät riittäne ylläpitämään sitä pitkällä aikavälillä.	Esimerkkejä näistä voisivat olla tieto siitä, mitkä yhteistyömuodot toimivat missäkin olosuhteissa; yleisimpien strategisten riskien määrittely maaohjelmoinnissa – milloin ne esiintyvät ja miten niitä voidaan pienentää; sekä tietoa tehokkaista lisäarvon tuottamisstrategioista, jotta Suomen tuki maiden omille kehityspyrkimyksille voidaan optimoida.
Sen sijaan raportoinnissa alueellisilta yksiköiltä kehityspoliittiselle ohjausryhmälle on kehitettävää. Kyselyihin vastanneet tunnustavat vaiheen tärkeyden, mutta eivät uskoneet sen tuottavan lisäarvoa. Syynä saattaa olla ylimmän johdon vähäinen kiinnostus maastrategiamalliin ja tulosjohtamiseen. UM:n laajuinen tulosjohtaminen ei ole suoraan tukenut maastrategiamallin tuloksellisuutta maaohjelmien aikana.	Maaohjelmatoimintamallin prosessit ja sen tuottama tieto tarjoavat mahdollisuuksia epäsuoran tiedon saamiseksi eri maista siitä, mikä toimii ja mikä ei toimi suomalaisessa kehitysyhteistyössä. Tämä tieto tulisi saada näkyväksi ja käyttöön systemaattisemmin.	Tämä kaikki täydentäisi maaohjelmatoimintamallin arvoa organisaation tulosraportoinnille ja auttaa luomaan tuloskulttuuria.
Maaohjelmista saatavaa tietoa ei käytetä tehokkaasti tulosjohtamisessa alueellisten yksiköiden ulkopuolella, vaikka ohjelmista raportoidaankin kehityspoliittiselle ohjausryhmälle. Synteesiraportit ovat kiitettävän lyhyitä ja kiinnostavia, mutta niiden käyttötarkoitus on rajattu.		
Kokemukset muilta rahoittajilta osoittavat organisaation tuloskulttuurin merkityksen sekä selkeiden institutionaalisten vaikutuskanavien, joiden avulla maaohjelmien tuloksia voidaan käyttää oppimiseen ja tulosvastuullisuuden osoittamiseen tärkeyden.		
Nykyiset prosessit organisaation raportoinnin saattamiseksi tulosperustaiseksi (varsinaisen organisaation tuloskehikon sijaan) edustavat neuvoteltua kompromissia tulosjohtamisen vahvistamisen seuraavaksi askeleeksi.		

Tulokset	Johtopäätökset	Suositukset
Maaohjelmatoimintamalli kehitettiin UM:n sisäiseksi tulosperustaiseksi suunnittelu- ja johtamistyökaluksi. Tämä on tarkoituksenmukaista tulosjohtamisen näkökulmasta. Maa-ohjelmoinnin prosessit olivat sisäisiä, eivätkä ne painottaneet maatason konsultointeja. Tämä rajoitti maaoh-jelmatyökalun kykyä testata maa-ohjelmien tavoitteiden sopivuutta (relevanttiutta) kumppanimaille ja muille rahoittajille; selvittää, ovatko maaohjelmien alla toteutettavien hankkeiden taustaolettamukset edelleen päteviä; ja kerätä näkemyk-siä siitä, miten Suomi voi parhaiten käyttää resurssinsa tukemaan kump-panimaiden omia tulostavoitteita. Tämä rajoitti myös kykyä tuottaa maaohjelmia, jotka tehostavat maaohjelman toimenpiteitä parem-man koordinoinnin ja omistajuuden ansiosta, koska maatason sidosryh-mät eivät tienneet maaohjelmista tai niiden sisältö oli tuntematon.	**5. Maaohjelmien laatimisprosessi aliarvioi maatason konsultaa-tioiden arvon** Suomen tukitoi-menpiteiden laadun ja tulosten parantamisessa.	**5. Tulevaisuudessa maaohjelmien laatimisprosessin tulisi sisältää hyvin jäsenneltyjä maatason konsultaatioita paikallisten sidosryhmien kanssa,** mukaan lukien hallituksen edustajat ja kehityskumppanit. Nämä tulisi suunnitella ja esitellä konsultaatioina, ja näin ollen selvästi erillisinä maatason neuvotteluista. Konsultaatioiden tulisi keskittyä Suomen suunniteltuihin maatason kehitystulosalueisiin ja -tavoitteisiin, sekä keinoihin, joilla nämä voidaan parhaiten saavuttaa, ottaen huomi-oon Suomen suhteellisen edun ja kunkin maan taustatekijät.

Tulokset	Johtopäätökset	Suositukset
Maatiimit ovat pieniä, eikä niissä aina ole tulosjohtamistaitoja. Lisäksi, henkilöstöllä on suuri vaihtuvuus. Kehitysyhteistyön virkoja ei nähdä uraa edistävinä, eikä niistä makseta hyvin suhteessa vastuisiin vastuuvirkamiesten ja tiimin vetäjien tasolla. Maatiimien avainvirkojen miehitys on tärkeää maaohjelmoinnin tuloksellisuuden kannalta. Maaohjelmoinnin käyttöönoton yhteydessä tarjottiin vähän koulutusta. Kuitenkin molemmat alueelliset yksiköt ovat sen jälkeen tarjonneet tulosjohtamisen koulutustilaisuuksia. Tulostavoitteiden määrittelyn, indikaattoreiden valinnan ja tulosten hyödyntämisen maaohjelmoinnissa tuloksellisuuden laatu vaihtelee. Vuoden 2016 budjettileikkaukset vähentävät todennäköisesti henkilöstön määrää maatiimeissä. UM:ssä ei ole varsinaista yksikköä, jonka vastuulla tulosjohtaminen olisi, vaikka siellä onkin yksi tulosjohtamisen neuvonantaja. Pieni, epävirallinen maaohjelmatyöryhmä vastasi mallin suunnittelusta ja käyttöönotosta. Muut rahoittajat ovat määritelleet koulutusbudjetteja tai kehittäneet vertaisoppimis- tai tukimekanismeja tulosjohtamisen henkilöstöresurssien kehittämiseen ja ylläpitoon.	**6. Vaikkakin edistystä on tapahtunut, tulosjohtamisen ja maaohjelmoinnin henkilöresurssit UM:ssä ovat rajalliset, eikä tarpeeksi ole tehty näiden taitojen parantamiseksi/tämän osaamisen lisäämiseksi.** Tämä vaikuttaa tulostavoitteiden laatuun sekä indikaattoreiden valintaan ja rajoittaa tuloksellisuutta, jonka avulla kumppanimaat voivat käyttää tulostietoja Suomen kehitysyhteistyön parantamiseen. Tulosjohtamisen käyttöönotto maaohjelmien johtamisessa tarkoittaa sitä, että vastaavilla viranomaisilla, tiimien vetäjillä ja kehitysneuvonantajilla on määräävä rooli UM:n kyvyssä raportoida systemaattisesti, oikein ja relevantisti verorahojen käytöstä.	**6. UM:n tulisi ryhtyä päättäväisiin toimiin tulosjohtamisen henkilöstöresurssien vahvistamiseksi.** Tämä sisältää: • **tulosjohtamisen vertaisoppimisverkoston perustamisen. Verkosto auttaa tukemaan henkilöstöresurssien kehittämistä tulosjohtamisessa ja maaohjelmoinnissa.** Tällaisen verkoston ydin on jo olemassa ministeriössä. Verkoston tulisi rakentua jo toteutetulle tulosjohtamisen koulutukselle, joka voitaisiin muokata vertaisoppimistapahtumiksi. Jatkuva tiedonvaihto maatiimien henkilöstön välillä, tukee henkilöstöresurssien heikkoudesta eroon pääsyä. Maatiimit kamppailevat tarkoituksenmukaisten tavoitteiden ja hyvien indikaattoreiden laatimisen kanssa. • **maatiimien avainvirkojen parantaminen,** jotta saataisiin palkattua useammin ja pidemmäksi aikaa päteviä henkilöresursseja.

Tulokset	Johtopäätökset	Suositukset
Maaohjelmoinnin yhteyttä budjetointiprosesseihin ei ole riittävän hyvin tuotu esiin, joten maaohjelmointi ei lopulta toimi hyvin suunnittelutyökaluna. Budjetointiprosessit käydään läpi kahdesti vuodessa, ja ne vaikuttavat päätöksiin projekteista. Niitä ei ole kuitenkaan riittävän hyvin tuotu esiin maaohjelmien arviointiprosesseissa, minkä tuloksena tietyn kumppanimaan hankebudjettipäätökset, joihin maaohjelma jälkikäteen sovitetaan, heikentävät sen käyttöä strategisena työkaluna. Maaohjelman ja suurlähettilään suunnitelman välistä yhteyttä ei myöskään ole tuotu esiin riittävästi, mikä rajoittaa maaohjelman mahdollisuuksia myötävaikuttaa ulkoiseen johdonmukaisuuteen. Maaohjelmoinnin, hankkeiden arviointien ja evaluointien väliset yhteydet eivät myöskään toimi hyvin. Vain harvat arvioinnit ja evaluoinnit on nimenomaisesti tehty maaohjelmoinnin tavoitteiden mukaisesti, eikä arviointien ja evaluointien tuloksia oteta tarpeeksi huomioon maaohjelmien arviointiprosesseissa.	**7. Maaohjelmatoimintamalli toimii liikaa erillisenä prosessina,** vaikka maita koskevaa kehitysyhteistyön suunnittelua, hallinnointia ja seurantaa tehdään UM:n muidenkin instrumenttien toimesta. Sen toiminta strategisena instrumenttina parantuisi, jos yhteys muiden suunnittelu- ja budjetointisysteemien, suurlähettilään suunnitelman, hankkeiden arviointien ja evaluointien kanssa olisi tuotu esiin selvästi.	**7. Maaohjelmatyöryhmän tulisi tarkistaa vuosittaisen arviointiprosessin aikataulu ja koordinoida se paremmin UM:n budjetti/budjetointiprosessin kanssa.** Samoin tulisi varmistaa maaohjelmoinnin koordinointi suurlähettilään suunnitelman ja arviointien, tarkastelujen ja evaluointien. Toisaalta, näiden instrumenttien ohjeistuksen ja eri maatason evaluointien ja esimerkin hankearviointien tulisi varmistaa, ne käyttävät maaohjelmaa yhtenä keskeisenä viitekehyksenä.

SAMMANFATTNING

Utrikesministeriet (UM) införde 2012 sitt landprogram modalitet (LPM) för att leda ministeriets egna programmerade interventioner inom utvecklingssamarbetet i de långsiktiga partnerländerna. LPM är ett ramverk för resultat-baserad strategiplanering och ledning, som introducerades i samband med 2012 års Utvecklingssamarbetsprogram, för att förstärka ett resultat-baserat synsätt för programmeringen i partnerländerna.

Målsättning med utvärderingen

Utvärderingens målsättning är att ge bevisbaserad information och praktiska riktlinjer för hur förbättra ett resultat-baserat synsätt i landprogrammeringen, samt kvaliteten vid genomförandet Finlands utvecklingspolitik i partnerländerna. Mot denna bakgrund utvärderar evalueringen (i) framgången av utvecklingssamarbetsprojekten och -programmen som styrts medelst dessa strategier (landprogramportföljerna) i Etiopien, Moçambique, Nepal, Tanzania, Vietnam och Zambia mellan åren 2008 och 2015; samt (ii) landprogram instrument som ett ramverk för resultat-baserad strategiplanering och ledning på landnivå. En lätt översikt av landprogram modaliteten genomfördes i Kenya, Finlands sjunde partnerland, för att samla in ytterligare evidens för utvärderingen av LPM.

Metodologi

I verkligheten kunde inte LPM inverka alltför mycket på landprogrammens projekt och programportföljer mellan 2013 och 2015, eftersom en stor del av åtgärderna och förfaranden varit fastställda redan före introduktionen av modaliteten. Detta utgjorde en utmaning för utvärderingen av LPM. Samtidigt var tidshorisonten kort efter det att landprogrammen introducerades, landprogrammens resultatkedjor var långa och tillgänglighet av verifierbardata och statistiskt data på resultaten bristfälliga. Dessutom, med tanke på volymen av Finlands interventioner i förhållande till målsatta resultat, var det en utmaning att kunna tillhandahålla bevis-baserad information och praktiska riktlinjer för hur väl implementeringen av landprogrammens projekt-och programportfölj fungerat. För att ta hänsyn till dessa utmaningar utvecklades under utvärderingen en integrerad teori för förändring omfattande två separata, men sinsemellan sammankopplade förändringsteorier. Den ena användes för att validera resultatkedjorna i landprogrammens logiska modeller, den andra för att utvärdera hur väl LPM fungerar som ett resultatbaserat styrinstrument.

Användandet av ett teori-baserat synsätt visade sig vara lämpligt för evalueringen. Ett teoribaserat närmande ger möjligheten att identifiera och sen utvärdera resultat från tidigare element i resultatkedjan, samt för utvärdering av sannolikheten för fortsatta resultat, via en blandning av olika analysmetoder. Detta inkluderar även bidragsanalys, logiska resonemang och processanalys, samt utstakande av godtagbara kausala mekanismer som sen kan användas vid validering av experter och för feedback från intressegrupper.

Genom att använda evalueringens utvecklade förändringsteorier tillsammans med en matris av frågor för utvärderingen länkat till evalueringskriterierna, samt mera detaljerade kriterier för varje enskild fråga, kunde evalueringsteamet fokusera på två faktorer separat. Dessa var (i) huruvida landprogrammens projekt- och programportfölj presterade i enlighet med givna målsättningar och förväntade resultat och (ii) hur landprogrammens portfölj och LPM medverkade till denna prestation. Den senare fokuseringen var i sin tur i två nivåer; i) den inverkan som introduceringen av LPM redan har åstadkommit på innehåll och implementering av landprogrammens portföljer och ii) relevansen, effektiviteten och uthålligheten av LPM som en resultat-baserad metodologi för att leda och styra landprogrammens portföljer.

Utvärderingen – processer och resultat

Utvärderingen genomfördes under perioden september 2015 och juni 2016. Den omfattade verksamhet på lands- och globalnivå. Evidensen för bägge komponenter i evalueringen insamlades, analyserades och validerades på landnivå. Valideringen utfördes under två workshops, en per varje land med UM:s ambassadspersonal och intressegrupper, samt en annan workshop i Helsingfors med UM:s personal. Evalueringsrapporterna på landnivå publicerades som separata dokument, sammanfattningarna återfinns i Bilaga 8. Evalueringen på globalnivå samlade in evidens på LPM global nivå, och sammanställde alla evidens om utvärderingen av landstrategierna och LPM för denna rapport. En valideringsworkshop för LPM hölls i Helsingfors. Sammanfattningen av observationerna, slutsatserna och rekommendationerna av LPM utvärderingen är inkluderade i denna rapport.

Landprogramportföljens prestanda

Evalueringen fann att landprogrammens målsättningar och de utvärderade interventionerna var relevant för partnerländerna och målsättningarna för Finlands utvecklingssamarbete. I vissa fall fann utvärderingen att designen av interventionerna och val av modalitet inte var helt relevanta. Evalueringen fann även att landprogrammens fokus i Vietnam och Zambia var för snäva för att övergå till andra form av utvecklingssamarbete baserad på partnerskapmodeller i dessa länder. Ibland drev Finlands noggranna val av kompletterande interventioner eller målsättningar i riktning mot resultat och landprogrammens målsättningar.

Många implementerade interventioner i de sex länderna har åstadkommit resultat. Genomförandet var dock ofta fördröjt, vilket ledde till att allokeringen av de finska resurserna för implementering av programmen inte var helt optimala för att producera resultat inom utsatt tid. Trots att utbetalningstakten förbättrades under perioden, budgeteringsrutinerna inte beaktade sakligt den för sammanhanget, institutionella och programspecifika risken som fördröjer utbetalningarna. För en del interventioner åstadkom dessa risker att resultat inte åstadkom trots det att utbetalningarna genomfördes.

Finlands insatser på politisk nivå, koordination med andra bidragsgivare, politisk dialog via olika sektorforum har i många fall bidragit till hur landprogrammens målsättningar uppnåtts. Utveckling av framgångsrika prototyper

och förmåga att få samarbetsländerna att etablera dem har även haft en positiv inverkan vad det gäller uppnåendet av landstrategiernas målsättningar. Politiskt inflytandet och koordineringen är därför starka bidragande faktorer till landprogramportföljernas effektivitet och inflytande. Utvärderingarna fann mindre belägg för det att enhetlighet (såväl intern som extern) eller komplementär samverkan mellan Finlands icke-landprogramkopplade utvecklingsinstrument skulle ha bidragit till effektiviteten av landprogrammens implementering och uppnåendet av dess målsättningar.

Evalueringen fann att de uppnådda resultaten inte var genomgående uthålliga. Trots att man förlitade t sig på direkt implementering, i mer än hälften av landprogrammens interventioner över länderna, satsade Finlands landsteam samtidigt på att bygga upp partnerlandets känsla av äganderätt. Detta var mer eller mindre framgångsrikt, beroende av land- och sektorsammanhang. Den institutionella- och finansiella kapaciteten hos samarbetslandet var ofta en faktor som påverkade uthålligheten. uthållighetsfaktor. I de fall där finska utvecklingssamarbetets interventioner upptogs av lokala institutioner åstadkoms anmärkningsvärda framgångar.

Prestandan av LPM

LPM är ett synnerligen relevant instrument för UM, i synnerhet på målsättningsnivå (d.v.s. då målsättningar görs upp). Förutom att möjliggöra UM att fullfölja sina utvecklingsprogramsförbindelser 2012 (DPP) genom att stärka landprogrammen med en resultat-baserad styrningsansats, avsåg LPM att förbättra valen på landnivå för att göra dem mera enhetliga, strategiska och resultatbaserade. Med tanke på de minskande biståndsbudgetarna (utvecklingssamarbetsbudgetarna i de sex länderna sjönk med cirka 40 procent från 2013 till 2015), var löftet om förmågan att göra bättre val med tillgängliga medel relevant för UM.

Samtidigt urholkades dock utformningen av styrinstrumenten vis a vi dess relevans. LPMs fokus på bilateralt utvecklingssamarbete medförde att utvecklingssamarbetet inte var helt relevant med tanke på utfasningen i Vietnam och Zambia, var strategiskt tänkande ifråga om andra former av partnerskap krävs.

Utvecklingssamarbetets fokus på endast en del av UM:s samarbetsinstrument betyder att den inte effektivt kunde beakta enhetligt externa icke-UM finansierade bistånd och övriga komplementära biståndsinstrument i sin landsportfölj, och därför kunde inte möjligheterna optimeras för bättre val. I utvärderingen på landnivå framkom att LPM inte ännu har haft stor effekt på landprogrammens program -och projektportfölj. I LPMs förändringsteori, kommer denna brist att vara mot slutet av resultatkedjan, var ansvarsskyldigheten och lärandet via resultat-baserade LPM processer redan ger feedback och förbättrar landprogrammens portföljer. Under landprogramperioden var en väg för detta inflytande – valet av nya strategiska åtgärder och strategiska sätt att genomföra åtgärderna – inte tillgängliga för dem som planerade landprogrammen under större delen av perioden. Det finns dock gryende evidens för en annan giltig väg är möjlig, att förbättra hur pågående landprogrammens portföljers förverkligas. Det finns starka belägg för att två tidiga länkar LPMs förändringsteori fungerar, nämligen de interna landprogramrapporterna och dess

granskningsprocess samt landprogramprocesserna på UM-nivå och återkopplingarna därtill. Landsutvärderingsrapporterna och det globala fältarbetet levererade belägg för det att dessa förfarande för landprogramprocesser leder till strategiska reflektioner av framsteg en gång per år på lands- och branschnivå (vilket är mera än tidigare) och detta kan inverka positivt på beslutens prestanda såväl inom sektorer och för de åtgärder som genomförs. På detta sätt fann utvärderingen att förfarandet redan hade skärpt relevansen, helheten och effektiviteten i landprogramportföljerna. Denna möjlighet till reflektion är också mycket uppskattad inom UM, men speciellt bland landsteamen. Det finns på andra sidan bevis på att även det motsatta sker: beslut tas som negativt påverkat landprogramsportföljernas prestanda, även om LPM processerna ger belägg för att beslutet skulle vara felaktigt. Dessutom, process analyser visade att alla positiva beslut inte kunde explicit bindas till LPM processerna.

En granskning av evidensen gentemot LPMs resultatkedja visar tydligt var brister finns:

För det första, den strategiska planeringsmodellen var inte helt ledande för strategisk styrning av landsportföljer. De utformande resultatkedjor som var för långa för att producera användbar resultatbaserad styrinformation; det logiska ramverket klargör inte hur ett resultat på en nivå kan överföras till en annan nivå, hur Finland kan påverka detta, var riskerna ligger. Dessutom definierade den strategiska planeringsmodellen för snäva gränser för omfattningen av analysen och spårning av resultaten, för att underlätta en komplementärt utnyttjande av alla Finlands resurser eller en helhet med andra icke-bistånds assisterande åtgärder i partnerländerna.

För det andra, skapade valet av indikatorer, stabiliteten och datatillgängligheten uppföljningssvårigheter. En gemensam nämnare var att landsteamen hade svårighet att rapportera i enlighet med utvalda indikatorer. En bidragande faktor till detta var det att resultatbaserad ledande och styrning ännu är under utveckling inom landsteamen.

För det tredje, den svaga kopplingen mellan strategin och UM:s budgeteringsrutiner betydde att strategiprocessen inte i tillräcklig mån kunde påverka handlingsbesluten, tagna ur budgeteringsprocessen. Detta utgör förlorade möjligheter för stärkandet av den resultatbaserade styrningsprocessen via ett verktyg som LPM. Till sist, överlag svaga resultat-baserade processer inom UM betyder att information och lärande från strategiprocesserna inte optimalt utnyttjades för att uppnå en bättre styrning av utvecklingspolitiken överlag. Detta möjliggjorde att beslut inom landprogrammen kunde fattas utan att beakta lärdomarna från LPM.

Rekommendationerna är att relevansen för UM av resultat-baserad styrning på landnivå visar sig vara tillräckligt lovande för en fortsättning, men att förfarandena i sig bör ses över. Omfattningen bör utvidgas med eftertanke på hur olika styrinstrument kunde administreras; den använda strategiska modellen bör använda kortare resultatkedjor och utstaka klara riktlinjer för Finlands bidrag och inflytande längs denna kedja; processen för modaliteten måste omformuleras så att den sammanfaller med budgetprocessen och Finland bör förbättra färdigheterna inom landsteamen ifråga om resultatbaserad styrning.

SUMMARY

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFA) introduced the country strategy modality (CSM) in 2012 to manage development cooperation interventions programmed by the MFA itself in its long-term partner countries. The CSM is a results-based country strategy planning and management framework introduced in the context of the 2012 Development Policy Programme (DPP) commitment to strengthen partner country programming in accordance with the results-based approach.

Purpose of the evaluation

The purpose of the evaluation was to provide evidence-based information and practical guidance on how to improve the results-based management (RBM) approach in country programming and the quality of implementation of Finnish development policy at the partner country level. The evaluation therefore assessed (i) the performance of the development cooperation projects and programmes managed through the strategies (the country strategy (CS) portfolios) in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nepal, Tanzania, Vietnam and Zambia between 2008 and 2015; and (ii) the CSM as an RBM country strategy planning and management framework and process. A light review of the strategy modality in Kenya, the seventh partner country, was done to gather further evidence for the CSM component of the evaluation.

Methodology

As a matter of fact the CSM could not change the CS portfolios much between 2013 and 2015, having inherited interventions and modes of delivery set prior to its introduction. This presented a CSM evaluation challenge. At the same time the short period since the introduction of the country strategies, long CS result chains, limited availability of validated information and statistical data on results, and the size of Finland's interventions relative to the results targeted, presented a challenge to providing the evidence-based information and practical guidance sought on the performance of CS portfolios.

In order to address these challenges the evaluation developed an integrated theory of change comprising two separate but inter-linked theories of change. The first was to assess the CS portfolios against the result chain set out in the CS logical models, and the second was to assess the performance of the CSM as an RBM instrument. Using a theory-based approach was useful for this evaluation, which occurred early in the life of both the CSs and the CSM. This is because the approach allowed for first identifying and then evaluating the achievement of earlier elements in the causal chain; and for evaluating the likelihood of further results by setting out plausible causal mechanisms that can be assessed though expert and stakeholder feedback. The evaluation used mixed methods, including contribution analysis, logical reasoning and process analysis.

By using the theories of change, together with an integrated matrix of evaluation questions linked to the evaluation criteria including judgement criteria for each question, the team was therefore able to look separately at (i) whether the CS portfolios were performing given the CS objectives and development results; and (ii) the contribution that the CS/CSM has made or could make to this performance. The second focus on the country strategy modality was in turn at two levels: the difference the introduction of the CSM has already made to the content and implementation of the CS portfolios; and the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the CSM as an RBM methodology to manage these portfolios.

Evaluation process and outputs

The evaluation was conducted between September 2015 and June 2016. It comprised a country and a global level work stream. Evidence for both components of the evaluation was collected, analysed and validated at country level. Validation occurred through two workshops, an in-country workshop with MFA Embassy staff and external stakeholders, and a Helsinki workshop with MFA staff. Country level evaluation reports are published as separate documents; summaries are provided in Annex 8. The global level work stream collected evidence on the CSM at global level, and synthesised all evidence from the CS portfolio and CSM evaluations for this report. A validation workshop for the CSM was held in Helsinki. The findings, conclusions and recommendations of the CSM evaluation are provided in this report.

CS portfolio performance

Across countries the evaluation found CS objectives and the assessed interventions relevant to partner countries and to Finland's development policy objectives. Some issues were noted where the design of interventions and choice of modalities were not fully relevant to the context. In some cases, however, Finland's careful choice of interventions or objectives that complemented the work of other donors and country partners drove both intervention results and contribution to CS objectives.

When implemented, many interventions in the six countries delivered results. However, implementation was often delayed, so that the full allocation of Finnish resources to the strategies was not used efficiently to produce results over the strategy period. While disbursement rates improved over the period, a key factor was that budgeting practices did not consider properly the contextual, institutional or programmatic risks likely to delay disbursements. For some interventions, furthermore, these risks meant that interventions did not deliver results even when funding was disbursed.

The contribution of Finland's CS portfolio projects and programmes to CS objectives was assisted in many cases by Finland's efforts at policy influence, including through donor coordination structures; participation in policy dialogue through sector forums; or establishing successful prototypes in its interventions and then leveraging these by influencing country and development partners to take them up. Policy influence and coordination are therefore strong contributing factors to CS portfolio effectiveness and impact. The evalu-

ations found less evidence that coherence (both internal and external) or complementarity to Finland's non-CS development cooperation instruments contributed to country strategy effectiveness.

The results achieved were found not to be consistently sustainable. Finland relied on direct implementation in more than half of the main CS interventions across countries. While Finland's country teams invested in building ownership of these interventions, these efforts were not always successful, depending on country and sector contexts. The institutional and funding capacity of counterparts was often a factor in sustainability. At the same time, however, the CS portfolios included remarkable successes where Finland's interventions were taken up by local institutions, including government, and mainstreamed.

CSM performance

The CSM is a highly relevant instrument for the MFA, particularly at the objective level (in other words for what it aims to do). Besides allowing the MFA to fulfil its DPP 2012 commitment to strengthen country programming with a results-based approach, the CSM aimed to improve choices at country level to make them more coherent, strategic and results-based. Given declining aid budgets (CS portfolio budgets across the six countries shrank by about 40 percent between 2013 and 2015) the promise of the ability to make better choices with available funding was relevant to the MFA.

At the same time, however, the design of the instrument detracted from this relevance. The CSM's focus on bilateral cooperation meant that it was not fully relevant in the transitioning context of Vietnam and Zambia, where strategic thinking about other forms of partnership is required. The CS focus on only a sub-set of MFA development cooperation instruments means that it did not effectively address a lack of external coherence with non-aid MFA, or complementarity with other aid instruments in the CS portfolios, and therefore did not optimise the opportunities for better choices.

The country evaluation teams found that the strategy modality has not yet had much effect in influencing CS portfolios. During the CS period one pathway for this influence – the selection of new strategic interventions and strategic ways of delivering interventions – for the most part was not available to CS designers. However, there is emerging evidence that the other pathway, through improving how the on-going CS portfolio is implemented, is valid. There is strong evidence that CS report and review processes at the country level and with the regional departments in the MFA are functional and delivering accountability. The country evaluation reports and the global fieldwork delivered evidence that these CSM processes lead to strategic reflection on sector and country level achievement at least once a year (which is more than previously) and can influence decisions on sectors and interventions positively for performance. The evaluation found that in this way modality processes already have sharpened the relevance, coherence and effectiveness of the CS portfolios. This opportunity for reflection is also much appreciated across the MFA, but particularly in country teams. There is, however, evidence that the opposite also happens: decisions were taken that affected CS portfolio performance negatively even if the CSM processes should have delivered the evidence that the decision would

be wrong. Furthermore, process analysis showed that not all positive decisions observed could be linked explicitly to the CSM processes.

An examination of evidence against the CSM result chain makes clear where assumptions about how a results-based CSM would deliver better-performing Finnish development cooperation in partner countries did not hold in practice..

Firstly, the strategic planning model used was not fully conducive to strategic management of country portfolios. It set out a result chain that was too long to provide useful results-based management information; the logic framework approach does not make clear how one level of results would translate into another, how Finland can influence this, and what the risks are; and it set the scope of analysis and result tracking too narrowly to facilitate complementarity between all Finland's resources or coherence with other non-aid assistance interventions in partner countries.

Secondly, in practice indicator selection, stability and data availability created monitoring difficulties. A common refrain was that country teams struggled to report against the measures selected. A contributing factor to this was that results-based management skills were still emerging in country teams.

Thirdly, weak linkages between strategy and MFA budget processes meant that strategy processes did not sufficiently influence decisions in the budget process on interventions. This represents lost opportunities for strengthening results-based management through an instrument like the CSM.

Finally, weak results-based processes overall in the MFA meant that information and learning from strategy processes were not used optimally for better development policy and implementation overall. This allowed decisions in the MFA to be taken on CS portfolios without taking into account the learning through the CSM.

The recommendations are that the relevance for the MFA of country level results-based management is showing enough promise to be continued, but that the modality itself needs to be rethought. The scope needs to be broadened with due consideration for how different instruments are managed; the strategy model used to target and achieve results must use a shorter result-chain and set out clear pathways for Finnish contribution and influence along this chain; modality processes must be reconfigured to align with budget processes; and Finland must invest in skills for results-based management in its country teams.

KEY FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
Results-based country programming and reporting – the CSM – can enable the MFA to track results and provide more systematic reporting on development cooperation internally and to its stakeholders, in a context where it is facing requests for such reporting. It provides the means to focus country programming, reducing fragmentation and improving internal coherence towards a common objective, and to make strategic decisions about the what, how and why of interventions against a limited number of country development results, in a context where aid budgets are declining. It is a touchstone for country teams to assess and potentially refuse new proposals for interventions during strategy implementation, reducing the risk of fragmentation due to ad hoc projects. It enables enhanced intra-MFA dialogue about the effectiveness of interventions across sectors in a context where staff work in silos, limiting institutional effectiveness.	1. **An RBM programming, management and reporting instrument at country level is highly relevant to the MFA in the context of demand for development results and declining aid budgets.** The alternative – to implement development cooperation in partner countries without an RBM-based instrument – would risk re-fragmentation and more inefficient, ineffective and poorly monitored development cooperation implementation.	1. **The MFA should retain using a results-based framework for planning and managing development cooperation in partner countries.**

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
The CSM sets out a long and multiple step result chain from the intervention to the country development result. The high level at which results are reported and monitored limits its usefulness for learning on Finland's development cooperation interventions, and accountability. The indicators to measure progress were not always appropriate: they were either too abstract/far removed from Finnish interventions, or time-relevant data were hard to find. Experience of other donors suggests that simpler frameworks are more conducive to effective RBM systems. How the CSM sets out results-based objectives does not target or monitor policy influence as a pathway to greater effectiveness despite it being an important component of why Finland achieves results disproportionate to the funding it disburses. Weak risk management in Finnish interventions causes delays and occasionally cancellations of programmes and projects that render programmes inefficient, if not ineffective. The CSM has not made a contribution to improving this, insofar as risk assessment and analysis in CSs also are superficial and not reported on. The CSM focuses strategic planning on an upcoming period of four years, and this may be insufficient given that prior intervention commitments already tie up resources for the four years, leaving limited space for more strategic choices. This is particularly limiting when countries have long-term objectives to fulfil, such as transitioning in Vietnam and Zambia.	2. The **approach or model for the CSM framework is not appropriate for the MFA context and not entirely fit for the purpose of RBM at country level.** • The upper levels of the **results framework are abstract relative to actual Finnish interventions.** • The use of the logic model as a tool means that the **CS does not set out the pathways through which one level of the chain will result in another,** particularly from the immediate results of Finnish interventions to a next layer in the chain. This means that strategies to leverage Finnish intervention results are not incentivised. • The **CSM has not contributed to improved risk management** and reduced associated inefficiency in country programmes, on account of poor analysis and reflection of risks in the CS. • The CSM **does not frame country strategies in a long-term vision** of Finnish engagement in the country but sets the horizon at the four years of the result framework.	2. The MFA **should rethink the CSM framework design and how it is used** to provide more value for the planning and management of Finnish partner country programming. This includes: • **switching to a theory of change approach** to help bring out the "added value"/policy influencing assumptions and opportunities and ensuring that monitoring and reporting also capture these dimensions. • **setting the desired results that the CS theory of change is aimed at closer to Finnish interventions and simplifying the layers measured,** but being more explicit about how the immediate results of Finnish interventions will translate to the CS objectives (through added value efforts for example) and what the underlying result chain assumptions and risks are; • **being clear why results at each layer are being monitored,** including focusing management of the country programme on lower levels of the results chain and being clear that monitoring change at higher levels is to demonstrate that short-term actions are aligned with long-term goals and to remind managers to check that their assumptions about how the Finnish contributions may assist the wider development effort remain valid • **framing the desired results for the next four years in a longer-term statement** on the direction of Finnish cooperation, for both aid and non-aid engagement.

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
The CSM scopes results in RBM of only a subset of a subset of bilateral ODA flows to partner countries. Thus it does not fully allow the MFA to focus its country programming towards more coherent and complementary Finnish engagement across all aid and non-aid instruments, crucial in view of recent budget cuts. In countries where Finland is transitioning to different forms of partnership, the narrow scope limited the CS focus too much to 'traditional' development cooperation interventions and results. CSM efficiency and sustainability are also affected by its limited scope, more so after recent budget cuts. The CSM scope for the first CS period was appropriate, given capacity for RBM. It kept the CSM relatively simple. Different departments of the MFA manage and are accountable for different cooperation instruments Demand-driven Finnish development instruments are not fully programmable. Others, like the CSO instruments, are traditionally associated with independent action by CSOs. But some CSOs are more willing to align, particularly at country level. Finland is known for its capacity for dialogue and has a lot of experience in coordinated activities with other donors at the country level. The RBM country-based programming instruments of other donors have matured to being embassy-wide (taking into account all the responsibilities of the embassy) or country-wide (also taking into account actions by donor government units outside of the aid-providing ministry/department) instruments.	**3. The CSM scope affects the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the instrument negatively.** The scope did not assist in utilising all Finnish aid and non-aid resources and actions coherently and in a complementary way at the country level. However, even if desirable, the scope for including more Finnish instruments in a next CS period is limited as they may overwhelm the instrument with higher transaction costs, affecting its sustainability.	**3. The CSM scope should be expanded to include other Finnish Development Cooperation Instruments, but with care.** The MFA should assess bilateral instruments one by one on how they should be included. A minimum form of this expansion of the CSM scope would comprise including the institutional cooperation instrument and the Funds for Local Cooperation more effectively. In addition, at a second tier CS level the CSM should include processes, rules and information mechanisms to ensure that all Finnish bilateral development cooperation and private sector instruments are taken into account for complementarity and discussed in the CS review processes for strategic purposes. This should include dialogue with CSOs funded by Finland at country level in the development of country strategies, and during the annual reporting processes. In countries where there is a significant potential for mutual reinforcement of results to justify the transaction cost, the MFA should pilot ways to treat some key Finnish-funded and willing NGOs as fellow development actors in a CS objective-wide approach.

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
CSM reporting processes at the country level – within country teams and from country teams to the regional departments – are functional, a key outcome of introducing the CSM and the main driver of CS influence in CS portfolios to date. Processes to design and review the CSM instrument are efficient and effective. Reporting from the regional department level to the Development Policy Steering Group, however, does not function well. Respondents acknowledged the procedural importance of this link, but did not think that it added value. One factor may be limited interest in the CSM and RBM at top management level. MFA-wide RBM has not contributed directly to the CSM effectiveness during the CS period. Respondents did however not expect this to occur in the first CS period. Information from CS reporting processes is not used effectively for RBM beyond the regional departments, even if reported to the Development Policy Steering Group. The synthesis reports are laudably brief and interesting, but of limited use. Experience from other donors shows the importance of a corporate results culture and clear institutional pathways to use country strategy results information well for learning and/or accountability. Current processes to build a corporate reporting framework on results (rather than a corporate results framework) represent a negotiated compromise on the next steps to strengthen RBM.	4. The MFA **has succeeded in instituting effective key CSM reporting processes** that are appropriately light for the MFA context, particularly to review and revise the CSM and for annual reporting at the country level. However, **it has been less successful in extracting value** from these processes across countries for development policy learning and accountability, also in the context of a weak corporate results culture. Current processes to introduce **a corporate reporting framework for results that will use the CSM information represent progress** and will be good for the CSM, but potentially are not sufficient to sustain it long term. The CSM processes and information offer opportunities for extracting implicit knowledge across country programming about what works and what does not in Finnish development cooperation that can be made explicit more systematically.	4. Effective country-level CSM processes must be leveraged into learning across countries by **improving the synthesis reports to include systematic monitoring and analysis as well as periodic review of cross-country programme design and management issues,** such as which modalities work in which circumstances; identification of common strategic risks to country programming, when they arise and how to mitigate them; and of effective value-adding/influencing strategies to optimise how Finnish interventions may assist country development results. This will supplement the value of the CSM for emerging corporate result reporting and help build a meaningful results culture, which in the long run will help sustain the CSM.

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
The CSM was conceptualised as an internal MFA planning and management RBM tool. This is appropriate to its purpose as an RBM instrument. As such its processes did not include a focus on country consultations, but were largely internal. This limited its ability to test the relevance of CS objectives to country and donor partners; re-test the relevance assumptions of CS constituent interventions; and gather views on how best Finland can use its resources towards country results. It also limited its ability to result in CSs that leverage CS interventions through better coordination and ownership as country stakeholders were largely unaware of/unfamiliar with CSs.	5. The **design of CS development processes underestimated the value of country consultations on country strategies** to enhance the quality and results from Finland's interventions.	5. **In future the process to develop country strategies should include well-structured country level consultations with local stakeholders,** including government and development partners. These should be conceptualised and presented as consultations, and therefore as different from country-level negotiations. The focus of the consultations should be on Finland's intended country development results areas and objectives, and the means to achieve them best, given Finnish comparative advantages and the country context.

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
Country teams are small and do not always have RBM skills. Also, there is a high turnover of staff. Development cooperation posts are not seen as career-advancing posts and are not well paid at desk officer and team leader level relative to the responsibilities. Who occupies key country team positions is important for how effective the CSM is. Very limited training was provided prior to introducing the CSM. However, both regional departments have since held RBM capacity building workshops. The quality of results targeting, indicator selection and the effectiveness with which results are used in and for the CSs are variable. The 2016 budget cuts are likely to result in reduced staff numbers in country teams. There is no dedicated unit to manage RBM, although a single advisor is in place. The CSM design and introduction was managed by a small informal CSM Working Group. Many past and current members of this working group are still around to participate in learning networks. Other donors have set aside training budgets or developed peer learning and support mechanisms to develop and sustain human resources for RBM.	6. **While there has been some progress, human resources for RBM and CSM management in the MFA are limited, and not enough is done to develop skills.** This affects the quality of results targeting and indicator selection and limits the effectiveness with which all countries can use results information towards better Finnish development cooperation. The introduction of RBM into the management of country programmes means that desk officer positions and team leader and development counsellor positions are key determinants of the MFA's ability to report systematically, accurately and relevantly on the use of taxpayers' funds.	6. The **MFA should take deliberate action to strengthen human resources for RBM.** This includes • **initiating an RBM peer-learning network that will help support human resource development for RBM and the CSM.** The core of such a network is already in place in the ministry. The network should build on the current approach of having RBM workshops that could be reconceptualised as peer learning events. On-going information exchange between country team members struggling with formulating appropriate objectives and identifying good indicators will assist in overcoming the human resource weaknesses. • **upgrading key posts** in country teams to attract skilled resources more often for longer.

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
The link of the CSM to budget processes is not sufficiently well articulated, so that the CSM in the end does not function well as a strategic planning instrument. Budget processes occur twice a year, and drive decisions about interventions. They are however not well articulated with CS review processes, with the result that decisions are taken about country interventions in the budget process to which the CS is then retro-fitted, undermining its use as a strategic instrument. The link between the CS and the ambassador's plan is not well articulated either, limiting the degree to which the CS can contribute to external coherence. Links between the CSM and country intervention reviews and evaluations are also not functioning well, with few reviews and evaluations being explicitly done in terms of CSM objectives, and the outcomes of reviews and evaluations not feeding strongly enough into the CSM review processes.	7. **The CSM is still functioning too much as a stand-alone instrument** despite sharing the planning, management and review space with the budget process and Ambassador's plan at the country level. Its functioning as a strategic instrument would be improved if its design made more explicit links in time and in content to the planning and budgeting system, the ambassador's plan and country intervention reviews and evaluations.	7. The **CSM Working Group should look again at the timing of the annual review process and align it better with the MFA budgeting process.** Similarly for the ambassador's plan and reviews and evaluations, the CSM design should ensure the CS and this plan align. On the other hand, the framework for these instruments and for country reviews and evaluations should be certain to include reference to the CS as a key country document.

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1   Origin and context of the evaluation

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFA) introduced the country strategy modality (CSM) – a country strategy planning and management framework – in 2012 within the context of the 2012 Development Policy Programme (DPP). This was also driven by the 2011 results-based management (RBM) evaluation of Finnish development cooperation. From 2013 onwards the CSM has been implemented in the seven long-term partner countries of Finland, namely Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Nepal, Tanzania, Vietnam and Zambia.

The CSM is a key instrument to introduce RBM in country programming and to enhance Finnish aid effectiveness and accountability. Before 2013 (in 2008–2012) country programming was set out as Country Engagement Plans (CEPs), which were not results-based. From 2013 the country strategies (CSs) that resulted from the CSM were required to set out goals and objectives with appropriate measures to track achievements.

In mid-2015 the MFA contracted Mokoro Limited and Indufor to undertake an evaluation of the CSM and CSs (Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nepal, Tanzania, Vietnam and Zambia). The results from the evaluation will inform adjustments to the CSM and the new CSs, and contribute to improved upwards results reporting within the MFA and beyond, including to the Parliament of Finland. The full terms of reference (TOR) for the evaluation are at Annex 1.

1.2   Purpose and objectives of the evaluation

The TOR set out the purpose of the evaluation as "to provide evidence based information and practical guidance for the next update of the Country Strategy Modality on how to 1) improve the results based management approach in country programming for management, learning and accountability purposes and 2) how to improve the quality of implementation of Finnish development policy at the partner country level".

The evaluation therefore aimed to:

- **Evaluate, for both accountability and learning purposes, Finland's bilateral cooperation with Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nepal, Tanzania, Vietnam and Zambia since 2008, but with a specific focus on 2013–2015,** the period after the introduction of country strategies. This was done through six country evaluations. Findings from this evaluation component are analysed in Chapter 4 of this synthesis report.[1] Conclusions and recommendations for each country from the country reports are summarised in Chapter 7 of this report.

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[1] TOR: "The country reports will be discussed with partner countries and the management response drawn up on this basis. The follow up and implementation of the response will be integrated in the planning process of the next phase of the country strategy."

- **Evaluate the CSM as an RBM country strategy planning and management framework and process.** This component drew on country level fieldwork from the six country evaluations and a light review of the CSM in Kenya, in which the influence of the CSM on country interventions was analysed and country CSM processes investigated, and on global level fieldwork in which the cross-country functioning of the modality was investigated. Findings from this evaluation component are analysed in Chapter 6 of the report. Conclusions and recommendations are set out in Chapter 7 of this report, and reflected in the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations table in the Summary above.

The *objective* of the evaluation is

- to provide evidence on the successes and challenges of the CS portfolios of interventions[2] in each of the six countries by assessing the relevance of Finland's interventions and of the strategic choices made in the CS, as well as the performance of the CS Portfolio against these choices;

- to provide evidence on the CSM for the purposes of results-based management of the MFA.

The evaluation therefore looks separately at (i) whether the CS Portfolios are performing given the CS objectives and development results; and (ii) the contribution that the CS/CSM made to this performance. The second focus on the country strategy modality is in turn at two levels: the difference the introduction of the country strategy approach made to the content and implementation of the CS portfolios; and the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the CSM as an RBM methodology to manage these portfolios.

1.3   Evaluation outputs and features

The *outputs* of the evaluation are:

- Six country evaluations evaluating the CS portfolio of interventions against the CS objectives and the evaluation criteria, as well as the CSM for its contribution to the CS portfolio performance and as a process. These country evaluations are available as separate papers. Summaries are provided in Annex 8.

- This synthesis report, which analyses the performance of the CS portfolios and comprehensively evaluates the CSM, drawing on evidence and findings from the country evaluations as well as global fieldwork.

The principal features of the evaluation are set out below.

- The **temporal scope** of the evaluation is the period 2008 to 2015. Although there is particular interest in the country strategy modality which was introduced only in 2012, it is necessary to consider a longer

The evaluation looked separately at the performance of country portfolios and the performance of the country strategy modality in influencing these portfolios.

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[2] The term **CS portfolio of interventions** (or more concisely "CS portfolio") is used in the country reports and this report as shorthand for the actually implemented/ongoing set of interventions and activities as framed by the CSs, notwithstanding the instrument through which they are funded or whether they originated from the CEP. Evaluating the country strategy means in significant part evaluating this CS portfolio against the evaluation criteria, to test the validity of the CS logical model and assumptions, and by extension the bulk effects of Finland's CS-directed interventions in the six countries.

period because (a) many of the interventions taking place during the post-2012 period were designed and commenced earlier, and (b) as stated in the TOR, "in order to understand the strategies as they are now and to evaluate the change and possible results of current country strategies, it is essential to capture the previous period as a historical context".

- The **content scope** of the evaluation considers Finnish bilateral cooperation in the context of Finland's development funding portfolio and non-aid activities as a whole and Finland's role as part of the donor community, and the CSM as a strategic planning and management instrument. For the bilateral cooperation content scope, it focuses directly only on the instruments that come within the scope of the CSs; however, it is not an evaluation of individual components separately, but of this CS portfolio as a whole.

- **Summative and formative dimensions.** The evaluation aims to explain the strengths and weaknesses of past performance and to make forward-looking recommendations at country level, as well as providing inputs to formative CSM recommendations.

- **Users.** The MFA country teams and desk officers will be primary users of the CS portfolio evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations. The MFA Department for Development Policy, and the MFA regional departments and their units (for the Americas and Asia, and for Africa and the Middle East) overseeing the CSs in the long-term partner countries are the primary users of the CSM component findings.

1.4 Approach and methodology

The evaluation methodology was developed to fulfil the purpose and objectives as set out in the TOR. The Inception Report (IR) elaborated the key evaluation instruments, analytical approaches, data collection and validation methods, and processes. Here we discuss the rationale for the methodology and the evaluation instruments, data collection and validation methods used in practice in summary. More detail is provided in Annex 2.

1.4.1 Evaluation challenges and limitations

For both the CSM and CS portfolio elements of the evaluation, the evaluation faced challenges and limitations. These were:

- **Short time lapse between CSM introduction and evaluation.** Firstly, when the first CSs were designed in 2012, it was not on a zero base. In each of the seven countries the CSs inherited a full programme of activities with commitments continuing well into the 2013–2016 CS period and the evaluation period. The degree to which country teams could adjust their portfolio of interventions and how they were implemented was therefore limited. Evidence on the effectiveness of the CSM to improve the quality of Finnish development policy at partner country level was therefore always going to be emergent.

- **Contribution gap.** Secondly, in all six countries for which evaluations of the CS portfolios were undertaken, the logical model included a 'contribution gap', or the recurring circumstance in all the CSs when the size of the Finnish intervention; the results chain length to the target development result; data availability (elaborated below); and/or the time needed for the result to occur following an intervention, would affect whether the results from comprehensive contribution analysis would yield useful and valid information for the MFA.

- **Portfolio assessment challenge.** Throughout the evaluation the team was challenged by summing the performance of individual interventions towards an assessment of the CS portfolio result chain.

- **Separating out evidence for the two components of the evaluation.** The TOR required the evaluation to assess "the feasibility of strategic choices made"; "progress made in strategic result areas"; and the feasibility of the CSM as an RBM instrument at country level (on page 136 below in Annex 1). At the same time they speak of evaluating the CSs. These requirements are interlinked. Logically, evidence of progress in strategic result areas would provide evidence that the strategic choices were feasible (an assessment of the CS), which in turn would provide evidence that the CSM is a feasible and effective instrument. In this specific evaluation, however, this chain could not automatically be assumed because the CSs inherited their component interventions and feasible strategic choices would not necessarily mean that the CSM was effective.

- **Availability of documented and/or validated information and statistical data related to interventions.** Thirdly, while the evaluation was able to draw on existing reviews and evaluation documentation and annual CS reports to some extent for information on results at both the intervention and CS objective levels for some CS objectives, for others existing documentation was absent or thin and statistical data relevant to the interventions were not available. Overall there were very few final evaluations of CS Portfolio interventions, even for previous phases. Furthermore, the CSM was introduced with limited documented information on its rationale and exactly how the MFA was expecting it to impact on country portfolios. Similarly, the logical model approach of the CSM does not explain why one level of results in the framework would lead to another.

The evaluation took these limitations into account in its choice of evaluation instruments and analytical and data collection methods to achieve the evaluation purpose and objectives.

1.4.2   Evaluation instruments

The TOR required an evaluation that would provide evidence-based information and practical guidance on how to improve the results-based management approach in country programming; and on how to improve the quality of implementation of Finnish development policy at the partner country level.

The evaluation methodology endeavoured to address the challenges identified.

This meant developing a methodology that would

- **For the RBM approach in country programming:** provide evidence-based information on what has worked and not worked in the CSM as an RBM approach in country programming, and why;

- **For the quality of implementation of Finnish development policy at partner country level:** provide evidence-based information on what has worked and what not in this implementation, and why;

and from these findings provide guidance on how the approach to RBM at the country level and the implementation of Finnish development policy could be improved.

Taking these requirements and the challenges and limitations discussed above into account, the evaluation methodology set out the evaluation instruments discussed below.

An integrated theory of change

Using a theory of change as the key evaluation instrument allowed the teams to answer not only the questions of what works towards the desired results, but also why and how it worked (or did not work). The theory-of-change approach was specified in the TOR, but the evaluation team concurred with this approach because:[3]

- Even when designs are not specified or linked to ultimate goals from the start, using a theory of change approach can assist in making explicit the implicit and explicit assumptions that underpinned the programme designers'/initiators' decisions, and test these retrospectively based on evidence from programme implementation.

- The approach allowed an assessment of the causal chain from the MFA's intervention (the CSM and the portfolio of interventions) to the desired long-term outcome (improved development cooperation), as well as of the assumptions that underlie the process/sequence of change anticipated, including on actors and events outside of the programme, and conditions that are needed to obtain or may affect obtaining the outcomes.

- It is suitable for evaluations that occur early in an intervention's life or for interventions that are complex with multiple causal chains, high uncertainty and emergent results, enabling an assessment of the likelihood that the intervention will result in the desired outcomes, by assessing (i) whether earlier elements in the causal chain have been achieved; and (ii) evidence on the likelihood of further results ensuing given the implementation context, concurrent influences and the characteristics of relevant actors. This was pertinent to the evaluation because of the short lapse of time between the introduction of the CSM and the evaluation, and the confluence of CSM and CS portfolio interventions and results in the evidence.

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[3] See Carter 2012; Center for Theory of Change 2014; Clark and Anderson 2004; James 2011; Morra Imas and Rist 2009; Rogers 2008; Vogel 2010; Weiss 1995; and White 2009 for discussion of these features of the use of theories of change in evaluation.

The evaluation used an integrated theory of change.

- Specifying the causal chain and assumptions provided the guide on what evidence to collect to validate, invalidate or revise the hypothesised explanations or assumptions.

- It allows the use of mixed methods, both qualitative and quantitative, both normative and positive to undertake the analysis of whether and why one step in the chain did or would contribute to another. This was pertinent because of data limitations in the evaluation.

The theory of change was developed in two diagrams with assumptions, one for the CSM component and the other for the CS portfolio component, each of which showed a collapsed version of the other component to make explicit the links between them. The diagrams are in Figure 7 (the CS theory of change) in section 4.1 and Figure 16 (the CSM theory of change) in section 6.1 below.

The CS theory of change sets out the intervention logic of the CS portfolio, as framed by the CS, as a result chain with explicit (in the CS) and implicit assumptions, which operates within the country contexts. The key assumption in setting out this chain against the evaluation purpose (improved Finnish development cooperation at country level) is that if the evaluation could conclude that the evidence collected about the CS portfolio interventions and their results supports in the country context a plausible link to the CS objectives and development results targeted, it would equal performance of Finland's development cooperation, provided that the targeted objectives/results were relevant, and the results were achieved efficiently and sustainably. Where evidence points to lack of results, unsustainable results, weak links, inefficient, incoherent or uncoordinated programme implementation, assessing the reasons would help provide recommendations to improve the cooperation. Each evaluation country team drew on the assumptions in the logic frameworks, interviews with the country team, and a review of the context to adapt the generic assumptions for CS theories of change in the IR for the country assessment.

The CSM theory of change sets out the assumed logic of adopting a results-based approach for managing country portfolios. The key assumption in setting out this chain against the evaluation purpose (improving the RBM at country level) is that the CSM would be a feasible RBM instrument, if there was emerging evidence that its formats and processes had triggered learning about and accountability for CS portfolio interventions, their results and pathways of contribution to higher level country results that allowed the MFA to take corrective action at the intervention, country and/or corporate level to improve development cooperation. The assumption is also that this CSM result would only occur sustainably if the CSM (with its formats, rules and processes), was efficient and appropriate for the MFA context, and supported so that it was sustainable.

Assessing CS portfolios and the CSM against the integrated TOC involved seven dimensions:

CS level TOC

i. Assessing whether the CS objectives and the interventions to implement them in the CS portfolio represent the right choices, or were relevant given country contexts and Finland's development policy objectives. This is discussed across country evaluations in section 4.2.

ii. Assessing whether the CS interventions took place (inputs and outputs materialised), and whether they delivered their planned results in the CS period (the intermediate outcomes of the CS theory of change). This is assessed across countries in the effectiveness section (see section 4.3).

iii. Assessing whether these results can be argued to have contributed to Finland's specific objectives (the TOC outcomes). The evaluation examined different hypothesised pathways for the contribution, which included both what the interventions were and how they were implemented, as well as leveraging through policy dialogue and uptake of models. The findings against this dimension are presented in the contribution section (4.4).

In assessing contribution the evaluation had to meet the challenge set out above of the short period since the CSM's introduction. This it did by taking into account the activities of CS portfolio interventions both during and prior to the CS period for on-going activities, to provide an assessment of alignment between and the contribution of cumulative CS portfolio activity results to the CS objectives. Activities initiated during the CS period were of course assessed for this period only. The assumption is that if the teams could provide evidence that the on-going assumed result chains were valid (or not), it would provide useful information for MFA managers for the next CS iteration. The alternative would have been either not to evaluate against effectiveness and impact, or only to evaluate the immediate outcomes of interventions. The first would not have fulfilled the need for evaluative information on current interventions expressed in the TOR, while the second would not have added much value over existing reviews and evaluations. The option of evaluating at higher levels of results against the CEPs was not available, as these plans did not include a results orientation.

The evaluation also had to meet the challenge of portfolio assessment. This the country evaluation teams did by using available evaluations and reviews of individual interventions, but they focused on the extent to which performance was achieved across the portfolio. This was facilitated by the methodology that assessed the CS portfolio against the CS objectives, as well as the application of the complementarity, coherence and coordination criteria (see point v below).

iv. Assessing whether there is evidence to support the CS logic framework hypothesis that the specific objectives, as realised through the interventions, would contribute to CS target development results (the TOC Impact result). This is assessed across countries in the impact section (4.5).

v. Assessing how well the CS Portfolios achieved the results:

- Were they efficient in translating Finnish resources to results (assessed in section 4.6)?

- Are the results sustainable (section 4.7)?

- Are effectiveness and impact supported through complementarity with other Finnish aid instruments, internal and external coherence, and coordination with partners at country level (section 4.8)?
- how well did they achieve Finnish cross-cutting development policy objectives (section 4.9)?

CSM TOC

vi. Assessing the emergent results from the CSM as an RBM technology. Did it influence the CS portfolio and its implementation at all, and why? This is discussed in sections 6.3 and 6.4.

vii. Assessing how well the CSM is operating: is it relevant for the MFA; is the CSM efficient and sustainable? This is discussed in sections 6.5 and 6.6.

Evaluation and judgement criteria

As is apparent from the section above, the evaluation used a set of evaluation criteria (OECD DAC criteria plus coordination, coherence and complementarity) that operated at the two levels of the evaluation. The criteria and their definitions are provided in Annex 2. These criteria were unpacked further through specifying judgement criteria, to ensure high consistency in judgement across country evaluation teams. These are set out as part of the evaluation matrix, also provided in Annex 2.

The evaluation matrix and evaluation questions

The evaluation – and assessing the theory of change – was framed by the evaluation questions provided in Annex 2. The evaluation matrix acknowledged the inter-related nature of the CS portfolio evaluation and the CSM evaluation, and thus made explicit in an integrated matrix which questions were to be examined to assess the performance of the CS portfolio against the evaluation criteria, and which related to the performance of the CSM. The judgement criteria provided guidance on how to interpret the questions and what would count as evidence.

Analytical devices

Any qualitative evaluation involves a combination of empirical evidence, interpretation and analytical judgement. Given the evaluation limitations set out above, the evaluation aimed to use a mix of analytical methods to investigate the performance of the CS portfolio against the evaluation criteria and theory of change, and the CSM.

CS portfolio evaluation

The use of different analytical instruments to evaluate the chain was aimed at usefully evaluating the performance of the CS portfolio interventions to the level of their direct outcomes. Higher up the results chain, the task was to check that the Finnish interventions were sensibly aligned with Finnish and country general objectives, and that the assumptions about their contribution to country-level results remained valid.

An integrated evaluation matrix set out the evaluation questions and judgement criteria.

- Contribution analysis supported by validated or statistical data was applied where the distance between CS portfolio intervention immediate results and the related CS objective, and data availability, allowed it to yield useful information for the MFA to take corrective action. Please see Annex 2 for a short discussion of contribution analysis.

- Where the team identified a contribution gap, including paucity of validated or statistical data, it used logical reasoning to identify plausible causal mechanisms, which were validated by expert and stakeholder feedback.

CSM evaluation

The team used contribution and process analysis and future causal mechanism validation through the stakeholders involved to assess the emerging influence and likely future influence of the CSM on the content and delivery of the CS Portfolio.

1.4.3 Data collection and validation

Overall, the evaluation team used mixed information sources to generate and triangulate the evaluation findings. These are referenced throughout this and the country reports. Data collection was aimed at addressing data availability challenges, as much as at reviewing the findings and conclusions of existing reviews and evaluations. Selection of site visits and selection of respondents, and interview questions therefore paid attention to filling these gaps. Information sources included the following:

- **Document sources:** country CSM documentation and reports; existing intervention reviews and evaluations; and relevant secondary literature from non-MFA sources including government documents and evaluations or reviews undertaken by other partners. The exact document sources are referenced throughout the reports.

- **Statistical information sources:** the reports use analysis of financial and other statistics collected from the MFA and other sources. References are provided throughout.

- **Semi-structured interviews based on the evaluation questions:** these included individual interviews, group interviews and focus group discussions. In view of the confidentiality assurances provided to respondents, respondents are not identified for each reported observation.

- **Site visits** to observe results on the ground and elicit beneficiary and local stakeholder feedback, in alignment with the TOR requirement for participatory evaluation.

Triangulation was done between sources, where possible, but also within a source-type. The data and findings were validated through a country-based and Helsinki-based country evaluation validation workshop (attended by embassy staff, country stakeholders and donor partners), and a Helsinki validation workshop with the MFA for the CSM evaluation.

1.4.4 Evaluation process

The evaluation took place during the period September 2015 to June 2016, with Alta Fölscher (team leader) leading the CSM components of the evaluation, drawing on the CS evaluations prepared by country team coordinators (CTCs) and team members as well as wider analysis. Global CSM research was supported by Lilli Loveday (research coordinator) and other members of the research team. Each of the country evaluations was undertaken by a team comprising 3 to 4 members under the leadership of the CTCs. The CTCs, the research coordinator and the team leader comprised the evaluation management team. A list of all team members and their responsibilities is provided on page 131.

The desk study first phase ran between the kick-off meeting on September 10th, 2015 and the submission of the inception report in November. The context analysis, TOC and emerging hypotheses for the CSM as well as a detailed work plan for the evaluation were presented in the inception report.

The CS evaluation country fieldwork was staggered between November 2015 and February 2016, with pre- and post-engagement by the country teams with MFA in Helsinki. This fieldwork included country-based assessment of the CSM. For the country fieldwork, country stakeholders, beneficiaries and donor partners were interviewed (145 for Ethiopia, 91 for Mozambique, 79 for Tanzania, 95 for Nepal, 65 for Zambia and 72 for Vietnam). Each country report provides a list of country interviewees. The desk review and fieldwork for the country evaluations support the country evaluation reports, but are also part of the evidence base for this report.

Further central CSM fieldwork occurred between February and May 2016, involving face-to-face and telephonic interviews with current and previous MFA staff. Key MFA staff involved both with the CEP and with the current CS processes were interviewed, including people who were directly associated with the transitioning from CEP to CS and with drafting CS guidelines and developing the RBM approach. A list of global interviewees is provided in Annex 3.

The evaluation process was participatory and consultative to ensure that key Finnish and country stakeholders at various levels could contribute. In each country an invitation was extended to government stakeholders to participate in the evaluation. Interviews and/or focus groups were held with counterparts in supported state, academic, civil society and private sector institutions; and with donor partners. The fieldwork included field visits and interviews with beneficiaries. The MFA Evaluation Department joined the fieldwork in two countries, Vietnam and Zambia.

Initial findings, conclusions and recommendations from the CS evaluations and initial findings from the CSM evaluation were presented at a validation workshop conducted at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs headquarters on 16 March. In addition, country level validation workshops were held.

The CSM evaluation examined documentation relevant to the evolution, implementation and functionality of the CSM, and conducted analysis of comparator donor practices to RBM (including telephone interviews with relevant stakeholders).

1.4.5 Risks to the country evaluations

Factual and analytical gaps, misinterpretation and weaknesses in evaluation outputs due to the scope of the evaluation and data availability. The methodology mitigated data availability risks. The evaluation process included two validation workshops to correct factual errors and address misinterpretation for each of the country evaluations, and one validation workshop for the CSM evaluation. A full set of comments from MFA stakeholders on the draft report has also been taken into account. In addition, an internal quality and an external peer review took place, and comments from these have been taken into account in this final report.

Inconsistency in making findings and coming to conclusions across country studies. This risk is at the synthesis level. The evaluation team developed country evaluation guidance, common templates for collecting data, common approaches to analysis, common evaluation and judgement criteria and common reporting templates across the country teams. In addition, two workshops were held to harmonise the way the teams applied these instruments, one during the inception phase and a second after the country fieldwork and during the analysis phase. Adjustments were made to the methodology used, analyses and assessments by the teams, based on common understandings reached at the workshops.

1.5 The evaluation report

The evaluation report is set out in the following chapters (with associated annexes).

- Chapter 1: Introduction. This chapter, which provides information on the evaluation purpose and objective, methodology, and the report. It is linked to Annex 1 (the TOR), Annex 2 (Methodology tables and graphs), and Annex 3 (People interviewed for the CSM evaluation (global)).

- Chapters 2 and 3. These describe the context for the synthesis of the country strategy evaluations. They are linked to Annex 4 (Chronology of Key Events and Finnish Development Cooperation).

- Chapter 4: The synthesis of country strategy evaluation findings. It is linked to Annex 5 (a data and analysis annex that supports the summary discussion in the chapter itself).

- Chapter 5: The CSM context and description that provides the basic information on the CSM and its evolution from the CEPs.

- Chapter 6: The CSM evaluation findings. This chapter is linked to Annex 6 (RBM Country Programming Practices of Selected OECD DAC Donors) and Annex 7 (Summary of the Kenya country context, CSM processes, CS and applicable findings).

- Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations on the CSM evaluation (Executive summaries, conclusions and recommendations of the CS portfolio evaluations are provided in Annex 8.)

2 SETTING THE CONTEXT: OVERVIEW OF FINLAND'S DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND COOPERATION

The introduction of CSM and CSs evolved from a long history of development cooperation starting in 1961. This chapter describes the context briefly, to contextualise the evaluation evidence and findings against the background of Finland's development policy and cooperation. The evolution of Finland's development cooperation is presented in more detail in the chronology at Annex 4.

2.1 Finland's development policy

2.1.1 Background

Finland has been committed to providing official development assistance (ODA) to developing countries since the early 1960s, when ODA was included in the state budget for the first time. It committed to reaching the 0.7 percent of GNI (gross national income) target for ODA in 1970 and became a member of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD DAC) in 1975. With commitments to development cooperation growing throughout the 1980s and exceeding 0.7 percent in 1991, systems and structures were established to oversee development cooperation and facilitate coherence across the programme. From 1996 Finland published policy guidance for development policy implementation, including a White Paper in 2001. The first Development Policy Programme, the instrument used today, was published in 2004. Advisory board structures also evolved and in 2003 the Development Policy Committee was established.

2.1.2 Evolution of development policy

The Development Policy Programme (DPP) – which is updated every four years, and which forms an integral component of Finland's foreign and security policies – frames Finland's development cooperation programmes. Table 1 below provides an outline of the objectives, principles and commitments detailed in each of the successive DPPs over the evaluation period. Table 1 highlights that Finland's development policy has consistently identified key areas as the focus of its development cooperation – notably poverty reduction, human rights, democracy and environmental protection. These themes were also present in earlier DPPs. Development policy has thus reflected considerable continuity in terms of goals, principles, channels and instruments.

Table 1: Evolution of Finland's development policy 1998–2012

2007	The key objectives of the 2007 development policy were "eradication of poverty and sustainable development" in compliance with UN Millennium Development Goals (MFA 2007b). The policy focused on sustainable economic, ecological and social development, climate and environmental issues, and prevention of crises as support to peace-building processes. The cross-cutting themes of the policy were: (i) Improvement of the position of women and girls in promotion of equality; (ii) Promotion of the rights of the children, persons with disabilities, indigenous people and ethnic minorities; and (iii) combating HIV/AIDS.
2012	The Development Policy Programme of 2012 (MFA 2012a) was in line with Finland's long-term commitment to human rights and societal equity as an anchor to development in all countries. The Development Policy paper had four priority areas: a democratic and accountable society that promotes human rights; an inclusive green economy that promotes employment; sustainable management of natural resources and environmental protection; and human development. The cross-cutting objectives (CCOs) that must always be taken into consideration were (1) Gender equality; (2) Reduction of inequality; and (3) Climate sustainability. These cross-cutting objectives were promoted globally and they had to be integrated in all development cooperation through (1) Mainstreaming, (2) Completing mainstreaming by targeted action, and (3) Including them in policy dialogue and in communication in bilateral, multilateral and EU cooperation. Reduction of inequalities implied particular attention to the rights and opportunities of groups that are particularly vulnerable and easily marginalized. These include children, persons with disabilities, ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples, people living with HIV/AIDS, and those belonging to sexual and gender minorities. Additionally, based on the mandate given by Finland's population to the Government through Parliament, Finland applied a value-based approach that emphasizes human rights and self-determination, freedom, equal opportunity and non-discrimination, democracy, equal participation, inclusion and equality. Supporting those who are disadvantaged has for a long time been a priority in Finland's development policies.
2016	The new 2016 Development Policy Programme aligns with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, outlining the special focus for Finnish development policy in four priority areas: I) The rights and status of women and girls are strengthened; II) Developing countries' own economies have generated jobs, livelihood opportunities and well-being; III) Societies have become more democratic and better-functioning; IV) Food security and access to water and energy have improved, and natural resources are used sustainably. The principles guiding the development policy emphasise democracy, gender equality, human rights, sustainable use of resources and sustainable economies. The goal of the Development Policy programme is to 'eradicate extreme poverty and to reduce poverty and inequality', with special emphasis on realising human rights in line with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Development Policy programme therefore underlines a human rights-based approach. Climate change is outlined as being 'one of mankind's greatest challenges', with the policy highlighting that all activities undertaken will be geared towards mitigating climate change and supporting climate change adaptation and preparedness. The Development Policy Programme emphasises that Finland will focus on areas where it has particular know-how.

2.1.3 Volume of aid

Between 2008 and 2015 Finland provided altogether USD10 876 million[4] in official development assistance (ODA) (OECD DAC 2016a). Disbursement volumes peaked in 2014, at USD 1 635 million, as shown in Figure 1. Finland's weighted average disbursement over the period was 87 percent. Funding for ODA was however cut significantly in 2016 as a result of overall MFA budget cuts. In the six long-term partner countries assessed in this evaluation funding volumes declined by 21 percent. Funding through the multilateral, CSO and private sector channels also declined significantly.

Finland is a relatively small donor. Its total disbursement over the period is equal to 38 percent of average disbursement by OECD DAC EU donors. The figure also illustrates that Finland's average disbursement is on a par with that of OECD DAC EU donors on average, which is also 87 percent.

Figure 1: Finland ODA volume and disbursements 2008 to 2016

Legend:
- Percentage of commitments disbursed (Finland)
- Percentage of commitments disbursed (average EU)
- DAC EU members average
- Finland

Source: OECD DAC 2016a

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[4] The OECD DAC figures are published in dollars as the DAC unit of account. However, the MFA submits the numbers that DAC publishes.

2.1.4 Sectors of Finland's development policy

The areas of emphasis in DPPs have translated to key sectoral areas of support in all countries. Key areas have been forestry, water, environment, energy, education, health and regional and rural development, as illustrated by Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: Finnish ODA by sector (to all partner countries[5] between 2008–2014)[6]

Source: OECD DAC 2016a. Note that at the sector level disbursement data are not available and 2015 data have not yet been released.

2.1.5 Partner countries in the DPP

Up to the 2016 Development Policy Programme, Finland's support to countries fell into two categories – long-term partner countries, and other partnerships – with some countries in transition. From the outset of establishing ODA, Finland identified and built partnerships with key countries, many of which remain the focus of its development cooperation in 2016. Assistance to Kenya, Ethiopia, Zambia and (then) Tanganyika began as far back as the 1960s. From 1996 there was an expansion in countries supported in line with a principle of flexibility – and especially on a short-term basis and to mitigate conflict (e.g. South Africa, Yugoslavia) (MFA 2001; OECD DAC 2003). However, this was followed by an emphasis from 2001 on the need for greater sector and country concentration in order to enhance effectiveness (OECD DAC 2003). In 2004 a Government Resolution out-

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[5] This includes long-term partner countries and assistance to other countries.

[6] Note that this figure reflects all Finnish ODA flows, not only the support provided through bilateral instruments in long-term partner countries (see section 3.1 for further discussion).

lined directions for channelling bilateral aid to fewer countries and sectors. Subsequently, Finland made efforts to focus on no more than three sectors in each of its long-term partner countries (alongside provision of general budget support) and reduced the total number of long-term partner countries (currently 7) from 11 in 2003 (OECD DAC 2007). The 2016 Development Policy Programme however only refers to Partner Countries.

The 2007 DAC Peer Review highlighted the need for Finland to 'establish clear and coherent objectives' and 'ensure clear criteria for the selection of partner countries' (OECD DAC 2007). The 2007 Development Policy articulated that bilateral development cooperation was to be targeted in countries 'where development policy targets can be effectively promoted' (MFA 2007b). It indicated that the country's need for assistance (i.e. only low-income countries), the degree of support already received, the political situation, and the added value of Finland's cooperation would be considered in planning and programming cooperation. The 2007 DPP also stated that continued engagement in countries would be guided by a review of the continued need and value added, and, when appropriate, transition strategies would be developed to enable exit. Over time, the number of countries constituting long-term partner countries has fluctuated, with countries transitioning to other types of development cooperation, including most recently Nicaragua.

Figure 3 below shows the volume of disbursements by Finland for all ODA instruments between 2008 and 2014 (the bars on the chart), as well as the share of Finland's ODA in overall ODA disbursed (the dots on the chart). For example, in Nepal Finland disbursed USD 803 million between 2008 and 2014, comprising 3 percent of all ODA to Nepal. In Tanzania, however, Finland disbursed almost double the amount disbursed to Nepal, but this equalled only 2 percent of ODA.

Figure 3: Aid disbursement to long-term partner countries
(USD million 2008–2014)

Source: OECD DAC 2016a

2.2 Channels and instruments of Finland's development policy 2008 to 2016

The instruments and channels outlined in the 2012 and 2016 DPPs include other aid modalities and channels for support (private, multilateral and civil society-based) beyond those that are project-based and constitute more 'traditional' cooperation (government-to-government).

2.2.1 Bilateral cooperation instruments

Bilateral support comprised 16 percent of Finland's overall ODA portfolio in 2014 (MFA 2014). Historically, project-based support was the primary mechanism for Finnish bilateral development cooperation. However, in the early years of the evaluation period, shifts towards programme support as well as support channelled through sector-wide approaches increased. Finland has been an active participant in sector and pooled funding programmes, including through dialogue and chairing of sector working groups. Throughout the 2000s, general budget support (GBS) was a growing modality for channelling development cooperation funds amongst the wider donor community. The 2007 DPP stated that budget support would be part of its programme-based cooperation in countries where it was feasible (MFA 2007b), and in the 2012 DPP it was detailed as a mechanism to enhance the objectives of the country programming. For Tanzania, Mozambique and to some degree Zambia GBS was a substantial component of support for a number of years earlier in the evaluation period. However, by the end of the evaluation period GBS had been phased out in partner countries, driven by budget cuts made in 2015 for the 2016 budget as well as by weakened conditions for budget support in partner countries (see Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania country evaluation reports). Finland also engages in regional development cooperation, providing support mainly through international organisations and regional institutions for economic cooperation, but with the emphasis that regional programmes should have regional scope and support wider integration.

In addition, Finland provides bilateral cooperation through the Institutional Cooperation Instrument (ICI). The 2007 DPP outlined the need for cooperation between Finnish and partner country public sector organisations to be increased. The ICI (and the Higher Education Institutional Cooperation Instrument, HE-ICI, which is not a bilateral instrument) was developed in order to facilitate financing of public sector organisations and support the strengthening of capacity in partner countries by utilising the technical expertise in Finnish public sector organisations. In Finland, this instrument is available to government agencies and public institutions (MFA 2007a).

Figure 4 presents the proportion of total Finnish aid to its key partner countries (including Nicaragua) between 2008 and 2014 by bilateral aid channel. The figure highlights that the highest proportion of bilateral aid is channelled as bilateral country programmable support, but that other channels increased and fluctuated (including in concessional credits) over the period.

Bilateral support comprises less than 20 percent of Finland's overall ODA portfolio.

Figure 4: Finnish aid flows by modality to partner countries (2008–2014)

EUR '000

Source: MFA 2015

2.2.2 Other channels and instruments

In addition to the bilateral cooperation instruments outlined above, development cooperation is also channelled through a number of other mechanisms, including NGOs/CSOs, private sector and multilateral institutions. The evolution and main instruments of these channels are briefly outlined in Table 2 below, with a growing emphasis in the 2012 and the 2016 DPPs on alternative channels and instruments.

Table 2: Summary of other development cooperation channels

Channel	Support to Finnish Civil Society
Evolution	Support to Finnish Civil Society to implement activities in developing countries has long been an important component of Finnish development cooperation. Guidelines were developed in 2010. An increasing share of Finnish ODA is channelled through CSOs. In 2011, 545 organisations received Finnish ODA, with a wide range and geographical spread of projects (Reinikka 2015). Issues of complementarity between CSO activities and Finland's operations were highlighted in a 2013 evaluation (Olesen and Endeshaw 2013); the 2012 DAC Review also noted the administrative burden of delivering and monitoring these activities. The 2016 DPP outlines Finland's aim to reinforce the capacity of civil society organisations in developing countries, given their core function in contributing to democratic and just societies and to building political accountability. The 2016 DPP states that civil society organisations receiving state support should be cognizant of Finland's values, principles and goals in their activities, with Finnish CSOs encouraged to work in the poorest countries.
Instruments	The 2016 DPP states that the majority of resources will be targeted through multi-annual programmes implemented by experienced organisations. The main channels for providing grants to civil society actors are as follows: • Partnership agreements with Finnish Development Organisations: funding to Finnish NGOs with long-term agreements with MFA. • Support for Special Foundations: funding to intermediary NGOs in Finland to administer grant programmes in developing countries. • Grants to International NGOs: selective support provided to organisations that support Finnish goals; also those engaged in development communication and global education activities. • Funds for Local Cooperation (FLC): grants made and managed at country level by Finnish Embassies to local civil society organisations and educational institutions supporting Finland's development cooperation objectives
Channel	**Private sector**
Evolution	The private sector was recognised in the 2012 DPP as an increasingly important sector, with a need to develop modalities that support interventions. Commitment is reinforced in the 2016 DPP, which outlines mechanisms to deepen cooperation with the private sector (to build developing countries' economic base and promote job creation). Support to the private sector is presented as a way in which climate change and sustainable development goals can be met. The work of the MFA is supported by the work of Team Finland, a network to promote Finland and Finnish company success abroad, bringing together state-funded actors and services. Team Finland Supports Finnish company activities abroad.

Channel	Private sector
Instruments	**Finnfund:** a state-owned development finance institution with oversight provided by MFA, enabling private-to-private cooperation. It provides long-term risk capital for profitable investments supporting economic and social development. DPP 2016 states that Finnfund should focus on poor developing countries and support activities in line with Finnish interests/goals. In 2014, Finnfund's investment portfolio exceeded EUR 115 million with investments in manufacturing, renewable energy, forestry and health care.

Finnpartnership Programme: provides business partnership support and advisory services in developing countries as well as seed financing to joint development projects (of Finnish and developing country actors). It is designed to encourage business partnerships especially in developing countries.

BEAM (Business with Impact): a new joint initiative (between Tekes and MFA) to generate new, sustainable business in developing countries through innovation and opportunities for private sector participation. Funding sources include half from commercial enterprises.

Concessional credits: utilised to support Finnish private sector participation in international development/public sector projects from 1987, but with a commitment in the 2012 DPP to develop a new modality. Evaluation in 2012 highlighted major weaknesses in the resourcing, monitoring and implementation of the concessional credits scheme. Replaced in the 2016 DPP by **the Public Sector Investment Facility** to support public sector investments in developing countries with Finnish technology and expertise. |
| **Channel** | **Multilateral cooperation** |
| Evolution | Increased levels of multilateral assistance in overall ODA. In 2014, the total amount of multilateral assistance was 42% of Finland's aid budget, and around 100 multilateral agencies and funds were supported. Considered to be an important channel through which to extend influence and 'have a say' in targeting of development funding, including in countries where Finland is not directly engaged. |
| Instruments | **UN agencies** (such as UN Women, UNFPA, and UNICEF), where the focus is on gender equality, reducing inequality and sustainable environmental development. Support also to the UN WIDER Institute based in Helsinki.

Multilateral agencies and development financing institutions: the EU and the World Bank.

International environmental cooperation/climate financing: Including the Green Climate Fund and support to the Global Environment Facility. |

2.3 Management of Finland's development policy

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) is an integrated ministry with overall responsibility for preparing and guiding the Government of Finland's foreign policy. It has operated as an integrated ministry since the late 1990s, when a reorganisation in 1998 led to the establishment of geographical divisions to oversee development cooperation as well as trade and political ('foreign policy') affairs (OECD DAC 1999). The reorganisation was undertaken in response to growing acknowledgement of the need to consider development cooperation as an instrument of foreign policy, as well as to view relations with developing countries more holistically (and taking account of trade and aid as whole). In addition, a Development Policy Committee was established with a focus on ensuring policy coherence for development.

Under the current organisational structure, there are three ministers responsible for issues falling within the mandate of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs: the Minister for Foreign Affairs is supported by a Minister for Foreign Trade and Development and a Minister for Nordic Cooperation, with overall leadership lying with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. In addition, there is a Secretary of State (the head of the Office of the Minister) and four Under Secretaries (for Development Cooperation and Development Policy; External Economic Relations; Foreign and Security policy; and Internal and external services).

There are eight departments (three with responsibility for policy coordination, four with responsibility for regional matters, and a communications department), as well as functions existing outside the departmental divisions (e.g. financial management, internal audit, policy, planning and research, development evaluation) and ambassadors based in units of the regional departments (MFA 2016a, see Figure 5 below). The structure has brought about complexities and need for strong coordination given the spreading of development cooperation responsibilities across multiple departments (Reinikka 2015).

Key development cooperation departments and structures

The **Department for Development Policy** is responsible for Finland's development policy, development cooperation policy and development and humanitarian financing. It has responsibility for planning (including financial planning) and monitoring development cooperation, including developing guidance materials, and undertaking quality control. The Department for Development Policy includes units that oversee Finnish support channelled through multilateral institutions and Finnish civil society organisations, as well as through various private sector instruments.

Figure 5: Structure of the MFA

Source: MFA 2016a

There are **four regional departments** that have various responsibilities, primarily including oversight of bilateral relations (including political, trade, commercial/economic, and development cooperation issues) with countries. The regional departments have a mandate to decide upon the ODA funds under their management. This comprises the preparation, presentation and handling of development cooperation projects in the MFA's internal system (or programmed by the ministry itself), as well as their management and monitoring. Finland's partner countries fall under the responsibility of the Department for Africa and the Middle East (Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia) and the Department for the Americas and Asia (Nepal and Vietnam).

Additionally the **Development Policy Steering Group** (DPSG) and the **Quality Assurance Board** (QAB) provide internal coordination and oversight. The DPSG provides recommendations on the Country Strategy papers before the Minister approves them. Proposals for programmes/projects are screened by the QAB to ensure they comply with guidance/policies and quality requirements.

Embassies have responsibility for the key functions of Finland's foreign service such as trade and political relations, and consular services, besides development cooperation.

The CS portfolios are managed by a country team that comprises staff members sitting both within MFA regional departments (who 'steer' operations) and within the embassy of the partner country. Thematic advisors and specialist at the embassy level oversee implementation of interventions. The country team oversees implementation of the partner country activities through delivery of the country strategy.

The OECD DAC Peer Review undertaken in 2007 recommended delegation of decision-making to embassies, and a system was introduced by MFA to enable embassies in long-term partner countries to increase their authority (OECD DAC 2007). A framework was developed outlining eligibility criteria and qualifying

conditions, with a list of tasks that would be decentralised. Despite these provisions, embassies have very limited decentralised decision-making authority, including for financial decision-making. In addition, the 2012 DPP committed to advance delegation of development cooperation administration to embassies (DPP 2012). However, the 2012 OECD DAC review emphasised that decisions to decentralise authority were 'decided on a case-by-case basis and based on individual initiative and resources', which, whilst ensuring that individual embassy capacity could be taken into consideration, limited embassies' ability to respond to policy/programme needs (OECD DAC 2012). An evaluation undertaken in 2015 highlighted that financial decisions above the value of EUR 500,000 required sign-off from the Minister, including those made in line with CS documents. It concluded that this undermined the responsibilities of regional departments and embassies to deliver an effective programme, with embassies restricted in being able to respond flexibly to country situations (Reinikka 2015).

2.4   Conclusion: context for the CSM and CSs

Finland's development policy has long identified key focuses for its development cooperation, notably poverty reduction, human rights, democracy and environmental protection. Its key areas of support are forestry, water, environment, energy, education, health and regional and rural development. Finland is a small donor. Between 2008 and 2014 its aid disbursements were about a third of the average for DAC EU members.

Up to the 2016 DPP Finland's support to countries fell into two categories: long-term partner countries and other partnerships. From 2001 Finland has emphasised the need for greater sector and country concentration in order to enhance effectiveness. Thus over the CS period Finland had seven partner countries, down from 11 in 2003. In the partner countries assessed Finland's share of total ODA disbursed is between 1 and 3 percent.

Finland provides support through many channels and instruments. Bilateral support and the ICI are channelled through the regional departments that also have responsibility for oversight of political, trade and commercial/economic bilateral relations with countries. Support is also provided through Finnish NGOs/CSOs, private sector instruments, and the multilateral institutions. This cooperation is managed by the Development Policy Department. This means that development coordination is managed across two departments, one of which has additional responsibilities.

Finland's development cooperation is managed by two separate departments of the MFA.

3 DESCRIPTION OF COUNTRY CONTEXTS AND STRATEGIES

3.1 Context of Finland's development cooperation in long-term partner countries

Finland's long-term partner countries have a range of development challenges and are in different stages of economic and social development, as well as sharing similarities in development. Their populations range from 15.72 million people in Zambia to 90.7 million in Vietnam and 97 million in Ethiopia, one of the most populous countries in Africa, though it is Zambia that has the highest population growth rate at 3.1 percent in 2014 (World Bank, 2014). The growing population pressures in these countries exacerbate the pressure on resources. In Zambia, for example, pressure is increasing on forests with economic development and energy challenges, and soils are being degraded. Food insecurity remains a major issue in Ethiopia. Table 3 provides a snapshot of the long-term partner countries against key development indicators.

Table 3: Long-term partner countries against key development indicators

	Ethiopia	Kenya	Mozam-bique	Nepal	Tanzania	Vietnam	Zambia
GNI per capita USD current 2013	470	1160	610	730	860	1740	1810
Annual GNI per capita growth 2014	8%	3%	3%	5%	4%	4%	0.4%
Aid flows per capita USD current 2013	41	76	88	31	68	46	75
Annual average growth 2008–13	11%	7%	8%	11%	10%	11%	8%
Income status (LM=lower middle)	low	low	low	low	low	LM	LM
Gini index (different years)	29.8	47.7	45.7	32.8	37.6	35.6	54.6
Gini index country quartile ranking out of 154 countries	(1st)	(4th)	(4th)	(1st)	(2nd)	(2nd)	(4th)
% of population living below USD 2 per person per day	72	67	82	56	73	13	83
Human Development Index ranking out of 188 countries (2015)	174	145	180	145	151	116	139
Environmental public health and ecosystem Performance Index rank (2012, in 132 countries)	70	83	89	38	64	79	64

Source: World Development Indicators June 2015; Yale Centre for Law and Environmental Policy 2012; Human Development Index 2015

It shows that two of the long-term partner countries had already advanced to lower middle-income status by the start of the CS period, namely Vietnam and Zambia. By the end of the CS period Kenya too had migrated to the lower middle-income status group (World Bank 2016). A fourth country, Tanzania, if it continues the annual per capita growth rates experienced between 2008 and 2014 (about 3 percent), could achieve lower middle-income status in the next few years.

While both Vietnam and Zambia are also the highest ranked in the Human Development Index (HDI) of the partner countries, in Zambia a high percentage of the population is still living on less than USD 2 per day, resulting in the highest inequality measured amongst the partner countries. Ethiopia and Mozambique had the lowest income per capita at the start of the CS period, coupled with low HDI rankings and high poverty. Interestingly, Kenya and Nepal share the HDI 145th ranking out of 188 countries, but with very different income per capita and inequality statistics.

The context assessments in the CS evaluation reports show furthermore that the partner countries are faced with a range of challenges in achieving development targets. Common issues are political instability, institutional weaknesses, poor governance and the threat of corruption (see the CS reports for Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Nepal and Zambia), as well as vulnerabilities to natural disasters and climate instability (see reports for Mozambique, Nepal and Vietnam).

The countries are dependent on aid to varying degrees: Vietnam, Zambia and Nepal's receipts represent between 3 and 4 percent of per capita income, whilst Tanzania, Ethiopia and Kenya receive between 7 and 9 percent of per capita income in aid. Mozambique is the outlier, receiving 14 percent of per capita income as aid. In Zambia and Vietnam many donors moved to other forms of partnership over the evaluation period.

3.2   Evolution of country programming 2008 to 2016

The section draws on analysis across the country programmes, with Figure 6 below summarising the sectors and expenditure per sector as supported in each country between 2013 and 2015, the main CS period.

There is a strong link between the CEP and the CS phases of the evaluation period with many of the individual programmes or projects undertaken by Finland in the early years of the CSs having started before 2013 and having been developed under the 2007 DPP and the CEP modality. There have also been very few changes in the focus sectors of the countries during the period 2008–2016, although in Zambia, Tanzania and Nepal the number of interventions or sectors supported reduced after 2012.

There have been some sectors that have been discontinued. In Mozambique support to the health sector was discontinued from 2010 in the interests of donor harmonisation and the agreement that each donor would concentrate on a maximum of three sectors. In Vietnam, rural development programmes were discontinued by 2010 to ensure a better fit between the portfolio and Finland's emerging transition objectives, and because financial space was needed for new types of interventions such as the Innovation Partnership Programme.

There were also some new sectors and interventions introduced by countries. In Zambia governance was introduced as a sector in its own right and new specific interventions in private sector development, PFM and social protection were also added within this sector. In Ethiopia a third sector, rural economic development, was added in 2012. This reflected the availability of additional funding for Ethiopia as well as sectoral preferences at MFA minister level. An increased emphasis on human rights is also seen in the evaluation period with Finland's

2012 DPP reinforcing a strong emphasis on the Human Rights Based Approach. The Nepal CS emphasised human rights and introduced an increase in funding to support Peace Progress and Human Rights, which constituted 14 percent of the planned budget, compared to 5 percent during the CEP period.

Figure 6: Summary of sectors and expenditure in countries 2013–2016

Dark colours = Budgeted (2013–2016)   Light colours = Realised (2013–2016 to date)

Source: CS evaluation reports for Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nepal, Tanzania, Vietnam and Zambia. Financial data from MFA KEO-80

4   COUNTRY STRATEGY EVALUATION FINDINGS

The evaluation was of the country strategies as much as of the country strategy modality. As the terms of reference made clear, and as interpreted in the inception report (Mokoro and Indufor 2015), evaluating the country strategy is only very partially about evaluating the strategy in the abstract. In order to come to any meaningful findings about the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, complementarity, coherence, coordination and sustainability of the country strategy, the underlying country strategy portfolio needs to be assessed. This chapter provides a synthesis of evaluation findings on the country strategy portfolio, with reflection on how its performance can be related to the strategy as such. The next chapter – on the performance of the CSM – will reflect more specifically on the contributions made by the introduction of country strategies to the performance of Finland's development cooperation. The chapter discusses the country strategy evaluation findings in terms of Finland's theory of how it would affect development outcomes in its long-term partner countries, as expressed in the Country Strategies. Separate reports are available for each country, providing a coherent picture by country.

4.1   A theory of change perspective on the CSs

Figure 7 below sets out the theory of change framework for how the country evaluations approached the assessment of country strategies. The diagram is schematic, in other words it does not include the specific objectives, interventions, inputs and pathways of each country, or the assumptions. Rather it sets out the generic causal chain and assumptions investigated in each country case to assess the strategies. The numbers point to the key explicit or implicit assumptions, given the context, underlying the theorised causal chain from Finnish inputs to the Finnish contribution to the observed results. These – in broad generic terms and with the related evaluation criterion – are:

1. The choice of interventions (the what and the how) was relevant, given the context, so that interventions and actions represent an optimal use of Finnish resources (relevance).

2. Finnish actors and implementation partners have the capacity to deliver the interventions and required actions to deliver results and enable the causal linkages (efficiency).

3. MFA funding is available on time, and is used efficiently/cost-effectively for interventions and actions (efficiency).

4. Development partners – government and other donors – provide inputs, outputs and results that support the interventions and causal linkages of the CS theory of change. Finland's choices are well coordinated with the actions of other development actors (coordination).

5. Direct interventions and policy influence actions are mutually reinforcing (effectiveness, coherence).

6. Outputs are implemented well and achieve their objectives (effectiveness).

7. The contribution of Finnish intervention results to the Finnish Specific Objectives and Objectives targeted in the CSs is arguable. The intervention results are significant in the context (see also 1), are mutually reinforcing with Finland's policy influencing actions, its other interventions, and those of other development actors, and arguably make a telling contribution in one or another way to the objectives targeted (complementarity, effectiveness).

8. Similarly, the achievement of these Finnish objectives will be sustained so that they can, and will make a telling contribution to the development results targeted (sustainability and impact).

The scheme also includes, at the bottom, a reflection of how the CSM, in theory, would affect the country strategies. This theory of change is expanded and assessed in section 6.1.

Figure 7: Scheme of CS theory of change

For a country strategy to succeed it would need to perform well against most if not all of these linkage assumptions. For example, in cases where relevant intervention choices were made, but the chosen interventions were not implemented efficiently or effectively, the theoretical contribution argued by a CS would not have occurred even when the target results were observed. In such cases the strategy would have failed, at least in relation to that one component.

The discussion below therefore builds up the case for arguing – on average across countries given the evaluation evidence – contribution by Finland to the objectives and results targeted. The next chapter will argue what, if any, contribution the CSM made to the findings presented here.

4.2   Relevance of country strategies

From a theory of change perspective, a key question is whether appropriate intervention choices were made in the CS portfolios. An assessment of the CS portfolios against the relevance evaluation criterion, however, provides useful signals on the appropriateness of Finland's choices. Relevance was defined for the evaluation as the extent to which the CS objectives and intervention choices are consistent with the priorities and rights of partner country stakeholders and beneficiaries; partner country development policies and priorities; and Finnish development policies. Each of these are discussed below, based on the country evaluation findings. A discussion of the relevance of specific interventions by sector is provided in Table 10 in Annex 5.

4.2.1   Relevance to partner countries

At a high level country strategies are relevant by design, because they are tied into country development plans. As the country strategies were required to be linked in with partner country development plans, at the level of objectives they are fully relevant. All six country evaluations confirmed that the development results targeted were derived from the prevailing national development plans and strategies.

Overall the teams also found that this objective level relevance extended to the interventions chosen to achieve the objectives. This was enhanced in countries with strong donor harmonisation, alignment and coordination institutions, like Ethiopia, Mozambique and Zambia. Overall Finland was found to make an effort at harmonisation and alignment with other donors, which facilitated relevance to donor partners, although the evaluation teams in Tanzania and Mozambique found that it was difficult to properly assess relevance to other donors as Finland's strategy was not well known, and therefore donor respondents could not comment in any depth on relevance to their programmes. Coordination is discussed further in section 4.8 below.

Finland's intervention choices are often relevant, as they are driven by awareness of the need to make good 'niche' choices complementing other contributions. There is evidence that in selecting/designing interventions, Finland is aware that as a small donor it had to make choices that played to its strengths, overall and as a result of its history in the country, and so that it could make a relevant and meaningful contribution, even if this was small compared to the contribu-

tions of large volume donors. Thus in Zambia, for example, Finland's contribution to the social protection programme was aimed at being complementary to the inputs of other donors, filling gaps by focusing on the poorest and gender. In the environment sector also in Zambia, support by Finland sought to be complementary by working at the decentralised levels. In Vietnam the Innovation Partnership Programme was initially the only donor support for innovation, and even now, with large volume donors active, Finland has still found a complementary niche to support. In the water and sanitation sector Finland chose to support the provision of services in small towns, and focus on sanitation.

Programming choices that may be less relevant to official country plans, are nevertheless still relevant to the citizens of partner countries, especially the most vulnerable and marginalised groups. In some cases the teams noted sector and programming choices that were not fully at the centre of official country priorities. For example, in Tanzania the team argued that the CS emphasised sustainable natural resource management and access to land disproportionately to their profiles in the national programme statements. In Nepal, also in the environment sector, cooperation was initiated by Finland and at the time of formulating the CS, not a priority for the government. In Mozambique the poverty-reduction orientation of the CS portfolio was found to align well with the national joint poverty reduction strategy, but at the same time the team also reported that ownership of this strategy was perhaps not fully with government, and in any case it came to an end in 2015. The current government-driven five-year plan is far more focused on economic growth and job creation, and some government respondents expressed a desire for more Finnish support in this direction and investment by Finnish companies in Mozambique.

This mismatch also occurred in a few instances in relation to the relevance of the interventions chosen, even if the choice of sector was relevant. For example, in Mozambique the team noted that the Finnish interventions were aimed at supporting the food and nutrition security of smallholder farmers, but that government's official agriculture priorities were to support agri-business and commercialisation.

However, it is observable across the countries that where Finland's objective and intervention choices were not strongly relevant to government programmes and strategies, it is because the intervention choice represented a stronger weighting of relevance to the population of partner countries, or of Finnish priorities. This is the case in all the examples used above. For some this affected the effectiveness and sustainability of the interventions (see sections 4.3 and 4.7).

The relevance of initiatives supported by Funds for Local Cooperation (FLCs) is a further case in point. While the substance of the initiatives themselves was found to be relevant to the country context and Finnish objectives for the most part, in Vietnam, Ethiopia and Nepal relevance was also because of the importance of supporting the CSO sector in the country context.

Finland's focus on poverty reduction in many instances enabled relevance to country beneficiaries. While all partner countries have shown economic and/or development gains, poverty and access to public services remain issues in all, even if only for pockets of the population. In four out of the six countries Fin-

land has enabled the relevance of its programming choices by choosing objectives and interventions that address poverty reduction concerns, often with a gender focus. In Zambia and Vietnam, however, the teams found that while this relevance factor was present, the direct relevance to the immediate needs of the poorest population was not always evident, with some exceptions (the social protection programme in Zambia). In Vietnam, the deliberate choice was to focus more on new types of interventions such as the innovation programme, and pay less attention to poverty reduction as the key goal. Nonetheless, the country team made a small adjustment to one instrument to improve poverty reduction relevance.

Even if objectives are relevant, design choices may negatively affect relevance. Issues were raised for some interventions where the intervention designs were not relevant for the context. Factors included that interventions tried to take on too many issues (e.g. Zambia); or were too narrowly focused on specific communities or supporting specific projects rather than a programmatic approach (e.g. forestry in Nepal). The highly technical nature of tools and systems being put in place, which may not be context relevant, was noted as affecting relevance in Zambia, in the rural district agribusiness support programme in Tanzania, and in the ICT intervention in Mozambique. In Vietnam using forestry information as an entry point to develop community forestry was also found to be less relevant than a focus on alternative mechanisms might have been, even if another Finnish intervention supported the development of forestry information. There are also instances where the size of projects makes them less relevant. In Vietnam, for example, the private sector development instruments, while highly relevant in principle, were less relevant in implementation because of their size, but also because they were not flexible enough to respond to needs. The impact of budget cuts will also affect the relevance of some programmes, insofar as they were conceived for long-term support and may not go to scale in a context where funding is restricted (e.g. in Zambia).

4.2.2 Relevance to DPPs

The 2007 and 2012 DPPs highlight democratic and accountable societies that promote human rights, inclusive green economies, sustainable development and sustainable management of natural resources, and human development. Both the 2007 and 2012 Finnish development policies put a strong emphasis on cross-cutting themes, namely human rights, gender, climate change and equality. **Across the country evaluations, CS portfolios were found to be highly relevant to these DPP emphases.** They were explicitly acknowledged in the texts of the CSs, and in some cases (e.g. Vietnam) changes were made in the CS portfolio and interventions to sharpen alignment.

However, the DPPs give broad guidance, and no dramatic changes in country programming between the CEPs and CSs occurred, despite the change of the DPPs. This is perhaps inevitable: any one intervention usually spans a DPP (and CS) change. Besides, the importance of building a development relationship with partners would make frequent changes of direction undesirable for results. The impact of a DPP on country strategies and of country strategies on programming will always lag, with the impact perhaps only seen on the ground once the period for the DPP/CS has passed. However, it is arguable that broad

While the objectives of interventions are mostly relevant to context, their design in some cases was not.

consistency between the DPPs does not necessitate drastic change, so even if there had been more flexibility in the short term, CS portfolios would not have changed much.

There is much evidence across countries of programme choices being relevant to cross-cutting concerns of the DPPs. Two countries, Nepal and Tanzania, include support for UN Women. Others have significant gender elements within interventions, for example the land management and environmental project in Tanzania that is aimed at enhancing women's access to productive resources, the gender focus in the Zambia social protection programme, the gender focus in Nepal's water and sanitation programmes.

It is apparent too that human rights and climate change concerns weighed strongly for teams when making programming choices. For example, in Nepal the choice to include environment interventions in view of the country's climate change vulnerability speaks to this. And in Mozambique it can be argued that bilingual education is an important human rights issue, even if in the context it is not perhaps the most cost-effective means for improving education quality outcomes. In a country like Ethiopia, the evaluation found that this relevance was still enabled by focusing the CS portfolio on economic and social rights. The land intervention, for example, sought to make communities more aware of their rights to services, while also building government capacity to deliver services.

In two countries, however, the CSs were not fully relevant for the (country-specific) Finnish transitioning objectives. This was the case in Vietnam and Zambia. In Vietnam the team argued that while the existing portfolio at the time of the CS – which for the most part determined the CS – was relevant to the country and to the prior Finnish DPP, it did not leave room to allocate significant funding for instruments and interventions to facilitate transitioning, a Finnish objective. In Zambia the team found similarly that relevance was reduced by the CS not being flexible enough to act as a framework for more explicitly acknowledging that the context in Zambia was evolving.

There is some evidence across the countries that the introduction of specific priorities into country programming by the Finnish political leadership can lead to less relevant intervention choices, both for the country and for Finland's programme overall. An example is the STIFIMO project in Mozambique which was introduced in a context where the absorptive capacity for the scale and ambition of the project was lacking. In contrast, in Tanzania the introduction of an electricity project – out of keeping with the rest of the portfolio – was found to have been a relevant contribution to tackling issues relating to the capital's aging and inadequate electricity network, but at the same time not to have made any direct contribution to CS objectives.

4.3 Effectiveness of country strategies

Finland's country strategies are built on assumptions about the effectiveness of strategy interventions. They also make assumptions about the relationship between intervention results, and the achievement of the strategy objectives. In short, the assumption is that if the strategy interventions and actions are

implemented well and deliver their results as planned, Finland should be contributing to the strategy objectives targeted.

The evaluation tested both of these sets of assumptions. Whilst the findings across the country evaluations are mixed, it is possible to discern trends. This section discusses these trends, citing examples from the country cases.

4.3.1 Intervention effectiveness

The discussion below relies on assessment of intervention effectiveness through review of existing documentation and follow-up primary fieldwork. In many cases an assessment of intervention effectiveness at a strategy level was hampered by limited availability of outcome level data and full evaluations of interventions, which would have provided consistently robust evidence bases. In cases where existing documentation was limited, the teams themselves undertook a light review of intervention performance, but this in principle would not deliver as strong an evidence set as a full review or evaluation.

Overall, most of the funding provided via the country strategies to country interventions over the CS period was used in interventions that were found to have achieved their results, even if with qualifications. This finding is supported by Figure 8 below that draws on the country teams' assessments of individual CS interventions to develop a summary view of how different country strategy portfolios performed, at the intervention level.

Based on the qualitative assessments provided by the country evaluation teams, each major CS intervention was given a rating of

- good results: the intervention had delivered its planned results, with no material qualifications;

- good results with qualifications: the intervention had delivered its results on balance, but with material qualifications;

- poor with some results: the intervention had not delivered results for the most part, but with some material exceptions;

- poor results: the intervention had not delivered results, any results observed were minor and not material.

For some interventions the teams were unable to assess the effectiveness because of a lack of data or because it was too early to provide an assessment. These interventions were rated as unclear. In order to assess the performance of a country portfolio overall, this indicative rating was applied to the aggregate project budgets 2013 to 2016 by project, to provide a performance-rated assessment of the funding attached to each project. In Figure 8 below the bar represents the share of projects rated in each category, of the overall portfolio budget rated. The line – linked to the right axis – represents the total amounts attaching to rated projects over this period. The bar on the far right is the share of interventions rated in each category, in the total budget for all projects rated. A detailed table setting out the rated interventions, their associated budgets, the rating and a summary explanation for the rating is provided in Annex 5.

For the most part the country programmes committed funds to interventions that were effective.

While this analysis is a somewhat blunt instrument to assess effectiveness[7], it does provide an 'at a glance' view of the CS performance. And this view clearly shows that for the most part, adjusted by value, the CS evaluations found evidence that the underlying CS interventions have been effective. Across all projects 74 percent of budgeted funding was for interventions that were found to produce good results, even if teams noted more or less significant qualifications to this finding in the interventions associated with more than half of this funding.

In Zambia the higher proportion of funding that was budgeted for interventions for which the teams noted poor results is linked to large projects that took up a significant block of the CS portfolio budgets, namely the small-scale irrigation project. In Mozambique the underlying projects associated with the negatively rated project funding were the rural development programme, a terminated forestry programme and a science and technology intervention.

Figure 8: Performance-weighted budget shares in aggregate and by country (2013 to 2016)

Source: CS evaluation reports for Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nepal, Tanzania, Vietnam, Zambia. Financial data from MFA KEO-80

This analysis can also be done by sector. The heights of the bars in Figure 9 below reflect the amount budgeted between 2013 and 2016 for the assessed main CS interventions by sector, across the six CS countries evaluated. It shows that all assessed interventions with objectives in the education; private sector; growth and employment; law and human rights; and women empowerment sec-

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[7] The results of the analysis should be taken as broadly indicative of relative performance trends, rather than a precise calculation of performance differences between country portfolios. Firstly, the quantitative analysis is based on qualitative and interpretive findings by country teams, and secondly, intervention size is not necessarily a direct predictor of potential intervention contribution to country level results.

tors were found to deliver good or good with qualifications results. In the latter two areas, however, the amounts provided were dwarfed by high-budget and more poorly performing interventions in agriculture, rural development and land management; forestry; and water and sanitation to a lesser degree.

Figure 9: Performance weighted budgets by objective area 2013–2016

Euro Million nominal

Source: CS evaluation reports. Financial data from MFA KEO-80

4.4 Contribution of CS portfolios to country strategy objectives

Given that in many cases Finland's interventions under the country strategies delivered their intended results, the question is then whether contribution can be argued from these results to the associated CS objectives. Evidence against this question is analysed in detail in Annex 5, Table 12, by country. Across countries however, teams found that a robust analysis of contribution from intervention results to CS objectives was not possible. Given Finland's size, in many cases the contribution distance from interventions to country objectives was long, with many other factors impacting the results shown at objective level. Assessment of contribution was therefore often only in principle. Even where this contribution gap was smaller, data against the measures in CS results frameworks to assess results at the objective level were not consistently available. In

many cases therefore, the contribution assessment was limited to investigating whether there are positive or negative signals of contribution, even if the size of the contribution could not be analysed or measured with any accuracy.

In summary, the evidence in the country reports from these assessments and as summarized in Annex 5, Table 12, provides the following findings:

- The Ethiopia strategy interventions were found to make a strong contribution to the country strategic objectives in the education and water sectors. In other sectors contribution is still emerging. The country, through utilizing the dialogue and donor coordination system, has made good use of policy influence and the development of models and approaches to build contribution pathways to the target objectives.

- In Mozambique the country strategy interventions had thus far delivered limited or localized contribution for some interventions; in principle a country-wide contribution could be argued for others. In education the sector programme made good contribution to realising the country objective on access to education, but quality results were not achieved, and the specific intervention on quality has not as yet yielded concrete results at the outcome level. One intervention delivered no contribution.

- In Nepal contributions were either localised to project beneficiaries (water and sanitation, forestry), or limited by difficulties in institutionalising progress (environment, law and human rights, water), because of the narrow nature of the intervention relative to the objective. While the value of localised contributions should not be underestimated – especially for the beneficiaries reached – better contribution occurs when local project success can be leveraged through policy influence. As cases in point, good contribution in education was argued, and the foundations for a good contribution in environment have been laid through establishment of a model for local authority environmental management.

- In Tanzania the team found that while many interventions were effective in terms of their objectives at the intervention level, contribution to the higher level objectives was often limited by difficult contexts for the interventions, or could only be argued in principle.

- In Vietnam the innovation partnership programme made a strong contribution to a basis for a knowledge-based society, but little as yet to an enhanced green economy. In the natural resource and climate change sector some contribution was made through leveraging models in forestry and water and sanitation sectors, beyond which contribution was more limited or localised.

- In Zambia the CS interventions were found to make strong contributions in the private sector and social protection objectives, but only limited or localised contributions in the agriculture and environment sectors. Limited intervention effectiveness in these sectors affected the contributions, but the team argued that contribution could be leveraged particularly in agriculture through the establishment of models and approaches.

4.4.1 Policy influence and other contribution factors

The evaluations showed up examples of successful interventions where Finland's contribution to objectives was disproportionate to the resources it provided.

Finland's policy influence in the sectors it is supporting is in many cases a key driver of these results. The evaluation defined policy influence as influencing attitudes; influencing a range of formal policies, strategies and approaches; influencing budget changes; and influencing behavioural changes in partners and government when changed budgets translate into changed practices. Policy influence may come about through policy dialogue with government, but also through interventions that may serve as prototypes, or through participation in joint projects and sector forums, that influence the choices made by other donors. In the theories of change the evaluation highlighted the potential role of policy influence to fill the contribution gap between specific – and often relatively small – Finnish interventions and often ambitious country-wide objectives.

This section provides findings on whether policy influence offered an effective contribution pathway for Finland's interventions to target objectives.

Finland has participated actively in policy dialogue and donor and sector forums in all six countries, although not necessarily in each sector in each country, and in most with good effect.

- In Nepal water sector policy development, the Forest Master Plan, the national assessment systems and soft skills education were seen by respondents as the result of effective policy influence driven by or significantly contributed to by Finland.

- In Mozambique Finland was seen to have achieved policy change on bilingual education – although still not formally approved.

- In Zambia the team assessed Finland to have had policy influence in reforming agricultural subsidies by negotiating the introduction of an e-voucher system, and enabling a more equitable distribution of the subsidies, and a role for the private sector in delivering inputs to farmers. Finland is credited for playing a role in eliminating the requirement for yellow fever certificates to boost tourism. It has also successfully lobbied government for a substantial increase in funding for cash transfers.

- In Ethiopia the evaluation found that Finland's aid-effective approach to country programming, including the effort it puts in to ensure government/local ownership of interventions was a key factor to the CS portfolio's effectiveness.

However, effective policy influence is dependent on a country context conducive to dialogue, particularly at the national level. The country teams in Tanzania and Vietnam found that policy influence had been a more effective conduit to leverage Finland's financial investment towards country objectives during the CEP than during the CS period of the evaluation. In Vietnam the team found that Finland had been very active and quite successful in country policy dialogue up to 2011, having taken on leadership roles at national and sector levels.

Policy influence accounts for Finland's contribution to objectives being disproportionate to the resources it provides.

However, with a changed context in terms of aid coordination, the importance of dialogue forums declined, with less opportunity for influencing. In Tanzania government's appetite for policy dialogue declined over the evaluation period. In 2012 donors abandoned the local government reform programme (because of concerns over financial mismanagement) and in 2015, GBS. This has left the Embassy uncertain about how to rebuild dialogue at this level.

In some sectors, however, Finland's long-standing relationship with government still enables constructive policy dialogue despite deteriorating national contexts, e.g. in forestry, notably about a paradigm shift from conservation to sustainable production and commercial development. In Zambia the evaluation found that the environment for aid-effective engagement was more challenging over the CS than the CEP period. Besides a general waning of donor activity in the country in the context of economic growth, the GBS mechanism collapsed in 2014. Yet Finland has been effective at the sector level, as discussed above.

There are several factors that drive Finland's success in policy influence across the six partner countries, despite its relatively small size.

- **Credible counsellors and advisors at Embassies are critical for effective policy engagement with government and partners.** This is found commonly across countries, both as a positive factor building policy influence, and a negative factor detracting from effective engagement when it diminishes (e.g. Vietnam). Once part of a dialogue forum it was found that the size of the financial contribution mattered less than the quality of the dialogue inputs.

- **Finland is willing to take on and resource leadership positions, disproportionate to its staff size.** A common refrain across the country studies is that Finland's taking on leadership positions – with a frequency often disproportionate to its staff size – provides it with influence disproportionate to its financial contribution. It is often the chair or co-chair of national and sector groups, and backs this with support resources. It has also, for example in Mozambique in the education sector, shown leadership by increasing its contribution at a strategic time as other donors were reducing theirs.

- **Its long-term engagement makes it a trusted partner.** Despite deteriorating national circumstances for policy dialogue in Tanzania and Zambia, for example, Finland has been able to continue to influence policy effectively at sector level on the back of longstanding roles in sectors. In Vietnam and Nepal too the evaluation found that its influence in support sectors was a function of its long-standing engagement. While this suggests that results are not solely or even predominantly on account of the current strategy and strategy interventions, the frequency of this finding by country teams provides a strong strategic pointer to how a small donor like Finland can contribute to sector outcomes, beyond its immediate support. It also points towards the current strategy interventions contributing to results in future, provided that support is sustained

Policy influence is dependent on having credible counsellors at the country level.

- **The choice of modality relative to the environment is important for policy influence.** The relationship between policy influence and modality choices is not clear cut. Sector programmes did offer good opportunity for successful dialogue, but not in all cases (e.g. agriculture in Mozambique where ministry-specific context renders dialogue ineffective). On the other hand project modalities were linked to successful influence, particularly when they established replicable/scalable models or approaches, but only when Finland had an established and/or dialogue-friendly relationship (e.g. in agriculture in Zambia and Ethiopia) and made an effort to leverage the model (e.g. in Vietnam). In many cases a combination of sector support and specific technical assistance or project interventions worked (Tanzania, Vietnam, Nepal, Zambia, Ethiopia): in Mozambique the team found that Finland had not exploited the synergy widely.

- **Generally, there are a many examples of Finland's support being used effectively to pilot models or approaches in sectors.** Examples here include the support for leasehold forestry in Nepal, which also owes some of its effectiveness to being implemented in geographic areas not yet supported by other donors. Another example is in community-based forestry in Tanzania, where the evaluation found the project's most effective achievement was to clarify what the most effective approaches to community-based forestry would be through making good progress towards a pro-poor model. In this case, however, the evaluation also found that to make this model effective, long-term support might be needed to scale it up. In Vietnam the government's forest trust fund is modelled on an earlier model established by Finland. In agriculture in Zambia a largely unsuccessful small-scale irrigation project did deliver an example of a public-private partnership (PPP) model and thereby of commercialization of agriculture, while support for the local farmers' union included the creation of innovative ways of accessing financial services. In Ethiopia a Finnish intervention pioneered low-cost approaches to secondary land registration.

Other contribution factors

Overall, discerning intervention selection by Finland as a small donor also drives CS effectiveness. Policy dialogue and influence are not the only factors driving CS effectiveness. In many cases, as alluded to in in section 4.2 above on relevance, this effectiveness is also the result of Finland targeting niche areas to support or piloting approaches which are then adopted, thereby improving overall sector performance, and/or leveraging the contributions of much bigger donors. A good example of this is Finland's support for the social protection programme in Zambia, which now has government commitment to scaling up the initiative. Finland came late to the programme, enabling it to complement and leverage the contributions of much larger donors. It added a focus on policy, disability and support for reform of public welfare assistance, which is much broader than the initial cash transfer programme. Its direct support to the ministry has built the capacity of the institution, supporting trust in government, and making the ministry overall more professional.

This example suggests that **the more relevant the programme to the context, and the more discerning Finland is in what it chooses to support relative to other donors,** the more likely it is to contribute to the results it is seeking. Other examples of this are Finland focusing on sanitation as part of its support in the water and sanitation sector in Nepal and Vietnam; the support for the farmers' union in Zambia; the innovation partnership programme in Vietnam; and examples in education such supporting the development of a national assessment framework in Nepal, and supporting inclusive and special needs education in Ethiopia. In the education sector Finland often saw results by getting a focus on easily marginalized learners onto government's agenda.

Interventions that sharpen countries' ability to deliver, rather than being delivery programmes themselves, if successful, can contribute significantly to CS objectives. In Zambia support to the counterpart ministry for the multi-donor social protection programme, and ensuring capacity in the ministry, helped leverage all the contributions to the programme, including government's. In Vietnam policy and regulatory developments in the knowledge society interventions resulted in a much more conducive environment for technology start-ups, while in forestry important initiatives and models have been piloted by Finland, with take-up by government. However, there are also cases where efforts were not fully successful in building the capacity of governments to deliver.

Projects that are aimed at the introduction of highly technical or ambitious interventions are high risk in terms of effectiveness. Examples are the water and sanitation project in Vietnam and the science and technology intervention in Mozambique. Teams have noted in the case of these projects that the high technical requirements or ambitious scope of the project affected the ability to achieve results in the first place, and even if results were achieved, sustaining them was problematic (see also the discussion on sustainability).

Delays in designing, approving and implementing projects often meant breaks in the causal chain between the selection of relevant interventions and a contribution to the objectives targeted. Similarly, there are many instances of projects that were cancelled due to poor performance or fiduciary issues, affecting the effectiveness of the overall strategy. Delays and early terminations were driven by a number of factors, including on the side of Finland, very long project design phases (e.g. the decentralized forest and other natural resource management programme in Zambia; an agribusiness support project in Tanzania) delays in project negotiation and approvals (e.g. the support for women's leadership and political participation in Tanzania); delays in mobilizing projects including establishing project implementation units (smallholder production promotion in Zambia).

However, delays in and low effectiveness of interventions could also be attributed to difficulties encountered in the project context. For example, in Zambia a small-scale irrigation project underperformed because of low rainfall preventing the anticipated rise in incomes, but also because of delays in land preparation and land issues amongst the beneficiaries. In Tanzania the approval of a new ICT policy was delayed by elections and changes in ministerial portfolios. In Nepal a major local environmental administration initiative could not be implemented because of political issues.

Highly technical or ambitious projects are at higher risk of not delivering.

Context factors also affected effectiveness directly: even if there were no delays, some projects did not deliver expected results because of the context. In Tanzania, for example, governance and political challenges made communities reluctant to put their forest land into statutory village land forest reserves, and the challenges of shifting the national forestry paradigm from conservation to a use mode have slowed results. The project, however, was judged to have laid useful foundations for the required paradigm shifts and institutional development. In Mozambique institutional weaknesses in the counterpart ministry resulted in Finland shifting its support modalities from a sector approach, which in principle could have had more sustainable results towards the country objectives, to much narrower project-based support to a specific beneficiary group.

Capacity and approach of implementing partners are crucial. In Vietnam a water and sanitation project was hampered by the poor capacity of the contractors in terms of the completion and quality of the work. In Tanzania support to women's political participation, implemented through UN Women, was affected by weak capacity of the implementing NGOs.

When Finland works in areas that are a high priority for it, but are lower priority for the partner country, intervention effectiveness can suffer. In Zambia, for example, improvement of environmental management for a reduced rate of deforestation, wildlife depletion and degradation of heritage sites, land and wetlands is one of four CS objectives. Many of the interventions in the sector to contribute to Zambia's achievement of this objective are affected by the sector not being a priority for government. Government funding for a project to establish a data system for biophysical and forestry/environmental data is negligible, affecting the availability and sharing of data and project sustainability.

4.5   Contribution of country strategies to impact

The CS evaluations also looked at the impact of the CS portfolios, or, as defined as an evaluation criterion, the positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by the CS portfolio or likely to be produced. In terms of the CS TOCs, this meant looking at the end of the postulated results chain of the strategies, namely at the effects or likely effects of the CS interventions on the CS objectives and from there to country development results.

Across the country cases and across sectors teams found it difficult to assess progress at the higher end of results chains and precisely link this progress to the CS portfolios through comprehensive contribution analysis so that the information was useful for the MFA for CS management purposes. As discussed in section 1.4.1, this was due to common limitations on the evaluability of CS portfolios against this criterion: paucity of baseline and results data, lack of impact evaluations, long result chains and short time lapses between intervention results and impacts in some cases hampered such an assessment. However, as a proxy and to test the validity of the assumptions underlying the TOCs on contribution at the higher end of the chain, the teams collected evidence on whether the country strategy interventions were likely to have impact, given the country context and the interventions themselves. On this measure, teams identified the following findings:

Some significant changes in government practices can be linked to Finland's interventions. Often these shifts are the result of an accumulation of influence over multiple phases of support. In Nepal, for example, scientific forest management was introduced by Finland several decades ago and is now government practice. Improvements in forest coverage, biodiversity, watershed quality and livelihoods are thus linked to Finland's cooperation in this sector. In Ethiopia, Finland has been since the 1980s the only donor focusing on special needs education (inclusive education) and can claim significant credit for changing attitudes towards those with special needs.

For some interventions teams found that positive impact, while present, would not be for more than the relatively few communities, businesses or households affected. In country strategy interventions comprising mostly localised project-based support to specific districts, teams were able to argue positive quality of life impacts, but only for the beneficiaries reached. This is true in most water and sanitation projects and in some agriculture projects across countries.

Institutional and/or approach and paradigm changes were found in several cases to be likely to lead to broader impact. In Tanzania, for example, there could arguably be significant policy impact from Finland's support in forestry, as government and society shift from the paradigm of conservation to that of sustainable use. In Nepal the creation of environmental subcommittees and sections at the local level has had positive impacts on environmental management in project districts and was seen to lead to impact, provided that they were sustained. The Innovation Partnership Project in Vietnam with its policy and legal framework improvement focus, coupled with awareness-raising on the benefits of an open innovation culture, could feasibly have a society-wide impact. Also in Vietnam, the forestry information platform project's contribution to changing the mindsets of key actors on the value of open information could plausibly have an impact on the efficiency and sustainability of forest management, while the TFF helped change the way that government thought about funding forestry interventions. In Zambia Finland has lobbied government for a stronger policy framework for, and an increase of funding to, the case transfer system, with success, which is likely to have a significant impact on poverty reduction and quality of life in future. Similarly in education in Nepal, Ethiopia and Mozambique, bringing children with special needs, bilingual education and inclusive education onto policy agendas could arguably have an impact on equity and inclusiveness in education systems.

While current intervention results could feasibly lead to impact in future, this would only occur if the results were sustained. Many likely impacts are vulnerable to intervention results not being sustained. For example in Nepal, whilst the water and sanitation interventions have had impact on livelihoods in project districts, these impacts are vulnerable to the risk of poor maintenance of infrastructure.

When Finland's interventions lead to paradigm or institutional change in partner countries, impact is more likely.

4.6 Efficiency in country strategies

The discussion of effectiveness above highlighted that CS TOC result chains at times are interrupted or broken when human or financial resources are not used efficiently to produce the planned intervention activities and results. These cases point to the importance of fulfilling the assumptions in the TOC about funding being available on time and being used efficiently/cost-effectively for interventions, and Finnish actors and implementation partners having the capacity to deliver the interventions planned, towards the results targeted. This section summarises the findings across country evaluations relevant to these assumptions. It also discusses the degree to which the CSs were found to have anticipated risks to the postulated TOC results chains overall, and mitigated them.

4.6.1 Budget realisation

Whether budgets are realized (or disbursed[8]) as planned is a key indicator of a realistic CS, and of efficiency in the use of Finnish resources. Low disbursement rates point to delayed interventions against the budgeted plan, and a lower likelihood of achieving CS objectives to the degree targeted within the timespan of a plan. Across CSs, for the CS interventions altogether EUR 533 million was budgeted from 2013 to 2015, EUR 326 million was disbursed, and of this, EUR 235 million was used for interventions rated positively by the CS evaluation teams. In other words, only 61 percent of budgeted funds were disbursed as planned, resulting in only 44 percent used effectively. This on its own suggests that the country strategies were not implemented efficiently, and were therefore on average not as effective as they could have been. This finding however, should be read together with the effectiveness discussion above, which shows that Finland mostly budgets funds for interventions that are effective when implemented, and against the discussion in section 2.1.3, which found that over the 2008 to 2014 period, Finland's disbursement ratios were on par with other EU donors.

The aggregate disbursement figure plays out very differently across countries. In Figure 10 below the bars represent the amount of funds budgeted, the funds realized/disbursed, and the funds both realized/disbursed and rated positively for each of the countries. The line graph maps to the axis on the right and tallies the percentage of total budgeted funds disbursed and used effectively.

- In Mozambique, while having the second smallest budget, the country portfolio of interventions performed best in getting its funds out of the door and using them well. It disbursed 72 percent of budgeted funds over this period. And while it budgeted almost 30 percent of its funds for projects that did not perform (see Figure 8 above), it was most successful in disbursing budgeted funds and using them effectively, at 62 percent.

- In Nepal the CS portfolio was the second-best performer, budgeting EUR 81 million over the period, disbursing 66 percent of its funds, and using 86 percent of these funds effectively (equalling 47 percent of budgeted funds).

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[8] The terms are used interchangeably.

- In Ethiopia, Tanzania and Vietnam the CS portfolios fall into the next group of performers, using 47 percent (Ethiopia), 41 percent (Tanzania) and 38 percent (Vietnam) of their funds for performing interventions. In Vietnam most projects were rated positively, but the portfolio disbursement percentage was low at only 43 percent of funds. Also in Ethiopia, although all projects were rated more or less positively (with some for which results are still unclear), disbursement was only 60 percent of the funds. In Tanzania the CS portfolio had a significantly larger budget than any other country, at almost double the average of the other countries, but only disbursed 59 percent of this budget. This meant that 41 percent of its funds were used for positively rated projects, despite 70 percent of disbursed funds doing well.

- In Zambia portfolio performance lagged the other countries in effective use of budgeted funds. While the Zambia CS portfolio fared on a par with the other countries over the period in disbursing funds (with 63 percent of budgeted funds disbursed), only 43 percent of disbursed funds were used in projects that were rated more or less positively. This means that of the portfolio budget, which was the second largest over the period, only 27 percent was used effectively. Over the CS period this was driven by a limited number of large projects performing poorly, overshadowing good performance in many other projects with smaller budgets. The most significant of the poorly performing interventions have since been terminated.

Figure 10: Funds budgeted, realized, and used effectively 2013–2015

Source: CS evaluation reports for Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nepal, Tanzania, Vietnam, Zambia.
Financial data from MFA KEO-80

A positive finding, however, is that disbursement rates improved across countries over the CS period, although only marginally so in Vietnam. This is illustrated by Figure 11, which reflects full portfolio disbursement including for FLC funds, ICIs and programme administration costs.

Figure 11: Portfolio disbursement rates by year

The country evaluations showed up several reasons for poor disbursement, even if it improved over the period. In many cases foreseeable challenges affected disbursement and/or effective performance of disbursed funds. Many of these are discussed in the effectiveness section above. The assessments against the efficiency questions in the evaluation matrix related to country strategy programmes found a few more.

Choice of modalities. The country case study reports provide evidence of case-by-case issues with different modalities. In Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania and Vietnam the reports discuss delays in interventions due to procurement/ contracting issues for traditional projects implemented by third parties/contracted service providers, as well as issues with the competence for or quality of implementation. Also discussed in the case of Nepal and Zambia are delays and quality issues when Finland participates in a pooled fund and/or implementation occurs through a fellow donor or UN agency. The consolidated expenditure database and evidence across countries allows an analysis across countries of the efficiency and effectiveness of different modalities.

Table 4 below shows the result of this analysis. All rated interventions were tagged for the modality used in one of five categories. Category one is traditional project directly implemented by Finland through a contracted third party; two is funds disbursed to government or other local institutions for implementation; three is funds disbursed to a pooled fund or a fellow donor, often also for implementation of the project by that donor; four is funds provided for sector support; five is funds released for budget support.

Table 4 shows how the intervention and disbursement performance of different modalities affect the contribution made to Finland's effective development cooperation of each modality (column 5 of the table).

For example, altogether 51 percent of budgeted funds were for third party projects in 2013-15. While these projects performed well (column 2), low disbursement (column 3) meant that they only contribute 42 percent of Finland's funds that are out of the door and being used effectively (column 5). This is because only 40 percent of the budgeted funds for the modality are disbursed for interventions rated positively. Viewed from another perspective, while in aggregate 81 percent of funds budgeted for the category were for interventions rated as good, delays in implementation resulted in inefficient use of funding made available, affecting CS effectiveness overall.

For pooled fund mechanisms it is not as much the disbursement (column 3) as the performance of projects funded under these mechanisms (column 2), that cause its share of performing funds (column 5, at 9 percent) to be lower than its share of budgeted funds (column 1, at 12 percent).

In contrast, the most successful modality was sector support, which not only performed well in terms of disbursement, but also in terms of effectiveness. The story for budget support was more mixed: while it did well in terms of disbursement its overall performance across the countries was affected by the Zambia support, for which the evaluation found poor results in the CS period. However, for both sector and budget support the share of the modality in disbursed and performing funds for Finland was higher than their share in budgeted funds overall.

Table 4: Analysis of disbursement and performance by modality

	1. Share of CS portfolio budgeted funds	2. Share of funds budgeted for the modality also rated positively	3. Percentage of budgeted funds for the modality disbursed	4. Share of budgeted funds disbursed and rated positively for modality	5. Share in total CS performing funds
Third party project	51%	81%	49%	40%	42%
Government and other local systems	14%	55%	56%	31%	9%
Pooled Fund (including multi-bi projects)	12%	56%	66%	37%	9%
Sector Support	13%	100%	82%	82%	22%
Budget Support	11%	78%	97%	76%	18%

Source: CS evaluation reports for Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nepal, Tanzania, Vietnam, Zambia. Financial data from MFA KEO-80

4.6.2   Other efficiency factors

Weaknesses in risk identification and budgeting. Much of the picture by modality above can be explained by two interrelated factors in the management of country strategies.

· Firstly, a common finding across the country strategies was that risks to negotiation and implementation of interventions were not adequately identified or planned for in the CSs. Prolonged design phases, delays in procurement and contracting, and realised risks in the overall policy, institutional, economic and political environment of programmes often delayed planned interventions for which budgets were allocated.

A common risk was limited ownership, financial commitment and slow approval by government. For countries' CS portfolios that showed poor performing projects occupying a high percentage of the budget (e.g. Zambia), this was a common factor, notably in the agriculture sector (Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania).

- Secondly, across countries teams identified poor linking between budgets and programme implementation as a factor driving inefficiency. Often country teams would budget optimistically for interventions well before their implementation was likely to start even when delays in contracting often occurred. This was also confirmed by the Unit for Administrative and Legal Cooperation Matters (KEO 80) of the MFA. A factor in some cases is, furthermore, that consultation with this unit occurs too late in intervention design, resulting in the need to alter design or contracting elements to comply with legal requirements.

Over-optimistic design, over-estimation of capacity and under-estimation of technical complexity. As already discussed under effectiveness of the CSs, project designs often also did not ensure relevance to the context or likely obstacles to implementation. In Zambia for example, two private sector projects in design did not consider the difficulties target beneficiaries would face to access credit; the project to map land use did not take into account the challenges of introducing a highly technical mapping system in the Zambian context. The Vietnam report highlighted similar issues with the forestry information system, which was an expensive project compared to what is ultimately operational; in the water sector efficiency was reduced also by the complexity of the project design and modalities for engagement, although more in a pre-CS period phase. In Tanzania the evaluation pointed to several examples of interventions in agriculture and land management that were over-optimistic about what could be accomplished over the originally planned period.

Geographic spread or location of projects. In Vietnam and Nepal the geographic spread of projects relative to resources or the location of projects in difficult to reach terrain was found to add to project costs relative to output. In Ethiopia, in contrast, the limited geographical footprint of the programme was found to add to efficiency, amongst other things through limiting the demands on Finland's country resources to build institutional relationships.

Staff turnover and quality. The discussion on effectiveness in section 4.3 above noted the importance of skilled staff at the country level in leveraging Finland's development cooperation spend into policy influence. In the discussion of efficiency the evaluation reports for Vietnam, Tanzania, Zambia, and Nepal noted that efficiency was affected by rates of staff turnover in country staff in Helsinki, embassies, and sometimes in project technical assistance positions. In Tanzania, for example, one project manager reported having dealt with four programme managers at the Embassy. In Nepal the Desk Officer in MFA had changed three times, with several periods during which the post was vacant.

Portfolio focus versus fragmentation. The country evaluation reports noted increased focus in the country portfolios (Ethiopia, Zambia, Tanzania, Vietnam and Nepal) as a factor driving efficiency.

There were however also several factors contributing to more efficient use of human and financial resources, besides defragmentation of the portfolio, as noted by the country evaluation reports.

Gains through results-based management. The emphasis on results-based management has increased managers' and counterparts' awareness of the importance of implementation on time against targets and the quality of performance. This was found to be the case in Tanzania, Zambia, Nepal and Vietnam.

Complementary use of other instruments. In Vietnam the more aligned use of FLC funds was noted to contribute to increased efficiency, as was the use of institutional cooperation in Zambia.

Improving capacity in partners. In a few cases, notably in the education sector programme in Nepal, improving capacity of partners contributed to higher efficiency in programmes in the later part of the CS period.

4.7   Sustainability of country strategy results

While interventions may deliver results that could contribute to CS objectives, sustained results are necessary to make the contribution telling to country development results. This section considers the evidence from across the country evaluations of sustainability of CS results.

Summary evidence is presented in Table 5 below. More detailed assessment by CS pillar is provided in Annex 5, Table 12. Signals of sustainability are mixed, as can be expected. Across countries sustainability is driven by the degree of ownership of interventions, whether capacity in the relevant institutions was built, dependency of the institutions on funding and contextual factors.

Table 5: Assessment of sustainability by country

Country finding	Sector assessments
Ethiopia Signals of sustainability through ownership by beneficiary institutions present.	• The Ethiopia CS portfolio has invested in the development of ownership of interventions by the beneficiary organisations in an effort to ensure sustainability. • In the water sector the successful engagement of communities to take responsibility for water systems was judged to contribute to sustainability. • In education sustainability is enabled through working through a sector programme. However, in the side project on special needs education sustainability will be challenged by resource scarcity. However, a long-term shift in attitudes, policies and approaches was observed. • In agriculture and land management the interventions are relatively recent and still very much dependent on technical assistance. Sustainability is not certain.

Country finding	Sector assessments
Mozambique Signals of sustainability insofar as interventions are contributing to the building of capacity in institutions and households.	• In education the signals of sustainability are good, insofar as Finland's support has contributed to the implementation of the education ministry's own sector plan, with high ownership. • In agriculture attempts to build capacity in the ministry have been ineffective. The localised results of later support directly to beneficiary households through an NGO could be sustained at the level of the beneficiary households, insofar as it develops the capacity of these households. • In the governance programme sustainability is likely based on programme results in building capacity for accountability through building institutions.
Nepal Limited signals of sustainability. Institutionalisation of structures used or created in programmes not clear in a fluid context.	• In education good progress has been made through a highly owned sector programme, but further strengthening of capacities is needed. • In water and sanitation programmes have made efforts to institutionalise structures to sustain results, but the evaluation found evidence that the sustainability of these institutions, and therefore programme results, may not be robust as yet. The new federal system, which is as yet unclear, may significantly affect the sustainability of institutional structures built. • In forestry the evaluation reports have indicated issues of sustainability in more or less all the programmes on account of weak institutionalisation or capacity.
Tanzania Sustainability was found to be compromised by institutional weaknesses in central and local government, and only some interventions made progress towards addressing this challenge.	• High ownership of the public financial management reform programme suggests sustainability. • Forestry and natural resource management projects have striven to enhance environmental sustainability in the rural sector, but positive results are not yet assured. • While awareness has grown, it remains debatable whether government will show the ongoing ownership and entrepreneurial commitment that will be needed for sustainable results in the ICT sector. • The seed potato project offers at least some scope for sustainability through private sector agencies, and its completion report offers a detailed and convincing seven-point plan for sustainability.

Country finding	Sector assessments
Vietnam Sustainability is supported by the degree to which interventions have shifted mindsets and developed successful models that were taken up.	• In the knowledge society interventions sustainability is supported by its policy and legal development work, capacity building and creating models/ideas for replication and adoption. Partnerships created are likely to continue. • The trust fund model has been taken up by government in setting up its own fund, supporting sustainability. While the ownership of the forest information system is good and increasing demands will contribute to sustainability, technical capacity in the unit to sustain the system is a concern. • The water and sanitation project sustainability was judged to be good for the water systems side but less certain for sanitation that was not a high government priority.
Zambia Sustainability weak, with use of government systems not resulting in ownership/ sustainability; lack of financing to continue to build sustainability in other projects and only early results in others.	• In agriculture implementation was slow and results are yet to emerge, with the result that sustainability is not yet assessable. • In the private sector programme the use of government institutions to implement the interventions appeared not to have built ownership to the degree that activities would continue after the end of Finnish funding. • Support to CSOs for environmental advocacy has been relevant, and has yielded some results, but the vulnerability of CSOs generally makes sustainability uncertain. • In the public financial management interventions ownership across the ministry was not clear.

4.8 Coordination, complementarity and coherence in country strategies

The evaluation terms of reference required an assessment of: coordination with the strategies and interventions of other development partners; complementarity to other Finnish development cooperation instruments; and internal coherence between country strategy interventions and external coherence with other Finnish foreign policy interventions. All of these criteria are relevant to the effectiveness of the CSs insofar as they would support and leverage the direct results of the country interventions to better overall CS effectiveness. This section discusses the performance of the CS portfolios against each of these criteria in turn.

4.8.1 Coordination

Two evaluation questions are relevant, namely whether the CS interventions are aligned to country systems, and how well coordinated they are with the interventions of other development partners.

Alignment with country priorities and systems

Finland's country strategies are closely aligned with partner country priorities. The relevance discussion in section 4.2 above demonstrates the significant degree to which the CS evaluations found good alignment between the CS portfolios and official country policies in terms of objectives.

Few interventions, however, also used country government systems to plan, implement and report on interventions. The efficiency discussion in section 4.6 shows that the modality used most often for CS interventions is direct implementation of projects through third party service providers (55 percent of budgeted support). In contrast budget support, sector support and projects that disburse directly to country systems comprised 31 percent of budgeted funds for interventions, with pooled funding arrangements making up the rest.

Many pooled funding arrangements however were also closely aligned with government systems. For example, in Zambia support to the private sector and financial sector development programmes was via pooled funds, but these funds were managed more or less using the systems of the beneficiary organisations.

There is some evidence of a shift from use of country systems to direct implementation. In Mozambique, for example, the CS period has brought a shift to modalities that do not use country systems: during the CEP 90 percent of total Finnish aid is estimated to have been disbursed to government and aligned to government programmes and priorities. There is a recent shift to alternative modalities and the termination of GBS has further diminished CS alignment to country systems. In Tanzania the general decline of aid effectiveness mechanisms has affected the alignment of most ODA, including Finland's, with particular difficulties at the local government level across the CEP and CS periods.

Emergence of use of non-government country systems. The Tanzania report however noted that during the CS period alignment with country systems has also meant using the systems of local non-government partners. Similar shifts can be observed in the Mozambique (using the systems of the NGO implementing the agriculture project) and Zambia (using the systems of the farmers' union) CS portfolios.

Coordination with other development partners

Coordination across the CS portfolios is evidenced through Finland's engagement in pooled funding arrangements and engagement in working groups. The relative volume of engagement in pooled funds, sector support and budget support programmes – all involving coordination with other development partners – was 36 percent of all budgeted funds, as reflected in Table 4 in section 4.6.1 above. This however underestimates donor coordination, as most of the support channelled through government and other country systems was also in coordination with other donors, adding a further up to 14 percent of budgeted funds between 2013 and 2015.

Interventions by country that are likely directly coordinated (here defined to mean coordinated by nature of the modality) and not directly coordinated are depicted in Figure 12 below. Note that for Ethiopia, the water and sanitation

<div style="float:left">

While country strategies are closely aligned with partner country priorities, few interventions also use country systems.

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and land management interventions are categorised as not directly coordinated. However, both are very closely linked to government systems and coordination mechanisms.

Figure 12: Budgeted funding by use of coordinated modalities by country

Source: CS evaluation reports for Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nepal, Tanzania, Vietnam, and Zambia. Financial data from MFA KEO-80

However, besides coordination by nature of the modality chosen, the CS evaluations also found evidence of coordination of stand-alone projects with the interventions of other donors through participation in project forums and through the choices made when selecting modalities. Section 4.4.1 above points to careful selection of complementary focuses in intervention areas as a driver of effectiveness. For example, in Vietnam coordination is not so much driven by the choice of modalities as by the design of interventions notwithstanding modalities. Finland is focused on improving water and sanitation services in small rural towns (where it is the only donor); establishing an open forest resource management information system; and working with innovation development with special focus on start-ups, where Finland has been a pioneer and the risks of overlapping donor work are limited. Section 4.4.1 also discussed the extent of Finland's engagement in donor coordination structures, as a factor in determining policy influence. Across countries Finland was found to participate regularly and actively in overall and sector donor coordination forums, often taking a leadership role.

4.8.2 Complementarity

Across countries complementarity – a criterion defined for the purposes of the evaluation as the complementarity of CS interventions with other Finnish-supported development cooperation initiatives in the country – was found to be weak, with some exceptions insofar as some ICI funds were coordinated with CS interventions (e.g. the twinning support for the procurement authority in Zambia; and coordination between universities in Mozambique for social policy analysis).

In particular, there appears to be strong potential for mutual reinforcement between the CS and Finnish NGO projects and the various trade and commercial instruments, which is not exploited in the CS portfolios, as per the examples set out in Box 1 below. This was particularly relevant for Vietnam, Nepal and Ethiopia.

Box 1 Examples of missed opportunities for mutual leveraging between different Finnish ODA flows

- In **Mozambique** the same local NGO supported through the agriculture project, ADPP also used funds channelled through Humana People to People (UFF) to establish a large-scale teacher training operation. An estimated 16,000 teachers, or *15 percent of the total number of teachers in the country*, have been trained in these institutions and at a significantly higher standard than national training institutions (Alberts and Sitefane 2009). This is a significant contribution, given the pressing need to increase the number and quality of teachers in country. However, it is neither strategically integrated with the CS nor captured in country-level reporting. Coordinating both channels of support to ADPP to coherently build its capacity was also not done.

- A second example is that support to CSO organisations in **Mozambique** is already provided through KEPA. The planned support to CSOs through the good governance sectors appears to have significant similarities and raises questions about whether a closer integration of KEPA expertise and commitment to this is appropriate.

- In **Tanzania** the CS refers briefly to the need for "new development instruments" and mentions the use of Finnfund, Finnpartnership, the Institutional Cooperation Instrument (ICI), the Higher Education Institutions Institutional Co-operation Instrument (HEI-ICI), the Fund for Local Cooperation, funding through multilateral agencies and regional initiatives such as TradeMark East Africa (MFA, 2014: 21). But it does not offer a structured explanation of the proposed complementarity between these instruments and initiatives.

- In **Vietnam**, which is moving towards transitioning, the transition visioning process in 2007–08 already said that instruments such as Finnpartnership, ICI, etc. must be used in a complementary manner to promote other forms of cooperation based on a partnership approach with the private sector and institutions as well as CSOs. This evaluation has shown however that these instruments are not adequately integrated or sufficiently flexible. Complementarity with the CS is thus under-utilised.

Finnish humanitarian aid also operates through channels that are almost completely separate from the management of development aid, and the involvement of embassies in humanitarian aid is minimal. This has consequences for the effectiveness of both humanitarian and traditional ODA flows. As stated in the evaluation of development cooperation with Ethiopia 2000–2008: "The administrative separation from the rest of Finland's development cooperation limits the use of country knowledge for decision-making and opportunities for monitoring" (MFA 2010).

4.8.3 Coherence

The country teams assessed both internal coherence between the interventions of the CSs, and coherence between the CS bilateral interventions and other Finnish foreign policy actions. Findings on coherence differed across countries:

- In Zambia the evaluation found good coherence within the development result areas of the CS. For example, in the private sector development result area the private sector development support programme was coherent with the financial sector programme insofar as the one tackled business regulations and systems and the other financial inclusion and access to credit.

- In Vietnam, in contrast, the evaluation could not find evidence that the CS interventions were mutually reinforcing so that the sum of CS intervention results was more than their parts.

- In Tanzania some coherence was found within clusters, but this was found to be disrupted by the discontinuing of support towards the end of the evaluation period, as a result of budget cuts. The country evaluation report also pointed out that given that the CS inherited a number of projects, building coherence would take a few CS cycles, provided that the country focuses remain stable.

- In Nepal the team found that within development result areas it was possible to postulate that interventions were mutually reinforcing. In education, for example, the technical and vocational education intervention supported the implementation of the sector support programme and provided feedback from the ground to policy dialogue processes. In water and sanitation the direct implementation projects complemented the UNICEF sector programme, which operated at a higher level.

- In Mozambique two of the sectors had one programme only. In the good governance sector the three interventions were found to have complementary elements towards improved accountability in principle, between general budget support, support to the supreme audit institution and support to a think tank to build capacity for scrutiny of government policy and implementation.

- In Ethiopia coherence within sectors was found to be strong, and between sectors supported by geographical concentration.

- In both Vietnam and Ethiopia the teams found no issues with coherence with other Finnish foreign policy actions and objectives, but also found that the current format of the CS did not contribute to fostering improved coherence.

4.9   Cross-cutting objectives in country strategies

Finland's 2012 Development Policy Programme reinforced a strong emphasis on Human Rights Based Approaches (HRBA), while gender, climate change and equality were maintained as mandatory cross-cutting objectives. This section briefly considers the degree to which the CS portfolios contributed to these objectives.

Vietnam is the only country in which the evaluation found limited attention to cross-cutting objectives. In the other five countries, whilst most interventions paid attention to at least one of the cross-cutting objectives, and some to more, achievement of these objectives was in line with the overall effectiveness of the intervention. Table 6 below provides more detail by country.

Table 6: Assessment of cross-cutting objectives in CS portfolios

Country	Assessment
Ethiopia	The Finnish programme is suffused with attention to economic and social rights, both in increasing the capacity of duty-bearers to meet obligations and in helping rights-holders to claim their rights. Support to local CSOs through the FLC helps to keep open space for CSO activity, and, jointly with other donors, Finland maintains a dialogue on political rights. The programme also responds to Finland's cross-cutting objectives concerning gender, equality and climate change. Equality clearly underpins work on water, land and inclusive education. GEQIP includes targets for greater gender equality in education and there is emphasis on women's involvement in water management and on the registration of women's interests in land. The water sector approaches in which Finland participates are paying increased attention to resilience against climate change.
Mozambique	In Mozambique the human rights-based approach underpins the core goal of poverty reduction selected in the CS. A focus on social sectors of education, and to some extent agriculture, can be interpreted as aligned to the progressive realization of human rights. Targeted action toward gender equality is evident in Finland's approach. There is a strong commitment to equal access to education and participation in the agricultural project. The CS includes cross-cutting commitments to reducing inequality in all three result areas. However, climate sustainability receives relatively superficial treatment in the CS and no interventions are actively addressing this issue.
Nepal	The CS portfolio was found to be well aligned with the cross-cutting objectives of Finland's DPPs. The programme promotes the realization of basic rights to education and water, and participation in public affairs. Particular attention is given to vulnerable groups. Most of the programmes in the portfolio also have a strong focus on empowering women, and Nepal is one of two partner countries in which a focused programme of support to UN Women is provided. Programmes have achieved the objective to some degree, although not equally so across programmes. There has however been less of a focus on climate sustainability.

Country	Assessment
Tanzania	The CS makes multiple commitments to inclusive approaches that seek to assist the marginalised and underprivileged as well as those more readily able to benefit from development interventions, and makes numerous references to promoting gender equality and the empowerment of women. The good governance cluster provided high-level advocacy of rights-based approaches through the work of the Uongozi Institute and an explicit gender focus through the project on women's political participation with UN Women. The sustainable resource management and access to land cluster is indirectly intended to enhance the rights of women and marginalised people in rural communities by strengthening equitable and democratic community management structures for land and natural resources, although with little evidence of achievement so far. Interventions towards promotion of inclusive, sustainable and employment-enhancing growth were intended to enhance equitable opportunities.
Vietnam	In Vietnam the country evaluation did not find strong links to the cross-cutting objectives. An exception is the water and sanitation programme which has been pro-active in pursuing the participation of women in in decision-making processes, but also does not in other ways address gender concerns directly. In some cases the focus on cross-cutting issues has resulted in additional projects added to compensate for the lack of focus on these issues, e.g. a participation project implemented through ActionAid linked to the forestry information project.
Zambia	The inclusion of social protection in the CS provided an opportunity to address all three of the CCOs and is an important driver of results related to the objectives. In the agriculture projects for small-scale irrigation and smallholder production attention to gender and social equality was found to be weak. In the agriculture and rural development programme more attention was paid to these objectives and to climate change in programme design, but slow implementation has severely limited achievement of the objectives. In the support implemented through the farmers' union, specific interventions to address gender and environment issues were implemented (e.g. gender-responsive targeting and resource allocation, and climate-smart agricultural practices). All the private sector interventions paid attention to gender inclusiveness. In environment the CSO capacity building project has had women as the primary beneficiaries. In governance and accountability the general budget support programme had gender-sensitive objectives. The public financial management reform programme is the only one without specific cross-cutting objective activities.

Source: Country evaluation reports for Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nepal, Tanzania, Vietnam and Zambia.

4.10 Conclusion: synthesis of country strategy evaluations

The country case study evaluations present evidence that Finland's intervention choices are relevant to partner country priorities and beneficiaries, and to its own objectives. Some issues were noted where the design of interventions and choice of modalities were not fully relevant to the context. In some cases however, Finland's careful choice of complementary interventions or objectives, drove both intervention results and contribution to CS objectives.

There is also significant evidence that Finland's interventions deliver on their intended results, when implemented. Low disbursements, particularly for interventions that are implemented through pooled funds or directly by Finland through third parties, however meant that in any given year all of Finland's development resources were not used to deliver results towards CS objectives. While this has improved over the CS period, a key factor was that country teams' budgeting practices did not consider properly the contextual, institutional or programmatic risks likely to delay disbursements. For some interventions however, these risks meant that interventions did not deliver results even when funding was disbursed. However, most interventions were found to be more or less successful, when implemented.

Evidence from the countries is mixed on contribution, but with some positive signals in each. In many cases contribution is not necessarily country-wide, but localised to beneficiary populations.

Country strategy programme success – in the sense of delivering results at the intervention level and contributing to the target objectives – was assisted in many cases by Finland's efforts at policy influence, either through donor coordination structures and participation in policy dialogue or through establishing successful models/approaches in its interventions and then leveraging these through engagement with both partner countries and development partners. Coordination is therefore a strong contributing factor to CS effectiveness and impact. The evaluations found less evidence that coherence (both internal and external) or complementarity between Finland's development cooperation instruments contributed to CS effectiveness.

The results achieved were found not to be consistently sustainable. Despite relying on direct implementation in more than half of the main CS interventions across countries, Finland's country teams invested at the same time in building ownership of interventions. This was more or less successful, depending heavily on country and sector contexts. The institutional and funding capacity of counterparts was often a factor in sustainability. At the same time however the CS portfolios included remarkable successes where Finland's interventions were taken up by local institutions, including government, and mainstreamed.

Chapter 6 below evaluates the likely contribution of the CSM to this performance of the country strategies. In order to appropriately frame this discussion Chapter 5 following provides a discussion on the CSM context and a description of the modality. Chapter 7 discusses the conclusions on the CSM and recommendations. Conclusions on the country strategies are set out in the country strategy reports, with associated recommendations.

5   THE CSM CONTEXT AND DESCRIPTION

This section presents the wider RBM context for the CSM – including providing the global context in which RBM thinking and approaches have emerged and evolved – as well as detailing the origins of the CSM in MFA, its design and how it is implemented at country level. It also provides details on how the CSM provides a building block from MFA's commitment to RBM.

5.1   Global context for the CSM

Results-based management (RBM) thinking dates back as far as the early 1950s and in the 1960s a landmark publication, *Managing for Results* (Drucker 1964), emphasised the importance of making strategic decisions on the basis of evidence and performance. Emerging from this, a number of alternative models were developed and gave rise to the Logical Framework Approach (LFA) that became a popular tool for planning and monitoring interventions. During the 1980s an emphasis on results started to complement the previous emphasis on development aid management, which had been defined by its focus on budgeting, activity and control approaches. (Vähämäki et al. 2011). The results agenda in development cooperation built momentum in the 1990s and was incorporated into multi- and bilateral agencies' approaches to ODA management.

By the early 2000s, a new rationale underpinned RBM thinking, with a number of studies and evaluations emphasising the need for contextualisation, regular monitoring and promotion of dialogue to promote ownership, based on performance. This was spurred by the aid effectiveness agenda, which had its origins in the 2002 Monterrey Consensus, and resulted in a series of High Level Forums of donors and partner countries in Rome (2002), Paris (2006), Accra (2008) and Busan (2011). These forums committed both donors and partner countries to mutual accountability and managing for development results.

Amidst financial constraints and focus on aid effectiveness, there has been growing pressure since to demonstrate – both to those receiving aid (citizens, governments etc.), and to those contributing to it (taxpayers, donors) – effectiveness, and more recently, value for money.

Whilst there are different definitions of what RBM constitutes (see Box 2 below), there is general consensus that it is more than a set of tools. Rather, it is a management strategy with learning being used to inform decision-making. It requires a focus on managing for outcomes rather than focusing on resources or output delivery. In practice, there have been recurrent issues with RBM, notably in its implementation and arising from conflict with other management ideas/models as well as from trying to fit the process into tight, mechanistic tools rather than enabling analysis, adaptability and learning. Results processes have also been difficult to institute in organisations where accountability and learn-

ing is not embedded in the culture and way of working (Vähämäki et al. 2011; Poate and Bartholomew 2011; OECD DAC 2014).

Box 2 Definition of results-based management

The MFA guideline on results-based management defines it as follows: *'Results based management therefore involves shifting management approach away from focusing on inputs, activities and processes to focusing more on the desired results.'*

OECD DAC defines RBM as *"A management strategy focusing on performance and achievement of outputs, outcomes and impacts"*.

Thus, results based management in development cooperation is simultaneously:
■ An organizational management approach, based on a set of principles;
■ An approach utilizing results based tools for planning, monitoring and evaluating the performance of development projects and programmes.

Sources: MFA 2015; OECD DAC 2010

5.2 CSM origins

The CSM is not the first instrument used by the MFA that is results-oriented. Logical frameworks had been commonly used in MFA planning and monitoring since 1998, but primarily at the programme and project level and not at the country level. The Country Engagement Plans (CEPs) introduced in 2008 were an innovation in terms of developing a plan for the country bilateral programme, but were not results-based.

Thus, the 2011 evaluation of RBM in Finland's development cooperation at country and programme level found there was no core formal policy that defined the results-oriented approach, or set objectives for it, despite its being widely referred to as a key part of development policy (Poate and Bartholomew 2011). Furthermore, the institutional arrangements for RBM at that point still largely focused on individual projects and did not strategically target results in Finland's overall and partner country development programmes, or monitor these against the desired results. And even at the individual project and programme level, the evaluation found that the required results frameworks were not always in place and their actual use was not guaranteed. The institutional context for RBM did not incentivise its use for learning and accountability, with weak information systems, ineffective processes and no strong incentives in the human resource management system to support a results orientation.

One of the core recommendations from the evaluation was that the country-level programming system should be revised to define measurable objectives and indicators. This was in addition to recommendations on framing Finland's development cooperation overall within a strategic results framework and building the systems required to utilise information on results towards development effectiveness.

The 2012 DPP set the objective of improving results-based management in Finland's development cooperation, including requiring results-oriented country programming (MFA 2012a). Against this, and after the formulation of an RBM

The country strategy modality is the first country level instrument that is results-based.

Action Plan in 2012, the MFA decided to design a new model to develop and manage Finland's bilateral interventions in long-term partner countries. On 2 May 2012 the DPSG approved guidelines for the development and content of the new results-oriented CSs, requiring the first drafts to be presented by 1 September of that year (MFA 2012b). In 2013, the final CSM CSs were adopted in all the long-term partner countries. Further guidelines on reporting against the CSs were adopted early in 2013 (MFA 2013a). In line with the CSM the 2013 CSs have been revised, and the first sets of semi-annual and annual CS reports produced and processed. The guidelines have since been updated in 2014 with new separate instructions on the CS reports, annual reporting and the synthesis report (MFA 2014b; MFA 2014a).

5.3 Design of CSM

5.3.1 CEPs as a precursor to the CSM

The introduction of the CSs in 2012 and the processes leading to their development marked a transition from the CEPs. In brief the CEPs were:

- Prepared largely as an internal document, based on inputs from the country team (MFA-based and country-based), but with limited consultation at country level;

- Prepared over a short time frame, and there was very limited guidance – and no formal instructions – on their content or structure;

- Never formally approved or published and the full CEP document was prepared in Finnish, with a short (around nine pages) summary translated into English;

- Structured to include an outline of the country context, Finland's engagement, and the wider country aid context, with these sections providing 'top-line' indications on development challenges and the history of bilateral development cooperation.

Whilst the CEPs set out the principal goal of the programme in country together with principal themes and activities, they do not specify objectives or outcomes or how activities will support objectives of Finland's development policy. Effectively, the CEPs constitute a description of the programme, but do not provide any indicators to aggregate or assess performance.

The CSM was introduced in 2012, for implementation from 2013. The instrument was catalysed both by the 2011 evaluation of RBM in Finnish development cooperation and by the OECD DAC peer review undertaken at the same time and published in 2012 (OECD DAC 2012). The CSM however was implemented in a context in which there was no corporate-level framework for target setting and result monitoring. While the DPPs set out objectives, there were no measures and targets (Palenberg et al. 2015). To some degree the CSM was a piloting of a more explicit results-based approach to the management of development cooperation above the level of specific projects and programmes.

5.3.2 Design process

Development of CSM guidance and instructions (including their initial design) was (and still is for revisions and redesign) led by a Working Group of participants from two regional departments – the Africa and Asia departments – as well as the Development Policy Department. The Working Group operates as an informal structure. While instructions for the country strategies are prepared by the Working Group, they are formally issued by the Development Policy Department, initially through the sectoral unit (KEO-20) but later by the unit for general development policy (KEO-10). In addition, the DPSG is presented with the guidelines for discussion and comment.

Initially, the development of CSM guidelines drew from a mapping of other donor experiences and approaches to RBM and country programming (namely Switzerland and Ireland). The first guideline document issued on the CSM (MFA 2012b) defines the instrument as the "MFA's planning and management tool for development policy and cooperation". The CSM guidelines conceptualised the country programming as a "thinking and design process", the result of which is the CS document. An update of the country strategies, and accompanying guidelines, is planned for 2016, with one area of focus being an update of the results framework.

5.3.3 CSM scope and structure

The CSM primarily includes bilateral cooperation instruments under control of the regional departments, which are responsible for the development, implementation and reporting on CSs. This is a sub-set of all ODA flows to any one of the long-term partner countries. Other flows not included in the CSM are support through Finnish CSOs, humanitarian flows, concessional credits and the private sector instruments. While some of the CSs also reference the institutional cooperation instruments and FLC funds as CS interventions, these were not formally required to be included even if under control of the regional departments and the Embassies. The demarcation of the CSs was driven by a desire by the regional departments not to be held accountable for instruments that were not under their control.

Structure of the CS

A CS document has to answer the following questions: How would the MFA see the situation in the country develop? Taking into account the situation in the country, Finland's development policies, available resources, the division of labour between donors, and best aid practices: what are the development results that Finland should focus on at individual country level, and with what means and tools? What are the indicators to monitor development in the country and the achievement of development results supported by Finland? What are the indicators to assess the effectiveness and impact of Finnish operations? How is reporting done? How is information gained from reporting used in CS implementation (learning organisation)?

The CSM prescribes a CS structure that forces a consideration of:

- DPP objectives and cross-cutting objectives
- Past lessons learnt in the country programme
- Country development goals and needs
- The Finnish objectives, specific objectives and results targeted in relation to DPP and national objectives
- Modalities – taking the need for national ownership into consideration – and implementation strategy
- The available resources.

The CSM prescribes a logical model template for results-based programming and a template for the results framework. The logical template result chain is as in Figure 13. The framework also requires that assumptions are listed for achieving the results chain by development result listed.

Figure 13: Results-chain for the CS logical models

Source: MFA 2012b

Structure of CS reports

The annual reports (as per the updated structure) comprised a combination of narrative and data-based reporting and were set out in four main sections:

- **Highlights:** a summary of the report.
- **Assessment of changes in the country:** a discussion section to detail relevant changes in the country context over the reporting year.
- **Progress on results:** this section discusses the results from the CS portfolio by country development result pillar. It is set out in three sub-sections:
  - Progress on the country development results.
  - Progress against Finland's objectives and specific objectives.
  - Rating of the performance of the development cooperation programme. The rating uses a traffic light system with three categories; good (fully on track with achievement of over 80 percent of target, no need for adjustment); satisfactory (generally on track with achievement between 60 and 80 percent of target, adjustments required); and unsatisfactory (off track with achievement below 60 percent of target, major corrective measures are necessary).
- **Strategic priorities for the coming period:** a narrative discussion on the priority actions for the coming year by development result.

The main text of the annual reports is between 10 and 15 pages in length. In addition to the main text a set of annexes is required: the logic model; a team calendar; the updated results monitoring framework; and a financial report.

5.3.4 CSM processes

Besides these output prescriptions, the CSM also has process directives. Figure 14 sets out CSM prescriptions for developing and monitoring a CS.

Figure 14: The prescribed CSM process

Stage 1: Background analysis		
Country analysis	Analysis on development financing in the country	Summary of previous Finnish development cooperation

Stage 2: Goal setting/comparison of options, prioritisation ← Stakeholder consultations

Stage 3: CS drafting

Stage 4: DPSG handling/hearing (country department as the presenter)

Stage 5: Finalisation of CS ← Annual review and updating of the CS

Stage 6: Minister approval and publication

Stage 7: Monitoring and reporting of CS

Annual self-evaluation by the country team

Source: MFA 2012b

The reporting processes are set out clearly in instructions (MFA 2012b and 2014b):

- A semi-annual reporting process to be followed internally, aimed at review, lesson learning and accountability downwards (between the CS portfolio and individual interventions) and horizontally (internal to the country team and within the CS). Whilst the first set of guidelines pre-scribed formats for the semi-annual report, this was revised in 2014 after which country teams could use a format to suit their own purpose and to facilitate the consideration of country-specific factors.

- An annual report process, oriented more towards upwards accountability and lesson learning relative to the semi-annual process.

Figure 15 sets out the process flow of CSM annual reporting.

Figure 15: CSM annual reporting process flow

Source: MFA 2012b and 2014b, Palenberg et al 2015

5.3.5   CS and CSM capacity building processes

Besides the formal reporting and review processes for CSs instituted under the CSM, the Departments for Africa and Middle East, and the Americas and Asia have undertaken cross-country workshops at which results-based management practices and CS content are discussed. The Africa and Middle East department had held three workshops by March 2016, and the Americas and Asia department one. In each case another workshop was being prepared for 2016. The workshops provide an opportunity for embassy staff and Helsinki-based country-team members to participate in discussions and learning around RBM.

5.4   Other key planning instruments for country development cooperation

The CSM is not the only instrument related to CS portfolios. Two other instruments are:

- The ambassador's strategic plans which are drafted by incoming ambassadors at the start of their posting, and set out the objectives for Finland's foreign policy for the Embassy during the ambassador's tenure. The plans incorporate not only development cooperation, but all foreign policy objectives of Finland that are implemented by Embassies.

- The MFA operating and financial plan (or TTS), which is the results-informed medium term budgeting framework the Ministry operates as part of the joint planning system of the Finnish state. It is drafted each year by the Ministry's departments setting out their objectives, measures

and result targets on a rolling three-year basis. It precedes the detailed budget proposals, which are submitted to the finance ministry. The TTS and budget are revised mid-year based on implementation to date. TTS preparation is led by the Unit for Administrative and Legal Development Cooperation Matters (KEO 80) in the Development Policy Department.

The CSM overlaps with both of these instruments. Development cooperation forms a component of the ambassador's strategic plan and is planned and financed through the TTS. Its focus however is narrower than both.

6   CSM EVALUATION FINDINGS

The CSM is a technology to improve country programming through a results-based approach. As such it comprises the

- **processes** of designing and revising the CSM; and processes to develop, manage, report on and provide feedback against CSs;

- formal and informal rules for CSs and CS processes, including the **roles and responsibilities** of different actors and the instructions for CSs; and

- **information instruments** (the CSs, logic frameworks, results frameworks and report formats) of the country strategy system in Finnish development cooperation. The CSM was conceptualised as an internal planning and management instrument of the MFA. It is however published and therefore also serves a transparency and communication function.

Whereas Chapter 4 summarised the CS evaluation findings on CS portfolios, this chapter focuses on what the contribution of the CSs was to the performance of CS portfolios as assessed, and how the CSM as defined in the previous paragraph has supported this contribution.

6.1   CSM theory of change

The introduction of the CSs was aimed at improving the relevance, coherence, complementarity, coordination, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of Finland's bilateral aid programmes in long-term partner countries. The theory of how results-based strategies would engineer this improvement, and the assumptions underlying this theory are set out in Figure 16 below. The figure discerns three interconnected results chains.

- At the lower end of the diagram (in green) is a summary scheme of how Finland's interventions at country level will result in desired country development results. This scheme is set out in more detail in Figure 7 above (the CS TOC). Chapter 4 provides a summary of country strategy evaluation findings on whether the results chain was operational to deliver the target results from Finland's inputs through efficient implementation of relevant, coherent, effective and sustainable interventions. This chain is not evaluated in this chapter.

- The orange block in the middle sets out how the MFA expected the CSM to contribute to a better functioning country results chain. It details that the CSM design and process to transform CEPs into RBM-enabled CSs were expected to result in improved country plans, leading to more relevant, coherent, effective and sustainable interventions than previously. Regular reporting of financial and non-financial performance on CS portfolio interventions and their contribution to results was expected to result in accountability and learning through a system of review and assessment internal to country teams, as well as a CSM-specific sys-

tem of external review and assessment in MFA structures. This learning and accountability (on what works and what does not and why) was expected to feed back into even better CSs, setting off another cycle of implementation, reporting, review, and learning and accountability. Whether the CSM has succeeded in triggering this results chain is discussed in this chapter.

Figure 16: CSM theory of change and assumptions

Assumptions

Associated with the circled numbers on Figure 16 and where they are discussed in the report in brackets.

1. Design of CSM is appropriate for context and fit for purpose (relevance; effectiveness).

2. Capacity building is appropriate and adequate; guidance material is clear (efficiency).

3. Country stakeholders are willing and able to change CS portfolio (effectiveness).

4. The transaction cost of the CSM is sufficiently low to ensure that it is sustainable (relevance; efficiency; sustainability).

5. Measuring and targeting of results are appropriate (effectiveness).

6. Data are available regularly to report against indicators (effectiveness).

7. Internal review processes are effective and there is a results culture in the MFA (effectiveness). This occurs at both the country and corporate levels.

8. The trade-off made in the system between learning and accountability is right (effectiveness). As for seven, this occurs at both the country and corporate levels.

9. Systems exist to appropriately aggregate results data from the CS (effectiveness).

The blue block at the top demonstrates how the CSM cycle was expected to interlink with MFA-wide RBM. This results chain is also evaluated in this chapter. Firstly it postulates that learning in MFA RBM from the CSM cycle on the instrument itself will lead to redesign of the instrument so that it can achieve its purposes better. Secondly, it also sets out the expectation that information on results from country level, as well as from global MFA processes (i) will contribute to MFA external reporting, which in turn will satisfy the MFA's external stakeholders, leading to more aid; and (ii) will contribute to learning on Finnish development policy, leading to better policies, which will accelerate CSM cycle effects in leading to better country strategies. In the theory of change these blocks are in grey as the team's fieldwork made clear that these upper result chains (for MFA external reporting and global development policy learning) were not expected to be in place during the first CS period. The CSM was seen as a first, pilot venture for the MFA into more rigorous RBM beyond the management of interventions; and, at the time of its design, commensurate development of overall MFA RBM systems was not expected, even if in principle this was part and parcel of the 2012 DPP results objectives.

6.2 Relevance of the CSM

Assessing the relevance of the CSM means assessing whether, as an instrument, it was relevant to the MFA: did it make the right choices with regards to country strategy institutions (the processes, rules, and information instruments for CSs) so that it was consistent with the objectives and priorities of the MFA?

6.2.1 Was the CSM relevant for the MFA?

In 2012 when the CSM was introduced it was expected to address a number of weaknesses in the planning and management of country programming, which were affecting the effectiveness of the use of available funding for Finnish development cooperation in partner countries. By providing a means to address these weaknesses, the CSM was relevant to both MFA management and country programme managers' needs.

Firstly – and most explicitly in response to the 2012 DPP, the OECD DAC peer review and the 2011 evaluation of RBM in Finland's development cooperation – **the CSs were to introduce results-based management in country programming.** This was highly relevant to the MFA, insofar as they were to make concrete the commitment in the 2012 DPP to strengthen country programming in accordance with a results-based approach (MFA 2012, p17), as well as implement the 2012 RBM action plan.

RBM itself was relevant to the MFA as it offered a key mechanism facilitating more effective and efficient use of its financial and human resources for development cooperation in principle. Given declining aid budgets (CS portfolio budgets across the six countries shrunk by about 40 per cent between 2013 and 2015) the promise of the ability to make better choices with available funding was relevant to the MFA. While the CEPs provided a tool to frame development cooperation in countries, they made no reference to results, or measures and targets. The CSM introduced the setting of goals at the country level, and monitoring and reporting against a results-framework measuring progress against these goals. Global correspondents saw this as an important addition to the management of Finnish development cooperation, as it provided focused points annually for the country teams to review the interventions and monitor results holistically.

Secondly, **the CSM was relevant because it introduced systematic results-based reporting and monitoring across interventions, whereas previously review was mostly at the intervention level.** This addressed a weakness in MFA management systems: the systems had allowed for rigorous management ex ante review of interventions against MFA development cooperation objectives, but were less systematic in ex post oversight (Bäck and Bartholomew 2014) beyond the management of specific projects.

Thirdly, through the introduction of results-based country reporting **the CSM in principle enabled the MFA to do more systematic reporting on the results from development cooperation to its stakeholders,** enhancing its ability to justify the ODA share of public resources and demonstrate what was being done with the resources. This was highly relevant to the MFA, which was being criticised by the Parliament of Finland for reporting more anecdotally rather than system-

The CSM addressed weaknesses in the planning and management of country programmes and was relevant as such.

atically on the results of development cooperation. The Parliament requested more systematic reporting on results and on positive and negative lessons learnt (interviews and Palenberg et al. 2015).

Fourthly, **the CSs were relevant because they provided in principle the means to refocus CS portfolios and reduce fragmentation, by assessing interventions against a limited number of country development results.** Reducing fragmentation in Finland's development cooperation programme so that funding can be used more effectively is a long-standing Finnish development policy objective. It was first made explicit in the 2001 White Paper on development policy. Further directions to channel bilateral aid to fewer countries and sectors were provided in the 2004 Development Policy Programme (MFA 2004). However, as reported by MFA respondents in Helsinki and in some partner countries, interventions in countries became more fragmented in the early years of the evaluation period as ad hoc interventions and new sectors were introduced into country programming by the political leadership at the time. The CSM, with its instruction to select a limited number of development results areas (3), provided the opportunity in principle to look at country interventions through a holistic lens and reduce the number of sectors in which Finland was trying to achieve results against a set of strategic objectives. Given that the CSM inherited on-going programmes and projects from the CEP period, its short-term impact in this regard was limited. This is discussed further under effectiveness in section 6.3 below.

Fifthly and relatedly, **the CSM was relevant at the time of its introduction because it provided a touchstone against which intervention proposals could be assessed in future,** to protect country programming and country teams more from the introduction of ad hoc projects and sectors. Respondents at both the country and the Helsinki level emphasised the benefit of this 'space to work' and the ability to say no based on an explicit, agreed and transparent CS. The CEPs were never formally approved or public, limiting their ability to play a similar role.

The degree to which the CSM was able in practice to fulfil the promise in the first CS period of being a relevant tool for these reasons for the MFA, however, was limited because of its design, the MFA context in which it was being implemented, and by the nature of country programming.

Sixthly, **the CSM was relevant because it enhanced intra-MFA dialogue.** It provided the opportunity to counter the tendency to work in silos at the country level driven by the intervention management focus of MFA staff responsibilities, and to bridge divides between Helsinki-based staff and country-based staff. This was reported both by global respondents and by MFA staff at the country level. The CS development and reporting processes were found across countries to have improved dialogue between Helsinki-based country managers and the Embassy development cooperation staff in countries. Because of the limitation of the scope of the CSM to regional department bilateral cooperation, however, the CSM did not significantly contribute to dialogue between the Development Policy Department and the regional departments managing the CSs.

The CSM scope limited its relevance to the MFA overall. The CSM limited the CS scope to the bilateral interventions managed by the regional departments. Even then, in practice, country teams paid little attention to the ICI interven-

tions and the FLC funds as potentially co-contributing interventions to country objectives and development results. Given that Finland's development cooperation comprises more than the subset of bilateral country interventions programmed in terms of the CSM, the relevance of the CSM to Finnish results-based management and reporting needs is limited. Furthermore, if limited to only this subset of interventions, the CSM does not fully allow the MFA to consider all its interventions in a country, including through Finnish NGOs and private sector instruments, notwithstanding the instrument used, and make them more coherent, as some components of the MFA programme are excluded.

However, it is arguable that the CSM scope increased its relevance to country managers in the regional departments. The regional departments in Helsinki are responsible for the CS bilateral cooperation in countries, and required a tool to be better able to manage this cooperation, both for planning and for reporting. The CSM fulfils that function very well (see discussion of effectiveness in section 6.3 below), supported by its scope. If the scope were bigger and programmed and/or monitored other Finnish instruments jointly towards agreed country results, the accountability chain for achieving these results would be far less clear, and the CS portfolios more difficult to manage.

The extent to which the CSM was relevant to the needs of programme managers differed across countries and was dependent on the processes followed by country teams to compile and discuss the annual report. This was particularly true for staff at the embassy level. In Nepal the evaluation found that the process established at the country level to bring contracted managers of projects into the annual results discussion paid dividends and was very relevant to country managers, as was the format for a brief narrative report on each project that the Embassy attached to the annual report. Across countries, however, the principal concern and workload of the country teams from day to day focus on project design and management, not on the CS. Periodically they report on the CS, and this remains relevant, but they are still mainly operational rather than strategic managers: the CSM was not yet that relevant to their daily tasks.

The CSM was not equally relevant in all country contexts. Given its emphasis on the bilateral intervention-driven cooperation that falls under the auspices of the regional departments, it was not fully relevant for the MFA in the Vietnam context, where the emphasis is increasingly on economic and institutional cooperation and trade, and where bilateral project support is being phased out. According to interviews with key people dealing with planning transitioning, including Team Finland members, their focus is on broader issues than the CS and they are relying increasingly on other aid instruments. This results in a situation where the CS inadequately reflects these broader efforts. Similar issues were raised in Zambia, which lags Vietnam but which is also on a transitioning path (MFA 2016b).

The relevance of the CSM to the MFA external reporting needs was not fully realised over the evaluation period because of limited RBM practices in the MFA. The CSM alone is not sufficient to fulfil these needs. It is also dependent on MFA-wide systems for identifying, collecting and collating information for such reporting purposes. The 2015 Evaluation of Finland's DPPs from a results-based management point of view set out how weak results-based framing of

Country team processes influenced how relevant the CSM was to the needs of country programme managers.

development policy objectives, system weaknesses and a corporate culture that is not results-based undermine effective corporate results-based management and reporting (Palenberg et al. 2015). The same issues affected the degree to which improved CS RBM framing and reporting were able to be fully relevant to the MFA's external reporting needs. The assumption in the theory of change that systems exist to collate information and that an institutional results-based culture in the MFA supports effective external reporting on development results from the CSs did not hold.

6.2.2   The CSM and OECD DAC best practices

One measure of how relevant the CSM is to instituting RBM in Finland's development practices is the degree to which it is in line with OECD DAC/international best practices and takes account of the experiences of fellow donors, where relevant. The evaluation investigated this by looking at the CSM in comparison with lessons learnt by development agencies elsewhere, and to the practices of two similar donors, Irish Aid and the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation. This section briefly highlights key lessons from this comparison. It is linked to Annex 6, which discusses the practices of these two donors in more detail.

The OECD DAC published a review of challenges and practices in measuring and managing results in development cooperation in 2014. This review highlighted key lessons from the experience of donors in implementing RBM. Many of these resonate with the experience of Finland as reflected in the findings discussed here. Key findings of the review (OECD DAC 2014b) were:

· In practice donors face difficulties in identifying clear objectives in changing and complex environments, and struggle to select measurable indicators without losing focus on long-term deliverables. Common obstacles to selecting and using indicators are: difficulties in using information on results for accountability purposes; inadequate context analysis; difficulty in getting common understanding on what is a result; staff capacity; and difficulty in linking information on results tracking to decision-making. The country evaluation reports and global respondent interviews reflected that the experience of the MFA in introducing the CSM faced all these challenges.

· Some DAC members have found that detailed risk and context analysis, comprehensive approaches, strategic selection of indicators, and monitoring that is not mechanistic but is aware of the complex environments in which interventions are implemented can help overcome these challenges. Some donors overcome challenges on data availability by creating budget lines for monitoring and evaluation, pooling funds for data collection with other donors, and developing partnerships with third parties like research institutions and universities. The country and global fieldwork for the CSM evaluation highlighted issues of data-availability against results.

· Results information can be used for accountability or as a management (learning) tool, but these two purposes have a natural tendency to conflict as they produce different behaviours in selecting and reporting results. As there is pressure to produce results in the aid management

environment overall, the default is often to use performance information for accountability, resulting in less attention to the reasons underlying challenges and results below targets. There is evidence that the CSM processes have led to the closure of projects, for example exiting support to the forestry sector in Nepal. At the same time there is also some evidence that the CSM processes attempt to facilitate learning, for example through the regional RBM workshops that have been held. However, as yet there is no evidence of managers manipulating the CSM results frameworks and/or reporting to prevent accountability consequences, at the expense of learning. The global experience, however, suggests that trade-offs do exist.

· DAC members reported inadequate institutional demand for results information for decision-making and learning. Results cultures are lacking, as are staff that can develop and use results information. Commonly, organisations try to develop a results culture by incentivising results, providing an enabling environment for discussion of results, and training and peer support. Weak corporate level RBM systems at the MFA echo this. There is also evidence of efforts by the MFA to foster a results-culture, through for example the regional workshops.

· Key dimensions to improve a results-based culture include: a clear purpose for the results system; a mature results culture in which results are interpreted constructively; buy-in to results from donor agency management and partner organisations at country level; clear results set at country and intervention levels; ensuring a balance between short-term and long-term results; manageable results frameworks; and strengthened data availability and reliability.

Processes to develop the CSM included a review of the experience at the time of Irish Aid and the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation. Both of these are relatively small bilateral donors that incorporate the development cooperation function in the mandates of the foreign affairs ministry. In follow-up investigation the team found that both these agencies have since evolved their country programming systems, together with the overall organisational context in which they operate. Box 3 below highlights key aspects of their journeys that are relevant to key issues for the CSM in MFA discussed in this chapter.

Box 3 Review of Irish Aid and the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation experience

■ Both Irish Aid and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), like Finland, used narrowly focused country programming instruments to spearhead the introduction of RBM at levels higher than the management of interventions in the programme cycle.

■ Switzerland first introduced RBM CSs – called cooperation strategies – in 2010 when a more explicit results framework was added to the existing country strategy requirements. Irish Aid has been using Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) since the mid-1990s. It was only in 2006, however, that the decision was made to introduce an RBM approach. Finland's history of using country-level programming in contrast only started in 2008, with the introduction of CEPs. These became RBM-based in 2013.

■ Irish Aid is similar to the MFA insofar as it is an integral part of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. SDC similarly is an agency within the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. While Irish Aid targets its development cooperation to nine focus countries, the SDC has 37 priority countries.

■ **In both cases corporate-level results frameworks have now evolved which set out explicitly the goals and high-level measureable outcomes of development cooperation.** In the case of Irish Aid this results framework is linked to the development policy published in 2013. This policy in turn elaborates certain outcomes and areas within Ireland's revised foreign policy. In the case of Switzerland a joint Dispatch was published in 2013 with the economic cooperation arm of the Swiss government (SECO) that also set out an explicit framework.

■ For Irish Aid the development of this corporate-level RBM instrument meant that there was less pressure on country strategies to drive RBM, resulting in a latest revision of instructions that will lighten the burden on country strategies. A 2013 evaluation and a review by the Department's Audit Unit identified that guidance on RBM had focused on the development of CSPs without consideration for other processes, and therefore RBM was not integrated into how results were collected and used, for example for budget allocations. In particular, one of the challenges to implementing an RBM approach was the absence of a corporate-level framework and the absence of RBM in other business processes. This led to the development of an explicit corporate framework which now frames the Country Strategy Papers, as well as processes to programme interventions.

■ **Another key development in both cases is that country strategies moved from being narrowly focused to a whole-of-government approach.** In line with recommendations emerging from various reviews/evaluations, Irish Aid's CSPs are intended to take into consideration not only support channelled through bilateral mechanisms but also the mix of modalities (trade, political etc.). Similarly, the SDC's cooperation strategies are joint strategies with other units in the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs or even with other offices from the Federal government. Results are monitored at the domain (results area) level. The strategy format, however, also strongly advises that management/performance results should be spelt out at a lower level that relates to the inputs that each partner in the strategy will provide towards the domain objectives. This helps to clarify accountability chains.

■ After criticism in the 2013 OECD DAC peer review that it does not yet successfully link its interventions to the country-level results targeted, the SDC revised its results framework to include a requirement that contribution must be spelt out from the

Swiss Portfolio outcome to the country development result targeted. This means identifying which factors are expected to aid contribution as well as the risks to contribution.

■ The SDC has also recently introduced an Annual Report against the cooperation strategies. While the Strategy is fully strategic and remains in place for its time period, the Annual Report is used to steer country engagements. The Annual Report in this way becomes an operational document for the upcoming period, as well as a reporting mechanism for the previous period. This allows the strategy and its targets to remain stable. There is an explicit section in which the country director must set out the steering decisions taken in view of the Annual Report. Headquarters then approves (or not) these decisions in a management response.

■ In both cases there have been challenges around process, particularly related to capacity, human resource management and consistent use of tools. The SDC has responded to these challenges by introducing a Quality Assurance Network, which supports line management in RBM functions. This network has a small office of dedicated staff, but draws on capacities throughout the system as a peer learning and support mechanism. This includes providing assistance and reviewing products. The SDC has also invested in focused RBM training for staff. Irish Aid is in the process of considering how it will address human resource issues in the RBM.

Source: see Annex 6.

6.3   Effectiveness of the CSM

The CSM has both a country-level (improved country development cooperation) and an MFA global-level (improved results-based management and reporting in the MFA) purpose, as set out in the CSM theory of change. This section assesses whether it achieved these purposes, or made progress towards them, as well as the reasons for the successes observed and the challenges experienced.

6.3.1   Did the CSM improve CS portfolios?

The CSs, as results-based instruments, were aimed at improving the quality and results of Finland's development cooperation in long-term partner countries. In the evaluation framework this was interpreted as meaning resulting in more relevant, coherent, complementary, coordinated, effective, efficient and sustainable CS portfolios than prior to the introduction of the CSM.

Across countries and evaluation criteria the CSM is unlikely to already have resulted significantly in improved CS portfolios during the evaluation period. Given that processes to formulate CSs did not start from a blank slate but had to accommodate on-going interventions, the first country strategies were in practice retrofitted to existing country programming. In other words the existing interventions were found more or less to have determined the country strategy, rather than the country strategy determining the interventions. This was inevitable: ongoing financial commitments to existing interventions simply meant that little money was available to redirect programmes significantly. The key questions for the evaluation teams therefore were not primarily whether there was significant change in the composition or direction of CS portfolios, but rather:

The CSM was unlikely to result in significantly improved country portfolios during the evaluation period.

- Whether, where direction changes did occur, they could be attributed to the CS and CSM;

- Whether changes in direction occurred that detracted from the performance of CS portfolios despite the CSM;

- Whether the CSs – and therefore the CSM – made a significant contribution to accelerating the performance of on-going interventions against the evaluation criteria through better design, monitoring and management of pre-selected interventions, particularly where such performance was lacking prior to the CSM; and

- Whether there are signals that the future CSs and CS periods will gradually result in CS portfolios that will perform better against the evaluation criteria.

This section draws on evidence from the country evaluations and the global evaluation (see Annex 8 for summaries of the country evaluations), as well as from a light review of Kenya's implementation of the CSM (see Annex 7 for a brief summary of its findings), to discuss the degree to which the CSM has succeeded in this objective, as assessed.

CSM contribution to the relevance of CS portfolios

The country evaluations found that the CSM did create the conditions for improving the relevance of country interventions, even if there was not much opportunity to do so given inherited portfolios. To a large extent the relevance observed in the CS portfolios was present even before the introduction of the CSM. But some progress was made. In Mozambique the country team welcomed the opportunity to reflect regularly on the country context and review the portfolio as a whole; in Tanzania and Zambia the teams found that the CSM strengthened strategic choice relevance, previously absent, as it provided an overall framework for relevance, which otherwise would be specified/justified only at the intervention level. In Tanzania and Zambia, where portfolios were highly fragmented at the start of the CS period, decisions to streamline the portfolios were already taken prior to the CS processes. However, the CS processes provided an opportunity to examine these choices and document them. In Zambia and Vietnam the CSM resulted in efforts to adjust CS portfolios to pay more attention to the cross-cutting objectives of the DPP, to enhance the portfolios' relevance to Finnish objectives.

However, the CSM's ability to engineer more relevant CS portfolios was limited, because it was constituted as largely an internal process to the MFA, with little consultation with country stakeholders. The CSM does not require consultation with country stakeholders apart from a directive to use existing country-level analyses from non-MFA sources. CS processes offer a good opportunity to critically review intervention relevance and to sharpen it in view of whole-country contextual analysis and external consultation. Country teams are arguably biased towards their existing views on the relevance of the interventions they manage, resulting in fully internal CS processes underutilising the opportunity to improve relevance at both the objective and intervention levels. This process shortcoming was thought to affect also the degree to which the CSs could or would in future contribute to the effectiveness of CS portfolios.

Relatedly, **the quality of analysis in some cases was found to limit the degree to which the CSM would have been able to affect the relevance of the CS portfolios.** Like external consultation, the quality of context analysis is critical to relevance. While the CS portfolio interventions were found to be relevant, the evaluation team also found that this relevance by and large had been inherited together with the interventions from the CEP period. The direction of future interventions and their relevance, however, will be a function of the objective setting and strategic thinking of CSs, influenced by the analysis undertaken. If this analysis is weak, there is a risk that it will affect not only the choice of potential interventions to assess, but also their design. At the very least it will miss out on an opportunity to improve the relevance of MFA's choices. It is in view of these considerations that the views of MFA respondents that the quality of analysis in CSs was variable are important. The Helsinki validation workshop and the Nepal evaluation report also drew attention to limited human rights analysis in the CSs.

In the Vietnam context, **the team found that the CSM made no contribution to delivering a CS portfolio that is more relevant to Finland's transitioning objectives relative to what was already decided prior to the CSM.** This was found to be because it focused on the (to be exited) bilateral programme and while it did pay attention to other instruments important for transition, these other instruments faced many constraints. Overall the CSM did not allow for planning for transition, but was more focused on bilateral cooperation, which will be phased out. The Zambia evaluation raised similar issues, both by highlighting the benefits of the coordination between different instruments that did occur (e.g. the support to the Zambian procurement authority from the Finnish public administration training institution through an ICI), and benefits foregone through coordination that did not occur.

Contribution to the effectiveness and impact of CS portfolios

Country teams found evidence pointing to the CSM resulting in more effective CS portfolios, even if there was little space to significantly adapt the programmes. This was mostly on account of the **CSM framing CS portfolios more coherently, and improved management of country interventions** stemming from the introduction of an explicit country results framework, and the annual reporting and review processes. In Kenya, for example, staff reported that the CSM made the need for change in the portfolio more obvious and provided a guide on where it should be going. Reporting processes furthermore provided the opportunity to identify critical issues across the portfolio and for addressing them strategically and coherently. The Zambia report, for example, draws attention to improved quality of project monitoring as a result of the CSM, leading to closure in the case of the small-scale irrigation project.

In Zambia, furthermore, the CSM was a key tool to implement a political instruction to defragment the CS portfolio by cutting the number of projects in half. It resulted in the ending of support to the agriculture sector as a separate results area; the closing down of non-performing projects; and focusing the CS portfolio to be more coherent.

Country teams found evidence that the CSM led to more coherent and better managed country portfolios.

There is some evidence from other countries too that **the CSM led to country portfolio composition choices aimed at improving cross-portfolio effectiveness.** For example, in Mozambique the decision to invest more in the education sector programme was helped by CSM processes, and in Nepal the decision to no longer support the multi-stakeholder forestry sector programme was found to have been a result of considering the relative effectiveness of the intervention compared to other CS interventions in the context of overall budget cuts.

At the same time, however, **some portfolio decisions that were taken during the CS period probably would have been made even in the absence of CSs, even if they turned out to enhance programme relevance and effectiveness.** Exiting budget support in Zambia and Tanzania is an example, as is exiting the local government reform programme in Tanzania. In Kenya the decision to provide support to devolution through the World Bank and GIZ was not signalled in the CS or taken as a result of the CS review and reporting processes, was but taken as opportunities arose in the context.

There is also evidence of **portfolio decisions that arguably reduced effectiveness, despite the existence of the CSM.** In Mozambique the decision to exit budget support was political, driven by the relative ease with which budget support could be exited in the context of overall budget cuts, compared to other forms of support that was more clearly signposted on the ground as Finnish. Also in Mozambique, the decision to exit support to the supreme audit institutions on account of misuse of funds may not have fully weighted the results that the support had been achieving for Finland and was likely to continue to achieve with strengthened systems in the Tribunal Administrativo itself.

Evidence on the CSM incentivising policy influence is mixed. There is limited evidence in Ethiopia and Zambia that the effectiveness of policy dialogue can be attributed to the CSM. While in both cases Finland was already engaged in policy dialogue prior to the CS, the process of drafting and reviewing the CSM was reported to support a stronger focus on the overall context and on drawing more specific linkages between interventions and country objectives through policy dialogue. At the same time, however, the teams in other countries found that while policy dialogue was mentioned systematically in the CSs as an integral part of the interventions in each sector, in practice it did not lead to significant change on the ground as policy dialogue and influence were not targeted in the results frameworks. In Ethiopia the team found that the CSM approach had also led to somewhat more attention to the long-term impact of Finnish aid.

The positive results from policy dialogue and influencing observed in the evaluation predate the CSM. These results were found often to stem from long-term Finnish relationships that pre-dated the CSM, sometimes by several decades. It can be argued however that the CSM process should be commended for recognising the value of these relationships by continuing support in long-standing Finnish sectors.

However, **there was little evidence that the CSM has significantly influenced choices on modalities**, in light of how different modalities relate to country portfolio effectiveness in different contexts. This is because the CS period in most countries offered little room to adjust modality choices, as interventions and their

selected modalities were inherited. However, there is little evidence that the CSs are influencing the modalities chosen for pipeline and next phase projects.

The CSM, because of its limited scope, has also not contributed to leveraging other Finnish instruments to country development objectives.

Contribution to the efficiency of CS portfolios

The country evaluations offered little evidence of close linkages between budget processes and the CSM that could have led to efficiency improvements, despite the CSM requiring a financial plan to be attached to the CS and financial reporting attached to the annual reports. The improvement in disbursement rates over the CS period was reported to be more attributable to overall pressure to improve disbursement rates from the unit charged with legal and administrative affairs, including budgeting for development cooperation, than to the CSM processes, although some pressure also arose from these processes. There is also little evidence that the analysis of risks done for the CSM had a meaningful effect on the identification and management of risk in the CS portfolios. No CS impact on how MFA human resources are used for delivering results was evident either in the CS period. However, it is arguable that the introduction of the CS has brought renewed attention to the difficulty of establishing stable, quality human resource capacity for team leadership; country-level engagement with counterparts; and budgeting and project management. The impact of staff quality on the effectiveness and efficiency of the CSM is discussed further below.

Contribution to sustainability of CS portfolios

The focus of the CSs on contribution to country development results should reinforce attention to sustainability, as in many cases only sustainable interventions will result in shifts at this level. The country evaluations found however that **the CSM as it stands has made only a limited contribution to improving sustainability in the CS portfolios in the CS period** compared to earlier. Sustainability of results remains a matter mostly considered in the design and operation of individual interventions. Even where extensions or further phases were planned to support the sustainability of results achieved, these decisions could not be related to the CSM (e.g. Nepal). The limited scope of the CSs also meant that considering sustainability as a function of Finnish support across instruments was not fully explored by country teams (e.g. Tanzania, Zambia).

In Kenya, despite sustainability being a significant risk to Finnish development effectiveness in the country, it was not evident whether or how the CSM processes had contributed to addressing the problem. The current CS does not discuss sustainability issues either in terms of the individual programmes or in terms of the CS as a whole

Contribution to coordination, complementarity and coherence

Finland was found across countries to have been a strong partner in donor coordination processes at the start of the CS period. **There is little evidence that the CSM contributed to strengthening coordination further.** In some cases this was because of strong pre-existing coordination, but in others this can be considered to be a lost opportunity for strategic dialogue, engagement and innova-

tion linked to existing interventions, as reported in Kenya. The CSM instructions were clear in guiding teams to be more rather than less aid effective in their development choices. Arguably this should have resulted in no evidence of reduced coordination in the CS period. However, there is evidence of country teams opting for less rather than more coordinated interventions in the CS period compared to previously. Many of these examples – e.g. exiting budget support in Zambia and Tanzania; not continuing with the local government reform programme support in Tanzania exiting the agriculture sector support programme in Mozambique; exiting the multi-stakeholder forestry programme in Nepal – are however because the coordinated intervention was not delivering results (Nepal) and/or because other donors had exited (Mozambique) leaving Finland in a dysfunctional coordination arrangement. Exiting budget support in Mozambique is however one example of moving away from a coordinated modality despite its contribution to results.

Several country reports – e.g. Ethiopia and Tanzania – have noted the danger of the CSM with a four-year time horizon emphasising short-term results at the cost of long-term results and sustainability, despite building strategies from a country development result level. This is because the review processes encourage comparisons between interventions and countries, thereby building pressure to demonstrate results at lower levels of the strategy, and potentially leading to less aligned projects that will deliver tangible results more quickly, but less sustainably.

The scope limitation of the CSM has meant that it did not contribute to complementarity between bilateral country-programmed interventions and Finnish support through other instruments, or to coherence with non-ODA Finnish interventions. This has had an impact on the contribution of CS interventions to country objectives, and their relevance to Finnish objectives, particularly in the two countries for which transitioning to new forms of partnership is an explicit DPP objective as noted already. In other countries too the lack of performance against the complementarity criterion discussed in Section 4.8.2 can be linked directly to the scope of CSs and CS reporting.

There is significant evidence that the CSM contributed to the internal coherence of CS portfolios in countries where this was lacking. In Zambia particularly the streamlining of the country portfolio was done coherently because of the framing introduced by the CS.

There is no evidence that the CSM contributed to improving external coherence in the CS portfolios.

In conclusion there is evidence that the CSM has already contributed to better CS portfolios through building relevance, effectiveness and internal coherence, but less so through building efficiency, sustainability, coordination, complementarity and external coherence.

6.3.2   Were the CSM and MFA–wide RBM mutually reinforcing?

MFA–wide RBM has not contributed directly to CSM effectiveness during the CS period. However, this was perhaps expected. When introducing the CSM its designers were conscious that it was a first foray into RBM above intervention

The scope of the CSM limited its contribution to more complementary Finnish development cooperation across instruments.

level and therefore unlikely to have much effect on the quality and impact of Finnish development cooperation through results chains that depend on MFA-wide RBM.

That this expectation was correct is evident. The evaluation found that systems for upwards CS results accountability were still weak in the absence of a framework that sets out measurable and measured targets and systems to collate results across instruments, partners and countries.

The CSM itself includes a process for reporting upwards from country-level accountability (with country-level referring to the accountability between country teams and the management of regional departments). As described in Figure 15 above (in Chapter 5 above), the CSM reporting process involves the preparation of a synthesis report that is presented to the Development Policy Steering Committee, the highest management structure in the MFA, for review and discussion. However, although they have implemented, little value comes from these steps besides the benefit of having an opportunity once a year to discuss CS results coherently at the highest level. Many respondents were of the view that there was little interest from top management in the MFA in fully-fledged results-based management. Many also pointed to the structure and content of the synthesis report as not being conducive to meaningful processes, insofar as it has the difficult task of synthesising results from very different programmes and contexts without the help of a top-down ministry-wide result framework. Many however commended the document for brevity and interest, even while acknowledging that it is not very effective as a management tool.

Over the CS period, besides the internal synthesis report the MFA did not use the systematic reporting of results in the CSM for external reporting. According to Helsinki-based MFA staff, an effort was made to use the synthesis report(s) to reflect results externally but it was abandoned when it was found not to be possible in a meaningful way.

It has, however, contributed indirectly, insofar as processes to improve the CSM itself continued throughout the CS period, with revised instructions based on learning from previous rounds. As discussed in Chapter 5, this included dropping a fully-fledged semi-annual reporting round on the basis that it was too onerous and revising CS reporting instructions. As the team was undertaking the global fieldwork, an intensive process was also under way to revise the CSM for the next round of strategies.

At the same time there is evidence that the CSM itself has contributed to RBM in MFA. The most obvious way is that it was in itself a first concerted effort at systematic RBM of a cooperation instrument. Work has since also progressed in RBM in the influencing strategies for the multilateral support channel, and by systems to shift the management of the CSO channel from an input to a results basis. While this might have happened even in the absence of the CSM, given the commitment of the 2012 DPP to RBM, the perceived success of the CSM in improving CS portfolio coherence and performance was seen by senior staff to have helped these processes.

Also, the availability of results-based data from CS portfolios is facilitating the ongoing design of a development cooperation-wide results reporting framework

for the MFA, as a significant forward step in MFA-wide RBM. Data from the CS reports together with reports from other instruments are expected to be one pillar of this, while other pillars comprise a set of sector-driven centrally-collected measures, and systematic reporting of portfolio information through markers in the financial system. While this process is linked to the findings and recommendations of the 2015 evaluation on RBM for the DPP (see Palenberg et al. 2015), some respondents also thought that the process to reach consensus on how to respond to the evaluation and on the design of the framework would have been even more difficult in the absence of the demonstration effect of the CSM.

6.4 Internal drivers of CSM results and challenges

The discussion above already referred to context-limitations on the ability of the CSM to result in improved CS portfolio and overall Finnish development cooperation performance. These are:

- Inherent limitations to CS portfolio planning which at any point inherits on-going interventions from previous planning periods with their predetermined delivery modalities, and has limited space within available budgets to radically alter programme content or delivery;

- The absence of MFA-wide RBM systems to leverage country-level CSM effectiveness through upwards accountability and learning processes.

This section focuses on internal drivers of CSM effectiveness, in other words the strengths and weaknesses of the CSM itself underlying the results discussed.

6.4.1 Effectiveness of processes to introduce the CSM

Processes for designing the CSM

The process to design the CSM was fit for purpose and for the MFA context. The design approach and process resulted in a CSM that, in the view of the evaluation team, was appropriately delimited to be manageable and useful without overburdening processes and staff and taking into account institutional capacity for RBM at the time of its introduction.

There is also an understanding in the MFA broadly and amongst the members of the CSM working group that the introduction of the CSM was an RBM learning process and therefore the instrument was (and is) not rigid.

The Deputy Director General of the Department for Africa and the Middle East initiated the group. The membership of the group has been fluid, as people moved in and out of relevant positions, but it was aimed at bringing together development-oriented MFA staff who are interested in effective RBM for the MFA, and/or who are key stakeholders in the process. It also benefitted from these members having worked previously in various positions related to development cooperation in different country contexts: as country ambassadors' development counsellors; country team leaders; MFA sector advisors; and country team members. A number of the group were also previously members of the Vietnam team that had over the CEP period developed an RBM system for the Vietnam programme for internal country management purposes.

CSM design processes operated on trust and consensus amongst stakeholders and were effective.

Past and current members of the CSM working group reported that the processes of the CSM working group operated largely on trust and consensus, and were effective. Whilst agendas were prepared for meetings, minutes were not kept. Tasks were, however, successfully delegated to individual members or sub-groups. A smaller working group, consisting of one person from each of the regional departments and the MFA RBM advisor, worked as an operating arm of the larger group. The outcomes and outputs from the group became the instructions themselves, after discussion in the Development Policy Steering Group.

The development of the CSM therefore benefited from being in-house with the institutional knowledge of MFA staff. At the same time it also benefitted from international experience, insofar as group members were tasked with reviewing the practices of fellow bilateral donors for results-based country programming to see if it worked.

The group also made an effort to test the emerging instrument with country teams, to ensure its functionality as a tool. This early testing round yielded important information to improve the instrument, but contributed to the perception amongst country teams – and reported in the country evaluation reports – that there were several confusing rounds of instructions. The instructions were intended to be 'light', in order to reflect the relatively limited resources available to those utilising them to undertake planning. This led to revisions to the reporting templates in 2013, including making the semi-annual report a very light narrative report.

Processes for implementing the CSM

Implementation processes threw up many issues. The CS instructions that were sent out in May 2012 as an outcome of this process were very light, comprising only a few pages. While this was intended to provide the flexibility to accommodate different country contexts, the working group prepared a set of clarifications in October 2012, including a more detailed CS table of contents. Given that there were few resources to implement the CSM and the novelty of the approach, implementation processes in the first round generated a number of issues, namely:

- **Instructions not detailed enough for the context.** The country evaluation teams confirmed the need for further clarification, finding that the MFA country teams in some cases found the instructions not detailed enough, as they were new to RBM and unclear on requirements.

- **There were no explicit quality standards for the CSM,** which resulted in first drafts that were of different quality between countries, according to global informants. There were few RBM experts around, members from the working group provided support to different processes.

- **Initially, there was no significant systematic effort to train staff on results–based country programming or the CSM.** RBM-capacity building workshops were however held later (three in the Africa region and one in Asia), and were reported to be very helpful in building understanding and capacity through peer learning amongst countries. The initial processes though were dependent largely on learning by doing, which MFA staff have reported as time-consuming.

- **Confusing drafting processes in some cases.** At the country level, processes leading to the CS were very different in each country, given different teams with different human resource capacities and commitment. Country teams were frustrated by what they remember as multiple rounds of instructions. As different human resource capacities drove the division of responsibilities between the Embassies and Helsinki in the first rounds, the country evaluations found that country teams were frustrated by the lack of clarity on the roles of Embassies and Helsinki in practice. In Nepal, for example, a lot of work was done at the Embassy level on an initial draft, with limited leadership from Helsinki. However, the finalised CS ended up very different from the initial draft, without much consultation with the Embassy team on changes made.

However, respondents at the global level also noted the value of making quick progress on RBM after the 2011 evaluation of RBM at project and country level, and the 2012 DPP.

6.4.2 Effectiveness of the design of the CSM

A key driver of limited relevance and effectiveness is the scope of the CSM, which limits it to a sub-set of bilateral development cooperation. That the CSM does not support complementarity between Finnish interventions affects the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, complementarity and sustainability of CS portfolios, more so in countries that receive significant other support through non-CS instruments. This has already been discussed extensively in Chapter 4 in the findings of the country evaluations, and in this chapter. Recent major cuts to development cooperation funds highlight the need for a more comprehensive strategy, as an alternative to arbitrary cuts which may result in remaining resources being spread too thin.

Whilst emphasising these findings, **the evaluation team also concurs with the view of the CSM Working Group that it was important to initially limit the instrument given the evident lack of RBM experience** in the MFA and country teams at the time of its introduction. As it was, introducing the instrument was a difficult institutional process. Expanding its scope to instruments that were not managed by the regional departments arguably would have overloaded CSM processes in the initial CS period given RBM capacity, with a bigger cost to effectiveness than that of a limited scope. Global respondents uniformly acknowledged the functionality of limiting the first CSs in this way, but many also questioned whether it would continue to be functional going forward.

Global respondents also pointed out that some private sector instruments, which are demand-driven, would be difficult to accommodate in the CS results framework, as it is difficult to target take-up against them. While CSO instruments could in principle have been included more easily – particularly as the core support to Finnish NGOs also became results-based – informants were of the view that would have been unlikely to get political support because of the long-standing tradition that the CSOs are independent actors supported by Finnish development cooperation funds. These factors made it more complicated to bring all bilateral instruments into the CSM.

A larger CSM scope at the outset could have overloaded the instrument given overall results–based management capacity.

The high-level results in the country strategies are distant from actual Finnish interventions, limiting the usefulness of the CSM in managing country portfolios.

The contribution gap in the CSM and the high level at which results are reported and monitored limit its usefulness as an instrument of mutual accountability at country level and in fostering accountability and learning in the MFA. A big contribution gap between the results from Finland's development interventions and the country results targeted means that while country teams cannot necessarily be praised when the targeted results do occur (as there are many other more likely factors explaining the results), they also cannot be held accountable when results do not occur. Even if learning, rather than accountability, is the key objective of CS RBM, the same gap occurs. This means that learning remains largely at the level of understanding why project inputs did not result in outputs, or outputs in intervention results, and not at the strategic level of how interventions can jointly contribute to results and which mechanisms could be used to have policy influence towards this end.

The CSM focuses strategic planning on an upcoming period of four years, and this is insufficient given that most resources for the four years are already committed. Given the limited space in the medium term for adjusting CS portfolios, this does not incentivise a strategy that looks beyond four years so that opportunities for change that come up during the four years are used to coherently contribute to strategic objectives that will still be valid in the longer medium term. If both the Vietnam and Zambia strategies had been based on a vision of where Finland's development cooperation would be in ten years' time, they would have been more likely to consider next steps after on-going interventions at the start of the CS period ended. This could have made the CSs more relevant to Finland's development objectives in these countries. The global interviews concurred with the Vietnam report findings that the horizon and design of the CSM meant that the team "could not see far enough" and that the strategy should have been wider.

The CSM is conceptualised as an internal instrument and processes to develop it are therefore also conceived of as predominantly internal. Knowledge of Finland's CSs is limited amongst country donor counterparts, thereby limiting opportunities for coordination. Also, CS development processes that are only internal forego an opportunity to build ownership of government counterparts in Finnish interventions and to sharpen relevance. The alignment of the CSM with country negotiation processes is also unclear to counterparts. These are easily then perceived as processes to inform counterparts on decisions already taken.

The conceptualisation of the CSM saw it as an instrument both for learning and for accountability. These twin objectives are not necessarily mutually supportive. There is evidence that if country strategy processes own up to failures as a part of learning about what works and what does not, they can easily lead to pressure to shut down the projects even if there is a potential for results if the learning is taken on board. This resonates with the OECD DAC report on donor RBM practices which found that there was a trade-off between using CS processes for learning and using them for accountability (OECD DAC 2014b).

The link of the CSM to budget processes is not sufficiently well articulated, so that the CSM in the end does not function well as a strategic planning instrument. Planning instruments can be either strategic or operational. In principle the CSM is conceptualised as the MFA's strategic planning instrument for RBM

programming of CS portfolios. However, in allowing for updates the MFA weakened the functionality of the CSM as an RBM strategic instrument, insofar as country objective statements and results-framework measures, indicators and targets changed with changing interventions between revisions, making it difficult to monitor progress. Ideally, a CS should be a high-level strategic instrument measuring progress towards country level objectives, notwithstanding the interventions used for a fixed period of time. A more operational instrument would then allow for another level of operational planning in which plans and targets could be adjusted to accommodate learning. In the MFA system this instrument could be the budget planning system. This system also operates at country level for partner countries, and requires measures and targets against operational intervention plans, linked to budgets. The links from this system to the CSM are however weak; for example, in Kenya a lot of planning happens linked to the budget request for the upcoming year (and two outer years), and the budget revision for the current year. As funding becomes available, operational planning occurs for the use of that funding. While the country team said that they referred to the CSM in making these decisions, neither process is explicitly linked to the CSM annual or semi-annual reporting processes, which are timed to feed into the annual development policy days. This means that operational decisions are made without benefiting from the CSM review processes. In principle changes to the CS portfolio through this time-bound operational system could then result in retro-fitting the CSM to accommodate new interventions. Rethinking the timing of the CS processes might enable a better link, allowing the budget system to be used together with the team calendar for effective operational planning linked to a high-level CS.

The links to ambassadors' plans are not well articulated either. This means that the CSM is not making significant contributions to the external coherence of the country bilateral development cooperation. The country evaluation teams found no evidence of documentary or process linkages between CSM processes and ambassadors' plans, which are whole of embassy plans including development cooperation. While the ambassadors' strategic plans are a very different instrument to the CSM and it would not be feasible to link them directly, they are nonetheless key instruments for non-aid cooperation foreign policy objectives.

6.4.3 Drivers of effectiveness in CSM implementation

The processes associated with CSM reporting were noted by all respondents to be important drivers of CSM effectiveness. While there are shortcomings in the process – particularly the functionality of RBM processes above the country level – respondents in both the country and the global evaluations thought that the CSM annual reporting processes between country teams and the regional departments represented value added by the CSM. For example: it "forced arranged time for discussions, at least once a year"; "it enabled dialogue between embassies and Helsinki"; "even though the drafting of first country strategies was lengthy and complicated, the most valuable part is that we spend a lot time getting the results and discussing what should be done based on the information we have"; "the process of doing annual reports, having response from the leadership of the department and then following-up in the half year report has been excellent" (MFA global correspondents). There is also evidence

from the country evaluations that these dialogues have been very useful and that the management responses are constructive.

The quality of the logic model and measures and indicators selected in the results framework did not, however, always optimise the annual reporting processes. Results frameworks were also pitched at different levels across countries. While the evaluation teams consistently found an issue with a missing middle, or a contribution gap somewhere between steps in the logic model from planned interventions to the target development results, where this gap appeared differed. In some countries, like Mozambique, the Finnish specific objectives were formulated to draw directly from target intervention results, resulting in a gap between this level and the development result. In others the gap was between the intervention results and the specific objective already. Either way, the contribution gap hindered effective learning from CS reporting and review processes. That country strategies were unable to bridge the gap is a result of the level at which the strategies pegged results, given Finland's size. It was also pointed out by global respondents that the logic model tool does not force countries to articulate clearly how the results chain would work: for a logic model it is sufficient to have contribution in principle.

Respondents also raised issues about the usefulness of the indicators for strengthening Finland's development cooperation programme in countries. The evaluation team's review of the results framework corroborated these views. Using the country objectives and Finnish objectives as a basis meant that results that could be related to the country interventions were hard to find. "It is sometimes very difficult to get the information we wish to have", said one global correspondent. The indicators were found to be often too abstract. For more concrete indicators, relevant up-to-date information can be hard to find. Results reporting overall is seriously hindered by inadequate results information provided by other aid instruments such as CSO work, the private sector instruments and concessional credits, particularly when as in Vietnam they were listed in the CS as contributing interventions.

The CSM links to intervention management processes or country processes are not well articulated and are ineffective. At the time of the evaluation the MFA was redrafting the bilateral programme manual, including so that the CSs become an anchor for developing intervention proposals, designs, and for their management, reporting, review and evaluation. This would be welcome, as the team found across countries that intervention review and evaluations did not support CSM processes sufficiently well, and that the results of these intervention-level processes featured only weakly in the CSM process. This does not support the relevance of interventions to the CSs, nor learning through the CS processes.

A key factor driving the effectiveness of the CSM is human resources. Both global and country respondents raised two issues: high turnover of staff affecting the consistency of CSM implementation; and the quality of staff and leadership of processes. Global respondents remarked that the CSM – with its CS development and reporting processes – was clearly more effective in countries where teams include high quality development experts. This also impacts the quality of intervention management. "It is about the analytical capacity to revisit: you can see people who bring you more food for thought every year. In other countries you do not see that kind of depth" (Global respondent, CSM evaluation).

Yet, many respondents also remarked on the fact that development cooperation positions were not seen as necessarily conducive to long-term career prospects. They were often short-term contracts that led to high staff turnover. In practice the human resources unit also does not always appoint staff with development cooperation experience to the lead development counsellor position, which is high risk for the implementation of country strategies as well as the development cooperation budget.

Furthermore, the Helsinki country officer positions were not appropriately valued in the MFA human resource management system. Country officers' pay and job levels did not reflect the responsibility they carry in terms of budget spend, and often did not attract the right level of people to result in quality CSM processes. Because of this status issue, turnover in these jobs was also high, with a steep learning curve on instruments, budgeting, procurement rules and processes and reporting to go through for each new appointee.

The 2016 budget cuts will also affect staffing levels in Embassies and country teams, which is likely to make a difficult human resource situation for the CSM worse.

Risk analysis and management through the CSM processes was weak, impacting on the ability of the CSM to improve effective and timely implementation of country interventions. The country evaluations found that even though the CSM guidance required an analysis of risks in country strategies, the actual analysis was superficial. While risks that were discussed were not that relevant, risks that the programmes faced in practice were not captured or monitored. One respondent remarked that this was an outcome of the logical model approach, which did not pay enough attention to assumptions and risks. Respondents however also agreed that primary risk management and mitigation should be strengthened within the design and management of interventions. The MFA is currently in a process of updating its risk management guidance for bilateral programmes.

6.5 The efficiency of CSM processes

CSM processes were found to be broadly efficient. Overall efforts to keep the instrument light and appropriate to the availability of human resources were successful. In line with the intent by the CSM designers, and the revisions made to the CSM guidelines to realise this intent, the country evaluation teams found that CSM processes were efficient relative to their effectiveness, insofar as they introduced better ways of working together and carrying out dialogue. In Vietnam, however, views were expressed that the effort CS managers/ team had to put into CSM implementation was not fully justified given that more attention was needed for effective transition planning and implementation.

Country teams found the work on indicators time-consuming. There were mixed views at country and global level on the efficiency of the guidance. Some viewed the guidance overall as fit for purpose, whereas other respondents felt that it should be more specific, to ensure greater consistency across countries, better quality, and less time wasted on drafts that required further work. Par-

ticularly, more guidance concerning the development of indicators was seen as necessary and important.

Global and country respondents however raised the issue of whether the 2016 budget cuts would impact the efficiency of CSM processes: in the absence of the broadening of the CSM to include other channels of cooperation, the cuts in principle imply that the CSM will be less cost-efficient for the next round.

6.6   The sustainability of CSM processes

Global respondents were of the view that while significant progress has been made in embedding the CSM as an effective RBM tool in MFA practices, sustaining it as a functional instrument that is used effectively by staff to steer CS portfolios is not yet certain. In the absence of a clear demonstration by top MFA leadership of support for the CSM and use of its outcomes to direct development cooperation above the country level, its processes are vulnerable to becoming compliance-driven and burdensome, as the incentives to participate meaningfully are not strong enough. Not all staff at the country level (in other words regional department and embassy levels) are equally committed to the CSM, resulting in weak links for these countries in processes that are functional and supportive of sustainability in others. High staff turnover and inappropriate staff appointments also threaten sustainability.

On the other hand, sustainability is likely to be supported by the continued demand by external stakeholders for demonstrable results from Finnish taxpayer resources spent on development cooperation, and for RBM of development cooperation from best practice paradigms in development cooperation management worldwide, and the OECD DAC specifically. In this regard the reported noting by the parliament of Finland of the country strategies is encouraging for sustainability.

6.7   Validity of the CSM theory of change

The CSM is a highly relevant instrument for the MFA, particularly at the objective level (in other words for what it aims to do). Besides allowing the MFA to fulfil its DPP 2012 commitment to strengthen country programming with a results-based approach, the CSM aimed to improve choices at country level to make them more coherent, strategic and results-based. Given declining aid budgets (CS portfolio budgets across the six countries shrunk by about 40 per cent between 2013 and 2015) the promise of the ability to make better choices with available funding was relevant to the MFA.

At the same time, however, the design of the instrument detracted from this relevance. Its focus on bilateral cooperation meant that it was not fully relevant in the transitioning context of Vietnam and Zambia, where strategic thinking about other forms of partnership is required. Its focus on only a sub-set of MFA development cooperation instruments means that it did not effectively address lack of external coherence with non-aid MFA, and complementarity with other aid instruments in the CS portfolios, and therefore did not optimise the opportunities for better choices.

The country evaluation teams found that the strategy modality has not yet been very effective in influencing CS portfolios. In the CSM theory of change, this shortfall would be at a further end of the result chain, where accountability and learning through results-based CSM processes already feed back and improve the country strategy portfolio. During the CS period one pathway for this influence – the selection of new strategic interventions and strategic ways of delivering interventions – was not available to CS designers for the most part. This implies that assumption 3 (country stakeholders are willing and able to change the country programme) did not hold for the CS period at least.

However, there is emerging evidence that the other pathway, through improving how the on-going CS portfolio is implemented, is valid. There is strong evidence that two early links in the CSM theory of change are functional and delivering accountability, namely internal CS report and review processes and MFA level CS processes and feedback. The country evaluation reports and the global fieldwork delivered evidence that these CSM processes lead to strategic reflection on sector and country level achievement at least once a year (which is more than previously) and can influence decisions on sectors and interventions positively for performance. In this way evaluation found that modality processes already have sharpened the relevance, coherence and effectiveness of the country strategy portfolios. This opportunity for reflection is also much appreciated across the MFA, but particularly in country teams. All of this indicates that assumption 7 is at least partly true at the country level. It may also indicate that the transaction cost of the CSM is low enough so that relevant staff do not perceive it as a burden compared to its benefit (assumption 4).

There is however, evidence that the opposite also happens: decisions get taken that negatively affect CS portfolio performance even if the CSM processes should have delivered the evidence that the decision would be wrong. Furthermore, process analysis showed that not all positive decisions observed can be linked explicitly to the CSM processes.

An examination of evidence against the CSM result chain makes clear where the breaks occur:

Firstly, the strategic planning model used was not fully conducive to strategic management of country portfolios. This means that assumption 1 (design of the CSM is appropriate for context and fit for purpose) did not fully hold. The CSM set out a result chain that was too long to provide useful results-based management information; the logic framework approach does not make clear how one level of results would translate into another, how Finland can influence this, and what the risks are; and it set the scope of analysis and result tracking too narrowly to facilitate complementarity between all Finland's resources or coherence with other non-aid assistance interventions in partner countries.

Secondly, in practice indicator selection, stability and data availability created monitoring difficulties. A common refrain was that country teams struggled to report against the measures selected. This means that assumption 5 (measuring and targeting of results) and 6 (data are available regularly to report against indictors) did not hold. A contributing factor to this was that results-based management skills were still emerging in country teams. The quality of the result framework across the CSs differed. This means that assumption 2

Results-based management skills are still limited, resulting in weak indicator selection.

did not hold, at least to some degree (capacity building is appropriate and adequate; guidance material is clear).

Thirdly, weak linkages between strategy and MFA budget processes meant that strategy processes did not sufficiently influence intervention decisions taken through budget processes. This is a design issue (assumption 1 not holding) but also suggests that learning through the CSM does not explicitly translate into budgeting choices, which may indicate weak translation of the CSM review processes into learning still. This represents lost opportunities for strengthening results-based management through an instrument like the CSM.

Finally, weak results-based processes overall in the MFA meant that information and learning from strategy processes were not used optimally for better development policy management overall. This allowed decisions to be taken on CS portfolios without taking into account the learning through the CSM. This indicates that assumption 7 (internal review processes are effective and there is a results culture in the MFA) did not hold at the global level.

7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Conclusions

1. **An RBM programming, management and reporting instrument at country level is highly relevant to the MFA in the context of demand for development results and declining aid budgets.** The CSM is relevant

   - to the MFA as an institution insofar as it implements its policy objectives as expressed in the DPP, can assist in its external reporting needs, and contributes to improved performance of development cooperation;

   - to the needs of both the MFA management and country programme managers insofar as it provides the means to focus the country programmes, reduce/prevent fragmentation and enhances dialogue.

2. The **approach or model for the CSM framework is however not appropriate for the MFA context and not entirely fit for the purpose of RBM at country level.**

   - The upper levels of the **results framework are abstract relative to actual Finnish interventions**.

   - The use of the logic model as a tool means that the **CS does not set out the pathways through which one level of the chain will result in another**, particularly from the immediate results of Finnish interventions to a next layer in the chain. This means that strategies to leverage Finnish intervention results to greater effect are not incentivised.

   - The **CSM has not contributed to improved risk management** and reducing the associated inefficiency in country programmes, on account of poor analysis and reflection of risks in the CS.

   - The CSM **does not frame country strategies in a long-term vision** of Finnish engagement in the country but sets the horizon at the four years of the result framework.

3. **The CSM scope affects the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the instrument negatively.** The scope did not assist in utilising all Finnish aid and non-aid resources and actions coherently and in a complementary way at the country level. However, even if desirable, the scope for including more Finnish instruments in a next CS period is limited as they may overwhelm the instrument with higher transaction costs, affecting its sustainability.

4. The MFA **has succeeded in instituting effective key CSM reporting processes** that are appropriately light for the MFA context, particularly to review and revise the CSM and for annual reporting at the country level. However, **it has been less successful in extracting value** from these processes across

countries for development policy learning and accountability, also in the context of a weak corporate results culture. Current processes to introduce **a corporate reporting framework for results that will use the CSM information represent progress** and will be good for the CSM, but potentially are not sufficient to sustain it in the long term. The CSM processes and information offer opportunities for extracting implicit knowledge across country programming about what works and what does not in Finnish development cooperation that can be made explicit more systematically.

5. The **design of CS development processes underestimated the value of country consultations on country strategies** to enhance the quality and results from Finland's interventions.

6. **While there has been some progress, human resources for RBM and CSM management in the MFA are limited, and not enough is done to develop skills.** This affects the quality of results targeting and indicator selection, and limits the effectiveness with which all countries can use results information towards better Finnish development cooperation. The introduction of RBM into the management of country programmes means that desk officer positions and team leader and development counsellor positions are key determinants of the MFA's ability to report systematically, accurately and relevantly on the use of taxpayers' funds. These positions have a high turnover, undermining RBM in country programming and the quality of Finnish development cooperation.

7. **The CSM is still functioning too much as a stand-alone instrument** despite sharing the planning, management and review space with other MFA instruments at the country level. Its functioning as a strategic instrument would be improved if its design made more explicit links in time and in content to the planning and budgeting system, the ambassador's plan and country intervention reviews and evaluations.

7.2   Recommendations

1. **The MFA should retain using a results-based framework for planning and managing development cooperation in partner countries.** The alternative – to implement development cooperation in partner countries without an RBM-based instrument – would risk re-fragmentation and more inefficient, ineffective and poorly monitored development cooperation implementation

2. The MFA **should rethink the CSM framework design and how it is used** to provide more value for the planning and management of Finnish partner country programming. This includes:

    · **Switching to a theory of change approach** from the logical model approach to help bring out the "added value"/policy influencing opportunities and identifying assumptions and risks. Figure 17 below provides a diagrammatic view on what the change would entail.

        – Key is focusing better on (a) what Finland needs to do to leverage added value (e.g. by participating in sector forums, developing prototypes and paying careful – but not uncritical – attention to aid effec-

tiveness principles in design and implementation of interventions), and (b) ensuring that monitoring and reporting also capture these dimensions.

    – The CSM guidance should also provide instructions that assumptions about the behaviour of other actors, the context, and Finland's own inputs should be made clear so that they can be monitored and corrective action taken.

    – The CSM guidance should indicate that risks, including risks relating to assumptions, should be spelt out, assessed and mitigated.

· **Setting the desired results that the CS theory of change is aimed at closer to Finnish interventions and simplifying the layers measured,** but being more explicit about how the immediate results of Finnish interventions will translate to the CS objectives (through added value efforts for example); and about the assumptions and risks underlying the result chain. Figure 17 below provides a proposed result chain in outline. It proposes simplifying the results framework by removing a layer, and equalling CS interventions' outcome results (or immediate results) to the first measured layer in the CS results framework. This would mean that the CSM reporting processes are more relevant to the CS portfolios being implemented, while at the same time providing a strategic view on how these results that are more within Finland's control would contribute to the outcome objective in the sphere of influence.

· **Being clear why results at each layer are being monitored,** including focusing management of the country programme on lower levels of the results chain and being clear that monitoring change at higher levels is to demonstrate that short-term actions are aligned with long-term goals and to remind managers to check that their assumptions about how the Finnish contributions may assist the wider development effort remain valid.

While it is desirable to link Finnish interventions to specific Finnish objectives and to wider country national objectives, it is not plausible that this could ever take the form of a results chain in which the indicators of national level results are useful in guiding the month-to-month or even year-to-year management of a Finnish country programme or even as a medium or long-term demonstration of its effectiveness. There are inherent limits to what such a monitoring framework can achieve, and the limitations are magnified when the framework is used to link a large country's performance to a small donor's contribution across multiple sectors. Whatever indicators are selected at country result level, it is not possible legitimately to assume that the trend of those indicators is a reliable verdict on CS performance. It is relevant to follow and to reflect on national performance, and what that may imply in the medium and long term about the relevance and effectiveness of the collective efforts of Finland's partner countries and their partners; but care is needed not to draw illegitimate conclusions about the performance of the Finnish programme itself.

One useful way of doing this is to use an explicit outcome mapping approach to developing CS theories of change (see for example Hearn 2015 and Vogel 2012). In such an approach the CSs would in the sphere of Finland's control be clear and specific about how what is being done and the way it is being done is expected to produce results, and what needs to be monitored to track performance. They would also distinguish Finland's efforts in the sphere of control from efforts to influence the behaviour of others in the sphere of influence. This would allow the strategies to plan for and resource the efforts at policy influence discussed above, and monitor their implementation and effectiveness. What occurs in the sphere of interest would be less pertinent to Finland's development policy implementation, but still important to track.

· **Framing the desired results for the next four years in a longer-term statement** on the direction of Finnish cooperation, for both aid and non-aid engagement. This does not mean a change to the theory of change layers or how results are set out, but a framing statement on a long-term vision for Finland's aid and non-aid objectives in the partner country. Such a statement should however influence what results are targeted and the strategies to achieve them.

The scheme in Figure 17 below sets out these key changes diagrammatically.

Figure 17: Proposed results chain linkages: CSM

FROM LOGIC MODEL

Existing result-framework

| MFA human resource and financial inputs | The CS interventions (outputs) | CS intervention results | Finnish specific objective (Outcome) | Finnish objective (Outcome) | Country result area |

TO THEORY OF CHANGE

Requirement in CS to argue contribution at the CS level by:

1. Explaining why the CS interventions results will contribute given context, identifying the impact pathways, specifically opportunities for policy influence and other value add factors; setting out the assumptions about factors for contribution (including contribution by partners and non-core CS MFA instruments); and identifying what additional actions and resources that will be required to ensure that assumptions materialise and contribution occurs

2. Identifying the risks to contribution occurring and strategies to mitigate them, including risks lower down in the result chain

3. Reporting against whether factors materialised/actions were taken/ risks mitigated

Theory of change result chain

| MFA human resource and financial inputs | The CS interventions (outputs) | CS intervention results (intermediate results) | Finnish objective (Outcome) | Country result area |

CS intervention outcome level results

Limited number of indicators, short contribution distance

Contribution assumed. Result may be reported, but not monitored as CS results framework measure

Focus of intervention management (More Operational)

Focus of CS results reporting and monitoring (More strategic)

Focus of CS review and discussion

SPHERE OF CONTROL

SPHERE OF INFLUENCE

SPHERE OF INTEREST

3. **The CSM scope should be expanded to include other Finnish Development Cooperation Instruments, but with care.** The MFA should assess bilateral instruments one by one on how they should be included.

A minimum form of this expansion of the CSM scope would comprise including the institutional cooperation instrument and the Funds for Local Cooperation more effectively. In addition, at a second tier more strategic CS level the CSM should include processes, rules and information instrument mechanisms to ensure that all Finnish bilateral development cooperation and private sector instruments are reviewed in the CS, so as to ensure strategic complementarity and external coherence. This should include dialogue with CSOs funded by Finland at country level in the development of country strategies, and during the annual reporting processes.

In countries where there is a significant potential for mutual reinforcement of results to justify the transaction cost, the MFA should pilot ways to treat some key Finnish-funded and willing NGOs as fellow development actors in a CS objective-wide approach.

4. Effective country-level CSM processes must be leveraged into learning across countries by **improving the synthesis reports to include systematic monitoring and analysis as well as periodic review of cross-country programme design and management issues,** such as which modalities work in which circumstances; identification of common strategic risks to country programming, when they arise and how to mitigate them; and of effective value-adding/influencing strategies to optimise how Finnish interventions may assist country development results. This will supplement the value of the CSM for emerging corporate result reporting and help build a meaningful result culture, which in the long run will help sustain the CSM.

5. **In future the process to develop CSs should include well-structured country level consultations with local stakeholders,** including government, and development partners. These should be conceptualised and presented as consultations, and therefore as different from country level negotiations. The focus of the consultations should be on Finland's intended country development results areas and objectives, and the means to achieve them best, given Finnish comparative advantages and the country context.

6. The **MFA should take deliberate action to strengthen human resources for RBM**. This includes

   · **initiating an RBM peer-learning network that will help support human resource development for RBM and the CSM.** The core of such a network is already in place in the ministry. The network should build on the existing RBM workshops that could be reconceptualised as peer learning events. On-going information exchange between country team members struggling with formulating appropriate objectives and identifying good indicators will assist in overcoming the human resource weaknesses;

   · **upgrading key posts** in country teams to attract skilled resources more often for longer.

7. The **CSM Working Group should revisit the timing of the annual CSM review process and align it better with the MFA budgeting process.** Similarly for the ambassador's plan and reviews and evaluations, the CSM design should ensure that linkages are made. On the other hand, the framework for these instruments and for country reviews and evaluations should be certain to include reference to the CS as a key country document.

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THE EVALUATION TEAM

The overall evaluation team leader was Alta Fölscher (from Mokoro Ltd), with Marko Katila (Indufor Oy) as Deputy Team Leader (and coordinator of the Vietnam country team). Alta led on the global analysis and Country Strategy Modality (CSM) synthesis and had primary responsibility for ensuring delivery of all evaluation outputs.

Marko Katila oversaw the country strategy evaluations (CSEs), including ensuring consistency in reporting and approach and contributing to the incorporation of CSM-specific findings from the individual CSs to the CSM evaluation.

The team leader and deputy team leader, together with the Country Team Coordinators (CTCs) for the country strategy evaluations (Stephen Lister (Ethiopia), Muriel Visser (Zambia), Nick Maunder (Mozambique), Stephen Turner (Tanzania) and Raisa Venäläinen (Nepal)), and the Home Office Coordinator/ Researcher (Lilli Loveday), comprised the Evaluation Management Team (EMT). The EMT brought together complementary expertise and technical as well as country-level experience. The EMT worked closely, under the overall guidance of the team leader, to ensure delivery of outputs, including providing inputs during the inception phase to the design of the methodology, undertaking global analysis and synthesis, leading the country strategy evaluations and preparing country evaluation reports.

The table below provides a summary of team member roles and responsibilities. Further details of team members working on each of the CSEs are provided in the relevant country annexes/reports (including more specific detail of team member areas of expertise and specific responsibilities in the evaluation).

Team Member/role	Main responsibilities	Days
Evaluation Management Team		
Alta Fölscher/ Team Leader	Team leader with overall responsibility for the evaluation and evaluation deliverables; providing supervision and support to team members. Led on global analysis and the CSM aspect of the evaluation. Responsible for overall design and delivery of the evaluation methodology; and for drawing together and synthesising findings across country evaluations. Acted as principal liaison with MFA on technical matters. Oversaw data collection/ analysis and conducted global level interviews. Joined as 'observer' on the Mozambique and Nepal country visits; to feed findings/observations to the CSM synthesis evaluation.	92
Marko Katila/ Deputy Team Leader and Vietnam CTC	Deputy Team Leader with responsibility for overseeing the country strategy evaluations, including ensuring consistency in implementation and reporting. Worked closely with the team leader to develop the methodology (especially elements linked to the country evaluations) and coordinated closely with team members across the evaluation, overseeing data and document analysis. Responsible for leading the CSE in Vietnam, also sharing lessons learnt to feed into other CSEs.	71

Team Member/role	Main responsibilities	Days
Evaluation Management Team		
Raisa Venäläinen/ CTC Nepal (and Tanzania country team member)	CTCs were responsible for coordinating the country teams working on the individual country evaluations. They coordinated closely with the team leader and deputy team leader and were responsible for preparation and delivery of country evaluation reports. CTCs assigned and coordinated country team member inputs (including research support inputs), in line with team member expertise and country level areas of focus for Finnish development cooperation.	51 (+28)
Stephen Lister/ CTC Ethiopia		52
Stephen Turner/ CTC Tanzania		52
Nick Maunder/ CTC Mozambique	They also formed part of the EMT and participated in all briefings with MFA and team workshops, inputting during inception to the preparation of the inception report. Where there was no conflict of interest, CTCs provided input to the synthesis and global analysis.	51
Muriel Visser/ CTC Zambia (and Vietnam country team member)		51 (+28)
Lilli Loveday/ Home Office Coordinator and Researcher	Supported the team leader and team members: provided research support on the CSM aspects of the evaluation as well as supporting coordination of research inputs across the evaluation (data collection/management/ analysis etc.). Fulfilled the responsibilities of the HOC (related to personnel management; financial management; quality standards). Participated in MFA briefings and team workshops. Joined as 'observer' on Vietnam country visit to feed observations/findings into the CSM element.	47
Country team members		
Vietnam: Muriel Visser/ Ngo Dung Tri **Nepal:** Ann Bartholomew/ Kumar Upadhyaya **Ethiopia:** Jyrki Salmi/ Gadissa Bultosa **Tanzania:** Raisa Venäläinen /Bernadetta Killian **Mozambique**: Stephen Turner/Aili Pyhälä	Worked directly to the CTC for the country evaluation; providing inputs during inception (document analysis, review; data collection) and in line with thematic areas of expertise. Supported CTCs in identifying components of the CS for analysis; developing the country-specific work plan etc. Participated during field work in interviews and site visits and inputted to the country evaluation report.	Each 28 days
Research and Logistical support		
Mariia Kaikkonen/ Julia Maximova Research support	Provided dedicated research support to three country teams: Vietnam, Nepal and Tanzania. Provided research inputs across the evaluation, including document and data collection/analysis and management (overseeing document requests and the main library). Provided Finnish translation support and logistics support.	42
Zoe Driscoll/Fran Girling Research support	Provided dedicated research support to three country teams: Mozambique, Zambia and Ethiopia. Provided research inputs across the evaluation, including document and data collection/analysis and management. Provided logistics support.	37
Quality Assurance		
Matthew Smith and Heidi Tavakoli Quality Support	Reviewed deliverables and advised on the relevance and credibility, as well as the practicality of the evaluation's approach (at inception stage) and on its findings, conclusions and recommendations (at the reporting stage) both in relation to the country evaluations and the country strategy modality synthesis evaluation.	5 each

Team Member/role	Main responsibilities	Days
Editorial and backstopping support		
Philip Lister/Editor	Provided editorial support.	16

ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE

Evaluation of Finland's development cooperation country strategies and country strategy modality

1. BACKGROUND TO THE EVALUATION

Over time, Finland has established long-term development cooperation partnerships with seven developing countries. These countries are Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, Nepal and Tanzania. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFA) has had a specific policy and implementation framework for planning and managing the development co-operation in these countries. These management frameworks have been called with different names over the times, but in practice, they have defined the Finnish country strategies in the long-term partner countries. The **Development Policy Programme 2007** introduced Country Engagement Plans (CEP) for each of the long term partner countries which were followed from 2008 until 2012. The current country strategy planning and management framework (hereafter Country Strategy Modality, CSM) was based on the **Development Policy Programme 2012** and implemented in partner countries from 2013 onwards. Currently, about half of the MFA's bilateral and regional development funding is channelled through the CSM. Now, the latest country strategies and the CSM will be evaluated in accordance with the annual development cooperation evaluation plan 2015, approved by the MFA.

Previously, the country strategies or programmes have been evaluated only on individual country basis. Countries evaluated within the last 5 years are Nicaragua, Nepal, Tanzania and Kenya. The other partner countries may have been evaluated earlier or covered only by policy evaluations or project evaluations.

All published evaluations: http://formin.finland.fi/developmentpolicy/evaluations

A synthesis of eight partner countries programmes was published in 2002. http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=50666&nodeid=15454&contentlan=2&culture=en-US

A separate evaluation study will be conducted as well as a country report drawn up from the following country strategies: Ethiopia, Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, Nepal and Tanzania. Kenya's country strategy was evaluated in 2014, and these evaluation results will be integrated into the context analysis and the synthesis of the evaluation. Similarly, the country strategy of Nicaragua that was terminated in 2012 during the evaluation period, can be taken into account in the context and the synthesis analyses based on the previous country and strategy evaluations.

2. CONTEXT

Country Strategy Modality

In 2011 the MFA commissioned an evaluation on results-based approach in Finnish development cooperation. The evaluation recommended, among the other recommendations, MFA to re-organize the system of country-level planning to identify more measurable objectives and indicators. As a result of the recommendation, and as a part of the Result Based Management development work (RBM) MFA decided to develop country strategy model that is more in line with the results base approach as well as the Development Policy Programme 2012. New guidelines for the country strategies were developed for the country teams in the second half of 2012. New country strategies were adopted country by country in 2013. New instructions for follow up and reporting were developed during the course, based on learning from experience. New versions and updates of the Country Strategies have been done annually.

According to the MFA's first internal guideline on Country Strategies in 2012, the Country Strategy is a goal-oriented management tool for managing the Finnish development cooperation in a partner country. The strategy provides guidance for planning and implementing the cooperation as well as for reporting on the progress. The Country Strategies answers at least to the following questions:

- How the partner country is developing?

- Considering the situation in the country, Finland's development policy, resources available, the coordination and division of the work with other development partners as well as the best practices in development aid, what are the development results that Finland should focus in the partner country, and with which tools and aid modalities?

- What are the indicators that can be used to follow up the development of the partner country as well as the results of Finland's development cooperation?

- What are the indicators that can be used to follow up effectiveness and impact of Finland's development cooperation?

- How the progress should be reported?

- How the information from the reports will be utilized in the implementation of the strategy?

One of the goals of adopting the current Country Strategy Modality in 2012 was one of the steps to increase the effectiveness and impact of Finland's development policy and cooperation at the country level. Following the good practices of international development aid, Finland's strategy in a partner country supports the achievement of medium-range goals of the partner country government in three priority areas or sectors. Country strategy also takes into consideration as far as possible the work done jointly with other donors (for example, the EU country strategies and multi-donor development cooperation programmes carried out jointly with Finland). The country strategies are approved by the Minister for International Development of Finland. However, the content is consultatively discussed together with the partner country government and other major stakeholders.

The aim was to keep the country strategy process light and the process flow loose to acknowledge the different country contexts.

Separate instructions have been developed for Country Strategy planning, follow-up and reporting. Some of these instructions are in Finnish.

Country Strategies to be evaluated

The country strategies were formulated in 2012 for each long term development partner country with the option for annual revisions in the case of changing environment. The country teams have reported the progress and results of the country strategies annually in the Annual Country results reports on Development Policy Cooperation by country development result and by Finland's objectives and specific objectives. The original country Strategies were updated in 2014,. These versions can be found from the MFA web site. The links are provided below. The updated versions may contain of some different information compared to the original ones, but provides sufficient information for tendering purposes. The original copies as well as other relevant internal documentation will be provided during the inception phase.

Ethiopia:
The updated Country Strategy for Development Cooperation with Ethiopia 2014–2017:
http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=274547&nodeid=15452&contentlan=2&culture=en-US

Zambia:

The updated Country Strategy for Development Cooperation with Zambia 2014–2017:
http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=274537&nodeid=15452&contentlan=2&culture=en-US

Tanzania:

The updated Country Strategy for Development Cooperation with Tanzania 2014–2017:
http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=274539&nodeid=15452&contentlan=2&culture=en-US

Mozambique:

The updated Country Strategy for Development Cooperation with Mozambique 2014–2017:
http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=274551&nodeid=15452&contentlan=2&culture=en-US

Nepal:

The updated Country Strategy for Development Cooperation with Nepal 2013–2016:
http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=274553&nodeid=15452&contentlan=2&culture=en-US

Tanzania:

The updated Country Strategy for Development Cooperation with Tanzania 2013–2016:
http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=274544&nodeid=15452&contentlan=2&culture=en-US

3. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE OF THE EVALUATION

The purpose of the evaluation is to provide evidence based information and practical guidance for the next update of the Country Strategy Modality on how to 1) improve the results based management approach in country programming for management, learning and accountability purposes and 2) how to improve the quality of implementation of Finnish development policy at the partner country level. From the point of view of the development of the country strategy modality the evaluation will promote joint learning of relevant stakeholders by providing lessons learned on good practices as well as needs for improvement.

The objective of the evaluation is to provide evidence on the successes and challenges of the Country Strategies 1) by assessing the feasibility of strategic choices made, progress made in strategic result areas, validating the reported results in the annual progress reports and identifying possible unexpected results of Finland's development cooperation in each of the long-term partner countries; and 2) by aggregating the validated results and good practices at the MFA level and 3) by assessing the feasibility of the Country Strategy Modality for the purposes of results based management of the MFA.

International comparisons can also be used when assessing the Country Strategy Modality. Comparison countries may be, for example, Ireland and Switzerland, whose systems have been benchmarked in the planning stage.

4. SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

Temporal scope

The evaluation covers the period of 2008 – 2015. The results-based Country Strategy Modality with new directions and guidance was designed in2012, and implemented from 2013 onwards in all the Finland's long-term partner countries. However, a longer period, covering the earlier modality is necessary to take in consideration, as most of the individual projects constituting the country strategies started already

before 2013. Many of the projects and interventions were actually developed based on Country Engagement Plan modality that was the precursor of Country Strategy Modality and was adopted in 2008. In 2012, the interventions were only redirected and modified to fit better to the new structure of Country Strategy Modality and the new Development Policy programme. In order to understand the strategies as they are now and to evaluate the change and possible results of current country strategies, it is essential to capture the previous period as a historical context.

Similarly, when evaluating the feasibility of the Country Strategy Modality at process level, capturing a longer period is essential. Therefore, the period 2008 - 2012 will be analysed mainly on the basis of previous evaluations with a particular interest to give contextual and historical background for assessing the change that the new Country Strategy Modality introduced.

Content scope

The evaluation covers the following processes and structures

1. The Country Strategy Modality, including the process transforming Country Engagement Plans into Country Strategies

2. In each of the countries, a country-specific context from 2008 to 2015, consisting of the Finnish bilateral assistance contributing to partner country's own development plan, Finland's development funding portfolio as a whole in the country and Finland's role as part of the donor community.

3. Current Country Strategies; achievement of objectives so far taking into account the historical context of the strategies and possible changes in the objectives 2013 onwards.

5. ISSUES BY EVALUATION CRITERIA

The following issues by evaluation criteria will guide the evaluation. Priority issues for each criterion are indicated below. In order to utilize the expertise of the evaluation team, the evaluation team will develop a limited number of detailed evaluation questions (EQs) during the evaluation Inception phase. The EQs should be based on the priorities set below and if needed the set of questions should be expanded. The EQs will be based on the OECD/DAC and EU criteria where applicable. The EQs will be finalized as part of the evaluation inception report and will be assessed and approved by the Development Evaluation Unit (EVA-11). The evaluation is also expected to apply a theory of change approach in order to assess the relevance of strategies as well as expected results and impact.

The Country Strategy Modality will be evaluated using the following criteria:

Relevance of the Country Strategy Modality

- Synthesize and assess how the country strategy modality has ensured the relevance of Finland's strategic choices from the point of view of partner countries, including beneficiaries, , Finland's development policy and donor community

- Assess the extent to which the country strategy modality is in line with agreed OECD DAC international best practices.

Effectiveness of the Country Strategy Modality

- Synthesize and assess the results of the country strategy process at the corporate level/ development policy level

- Assess the effects of country strategy process on accountability and managing for results: the reporting, communication and use and learning from results for decision making

Efficiency of the Country Strategy Modality

- Assess the quality of the country strategy guidelines, including their application including the clarity and hierarchy of objective setting, measurability/monitorability of indicators, appropriateness of rating systems etc.

- Assess the process of developing the strategy guidelines especially from process inclusiveness and change management point of views

- Assess the leanness of the Country Strategy Modality, including the resource management (human and financial) securing the outputs at country level

Complementarity and coherence of the Country Strategy Modality

- Synthesize and assess the extent to which the country strategy modality has been able to complement/take into consideration of other policies and Finnish funding in the partner countries and vice versa

- Synthesize and assess the best practices/challenges on complementarity in the current strategy modality.

Country strategies will be evaluated in accordance with the following criteria

In individual country strategy evaluations, the strategic choices of Finland will be evaluated in accordance with the following OECD DAC criteria in order to get a standardized assessment of the country strategies that allows drawing up the synthesis. In addition, each criterion may also consist of issues/evaluation questions relevant only to specific countries. In each of the criteria human rights based approach and cross cutting objectives must be systematically integrated (see UNEG guidelines). The country specific issues/questions are presented separately in chapter 5.1.

Relevance

- Assess the extent to which the Country Strategy has been in line with the Partner Country's development policies and priorities.

- Assess the extent to which the Country Strategy has responded the rights and priorities of the partner country stakeholders and beneficiaries, including men and women, boys and girls and especially the easily marginalized groups.

- Assess the extent to which the Country Strategy has been in line with the Finnish Development Policy priorities

Impact

- Assesses and verify any evidence or, in the absence of strong evidence, "weak signals" of impact, positive or negative, intended or unintended, the Country Strategy has contributed.

Effectiveness

- Assess and verify the reported outcomes (intended and un-intended)

- Assess the factors influencing the successes and challenges

Efficiency

- Assess the costs and utilization of resources (financial& human) against the achieved outputs

- Assess the efficiency and leanness of the management of the strategy

- Assess the risk management

Sustainability

- Assess the ownership and participation process within the country strategy, e.g. how participation of the partner government, as well as different beneficiary groups has been organized.

- Assess the ecological and financial sustainability of strategies

Complementarity, Coordination and Coherence

- Assess the extent to which the Country Strategy is aligned with partner countries' systems, and whether this has played a role in Finland's choice of intervention modalities.

- Assess the extent to which Finland's Country Strategy in the country has been coordinated with development partners and other donors

- Assesses the complementarity between the Country Strategy and different modalities of Finnish development cooperation in the country including NGOs, regional and targeted multilateral assistance (multi-bi) to the extent possible

- Assess the coherence between the main policy sectors that the country units and embassies are responsible for executing in the country.

5.1. Special issues per country

The evaluation aims to facilitate inclusive evaluation practice and learning between the partners at the country level. Following issues has been identified in discussions with the country representatives and/or the country reference group of the evaluation. The country specific issues will be integrated with the overall evaluation matrix where feasible, and recommendations made where evidence and justification found.

Ethiopia

- Assess the strategic value of

  - the sector approach for Rural Economic Development and Water.

  - SNE programme and possible mainstreaming to GEQIP II.

- The evaluation should make justified recommendations on

  - how to extend strategic support to new sectors in the future, as needs of Ethiopia is changing following the economic growth and increasing domestic revenue?

  - how technical cooperation between institutions (for instance ICI) could be formalized as part of Country cooperation framework?

- The field phase in late January–February 2016

Zambia

- Zambia is in a process of transitioning to the lower middle income country level. Therefore the evaluation should make justified recommendations on

  - how to advance broad based partnerships especially in trade and private sector development including interaction with civil society and public sectors in the future.

  - how the Country Strategy programming could better utilize existing processes like country/ sector portfolio reviews for advancing the collaboration between Zambia and Finland

- What has been Finland's value added on the sector coordination in agriculture, environment and private sector development.

- The partner country has expressed an interest to participate to some of the evaluation activities during the field mission

- The field phase in January-February 2016

Tanzania

- Tanzania is in a process of transitioning to the lower middle income country level. Therefore the evaluation should make justified recommendations on:

  - how to advance broad based partnerships especially in trade and private sector development including interaction with civil society and public sectors in the future.

  - The field phase in January-February 2016

Mozambique

- To what extent has the Country Strategy responded to the changing country context in Mozambique?

- Is the Country strategy balanced enough in terms of the chosen priority sectors?

- To what extent does the Country strategy complement the work of other donors and what is the strategy's value added?

- As the donor dependency of Mozambique is decreasing, the evaluation should give medium term strategic recommendations for Finland´s cooperation in Mozambique.

- The field phase in January-February 2016

Nepal

- Nepal is a fragile state in many aspects. In this context the evaluation should give medium term strategic recommendations for Finland´s cooperation in Nepal.

- Finland's Country Strategy and the programmes in Nepal were audited in 2015. The results of the audit can be utilized by the evaluation. The audit reports are in Finnish.

- The field phase must be in December 2015

Vietnam

- Vietnam is a lower middle income country and the economic development has been quite rapid in last few years. Therefore the evaluation should analyse how the country strategy has been able to adapt to the rapid transition of the economy, and how agile the strategy has been in responding the needs of private sector and other relevant stakeholders in the country.

- Recommendations should be given on how to broaden the strategic portfolio to new, mutually beneficial areas such as education and research, university and industry cooperation as well as increased trade ties.

- Private sector instruments like Finnpartnership and Concessional loan has played a role in the Country Strategy. The strategic role of these instruments in transitioning economy should be assessed, and possible best practices reported.

- Finland's Country Strategy and the programmes in Vietnam were audited in 2015. The results of the audit can be utilized by the evaluation. The audit reports are in Finnish.

- The partner country has expressed an interest to participate to some of the evaluation activities during the field mission.

- The field phase must be in December 2015

6. GENERAL APROACH AND METHODOLOGY

Evaluation is carried out and tendered as one large evaluation. The evaluation team leader is responsible for the synthesis and the evaluation methodology. Country evaluations will be carried out by country evaluation teams which are coordinated by a country coordinator together with the team leader. Coordination of the whole process and overall quality management of the evaluation will be the responsibility of the contracted evaluation consultancy company.

Evaluation will produce a synthesis report, as well as separate country reports on Ethiopia, Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, Nepal and Tanzania. These are also the reports that will be published.

Management response will be drawn up at two levels/processes: the synthesis report will be responded in accordance with the process of centralized evaluations and country reports in accordance with the process of decentralized evaluations as described in the evaluation norm of the MFA. The country reports will be discussed with partner countries and the management response drawn up on this basis. The follow up and implementation of the response will be integrated in the planning process of the next phase of the country strategy.

The approach and working modality of evaluation will be participatory. The evaluation will take into account the recommendations of the OECD/DAC on collaborative aspect of country evaluations where possible. Representatives of partner country governments will be invited in meetings and sessions when feasible. A possibility of integrating one evaluation expert representing partner country evaluation function will be made possible, where the partner country is willing and financially capable to provide such person. There is also a possibility that a representative of MFA and/or the partner country will participate in some parts of field missions with their own costs. The evaluation team shall contact the partner country representatives during the inception period for possible participation arrangements.

Mixed methods will be used (both qualitative and quantitative) to enable triangulation in the drawing of findings.

The country strategy result framework is based on logframe approach, but the evaluation team is expected to reconstruct a theory of change model of the framework describing the interaction between the elements in the logframe and dynamics of the intended result chains and prepare more elaborated evaluation questions as well as sub-questions based on the change theory approach. The Approach section of the Tender will present an initial plan for the evaluation including the methodology and the evaluation matrix for each of the countries as well as the Country Strategy Modality. The evaluation plan will be finalized during the inception period and presented in the Inception report.

During the field work particular attention will be paid to human right based approach, and to ensure that women, vulnerable and easily marginalized groups are also interviewed (See UNEG guidelines). Particular attention is also paid to the adequate length of the field visits to enable the real participation as well as sufficient collection of information also from sources outside of the institutional stakeholders (e.g. statistics and comparison material). The field work in each of the country will preferably last at least 2-3 weeks, and can be done parallel and take in account the availability of the stakeholders during the visit. Adequate amount of time should also be allocated for the interviews conducted with the stakeholders in Finland. Interview groups are to be identified by the evaluation team in advance. The MFA and embassies are not expected to organize interviews or meetings with the stakeholders in the country on behalf of the evaluation team, but assist in identification of people and organizations to be included in the evaluation.

Validation of all findings as well as results at the country level must be done through multiple processes and sources. The main document sources of information include strategy and project documents and reports, project/strategy evaluations, Finland's Development Policy Strategies, thematic guidance doc-

uments, previously conducted country strategy and thematic evaluations, development strategies of the case country governments, country analyses, and similar documents. The evaluation team is also encouraged to use statistics and different local sources of information to the largest possible extent, especially in the context analysis, but also in the contribution analysis. It should be noted that part of the material is in Finnish.

Debriefing/validation workshops will be organized at the country level in the end of each of the fieldtrip. Also a joint validation seminar will be organized with the MFA regional departments after the field trips. Embassies and the MFA will assist the evaluation team in organizing these seminars.

If sampling of documents is used, the sampling principles and their effect to reliability and validity of the evaluation must be elaborated separately.

During the process particular attention is paid to a strong inter-team coordination and information sharing within the team. The evaluation team is expected to show sensitivity to diverse communication needs, gender roles, ethnicity, beliefs, manners and customs with all stakeholders. The evaluators will respect the rights and desire of the interviewees and stakeholders to provide information in confidence. Direct quotes from interviewees and stakeholders may be used in the reports, but only anonymously and when the interviewee cannot be identified from the quote.

The evaluation team is encouraged to raise issues that it deems important to the evaluation which are not mentioned in these ToR. Should the team find any part of the ToR unfeasible, it should bring it to the attention of the Development Evaluation Unit (EVA-11) without delay.

7. EVALUATION PROCESS, TIMELINES AND DELIVERABLES

Evaluation of competitive bidding will be completed in July 2015, and the Kick-off meeting with the contracted team will be held in August.

It should be noted that internationally recognized experts may be contracted by the MFA as external peer reviewer(s) for the whole evaluation process or for some phases/deliverables of the evaluation process, e.g. final and draft reports (technical evaluation plan, evaluation plan, draft final and final reports). The views of the peer reviewers will be made available to the Consultant.

An **Inception phase** is September and October 2015 during which the evaluation team will produce a final evaluation plan with a context analysis. The context analysis includes a document analysis (desk study) on the country strategy modality as well as a context of each of the country strategy. The evaluation plan also consists of the reconstructed theory of change, evaluation questions, evaluation matrix, methodology (methods for data gathering and data analysis, as well as means of verification of different data), final work plan with a timetable as well as an outline of final reports. MFA will provide comments on the plan and it will be accepted in an inception meeting in November 2015.

The **Implementation phase** can be implemented in December 2015 – February 2016. Country-specific debriefing meetings will be organized at the end of each of the field visit. A joint debriefing and validation meeting can be arranged in Helsinki in the end of February/ beginning of March 2016. The validation seminars work like learning seminars based on initial findings, but also for validating the findings. The outcomes and further findings drawn up from seminar discussions can be utilized when finalizing the country reports as well as the synthesis report.

The **Reporting and dissemination phas**e will produce the Final reports and organize dissemination of the results. Final draft country reports will be completed by the end of April and the final draft synthesis report by the end of May, 2016. Country reports can be sequenced on the basis of the field phase. If the field phase is in December, the draft report shall be ready in February, and if in February, then the draft report shall be ready in April. Due to the scope of the evaluation reports, enough time must be left for feedback.

The final reports shall be ready in mid-June. Due the Finnish holiday season in July, a public presentation of evaluation results, a public webinar and other discussion meetings will be held in August 2016.

The evaluation consists of the following meetings and deliverables in each of the phases. It is highlighted that a new phase can be initiated only when all the deliverables of the previous phase have been approved by EVA-11. The reports will be delivered in Word-format (Microsoft Word 2010) with all the tables and pictures also separately in their original formats. Time needed for the commenting of the draft report(s) is three weeks. The language of all reports and possible other documents is English. The consultant is responsible for the editing, proof-reading and quality control of the content and language.

INCEPTION PHASE

I. Kick off meeting

The purpose of the kick-off meeting is to discuss and agree the entire evaluation process including the content of the evaluation, practical issues related to the field visits, reporting and administrative matters. The kick-off meeting will be organized by the EVA-11 in Helsinki after the signing of the contract.

Deliverable: Agreed minutes prepared by the Consultant

Participants: EVA-11 (responsible for inviting and chairing the session); reference group and **the management team** of the Consultant **in person**. Other team members and embassies may participate via VC.

Venue: MFA.

II. Inception meeting

A meeting to present the evaluation plan (incl. agreed minutes of the meeting), MFA and Peer Review comments/notes discussed and changes agreed.

Participants: EVA-11; reference group and **the management team** of the Consultant (responsible for chairing the session) **in person**. Other team members and embassies may participate via VC.

Venue: MFA

Deliverable: Inception report

Inception report **will constitute the final evaluation plan** that specifies the context of the evaluation, the approach and the methodology. It also includes the final evaluation questions and the final evaluation matrix. The sources of verification and methods for collecting and analysing data are explained in detail, including the methods and tools of analyses, scoring or rating systems and alike. The final work plan and division of tasks between the team members are presented in the evaluation plan. In addition, a list of stakeholder groups to be interviewed will be included in the evaluation plan. The evaluation will also suggest an outline of the final report(s).

The inception report will provide a **contextual analysis** based mainly on written material. It is based on a complete desk analysis of all relevant written material including, but not limited to project/strategy related documents, previous evaluations, policy documents, guidelines, thematic/regional programming, and other relevant documents related to development and development cooperation in partner countries identified by the evaluation team during the inception phase. Tentative hypotheses as well as information gaps should be identified in the evaluation plan.

It will also present plans for the interviews, participative methods and field visits including the identification of local informants (beneficiaries, government authorities, academia, research groups/institutes, civil society representatives, other donors etc.) and other sources of information (studies, publications, statistical data etc.) as well as an outline of the interview questions and use of participative methods according to the interviewee groups in each of the field visit countries.

The Inception report will be submitted to the EVA-11 and is subject to the approval of the EVA-11 prior to field visits to case countries/regions and further interviews in Finland. The report should be kept analytic, concise and clear.

IMPLEMENTATION PHASE

IV. Field visits to partner countries

The purpose of the field visits is to reflect and validate the findings and assessments of the desk analysis. The field visits may partly be joint missions with MFA and /or partner country representative participation. The length of the field visit(s) should be adequate to ensure real participation of different stakeholders and beneficiaries. The evaluation team is expected to propose the suitable timing of the visits, preferably at least 2–3 weeks.

Deliverables/meetings: Debriefing/ validation workshop supported by a PowerPoint presentation on the preliminary findings. At least one workshop in each of the partner countries, and one in the MFA related to all countries.

The preliminary findings of the visits will be verified and discussed with relevant persons from the Ministry, embassies, partner country government and relevant stakeholders, also beneficiaries including marginalized groups. The validation workshops are mandatory component of the evaluation methodology. The workshops will be organized by the Consultant and they can be partly organized also through a video conference.

After the field visits and validation workshops, it is likely that further interviews and document study in Finland will still be needed to complement the information collected during the earlier phases.

Participants:

Country workshops: The whole country team of the Consultant (responsible for inviting and chairing the session) and the relevant stakeholders, including the Embassy of Finland and relevant representatives of the local Government in person.

MFA workshop: EVA-11; reference group and other relevant staff/stakeholders, and the **management team** of the Consultant (responsible for chairing the session) in person. Other team members and embassies may participate via VC.

REPORTING AND DISSEMINATION PHASE

As part of reporting process, the Consultant will submit a methodological note explaining how the quality control was addressed during the evaluation and how the capitalization of lessons learned has also been addressed. The Consultant will also submit the EU Quality Assessment Grid as part of the final reporting.

V. Final reporting

Deliverables: Final draft report and final reports on CSM Synthesis and six partner country strategies

The reports should be kept clear, concise and consistent. The report should contain inter alia the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations and the logic between those should be clear and based on evidence.

The final draft report will be subjected to an external peer review and a round of comments by the parties concerned. The purpose of the comments is only to correct any misunderstandings or factual errors instead of rewriting the findings or adding new content.

The consultant will attach Quality Assurance expert(s) comments/notes to the final report, including signed EU Quality Assessment Grid, as well as a table summarizing how the received comments/peer review have been taken into account.

The final reports will be made available by 15th June 2016. The final reports must include abstract and summary (including the table on main findings, conclusions and recommendations) in Finnish, Swedish and English. The reports, including the Finnish and Swedish translations have to be of high and publishable quality and it must be ensured that the translations use commonly used terms in development cooperation.

The MFA also requires access to the evaluation team's interim evidence documents, e.g. completed matrices, although it is not expected that these should be of publishable quality. The MFA treats these documents as confidential if needed.

VI. Dissemination presentations

A MFA management meeting / a briefing session for the upper management on the final results will be organized tentatively in mid-June 2016 in Helsinki. It is expected that at least the Team leader and the Home officer are present in person, and the other team members via VC.

A public presentation will be organized in Helsinki tentatively in mid-August 2016.

It is expected that at least the Management team of the Consultant are present in person.

A Webinar will be organized by the EVA-11. Team leader and country leaders are expected to give short presentations in Webinar. Presentation can be delivered from distance. A sufficient Internet connection is required.

Optional learning sessions with the regional teams (Optional sessions funded separately. Requires a separate assignment by EVA-11)

8. COMPOSITION OF THE EVALUATION TEAM AND EXPERTISE REQUIRED

There will be one **Management team**, responsible for overall planning management and coordination of the evaluation from the Country Strategy Modality perspective, and six **country evaluation teams**. The evaluation team will include a mix of male and female experts. The team will also include senior experts from both developed and developing countries.

One of the senior experts of the team will be identified as the **Team leader**. The whole evaluation team will work under the leadership of the Team leader who carries the final responsibility of completing the evaluation. The Team leader will work mainly at global/CSM level but will be ultimately responsible for the quality of all the deliverables.

One senior expert of each of the country teams will be identified as a **Country coordinator**. Country coordinator will be contributing the overall planning and implementation of the whole evaluation from a country perspective and also responsible for coordinating, managing and authoring the country specific evaluation work and reports.

The Team leader, Country coordinators and the Home officer of the Consultant will form the Management group of the evaluation Consultant, which will be representing the team in major coordination meetings and major events presenting the evaluation results.

Successful conduct of the evaluation requires a deep understanding and expertise on results-based management in the context of different aid modalities. It also requires understanding and expertise of overall state-of-the-art international development policy and cooperation issues including programming and aid management, development cooperation modalities and players in the global scene. It also

requires experience and knowledge of HRBA and cross-cutting objectives, including UN resolution 1325, and related evaluation issues. Solid experience in large sectoral/thematic/policy or country strategy evaluations or large evaluations containing several countries is required. In addition, long-term hands-on experience at the development cooperation and development policy field is needed.

All team members shall have fluency in English. It is also a requirement to have one senior team member in each of the country team fluent in Finnish as a part of the documentation is available only in Finnish. Online translators cannot be used with MFA document material. One senior team member in each of the country teams shall be fluent in a major local language of the country. Knowledge of local administrative languages of the partner countries among the experts will be an asset.

The competencies of the team members will be complementary. Each country team will consist of 3 to 5 experts. One expert can be a member of multiple country teams, if his/her expertise as well as tasks and the time table of the evaluation make it feasible.

Detailed team requirements are included in the Instructions to the Tenderers (ITT).

9. BUDGET AND PAYMENT MODALITIES

The evaluation will not cost more than € 950 000 (VAT excluded). The payments will be done in all inclusive lump sums based on the progress of the evaluation.

10. MANAGEMENT OF THE EVALUATION AND THE REFERENCE GROUP

The EVA-11 will be responsible for overall management of the evaluation process. The EVA-11 will work closely with other units/departments of the Ministry and other stakeholders in Finland and abroad.

A reference group for the evaluation will be established and chaired by EVA-11. The mandate of the reference group is to provide advisory support and inputs to the evaluation, e.g. through participating in the planning of the evaluation and commenting deliverables of the consultant.

The members of the reference group may include:

- Representatives from relevant units/departments in the MFA forming a core group, that will be kept regularly informed of progress
- Representatives of relevant embassies
- Representatives of partner countries governments

The tasks of the reference group are to:

- Participate in the planning of the evaluation
- Participate in the relevant meetings (e.g. kick-off meeting, meeting to discuss the evaluation plan, wrap-up meetings after the field visits)
- Comment on the deliverables of the consultant (i.e. evaluation plan, draft final report, final report) with a view to ensure that the evaluation is based on factual knowledge about the subject of the evaluation
- Support the implementation, dissemination and follow-up on the agreed evaluation recommendations.

11. MANDATE

The evaluation team is entitled and expected to discuss matters relevant to this evaluation with pertinent persons and organizations. However, it is not authorized to make any commitments on behalf of the Government of Finland. The evaluation team does not represent the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland in any capacity.

All intellectual property rights to the result of the Service referred to in the Contract will be exclusive property of the Ministry, including the right to make modifications and hand over material to a third party. The Ministry may publish the end result under Creative Commons license in order to promote openness and public use of evaluation results.

12. AUTHORISATION Helsinki, 6.5.2015

Jyrki Pulkkinen
Director
Development Evaluation Unit
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland

ANNEX 2: METHODOLOGY TABLES

Table 7: Evaluation criteria

Evaluation criterion	Definition
Relevance	The extent to which the CS objectives and its implementation are consistent with the priorities and rights of partner country stakeholders and beneficiaries; partner country development policies and priorities; and Finnish development policies.
	The extent to which the CSM has been relevant to OECD/DAC best practices.
Effectiveness	The extent to which the CSM's and CSs' objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance, directly and indirectly.
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, etc.) are converted to results.
Sustainability	The continuation of benefits from an intervention after major assistance has been completed. The probability of long-term benefits. The resilience to risk (ecological, financial and institutional) of the net benefit flows over time.
Impact	Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by the CS or likely to be produced, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.
Coherence	The consistency of policy/programme elements of the CS with each other (do they complement each other in a positive, mutually reinforcing way?), as well as the consistency of the CS with non-development cooperation policies of Finland, such as trade, foreign and security and human rights policies, as appropriate.
Coordination	The complementarity, cooperation and division of labour of the CS in relation to other donors
Complementarity	The degree to which the CS complements and/or takes into consideration other instruments of Finnish development cooperation that are not incorporated into the strategy

Table 8: Main evaluation questions and sub-questions

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
EQ 1: How relevant are CSs and the CSM?		Evaluation criterion: Relevance
CS evaluation sub-questions **EQ1.1** How relevant are CSs to partner country contexts? • To country development policies, priorities and programmes? • To the rights (economic, social, political, civil) and priorities of partner country stakeholders and beneficiaries – especially the easily marginalized groups? • To donor partners? **EQ1.2** How relevant are the CSs to Finnish Development Policy priorities and principles?	The strategic choices made in the CSs in terms of interventions and how they are undertaken • are aligned to country development policies, priorities and programmes • target development objectives that are a priority/issues for country stakeholders and beneficiaries, especially easily marginalized groups • take into account what donor partners perceive as priority • take into account the development context of the country • are aligned with aid effectiveness commitments/principles • are aligned to the objectives and principles of the 2012 DPP and take appropriate account of sector/thematic guidance/ papers and other Finnish guidance	• Partner country development strategy and policy documentation, national sector/thematic, ODA policies/frameworks Finnish DPP, guidance documentation and sector/thematic guidelines • CSM documentation (instructions, templates) • CSs, engagement plans and related results reports • CS planning/updating process documentation • Existing evaluations, reviews and reports on the country programme, and other Finnish evaluations, reviews and reports • Country development statistics • Secondary literature on country development status and priorities • OECD/DAC guidance, studies and reviews • Studies and reviews from other sources • Documentation on country programming practices of selected bilateral donors • Interviews - with MFA actors and stakeholders in CSM design and implementation at MFA level - with country teams, including desk officers and in-country officers (current and past members) - with other relevant government officials
CSM evaluation sub-questions **EQ1.3** How relevant is the CSM to MFA management and country programme[9] managers' needs? **EQ1.4** How has CSM ensured Finland's strategic choice relevance to key stakeholders and development country contexts? **EQ1.5** Is the CSM aligned to OECD DAC/ international best practices?*	The CSM fulfils the needs of senior management in MFA and country teams related to country programming and management of country programmes The CSM – through its approach, rules, information requirements and processes – contributed to the relevance of CS strategic choices as measured (see all CS evaluation sub-questions) The CSM is flexible in responding to different country context, e.g. countries in transition/phase-out of bilateral aid vs fragile countries The CSM – through its approach, rules, information requirements and processes – facilitates the alignment of country programmes with aid effectiveness principles as measured The CSM is aligned to OECD/DAC country programming best practices	

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
EQ 1: How relevant are CSs and the CSM?		Evaluation criterion: Relevance - with selected non-MFA sources with direct relevant knowledge on the CSM (e.g. relevant global implementation partners) - with country implementing partners - with country stakeholders/programme beneficiaries, incl. also private sector, civil society, academia & the media as relevant - with other in-country development partners
EQ 2: Are Country Strategies and the CSM effective?		Evaluation criterion: Effectiveness
CS evaluation sub-questions **EQ2.1** What are the actual interventions undertaken by the Finland country programme as framed by the CS? **EQ2.2** Did the CS interventions achieve their planned purposes? **EQ2.3** What development results are observed relevant to CS interventions, intended and unintended? **EQ2.4** What contribution have CS interventions made to the specific development objectives and development result areas? **EQ2.5** How aid-effective is the country programme as framed by the CS?	Effectiveness assesses the contribution of the CS interventions to Finland's specific objectives Planned interventions took place and their purposes were/are being achieved as evidenced by existing reports, reviews and evaluations The Theory of Change causal chain implied by the Country Strategy from these target results to specific Finnish objectives, and the underlying assumptions is valid, taking into account social, political and institutional factors • Contribution can be argued from the Finnish interventions (targeted at policy influence and direct interventions) to the specific objectives targeted, given other factors The Finnish country programme as framed by the CS is aid-effective: the programme facilitates the leveraging of project and programmatic intervention results towards development effectiveness against the specific objectives. • Direct interventions and efforts to achieve policy influence are mutually reinforcing	CSs, engagement plans Annual and semi-annual (results) reports, synthesis reports Possible upstream results reporting Existing evaluations, reviews and reports on the country programme Project annual report/completion reports Other relevant Finnish global and regional evaluations, reviews and reports Country development statistics and secondary literature on country development status and priorities OECD/DAC guidance, studies and reviews Comparison of the quality of CSM and country engagement plan guidance and annual results reporting Studies and reviews from other sources

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KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
EQ 2: Are Country Strategies and the CSM effective?		Evaluation criterion: Effectiveness
CSM evaluation sub-questions **EQ2.6** How effective is the CSM/CSM processes? • Was the introduction of CSM managed inclusively (including key stakeholders), and well? • What are CSM programming, monitoring, reporting and accountability practices, in principle and in practice? • Do these present effective RBM: do they facilitate learning and accountability? • Does the CSM contribute to better targeting and measuring of results by MFA? **EQ2.7** Has the CSM contributed to more effective (including aid effective) country programming?	The management of the switch to CSM from CEPs at country level was inclusive and contributed to more effective CSs as measured. Change management was effective. The CSM contributes to effective results-based management in MFA • Reporting and management responses against the CSs is regular, accurate and appropriate for learning & accountability • The CSM facilitated the selection of appropriate indicators, given targeted results in CSs • At country & MFA level the CSM facilitates learning & accountability • The CSM has facilitated more effective aid management at a corporate level and better upstream results reporting within MFA The approach, rules, information requirements and processes of the CSM has facilitated a feasible Theory of Change results chain/ country programme logical model taking into account country social, political and institutional circumstances • The CSM has contributed to appropriate targeting of results and objectives given Finland's (small) relative financial contribution as a development partner • The CSM has contributed to better results-based thinking on on-going interventions at the time of the CS, and has resulted in appropriate (past, current, expected) changes to the country programme • The CSM has contributed to better incorporation of the findings of project/programme monitoring reports, reviews and evaluations in CS review, reporting • The CSM has contributed to appropriate implementation of aid-effectiveness commitments and principles	Interviews • with MFA actors and stakeholders in CSM design and implementation at MFA level • with country teams, including desk officers and in-country officers (current and past members) • with relevant government officials • with selected non-MFA sources with direct relevant knowledge on the CSM (e.g. relevant global implementation partners) • with country stakeholders, incl. in civil society, academia & the media as relevant • with programme beneficiaries • with country implementing partners • with other in-country development partners

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
EQ 3: What is the impact of the CSs and does the CSM contribute to this?		Evaluation criterion: Impact
CS evaluation sub-questions		Country social and economic statistics
EQ 3.1 What are evidence or signals of impacts from CS interventions?	Impact assesses the upper end of the result chain, from Finnish specific objectives to the development goal	Independent secondary articles, reports, reviews and evaluations relevant to the Finnish country programme, as framed by the CS.
EQ 3.2 To what extent does the CS TOC pathway support likely contribution to impacts?	Impact is accurately reported	Finnish country and relevant regional and global reports, reviews, evaluations
	In the absence of timely data against relevant impact measures, documentation and key respondents highlight signals of evidence of impact	Interviews
	The implied pathway from specific objectives to the development goal in the Theory of Change and underlying country programme logic model is feasible.	CS documentation, including reports and management responses
		CSM guidance documentation
		Interview with
CSM evaluation sub-questions		• with MFA actors and stakeholders in CSM design and implementation at MFA level
EQ3.3 Do existing CSM instructions and templates provide adequate guidance to build feasible CS impact pathways and to identify and report on appropriate impact indicators?	The CSM guidance and its implementation have contributed to better country team thinking on impact, and best pathways to impact.	• with country teams, including desk officers and in-country officers (current and past members)
		• with relevant government officials
		• with selected non-MFA sources with direct relevant knowledge on the CSM
		• with country stakeholders, incl. in civil society, academia & the media as relevant
		• with programme beneficiaries
		• with country implementing partners
		• with other in-country development partners

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
EQ4: Are CSs complementary, coordinated and coherent and does the CSM contribute to this?		Evaluation criteria: Complementarity, coordination and coherence
CS evaluation sub-questions		
EQ4.1 Are CSs/CS interventions aligned to country systems?	CS interventions are implemented using country systems to the maximum extent	CSs, engagement plans and all reports against strategies
EQ4.2 How well coordinated are CSs/ CS interventions with other development partners?	• Including systems for planning, budgeting, disbursement, implementation, reporting, monitoring/reviewing and auditing • If systems are not used directly, comprehensive and timely information on Finnish country programme is available to country partners	Existing evaluations, reviews and reports on the country programme
EQ4.3 How complementary are CSs/CS interventions to non-CS Finnish development cooperation in long-term partner countries?	Finland participates regularly and effectively (in terms of the resulting degree of coordination of the Finnish country programme) in donor coordination structures	Other relevant Finnish global and regional evaluations, reviews and reports
EQ4.4 How internally coherent are CSs (inter- and intra-sector)?	The CSs specific objectives and interventions are well coordinated with inputs from other development partners, in other words they represent an appropriate division of labour between the MFA and other development partners in country	Country development statistics and secondary literature on country development status and priorities OECD/DAC guidance, studies and reviews CSM guidance documentation Studies and reviews from other sources
• Are CS interventions mutually reinforcing so that the sum of CS intervention results is more than the parts?	CSs and CS intervention take into account and complement other (non-CS) channels of Finnish development cooperation, and vice versa so that they contribute coherently to DPP objectives, including the CS development goal	Interviews • with MFA actors and stakeholders in CSM design and implementation at MFA level
CSM evaluation sub-questions		• with country teams, including desk officers and in-country officers (current and past members)
EQ4.5 Does the CSM contribute to better alignment with partner country systems and coordination with development partners?	The CS leverages the results of specific interventions to contribute coherently to the specific objectives targeted	• with relevant government officials • with selected non-MFA sources with direct relevant knowledge on the CSM (e.g. relevant global implementation partners)
EQ4.6 Does the CSM contribute to complementarity between channels/instruments in Finnish development cooperation in country?	The country programme as framed by the CS does not (overly) fragment Finnish development resources	• with country stakeholders, incl. in civil society, academia & the media as relevant
EQ 4.7 Does the CSM result in a coherent (inter and intra sector) CS and a CS coherent with other relevant Finnish policies??	CSM guidance and actual CS design, monitoring and reporting processes and documentation appropriately emphasize complementarity with other Finnish aid channels, coordination with development partners, alignment with country systems and internal CS coherence.	• with programme beneficiaries • with country implementing partners • with other in-country development partners

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
EQ 5 Do CSs and the CSM contribute to efficient Finnish Development Cooperation?		Evaluation criterion: Efficiency
CS evaluation sub-questions **EQ5.1** How well are risks identified and managed? **EQ5.2** How efficiently are resources (money, people, partnerships) deployed in the CS country programme to deliver results?	The risks identified in the CS represent a thorough assessment of risks and the management of risks is appropriate given development goals and objectives Disbursements of Finnish resources have been predictable/timely The CS represents the most cost-effective choice of objectives and interventions, given Finnish resources (including financial, human and partnership resources)	Country strategies, engagement plans and all reports against strategies Existing evaluations, reviews and reports on the country programme + other relevant Finnish global and regional evaluations, reviews and reports CSM guidance documentation Studies and reviews from other sources Interviews • with MFA actors and stakeholders in CSM design and implementation at MFA level • with country teams, including desk officers and in-country officers (current and past members) • with relevant government officials • with country stakeholders, incl. in civil society, academia & the media as relevant • with country implementing partners • with other in-country development partners
CSM evaluation sub-questions **EQ5.3** How efficient are CSM processes? • How clear are CSM frameworks & guidance? • How costly are CSM processes to manage CSs given the observed results from CSM? **EQ5.4** How has CSM contributed to Finnish development policy implementation efficiency and risk management?	CSM processes use MFA resources (financial, human, time) efficiently to produce the RBM outcomes observed CSM guidance is clear, comprehensive and coherent, resulting in efficient and effective processes and documentation CSM prescribed processes are appropriate to be fit for purpose in different contexts The CSM has contributed to efficient implementation of Finnish development policy and sound risk management, i.e. balancing risks and benefits of intervention choices appropriately CSM has contributed to the selection of interventions with most value-for-money considering expected impacts. • CSM has contributed to resource-constrained planning and targeting of results	

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KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
EQ6: Do CSs and the CSM contribute to sustainable results from Finnish Development Cooperation?		Evaluation criterion: Sustainability
CS evaluation sub-questions	The Human Rights-based approach is integrated into the CS	Country strategies, engagement plans and all reports against strategies
EQ6.1 To what extent do specifically local partners/stakeholders own the CS and participate in CS interventions?	• The process to develop the CS, as well as processes to report on and revise the CS are inclusive of local partners and stakeholders	Existing evaluations, reviews and reports on the country programme, and other Finnish evaluations, reviews and reports
• How inclusive was the process to develop the CS?	• Beneficiaries, particularly marginalized groups, participate in Finnish country programme processes across the project/programme cycle so that local ownership is built	Studies and reviews from other sources on country programmes
• Is there sufficient participation by local partners/stakeholders across programme/project cycles to support sustainability?	• The country programme as framed by the CS contributes to rights awareness and the ability of rights-holders to claim their rights, and country duty bearers to fulfil the rights	Interviews • with MFA actors and stakeholders in CSM design and implementation at MFA level
EQ6.2 How sustainable are interventions and their results (ecologically, financially, politically, institutionally)?	The results targeted and achieved in the country programme as framed by the county strategy are sustainable, given institutional and financial factors.	• with country teams, including desk officers and in-country officers (current and past members)
	The Finnish country programme and its interventions as framed by the country strategy is ecologically sustainable and contribute to ecological sustainability	• with relevant government officials • with country stakeholders, incl. in civil society, academia & the media as relevant
CSM evaluation sub-questions	CSM guidance and implementation prioritise sustainability (ecological, financial, institutional) of Finnish Development Cooperation results	• with programme beneficiaries
EQ6.3 Does the CSM contribute to more sustainable Finnish DC?	Capacity building at MFA and country level has been sufficient to sustain CSM processes	• with country implementing partners
EQ6.4 How sustainable are CSM processes?	Result information management systems are well developed, build on national development/result indicators to the extent possible, and will sustain CSM	• with other in-country development partners
• Is CSM human resource capacity building and systems adequate?		
• Are there in-built mechanisms to enable learning on CSM?	The CSM is flexible and has adapted to implementation experience, changing country contexts	
EQ6.5 Does the CSM ensure CS responsiveness to better ensure sustainability in changing contexts	The CSM has contributed to better reporting on results from Finnish aid, which has supported the sustainability of Finnish DC	

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
EQ 7: What improvements to CSs and the CSM are necessary to improve Finnish DC?		
EQ7.1 What improvements are needed relative to country priorities and changing contexts, inter alia** • on sector/programme choices and strategically extending development cooperation to new sectors or thematic areas? • in modes and mechanisms of cooperation? • In transitioning and phasing out/ maintaining/scaling up bilateral aid? • to advance partnerships and cooperation in non-state sectors of the economy?	Improvements that will make the CS and related country programme more relevant, effective, impactful, efficient, complementary, coordinated, coherent, sustainable. Improvements to the CSM that will ensure that it contributes better to country programmes and to RBM in MFA. Improvements in the CSM that will make it more relevant to MFA needs, more efficient and more sustainable.	CS evaluation data and analysis Country CSM evaluation data and analysis Validation with key country and CSM actors and stakeholders
EQ7.2 What improvements in the CSM modality are necessary to ensure more relevant, effective, impactful, efficient, coherent complementary and sustainable CSs?* • What improvements are necessary? • Who should make these improvements? • When should improvements be made? • How should improvements be made?		

* These questions are not answered in the country evaluations
** This question is not answered in the main text of the synthesis report

Table 9: Terms associated with approaches to development cooperation

Term	Definition
Aid effectiveness	Aid effectiveness is about delivering aid in a way that maximises its impact on development and achieves value for aid money.
	A narrow definition of aid effectiveness would refer simply to the relationship between aid and its outcomes, in other words aid effectiveness is an assessment of the effectiveness of development aid in achieving economic or human development. In common usage however, the terms is strongly associated with the key principles in respect of how aid is delivered to achieve this outcome. These principles have been agreed between partner countries and development partners through a series of High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness and include ownership, alignment, harmonisation, a focus on results, and mutual accountability. The evaluation will use the term to refer to the application of these principles towards effective use of development aid. This is in line with the MFA Evaluation Manual, according to which an assessment of aid effectiveness would focus on evaluating the implementation of Paris Declaration principles
	Source: Killian, B, 2011: How much does aid effectiveness improve development outcomes, Busan Background Papers, OECD DAC; MFA Evaluation Manual
Results based management	The MFA guideline on results-based management defines it as follows: Results based management therefore involves shifting management approach away from focusing on inputs, activities and processes to focusing more on the desired results. OECD/ DAC defines RBM as *"A management strategy focusing on performance and achievement of outputs, outcomes and impacts"*. In conclusion, results based management in development cooperation is simultaneously:
	An organizational management approach, based on a set of principles;
	An approach utilizing results based tools for planning, monitoring and evaluating the performance of development projects and programs.
	Source: MFA, 2015: Results-based management in Finland's Development Cooperation, Concepts and Guiding Principles, MFA.
Human rights based approach	HRBA means that human rights are used as a basis for setting the objectives for development policy and cooperation. In addition, it means that the processes for development cooperation are guided by human rights principles.
	Finland's human rights-based approach is in line with the UN Statement of Common Understanding on Human Rights-Based Approaches to Development Cooperation and Programming (the Common Understanding) adopted by the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) in 2003, which stipulates that:
	• All programmes of development co-operation, policies and technical assistance should further the realisation of human rights as laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments;
	• Human rights standards contained in, and principles derived from, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments guide all development cooperation and programming in all sectors and in all phases of the programming process;
	• Development cooperation contributes to the development of the capacities of 'duty-bearers' to meet their obligations and/or of 'rights-holders' to claim their rights.
	Source: MFA, 2015a: Human Rights Based Approach in Finland's Development Cooperation. Guidance Note, 2015

Contribution analysis

This evaluation makes use of contribution analysis to infer causality from the application of a reasoned theory of change verified by evidence. The influence of other factors, exogenous or complementary to the CS portfolio intervention or CSM, is also weighed and considered. Contribution analysis is used to provide reasonable judgements of cause and effect when it is not practical, for example, to design an experiment.

The idea of contribution analysis is that it

- is based on the theory of change;
- is buttressed by evidence validating the theory of change;
- is reinforced by examination of other influencing factors; and
- builds a reasonably credible case about the difference the CSM or CS Portfolio intervention is making.

The key steps in the contribution analysis approach are given in Figure 18 below applied to the CSM evaluation. Stages 3, 4 and 5 in the figure are the kernel of the contribution analysis approach. The approach to contribution analysis is in line with its aim as set out in the MFA Evaluation Manual: "Contribution analysis aims to demonstrate whether or not the evaluated intervention is one of the causes of an observed change. It may also rank the evaluated intervention among the various causes explaining the observed change" (MFA n.d., p. 65).

Figure 18: Contribution analysis steps

Developed from Mayne (2009) and EuropeAid (2013)

ANNEX 3: PEOPLE INTERVIEWED FOR CSM EVALUATION (GLOBAL)

N.B. Titles and positions reflect the situation that prevailed at the time of the interviews.

FINLAND

Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Finland

Hellman, Pauliina, Senior Adviser, Development Policy, and member of CSM working group

Karlsson, Lotta, Director of Unit for Administrative and Legal Development Cooperation Matters (and colleagues)

Kuvaja-Xanthopoulos, Kristiina, Desk Officer, improvement of the quality of development cooperation, Unit for Sectoral Policy

Laatu, Riikka, Deputy Director General, Department for Development Policy

Lehtiranta, Sari, Director, Unit for General Development Policy

Oksanen, Riitta, Senior Adviser, Development Evaluation

Paananen, Pauliina, Development Evaluation Expert, Development Evaluation

Pulkkinen, Jyrki, Director, Development Evaluation

Puustinen, Pekka, Director General, Department for Development Policy

Stocchetti, Marikki, Secretary General, Development Policy Committee

Takala, Sanna, Senior Evaluation Officer, Development Evaluation

Virkkunen, Suvi, Senior Adviser, Development Policy, Department for Development Policy

von Bonsdorff, Max, Senior Adviser, Unit for General Development Policy

Department for Africa and the Middle East

Alanko, Kari, Deputy Director General

Anttinen, Pertti, Senior Adviser, steering and coordination of development cooperation

Karakoski, Jussi, Senior Adviser, Development Policy

Väisänen, Jatta, Senior Adviser

Valjas, Arto, Special Adviser, Development Policy

Unit for Southern Africa, Department for Africa and the Middle East

Sallinen, Harri, Team Leader (Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi)

Lehtinen, Juhana, Desk Officer (Mozambique Team)

Unit for Eastern and Western Africa, Department for Africa and the Middle East

Airaksinen, Helena, Director

Eskonheimo, Anu, Desk Officer (Ethiopia)

Jutila, Vuokko, Team Leader (Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, DRC and the East African Community)

Pulli, Heini, Team Leader (Kenya, Uganda, Seychelles)

Department for the Americas and Asia

Kullberg, Gunilla, Senior Adviser, Development Policy

Wanner, Petri, Desk Officer (Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Maldive Islands, regional organisations)

Unit for Eastern Asia and Oceania, Department for the Americas and Asia

Hares, Minna, Programme Officer (Vietnam, Forestry Projects of the Unit)

Unit for South Asia, Department for the Americas and Asia

Kuivalainen, Jetta, Programme Officer (Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh)

Turpeinen, Ville-Pekka, Assistant Desk Officer, Development Cooperation Projects

KENYA

Embassy of Finland in Nairobi

Alarcon, Eeva, Head of Cooperation

Raatikainen, Riikka, Counsellor (Gender, Good Governance)

IRISH AID

Holmes, Anne, Deputy Director, Performance and Planning Unit, Development Cooperation Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

Nolan, Paula, Development Specialist, Policy, Planning and Effectiveness Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

SWITZERLAND

Läubli Küenzi, Ursula, Head, Quality Assurance and Aid Effectiveness, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), Federal Department of Foreign Affairs

ANNEX 4: CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS AND FINNISH DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

The chronology provided in this annex is intended to situate Finnish development cooperation within the global aid context, as well as to highlight critical dates of Finnish engagement in the countries evaluated. The chronology looks beyond the evaluation period in order to provide an overview/background to more recent developments related to Finnish development cooperation and its current status, allowing for an analysis of the evolution of development cooperation as well as of approaches to country programming. The chronology also provides an overview of the policy context and shifts towards a focus on results and results-based management.

Year	Global context of development cooperation (major agreements and events shaping development cooperation internationally)	Finnish 'global' development cooperation context (developments in development cooperation at the central level)	MFA Country Engagement (overview of key events related to Finnish development cooperation engagement in-country)
Earlier		**1955:** On 14 December Finland was accepted as a member of the UN. **1961:** The state budget included ODA for the first time. **1965:** Development Aid Office was established in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Finnish development aid constituted 0.03% of GNP. **1970:** Finland adopted plan for ODA to reach 0.7% of GNI. **1975:** Finland became a member of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). **1979:** First advisory board on Finland's relations with developing countries was established, the Advisory Board for Economic Relations with Developing Countries (TALKE)	**1962:** The first collaborative Nordic development project began in Tanganyika. **1967:** Finland entered into development cooperation with Ethiopia. **1968:** Diplomatic relations with Zambia were established. **1960s:** Development assistance to Kenya began. **1979:** Development cooperation between Finland and Vietnam was initiated.
1980s		Throughout the 1980s Finnish development cooperation grew, with investments in large-scale infrastructure projects as well as CSOs. 1985: Kepa was established (now the leading civil society organisation on development policy issues).	**1982:** Ethiopia was selected as a programme country for Finland's development cooperation; aid increased During the 1980s Finland started supporting the Government of Ethiopia in Special Needs Education/Inclusive Education **1983:** Finland's development cooperation with Nepal started. **1984:** Finland entered development cooperation with Mozambique **1987:** Mozambique became one of the main recipient countries of Finnish aid **1980s:** Kenya became a target country for Finland.

Year	Global context of development cooperation (major agreements and events shaping development cooperation internationally)	Finnish 'global' development cooperation context (developments in development cooperation at the central level)	MFA Country Engagement (overview of key events related to Finnish development cooperation engagement in-country)
1990s	1992: Earth Summit – led to the Rio Declaration on sustainable development and the plan to implement it (Agenda 21) 1997: Kyoto protocol on climate change signed. RBM initiated by the UN	1991: Finland exceeded 0.7 percent target. Development aid constituted 0.8 percent of ODA per GNP. 1992: The recession led to a decision to reduce Finnish DC to 0.4% of GNP as a temporary measure TALKE became the Advisory Board for Relations with Developing Countries (KESU) and was mandated to cover relations with developing countries more broadly; promoting consistency in Finland's development cooperation. 1993: Finland's first development cooperation strategy published. 1995: Finland joined the EU's development cooperation. 1996: Cabinet committed – through a Decision in Principle – to 0.4% target by the end of 2000. The Decision in Principle outlined key objectives, including to reduce poverty, combat global environmental threats, and promote social equality. This also made development cooperation a key part of Finland's foreign policy and international relations. 1998: An implementation plan accompanying the 1993 strategy was outlined. The ministry underwent a reorganization, with aid management system changes to bring country programming into newly created geographical divisions, and to treat aid alongside political and trade affairs.	

Year	Global context of development cooperation (major agreements and events shaping development cooperation internationally)	Finnish 'global' development cooperation context (developments in development cooperation at the central level)	MFA Country Engagement (overview of key events related to Finnish development cooperation engagement in-country)
2000	**Millennium Summit** brought together world leaders to adopt the United Nations Millennium Declaration, making a commitment to reduce poverty and achieve time-bound targets (the MDGs) by 2015 Agreement on a **Programme of Action for the LDCs 2001–2010** to ensure fulfilment of ODA commitments.	Finland adopted the **MDGs.** ODA was 0.31% of GNI.	**Tanzania:** Finland started direct support to Local Government Reform Program (LGRP) in 2000.
2001	WTO negotiations in Doha led to the **Doha Development Agenda**, setting a target to take the special needs of developing countries into account. **UN Forum on Forests** established. **Brussels Programme of Action for the LDCs 2001–2010** aimed at improving market access for LDCs.	The government adopted a White Paper on development policy, with goals to alleviate poverty, prevent global environmental threats and promote equality, democracy and human rights. Finland began to grant **direct budget support,** providing GBS to Tanzania. Finland made the decision to concentrate development cooperation on a few countries, with more extensive programmes in each. ODA as percentage of GNI was 0.32.	**Nepal:** Government of Nepal and Government of Finland started the development cooperation project "Strengthening of Environmental Administration and Management at the Local Level in Nepal (SEAM-N Project – Phase 1). **Vietnam:** Evaluation of the Bilateral Development Cooperation between Vietnam and Finland conducted (last country level evaluation of the entire programme)
2002	**International Conference on Financing for Development** hosted in Monterrey, the first summit-level meeting hosted to address financial issues related to global development. The Monterrey Consensus was agreed between developed and developing countries, with the contribution of ODA to meeting the MDGs addressed and commitments made to providing more, and better, aid (with commitments to providing 0.7 percent of GNI). **World Summit on Sustainable Development** hosted in Johannesburg, ten years on from the first Earth Summit in Rio. The Johannesburg Summit Commitment committed countries to make concrete efforts to reach international targets on ODA.	ODA as per cent of GNI was 0.35. Finland committed to the Monterrey and Johannesburg Summit commitments on ODA.	

Year	Global context of development cooperation (major agreements and events shaping development cooperation internationally)	Finnish 'global' development cooperation context (developments in development cooperation at the central level)	MFA Country Engagement (overview of key events related to Finnish development cooperation engagement in-country)
2003	**Rome Declaration** on harmonisation of aid: development community committed to harmonising assistance around a country's development priorities and systems.	**KESU became the Development Policy Committee (DPC)** (a government-appointed advisory body, with representatives of each political party). The **Portfolio of Minister of Foreign Trade and Development** is included in the Cabinet. Amongst the recommendations which emerged from the **OECD Peer Review in 2003** was that Finland should reduce the number of partner countries and focus on policy coherence more explicitly. 11 countries supported through development cooperation. ODA as per cent of GNI was 0.35	**Ethiopia:** The third phase of The Rural Water Supply and Environmental Programme in Amhara region began (2003–2006). This was first funded in 1994. Phase III aimed at supporting decentralisation at community level, and was financed from Community Development Fund (CDF).
2004	**Marrakech Round Table on Results, Morocco:** Development agencies endorsed five core principles on managing for development results (MfDR).	The **Development Policy Programme of Finland** reconfirmed Finland's commitment to the Millennium Declaration. Cooperation with long-term partner countries was based on the national Poverty Reduction Strategies, focusing on two or three sectors. It guided development cooperation policy, containing priorities such as the MDGs, poverty reduction, policy coherence, sustainable development, country ownership, predictability and transparency. Net ODA (in EUR million) was 547 (0.37% ODA/GNI)	**Vietnam:** Water and Sanitation for Small Towns of Vietnam (WSPST I), Phase I (2004–2009) launched. **Kenya:** Agreement that Finland would focus on forestry, energy and good governance sectors in Kenya.

Year	Global context of development cooperation (major agreements and events shaping development cooperation internationally)	Finnish 'global' development cooperation context (developments in development cooperation at the central level)	MFA Country Engagement (overview of key events related to Finnish development cooperation engagement in-country)
2005	**Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness** endorsed by over one hundred Ministers, Head of Agencies and other Senior Officials; it outlined five principles for more effective aid: ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results and mutual accountability **UN World Summit** brought together over 170 Heads of State, emphasising the three interrelated components of sustainable development as economic development, social development and environmental protection. **EU Development Policy Statement** emphasised links between security, development and human rights. The **Brussels EU Target for 2015 ODA** committed EU members to achieve 0.7% ODA/GNI. **Aid for Trade Initiative** committed countries to support developing countries to benefit from trade.	Finland signed the **Paris Declaration** and committed to the Aid for Trade Initiative. The DPC's Annual Review of the State of Finland's Development emphasised policy coherence and the implementation of development cooperation from the point of view of the government's Resolution on Development Policy. The document **Finland's Interest: Global Responsibility: A strategy for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs** set out the objective to 'improve the quality of development cooperation and strengthening partnerships that favour sustainable development'. New policy on concessional credits was approved. Net ODA (in EUR million) was 726 (0.46% ODA/GNI)	**Mozambique:** Finland began supporting the PROAGRI sector programme. **Tanzania:** Sustainable Management of Land and Environment (SMOLE) programme of Zanzibar launched. Finland started shift towards sector-wide programmes and general budget support in Tanzania.
2006		DPC's annual review emphasised the connection between Finland's development cooperation and the EU's development policy (with 20% of Finnish development cooperation channelled through the EU). The report emphasised coherence across policies and the quality and quantity of development cooperation being implemented. Finland took over presidency of the EU and focused on securing agreement on the development cooperation instrument and advancing the aid for trade agenda as well as giving increased priority to the need for policy coherence. Net ODA (in EUR million) was 665 (0.40% ODA/GNI).	**Mozambique:** Finland began support to inclusive rural development through PRODEZA (Phase 1: 2006–2010) **Nepal:** Rural Village Water Resources Management Project (RVWRMP I), a bilateral project between Government of Nepal and Finland, was launched. **Vietnam:** Finland started supporting the National Targeted Poverty Reduction Programme (P135) Phase 2.

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Year	Global context of development cooperation (major agreements and events shaping development cooperation internationally)	Finnish 'global' development cooperation context (developments in development cooperation at the central level)	MFA Country Engagement (overview of key events related to Finnish development cooperation engagement in-country)
2007	In view of weaknesses in the international aid architecture the **Development Cooperation Forum** was officially launched (as a component of ECOSOC), and mandated to provide policy recommendations for more effective development cooperation. **Collaborative Partnership on Forests 2008–2015** agreement to further work on forests was drawn up.	The **Development Policy Programme 2007: Towards a Sustainable and Just World Community** was adopted. The document emphasised Finnish commitment to climate change and environmental issues, crisis prevention and support for peace processes. It maintained the overarching goal of the 2004 policy to reduce poverty and commit to the MDGs. DPC's annual review emphasised coherence in development policy across Finland's State administration. OECD review emphasised Finland's commitment to development cooperation, with clearly defined priorities and commitment to policy coherence and the aid effectiveness agenda. It highlighted that there are challenges in making its commitments bring real results. In According to an MFA opinion poll, 89% of the population thought development cooperation was important, but only 8% were familiar with the MDGs. ODA as per cent of GNI was 0.39.	**Ethiopia:** Bilateral negotiations led to continuation of the Special Needs Education Programme (2008–2012). **Zambia:** Finland stopped support to the education sector and started support to Private Sector Development (PSD) and budget support for poverty reduction.

Year	Global context of development cooperation (major agreements and events shaping development cooperation internationally)	Finnish 'global' development cooperation context (developments in development cooperation at the central level)	MFA Country Engagement (overview of key events related to Finnish development cooperation engagement in-country)
2008	**Accra Summit on aid effectiveness,** donor commitment on end to aid fragmentation and to improve ownership, partnerships, delivering results and capacity development. The Accra Agenda for Action committed actors to accelerate and deepen implementation of the aid effectiveness principles. **High level event on MDGs** hosted, bringing together different and diverse actors (from governments to civil society groups). **International Conference on Financing for Development** hosted in Doha, Qatar to review the Monterrey Consensus. Doha Declaration adopted, highlighting the importance of mobilising resources and using resources effectively for sustainable development. **First World Investment Forum (Accra, Ghana).**	Finland committed to the Doha Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action. DPC's annual review emphasised the need for Finnish development cooperation to be comprehensive and well-rounded. It recommended that Finland increase public development cooperation funding and promote predictability. Aid for trade action plan designed. ODA as per cent of GNI was 0.44.	**Nepal:** Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project in Western Nepal Phase I (RWSSP-WN I) launched.
2009	**Copenhagen Accord** committed developed countries to scale up funding to enhance action on mitigation, adaptation and new technology development related to climate change. **UN Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis led to agreement of the 2009 UN Crisis Commitment** which called for full implementation of ODA commitments made to the Millennium Declaration and other agreements.	Costs of receiving refugees counted as part of development cooperation budget. Finland committed to the Copenhagen Accord and the Crisis agreement. The DPC annual review emphasised that changes should be made in bilateral development cooperation and the relationships between different sectors/approaches. Recommended that for sustainability, partner countries should play a central role; joint forms of funding should be used; and additional sectors should be supported. The DPC recommended strengthening human rights, marginalised groups and HIV/AIDS work in all partner countries. Net ODA (in EUR million) was 926 (0.54% ODA/GNI)	**Ethiopia:** Finland and the Government of Ethiopia agreed on principles and key areas for cooperation; land administration was included as a new area of cooperation and funds were allocated to support work in this area. Rural Water Supply, sanitation and Hygiene Programme started (FinnWASH) Funding of EUR 14.9m was committed to GEQIP I (General Education Quality Improvement Project). **Mozambique:** Country negotiations resulted in a decision to continue cooperation in education and agriculture as well as budget support. Finland's Development Cooperation Programme in Mozambique 2009–2011 was produced.

Year	Global context of development cooperation (major agreements and events shaping development cooperation internationally)	Finnish 'global' development cooperation context (developments in development cooperation at the central level)	MFA Country Engagement (overview of key events related to Finnish development cooperation engagement in-country)
2009			Support to the forestry sector began through the Forest sector support programme.
			Nepal: Leasehold Forestry and Livestock Development Programme (2009–2013) launched.
			Finland began support to Nepal General Education Sector Programme.
			Vietnam: The following projects were launched: Water and Sanitation Sustainability Programme for Small Towns (WSPST II), Phase II (2009 – 2013); The Innovation Partnership Programme (IPP), Phase I; Management Project for Information System for Forestry Sector, FORMIS, Phase I (2009–2013); and Regional Energy and Environment Partnership Programme (EEP) Mekong, Phase I.
2010	**Global Action Plan 'Keeping the Promise' adopted at Summit on the MDGs**: over USD 40 billion pledged over five-year period to support efforts towards accelerating progress on women and children's health **World Investment Forum** (Xiamen, China).	Finland re-committed to increase funding for development cooperation and reach 0.58 per-cent of GNI by 2011 (and 0.7 percent by 2015). Finland exceeded its EU intermediate target of allocating 0.51 percent of its GNI to ODA by reaching 0.55 percent ODA/GNI. Net ODA (in EUR million) was 1006. **Guidelines for Civil Society in Development Policy** produced by MFA. They recognised that civil society was an essential and integral part of Finnish development cooperation. The guidelines encouraged Finnish civil society actors to focus on further developing quality, efficiency, effectiveness and impact in their development cooperation efforts. DPC's annual review emphasised challenges related to development financing and the criteria for financing, as well as what constitutes development assistance (with debate around climate funds).	**Mozambique:** Finnish funding to the health sector was phased out. Support to implementation of Mozambican National Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy began. Phase II of PRODEZA began (encouraging local economic growth **Nepal:** Rural Village Water Resources Management Project, Phase II (RVWRMP II) launched. **Tanzania:** The Sustainable Management of Land and Environment Programme (SMOLE II) in Zanzibar launched. **Zambia:** Private Sector Development Reform Programme Phase II (PSDRPII) launched, supported by Finland.

Year	Global context of development cooperation (major agreements and events shaping development cooperation internationally)	Finnish 'global' development cooperation context (developments in development cooperation at the central level)	MFA Country Engagement (overview of key events related to Finnish development cooperation engagement in-country)
2011	**Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation** signed by ministers of developed and developing nations, emerging economies, providers of South–South and triangular cooperation and civil society. The Busan Partnership agreement offered a framework for dialogue and efforts to enhance effectiveness. **UNFCCC Durban Climate Change Conference** led to a decision to adopt a universal legal agreement on climate change, and a management framework for the Green Climate Fund was adopted with a focused programme of long-term finance agreed. **Istanbul Programme of Action for the LDCs 2011–2020** included commitments to ensure fulfilment of all ODA commitments to LDCs and alignment of ODA to national plans, priorities, systems and procedures.	Finland adopted the Busan framework, the Durban Climate Change Commitment and the Istanbul ODA target to LDCs. **Evaluation of Results-Based Approach** in Finnish Development Cooperation conducted. DPC's annual review concentrated on youth and the future of development policy, including challenges for Finland's development policy. Net ODA (in EUR million) was 1013 (0.52% ODA/GNI)	**Ethiopia:** Community-led Accelerated WASH programme (phase I: 2011–2014) was started. Finland committed to long-term cooperation in the land sector (through the Ethiopia Sustainable Land Management Investment Framework), a bilateral project. **Tanzania:** Bilateral TANZICT (Information Society and ICT Sector Development Project programme) launched. Finnish-funded Seed Potato Development Project started operations in Tanzania. Lindi-Mtwara agribusiness support project (LIMAS) launched. **Zambia:** JASZ II 2011–2015(Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia) with continued Finnish focus on agriculture, environment and private sector development and new areas of social protection and science and technology.

Year	Global context of development cooperation (major agreements and events shaping development cooperation internationally)	Finnish 'global' development cooperation context (developments in development cooperation at the central level)	MFA Country Engagement (overview of key events related to Finnish development cooperation engagement in-country)
2012	**Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation** jointly supported by OECD and UNDP established as a result of Busan and to ensure accountability for implementation of Busan commitments. **Rio +20 Conference on Sustainable Development** led to an agreement to develop a set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to form the post-2015 development agenda (reiterating the commitment to eliminate hunger and poverty). Reaffirmed commitment to fully implement the Rio Declaration as well as various plans for sustainable development (including Agenda 21). **World Investment Forum** (Doha, Qatar) focused on the patterns of foreign investment in the post-crisis global economy. Three policy tools launched, recognising and endorsing investment for sustainable development as a principle for policy-making and investment decisions.	The **Development Policy Programme (DPP)** was adopted, providing guidelines for implementation of Finland's development policy and cooperation for the duration of the Government's term of office. The DPP set out three cross-cutting objectives: 1) the promotion of gender equality; 2) reduction of inequality; and 3) promotion of climate sustainability. The DPP outlined Finland's human rights-based approach to development. The DPP stated intention to phase out support in Nicaragua; and concentrate on African and Asian LDCs. **Manual for bilateral programmes produced** to provide an up-to-date overview of the management of bilateral development programmes within MFA. An OECD peer review of Finnish Development cooperation highlighted strengths of Finnish DC including: stable, long-term priorities, openness to dialogue, and cooperation with other donors; and reported improvements including, policy guidance, mainstreaming of aid effectiveness, and incorporation of RBM. Net ODA (in EUR million) was 1026.7 (0.53% ODA/GNI)	**Ethiopia:** First Country Strategy for Development Cooperation with Ethiopia (2013–2016), focusing on three sectors: education, water and rural economic development. Finland's support aligned to national plans. Start of the three-year programme AgroBIG (with EUR 9.3m of Finnish funding). **Mozambique:** Event on Inclusive Growth hosted in Maputo, with Finland committed to supporting the promotion of inclusive growth and private sector development. **Nepal:** Country programme evaluation conducted. Completion phase of "Strengthening of Environmental Administration and Management at the Local Level in Nepal" (SEAM) Phase II started. **Tanzania:** Country programme evaluation conducted.

Year	Global context of development cooperation (major agreements and events shaping development cooperation internationally)	Finnish 'global' development cooperation context (developments in development cooperation at the central level)	MFA Country Engagement (overview of key events related to Finnish development cooperation engagement in-country)
2013	**MDG High level** Forum to catalyse/accelerate further progress towards achievement of MDGs. Followed by a progress follow-up event. World leaders re-committed to meeting the MDGs by 2015 and planned to host a summit in 2015 to agree new goals.	**DPC's annual review emphasised that the human rights based approach** should be addressed more energetically. Net ODA (in EUR million) was 1081.1 (0.54% ODA/GNI)	**Ethiopia:** Bilateral project to Enhance Inclusive Education Capacity started. The Watershed Management M&E project closed. **Mozambique:** New Country Strategy (2013–2016) established, derived from the Government's Poverty Reduction Strategy for 2011–2014 (PARP). **Nepal:** Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project in Western Nepal Phase II (RWSSP-WN II) launched. Strengthening the Rule of Law and Human Rights Protection System in Nepal Programme (RoLHR) launched. Government of Nepal and three donors (Finland, Switzerland, and the UK) signed a joint funding agreement to implement Multi Stakeholder Forestry Programme (MSFP). **Tanzania:** Two major forest programmes – Private Forestry Programme and National Forestry Programme (NFBKP II) – were launched. The Dar es Salaam electricity distribution network project started. This was Finland's largest single development cooperation project in Tanzania with a budget of EUR 26.5 million covering the period 2013–2016. **Vietnam:** Management Project for Information System for Forestry Sector, Phase II (FORMIS II) (2013–2018) launched. Water and Sanitation Sustainability Programme for Small Towns Sustainability, Phase III (WSPST III) (2013–2016) launched.

Year	Global context of development cooperation (major agreements and events shaping development cooperation internationally)	Finnish 'global' development cooperation context (developments in development cooperation at the central level)	MFA Country Engagement (overview of key events related to Finnish development cooperation engagement in-country)
2014	**World Investment Forum** (Geneva, Switzerland) brings together investors from over 150 countries, and focused on investment to the SDGs.	The **DPC's annual review of Finland's development policy emphasised policy coherence** for development, with the development policy perspective taken into consideration across all policy areas affecting developing countries. ODA as per cent of GNI was 0.60	**Ethiopia:** Second phase of General Education Quality Improvements Programme started (Finland funded through a pooled funding mechanism). New bilateral agreement signed between Finland and Ethiopia for second phase of Community WASH programme. **Mozambique:** Four-year project initiated (with funding from MFA), for wealth creation among smallholder farmers. **Vietnam:** Finland was phasing out bilateral project cooperation gradually and moving towards other forms of cooperation based on more equal partnership. The following programmes were launched in Vietnam: Innovation Partnership Programme (IPP II), Phase II (2014–2018); EU-FLEGT support project (2014–2015); People Participation in Improvement of Forestry Governance and Poverty Alleviation in Vietnam Project/ ActionAid, (2014–2017); Regional Energy and Environment Partnership (EEP) Mekong programme, Phase II (2014–2018). **Zambia:** Finland's general budget support instrument discontinued.

Year	Global context of development cooperation (major agreements and events shaping development cooperation internationally)	Finnish 'global' development cooperation context (developments in development cooperation at the central level)	MFA Country Engagement (overview of key events related to Finnish development cooperation engagement in-country)
2015	**July: 3rd International Conference on Financing for Development hosted in Addis Ababa,** leading to the formation of a financing action agenda for the SDGs (with concerns raised regarding the anticipated short-fall of money needed to meet the goals). **September: UN Sustainable Development Summit** in New York, to adopt the post-2015 development agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (under Agenda 2030). **Sendai World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction and the COP21** (outcome pending).	**Evaluation of Finland's Development Policy Programmes from a Results-Based Management Point of View 2003–2013** was conducted. The evaluation investigated how the Finnish Development Policy Programmes of 2004, 2007 and 2012 succeeded in defining the foundation for results-based development policy and cooperation. In the **2016 draft budget,** cuts of approximately EUR 300 million were made to the funds earmarked for development cooperation administered by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, compared to the 2015 budget. The 2016 draft budget was EUR 498.1 million, compared to EUR 870 million in 2014. The **DPC's annual review of Finland's Development Policy** emphasised the need for a permanent base and clear objectives, to ensure continuity between governments. Finland committed EUR 34.7 million to counter climate change in developing countries to the Green Climate Fund (part of an 80 million funding target between 2015 and 2018).	**Zambia:** New Private Sector Development support programme was developed to complement the UN Green Jobs programme. **Kenya:** Evaluation of Finland's Development Cooperation with Kenya 2007–2013. **Vietnam:** Finland and Vietnam signed a free trade agreement.

ANNEX 5: DATA ANNEX – SYNTHESIS OF COUNTRY STRATEGY ASSESSMENTS

This annex presents key data to support findings in the main text, based on the country strategy evaluations.

Table 10: Intervention relevance by intervention area

General budget support	Budget support would normally optimise relevance. This was found to be true in Zambia where the budget support evaluation found it to be a highly visible and relevant instrument for development cooperation. In Mozambique the evaluation also found the choice to be relevant. In Tanzania the 2012 GBS evaluation found it had an important influence on growth, on improved outcomes in the education sector and on improvements in non-income poverty, but that its influence on local government's delivery of services was modest. This evaluation found that, in the period since 2013 (roughly) the climate for aid effectiveness, and thus the overall effectiveness of GBS, had deteriorated.
Governance, rule of law, public financial management and accountability	Overall efforts to strengthen institutions and systems in this area were found to be relevant to the development context in partner countries. This is true in Nepal (rule of law programme), Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique (PFM reform and/or support of local think tanks). In Tanzania, however, there are questions about whether a focus on PFM reform on the technical level without addressing higher level policy, institutional and governance problems is fully relevant. The support for rule of law and democracy interventions was however found to be relevant.
Forestry	In Tanzania Nepal and Mozambique forestry is a relevant choice as a sector because of Finland's long history of providing support, and therefore its ability to leverage its financing towards sector objectives. In Tanzania the interventions were also relevant to the evolving forestry context and government's poverty reduction objectives. Some forestry interventions sought to strengthen rural people's governance of their forest resources, which were also judged to be relevant to the countries' contexts, e.g. Tanzania and Nepal. In Vietnam the forestry information platform and trust fund interventions were found to be relevant. The way interventions were implemented in some cases reduced their relevance. In Tanzania, for example, issues were noted concerning viability at scale (as yet unproven).
Agriculture and land management	Across countries Finland's agriculture interventions often had a poverty focus and worked with smallholder farmers. This was judged to be relevant to the country government priorities in some countries, and to the needs of beneficiaries in all countries. Some also included a 'farming as business' approach within the poverty focus, making them relevant to DPP concerns, for example Zambia. Ethiopia and Tanzania included land management interventions. In Ethiopia the relevance of the programme was enabled by being part of a coordinated national strategy for land registration, and as with the agriculture intervention, by engagement at community level.

Environment and climate change	In Nepal support to the environment was found to be the result of Finland's priorities rather than the government's, and also in Tanzania where it enjoyed greater emphasis in the CS than in country plans. In others, however, like Zambia, this support was highly relevant to national priorities as well as the priorities of beneficiaries. In Vietnam ICI projects, which were part of the instruments cited in the country strategy, were seen as relevant and contributing to climate sustainability, but with diminished relevance because of their small size.
Education	The choice to support education was seen as highly relevant to the country development programme and populations of Nepal, Mozambique and Ethiopia. The choice to join sector support programmes in Mozambique and Nepal was seen as highly relevant, as it allowed Finnish influence on overall sector priority setting and optimised Finnish resources. In Mozambique, however, the team found issues about the relevance of the focus of Finland's support, on bilingual education, as many stakeholders argued that the cost and capacity needs of institutionalising bilingual education rather than other quality interventions might make it a less relevant specific focus. In Ethiopia support to a sector programme was an effective complement to Finland's long-standing support for inclusive education.
Water and sanitation	Finland's water and sanitation interventions were generally concerned with providing or improving access to specific populations. In Vietnam the water and sanitation cooperation is highly relevant particularly to the beneficiaries. Overall, while the targeting of interventions was found to be relevant, teams raised issues about how relevant such narrow interventions were against other options that might have a broader effect. One such example was in Nepal, where support to UNICEF's sector reform programme and efforts to establish a sector-wide approach were seen as highly relevant to the context. In Ethiopia this was managed by close linkage to the sector plans for water and sanitation with evidence that Finland's community based approaches and long sector experience were highly valued.
Private Sector Development	In Vietnam the private sector development instruments were found to be relevant for Finland's transitioning objectives, but not sufficient, sufficiently integrated or flexible enough to meet the needs, and therefore less relevant in implementation. In Zambia the private sector intervention pillar of the CS was judged to be highly relevant to the country's priorities, also because of its focus on inclusive growth.
Science, technology and innovation	While the Mozambique intervention was judged not to be relevant to the country context, the Tanzania intervention had made some progress and was fit to address key constraints in the development of the information society in Tanzania. Similarly, in Vietnam where the interventions were aligned to national strategies, they were found to be highly relevant, also because they were filling an important gap in support for innovation in the private sector.

Table 11: Interventions data and ratings for effectiveness assessment

Sector	Intervention	Judgement	Funding (Euro 1000)	Basis for judgement
ETHIOPIA				
Agriculture, rural develop-ment and land management	Agro-BIG	Unclear	15485	Slow start-up in an effort to ensure ownership. Effectiveness remains to be demonstrated.
Agriculture, rural develop-ment and land management	Responsible and Innovative Land Administration in Ethiopia	Good, with qualifications	17049	Foundations have been laid for rapid progress. Model has been emulated by much larger actors in the sector.
Water and Sanitation	Multi-donor Integrated Water Resources Man-agement Project	Good	500	Contribution of Finland in sector is acknowledged.
Water and Sanitation	Rural Water Supply, Sanita-tion and Hygiene Programme	Good	6358	Contribution is widely applauded. Technical assistance and capacity building supported by government investments. Good record of delivery.
Water and Sanitation	Community-Led Accelerated WASH	Good	23851	The community-based approach has been acknowledged as effective.
Education	General Education Quality Improve-ment Programme	Good	23395	Finland has made a unique contribution, including putting inclusive education on the agenda. GEQIP has consistently been rated satisfactory.
NEPAL				
Education	School Sector Reform Plan 2009 –2016	Good, with qualifications	23 415	Overall results of the sector support pro-gramme are good against access targets and gender equity. Major challenges still posed in terms of quality and inequality. Inclusive edu-cation strategy has been adopted but not yet implemented. The support for soft skills has delivered most of its outputs.
Law and Human Rights	Rule of Law and Human Rights	Good, with qualifications	5900	The evaluation of the programme found that project outputs have laid the foundations for dialogue, justice sector coordination, legal aid, affirmative legal education and legislative reforms, but the overall progress of the project has not been extensive on the structural issues and process change within the institutions.
Women empowerment	UN Women National Action Plan	Good, with qualifications	3980	Mid-term evaluation found the project's progress against outputs satisfactory. Most of the activities were successfully implemented, but with considerable delays. Disbursements were slow.
Water and Sanitation	Rural Village Water Resources Man-agement Project	Good	31656	The project has made good progress towards its goals, achieving most of its targets by 2015.

Sector	Intervention	Judgement	Funding (Euro 1000)	Basis for judgement
NEPAL				
Water and Sanitation	UNICEF WASH	Good, with qualifications	5800	The UNICEF programme has been effective in promoting national and local level sector coordination, particularly in sanitation. Some agreements are outstanding, although slow progress is being made.
Forestry	Leasehold Forestry and Livestock Development Programme	Good		This programme did not have funding on the budget over the evaluation period, as it ran from 2009 to 2012. It was however only finally closed in 2014. It achieved success through the piloting of leasehold projects.
Forestry	Forest Resource Assessment	Good, with qualifications	2351	The main objective of creating a reliable database of forest cover and biodiversity using advanced technology was achieved, although the evaluation has indicated inadequate capacity building of government.
Forestry	Multi-Stakeholder Forestry Programme	Poor, with some results	16862	The start-up and progress have been slow and the MTR has found the performance very poor and management weak, but noted the work on multi-stakeholder processes and gender inclusiveness important. Project has strengthened a number of district and village committees.
Environment and climate change	Strengthening Environmental Administration and Management at the Local Level in Nepal	Poor, with some results	2952	Project closed in 2014. A mid-term evaluation noted that only one component out of three was likely to achieve its targets. Progress was however found in terms of public awareness, pollution control, capacity of local institutions, environmental monitoring and public health and safety.
MOZAMBIQUE				
Agriculture, rural development and land management	Zambézia Province Rural Development Project	Poor	10312	MTR found disappointing results. Failed to establish good relationships with district or provincial authorities. Only results were local level impacts on a limited number of individuals.
Agriculture, rural development and land management	ADPP Farmers Club	Good, with qualifications	7500	Evaluation fieldwork showed project is performing well at output level. MTR will only be done after this evaluation. Some concerns that the implementing NGOs agricultural expertise is limited.
Forestry	National forestry programme	Poor	7802	Interventions well designed, but the project failed to achieve significant results. Management structure was an issue. Project terminated due to misuse of funds.
Science and technology	Programme of cooperation in science, technology and innovation	Poor	4489	Mid-term evaluation found that the project failed to achieve its objectives and was highly unlikely to do so before the end of the project. Design was found to be unrealistic and highly ambitious.

Sector	Intervention	Judgement	Funding (Euro 1000)	Basis for judgement
MOZAMBIQUE				
Forestry	Forest Research Capacity Strengthening in Mozambique	Good	800	Achieved its purposes in terms of improved research.
Education	Support to Education Sector	Good, with qualifications	32000	Progress has been recorded against the specific objectives. Some concerns about persistent poor quality of education. Bilingual education policy drafted, but not yet approved.
Governance, PFM & Accountability	Tribunal Administrativo	Good, with qualifications	1000	The Tribunal (supreme audit institution) has increased the number of audits, improved transparency of results, and released findings more timeously. Replacement of head in 2011, however, has impeded its ability to select audits independently, and internal governance and administration is poor, resulting in a negative audit and withdrawal of Finnish Support.
Governance, PFM & Accountability	Electoral Observation Mission	Good, with qualifications	400	The mission contributed effectively to electoral transparency, but it was later than it should have been.
Governance, PFM & Accountability	Good governance programme	Good	4250	Support to the Institute for Social Studies was judged by informants to this evaluation to be making valuable and high-quality contributions. The Institute has been widely seen as a success.
General Budget Support	General Budget Support	Good	12000	Evaluation found general budget support to be broadly effective, notably in various aspects of fiscal governance. While for a period it was seen not to be exerting the influence as previously due to better fiscal prospects for Mozambique based on natural resource flows, this may be reversed due to reduced energy prices globally.
TANZANIA				
Governance, PFM & Accountability	Public Finance Management Reform Programme	Good, with qualifications	3600	The 2015 mid-term review described the programme as a success story with a history of achievement, with achievement of most milestones. Questions were raised however about the programme focusing at the technical level, without higher level policy aspects and about clear ownership of the reforms.
Governance, PFM & Accountability	Uongozi Institute	Unclear (no outcome data)	13730	While the Institute's activity and output goals were achieved, it was more difficult to assess whether the support was achieving the outcomes targeted, as they were too vaguely stated to be measurable. This evaluation found that informants expressed general satisfaction with the Institute's performance and profile.

Sector	Intervention	Judgement	Funding (Euro 1000)	Basis for judgement
TANZANIA				
Governance, PFM & Accountability	UN Women	Poor, with some results	1500	Informants pointed towards the limited capacity of implementing CSOs jeopardising project effectiveness, exacerbated by a late start. Longer-term interventions would be needed for effectiveness. This evaluation could not obtain project reporting to make a more thorough assessment.
Forestry	Private forestry programme	Unclear	14263	While the progress made so far by this project indicates competent execution and promising delivery of outputs, it is premature to evaluate its effectiveness.
Forestry	National Forestry and beekeeping programme	Good, with qualifications	7850	There are four components of this programme. The first – having a pro-poor community-based forestry model – has seen good results. Some progress also reported against increased support to community-based forestry. But limited effectiveness against good governance, transparency and rule of law objectives, and preliminary at best results against increased income objectives.
Environment and climate change	Sustainable management of land and environment	Good, with qualifications	7532	The effectiveness of the programme was compromised by a broad scope and a failure to focus on areas where it was most likely to achieve sustainable progress. Updating land use plans and putting in place of environmental controls were achieved, with less progress on delivery of land administration and transaction services at scale.
Environment and climate change	Mama Misitu	Unclear		There are no comprehensive data on the effectiveness of this project in achieving the five outcomes set out in its revised 2014 design. Informants report a moderate level of satisfaction with its performance in the two districts to which it is now confined, but there is currently no way of assessing how effective its advocacy may have been.
Science and technology	Tanzania information society and ICT sector development	Good, with qualifications	9118	Slow progress in policy development. This evaluation found it difficult to assess outcomes on, amongst others, creating an open collaborative platform for innovative ideas, incubation of these, and assistance to commercialising. This is because the project has been managed flexibly, responding to needs as they emerge, and the original performance indicators are no longer relevant. Little analysis of achievements is available.

Sector	Intervention	Judgement	Funding (Euro 1000)	Basis for judgement
TANZANIA				
Agriculture, rural development and land management	Lindi and Mtwara Agribusiness support	Good, with qualifications	6964	The draft completion report found that there has been some, but incomplete, effectiveness at purpose level.
Private Sector, Growth & Employment	Dar es Salaam electricity	Good, with qualifications	50435	Reporting against this project is at activity and output level, but informants for this evaluation judged its likely effectiveness to be high, although it will soon be compromised by renewed overloading of power capacity.
Agriculture, rural development and land management	Seed potato development project	Good	2500	According to the completion report, this project was reasonably effective in achieving its four intended results.
Governance, PFM & Accountability	Local government reform programme	Poor	4000	While budgeted, these funds were not disbursed. Finland and other donors abandoned the programme at the start of the CS period due to unresolved concerns about government's management of funds. Expectations of resumption in 2013 were not fulfilled.
General Budget Support	General Budget Support	Good, with qualifications	22000	In the early part of the CS period a favourable evaluation of general budget support was undertaken. However, effectiveness of the instrument deteriorated until the suspension of Finnish contributions in 2014.
VIETNAM				
Science and Technology	Innovation Partnership Programme (both phases)	Good	18808 (budgets for both phases in 2013,14, 15 and 16)	Strategically important policy and regulatory developments are making a positive contribution to the CS result area "Improved Basis for the Knowledge-Based Society". Linkages between universities, research institutions and industry have been established, which is highly appreciated by stakeholders. A competitive and transparent performance-based grant for start-ups has been introduced and the implementation of innovative growth company projects has started.

Sector	Intervention	Judgement	Funding (Euro 1000)	Basis for judgement
VIETNAM				
Forestry	Forest Information Management Programme	Good, with qualifications	19733	The programme has made progress in delivering results under its four results areas contributing to the CS results areas dealing with access to information and knowledge society and to sustainability of natural resource (forest) management albeit indirectly. The information platform is ready, and effectiveness will improve once it is open, for which processes are under way. Sector data have been standardized and converted into the database and reporting against indicators is in place. Capacity for information collection and management has been strengthened, but there are still major gaps. However, because of limited time left for project implementation, there will be challenges in simultaneously expanding the system nationwide and building the related capacity to enable effective use of the platform at different levels.
Forestry	Trust Fund for Forests	Good	5503	The trust fund has supported and piloted important initiatives and models and created the basis for the development of a national forest protection and development fund.
Forestry	FLEGT VPA	Good, with qualifications	525	The support has contributed to increased dialogue between the Vietnam and European Union sides, involving NGOs and the industry, together with forestry administration. Some delay in signing the VPA. Overall however, the contribution of Finland is difficult to assess, insofar as it finances a VPA facilitator which is only a component of a complex process.
Forestry	People participation in improvement of Forestry Governance	Poor	1994	The mobilisation of this project has been delayed considerably, so it has not yet made concrete progress in the five provinces where it is working. It has not been able to access the data generated by the forest information platform, which has affected its performance.
Water and Sanitation	Water and Sanitation for small towns	Good, with qualifications	18287	Across water and sanitation all schemes are now completed after an extension phase. Various evaluation and internal reports as well as interview and field work evidence show that effectiveness overall, and of the drainage and sanitation (DS) component in particular has been hampered by the technical complexity of the project, and by the poor capacity of the contractors. However, Finland has provided a real added value in terms of know-how and technical inputs. Furthermore, the second phase of the programme has been seen as more effective.

Sector	Intervention	Judgement	Funding (Euro 1000)	Basis for judgement
ZAMBIA				
Agriculture, rural development and land management	Small scale irrigation project (SIP)	Poor, with some results	14765	The target for the project was not met. Results have been seriously disappointing and represent very poor value for money, mainly because of delays in payments and in approval of a no-cost extension. At best the SIP has established an example of the PPP model and thereby of commercialization of agriculture
Agriculture, rural development and land management	Programme for Luapula Agriculture and Rural Development	Good, with qualifications	12101	The mid-term evaluation revealed limited results and impact in all components as a result of challenges in management, design, and implementation strategies. However, benefits were shown in small-scale and local markets. It was found to contribute to an increase in household income, food security and household assets.
Agriculture, rural development and land management	Support to the Zambia National Farmers' Union	Good	10854	The programme contributed to making financial services accessible to smallholder farmers (through the Lima credit scheme), easy access to payments by using e-paying services (for visa card applications), inputs by the e-voucher system, and advice through e-advisory services. The ZNFU mid-term review undertaken in in 2012, including a separate review of the Lima Credit scheme, revealed that CSP performance was satisfactory with positive increases in agricultural productivity and incomes among smallholder farmers. At the time of this evaluation an audit was ongoing which might affect future support by Finland. The income objective was not met, but this was on account of a shortfall in the annual harvest and rising inflation levels.
Private Sector, Growth & Employment	Financial sector development programme	Good	2982	Progress has been good in the programme with the final project assessment indicating that almost all targets were achieved. Where targets were not achieved it was because actions are still pending such as laws needing to be passed. Access to formal and informal services in Zambia has increased.
Private Sector, Growth & Employment	Private Sector Development Reform Programme	Good, with qualifications	6408	While the final evaluation has not been done, interviews suggested that progress was made in some aspects of doing business, including in law and business regulatory reforms and establishing one-stop shops. However, the 2016 Doing Business Survey results suggested that the contribution of these results to the objective did not reverse a declining business environment.

Sector	Intervention	Judgement	Funding (Euro 1000)	Basis for judgement
ZAMBIA				
Private Sector, Growth & Employment	Green Jobs Programme	Good, with qualifications	244	Progress has been good to date with almost 60% of the target number of jobs created. The project has benefitted over 2500 households. Some components are however not on course to achieve objectives.
Agriculture, rural development and land management	Small holder production promotion	Poor	3400	Even after being put in the fast track after three years of delays, the S3P could not improve implementation. No results were achieved related to this CS objective. Some of the components had not even started, like Strengthening Farmer Organisations and their Federations. The MTR indicated that they were unlikely to achieve the targets set within the existing timeframe and a decision was made by Finland to end support.
Environment and climate change	Integrated land-use assessment	Good, with qualifications	8295	The support has resulted in the establishment of a national data collection system for biophysical and forestry/environmental data which in principle allows for data sharing to stakeholders across all sectors of society. However, there have been considerably delays, and other challenges are the technical demands of the system. Anticipated synergies with other environmental initiatives have so far not emerged, because of delays but also because of the system to date not allowing for decentralised data inputs. Some capacity has been built.
Environment and climate change	Decentralized Forestry and Other Natural Resource Management Programme	Unclear	7035	The programme has taken a long time to get from planning to implementation. This is expected to contribute to ownership and project effectiveness. However, it was found to be too early to make an assessment of the effectiveness of the programme.
Environment and climate change	Civil Society Environment Fund	Poor, with some results	4742	Positive results were in terms of the number of grants recorded and limited evidence of joint lobbying and coordination by CSOs. Results for the second phase have not yet emerged, and there have been delays in starting the phase, which have resulted in a loss of momentum. The evaluation noted that the project design was weak.
Governance, PFM & Accountability	Public Finance Management Reform Programme	Poor, with some results	3090	The programme has progressed very slowly and has not achieved the objectives expected. The World Bank has rated progress as satisfactory, but donor partners dispute this. The twinning support between the procurement authority and the Finnish public service training institution HAUS has worked well.

Sector	Intervention	Judgement	Funding (Euro 1000)	Basis for judgement
ZAMBIA				
Governance, PFM & Accountability	Social protection	Good	7269	Good progress has been achieved by the programme, and government will scale up the initiative, following a convincing case presented by Finland for upscaling. Finland has filled niches that were not supported by other donors, including introducing a focus on policy, on disability and for reforming public welfare scheme more broadly.
General Budget Support	General Budget Support	Poor, with some results	12577	While the programme was effective in the second half of the 2000s, performance declined over the evaluation period and stood at 30% of the performance assessment framework in 2013. Finland and other donors withdrew in 2014.

Table 12: Analysis of contribution: from intervention results to CS objectives

This table argues for each country contribution pathways/lack of contribution pathways to assess effectiveness. It elaborates on section 4.4.

Objective	Specific Objectives	Effectiveness findings & contribution argument	Sustainability	Conclusion
ETHIOPIA	The Ethiopia strategy interventions were found to contribute to the country objectives, although not consistently across CS pillars and interventions. The country, through utilizing the dialogue and donor coordination system, has made good use of policy influence and the development of models and approaches to build contribution pathways to the target objectives.			
Accelerated and sustained agricultural growth and rural development secured	A) Contribute to poverty reduction at small-holder farmer level through support to agriculture based economic growth • Establishment of efficient and profitable value chains of selected crops and/or products, which benefit the involved stakeholders along the chain (farmers, processing industries, traders and buyers). B) Improved rural land tenure security and sustainable management of natural resource in order to improve livelihoods and economic wellbeing of the rural population • Improvement of rural land tenure security through strengthening the land administration system in Ethiopia • Improvement of livelihoods of rural households through enhanced productivity and promotion of sustainable land use practices.	The rural land certification project has so far fallen well short of its original land registration targets. The link from land certification to agricultural growth and rural development assumes that certification will give farmers more confidence in their rights to land and so increase their willingness to make long-term investments that will in turn promote growth. This is plausible, but it is not self-evident that land registration is sufficient to achieve such an effect. But the project has developed a low-cost methodology for secondary registration that is being emulated by other projects which are operating on a much larger scale. The indirect influence of the project has thus been very substantial, and the foundation has been laid for more rapid progress by the project itself. The CS agriculture project also experienced a slow start-up phase, but this has been linked to efforts to ensure ownership, as well as to establish robust systems for its various loan windows. The project's value-chain approach is plausible (it is directly oriented towards promoting agricultural growth) but it will need to demonstrate effectiveness and possible impact in practice (bearing in mind that projects to support innovations should expect a proportion of failures).	The current interventions are relatively recent; both are working closely with government and seeking to develop sustainable government approaches but are still dependent on external TA. Sustainability not certain.	Leveraged contribution through establishment of a model in land. Value-chain approach in agriculture is in early stages of implementation and its effectiveness, therefore, is yet to be proven. Sustainability not certain in either case.

Objective	Specific Objectives	Effectiveness findings & contribution argument	Sustainability	Conclusion
ETHIOPIA				
2 Infrastructure services expanded and the foundation for long-term sustained growth and development strengthened	A) Improved access to potable water and improved sanitation and hygiene services in rural Ethiopia • Expedient water point and latrine construction process and their improved sustainability through the CMP approach.	The CMP approach in the WASH sector has been acknowledged, and its effectiveness is demonstrated indirectly by the willingness of regional governments to provide from their own resources the investment financing to accompany Finnish TA and capacity building, as well as directly by its record of delivery.	Sustainability is assisted by the CMP approach to water development successfully engaging communities in taking responsibility from the outset, while there are continuing efforts to embed this approach within the overall OneWASH system.	Leveraged contribution through establishment of a model. Sustainability possible.
3 MDGs in the social sectors achieved	A) Improved quality of general education Improved teaching and learning conditions in general education • Strengthened institutions at different levels of the education management. B) Addressing inequalities improved, especially with regard to children with special educational needs • Improved access and learning support for children with special educational needs.	Although the present phase of TA to support inclusive education has experienced some difficulties, Finland has made a unique contribution to education over many years. It has contributed to a marked shift in social attitudes to the education of those with special needs. Although there is still far to go before an adequate proportion of those with special needs are provided with an appropriate education, the topic is now firmly on the government agenda. GEQIP (which accounts for the bulk of Finnish funding) is consistently rated as satisfactory by the joint monitoring reviews, and Finland has been able to use its participation to advocate successfully for more attention (and a specific grant) for inclusive education within GEQIP.	GEQIP works through the national education system; sustainability of support to inclusive education is more challenging because needs are so large relative to available resources and there are doubts whether government's ambitious objectives are achievable; nevertheless Finland has played a significant role in securing positive long-term shifts in attitudes, policies and approaches.	Leveraged contribution through policy dialogue. Sustainability possible.

Objective	Specific Objectives	Effectiveness findings & contribution argument	Sustainability	Conclusion
ETHIOPIA				
Capacity of civil service to implement the government's policies and plans and participation of citizens and CBOs in the development process enhanced	• Strengthened capacity of the civil service, CBOs and citizens in the development processes Increased participation of citizens and CBOs in development processes within interventions supported by Finland • Increased participation of the civil society in government development planning, monitoring and evaluation through sector platforms in sectors where Finland is involved.	The country strategy did not list a specific project against this objective, but referred to country level dialogue and efforts within project to build capacity and institutions. The evaluation found that the aid effective design of Finland's main projects, with government ownership for Finland's interventions, accounts for much of the added value of the Finnish CS portfolio. The FLC is also relevant here, but needs to be considered in wider terms than the results of the specific projects it funds. Inevitably these are too small to make a discernible impact at national level, although the FLC monitoring systems ensure that they are carried out as planned. However, there are a number of "external" benefits: the close involvement of Embassy professional staff, up to the level of the Ambassador, gives them a grounding in Ethiopian reality that informs all of their work. Funding of indigenous NGOs helps to reserve space for civil society, and the FLC almost certainly has a disproportionate effect in generating goodwill towards Finland.	Sustainability is supported by strong country ownership, and work to strengthen government systems. Finnish and other donor support to CSOs helps to maintain space for civil society that might otherwise shrink.	Both the aid-effective design of main interventions and the FLC add value to Finland's portfolio in Ethiopia.

Objective	Specific Objectives	Effectiveness findings & contribution argument	Sustainability	Conclusion
MOZAMBIQUE	In Mozambique the country strategy interventions thus far delivered limited or localised contribution for some interventions; in-principle contribution could be argued for others. One intervention delivered no contribution			
Increased agricultural production and improved livelihood strategies	• Increased small-scale rural entrepreneurship • Improved food security for farmer families • Enhanced value chain for agricultural products, including increased production and improved market access	Results from the agriculture sector were mixed. While a rural development project was found to have disappointing results, the team's light-touch review of a programme of support to small-scale farmers through a local NGO showed promising results. The mid-term review however has not yet been done. Contribution to the country strategy objectives were found to be limited to localised effects on beneficiaries, in the absence of strong mechanisms to leverage the project results into scaled contribution. Forestry research capacity support was found to be effective, with likely contribution to objectives in future.	Attempts to build sustainable capacities in the agriculture ministry have been ineffective. The localised project approach could be sustained if capacities are sustained at the level of beneficiary households.	Localised and/or general contribution. Contribution can be argued, but limited to the direct beneficiaries of a localised project, and in a general sense for the forestry research capacity support.
Improved education	• Support to the improvement of the quality and expansion of basic education • Support to the implementation of MOSTIS (Mozambican Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy)	The team found the sector support to have delivered results. The support through the sector programme has contributed strongly to increased access. However, the overall quality of education remains very weak and the evaluation raised issues about the contribution of Finland's policy dialogue and support for bilingual education as the most cost-effective pathway to quality. The team found that the intervention to support the relevant ministry to implement the science, technology and innovation strategy did not deliver on its results, and therefore did not contribute to objectives.	Finland has wholly integrated its bilateral support to government, with the implicit assumption that results will be sustained in the institutions of government.	Limited contribution. Strong causal links between sector support and policy dialogue and improved accesses. Quality improvements have not yet materialized. No contribution to the specific objective or objective in science and technology.

Objective	Specific Objectives	Effectiveness findings & contribution argument	Sustainability	Conclusion
MOZAMBIQUE				
Enhanced state-society accountability	• Improved public financial management and audit function • Strengthening of official oversight and monitoring mechanisms	The interventions delivered results that contributed directly to the specific objectives, e.g. through an increased number of audits; improved transparency of public finances; and a valuable contribution from the economic and social research institute supported to debate on policy issues. Support to the audit institution however was stopped due to financial mismanagement, interrupting further results from the programme. Contribution from the direct interventions to the result framework objectives could be argued, but no improvement occurred in governance and human rights and a decline occurred in the rule of law over the 2012–2015 period, on account of countervailing factors in the context.	The approach in Good Governance is also based on the strategy of triggering (sustained) improvements in government institutions, processes and capacities. One track of support works directly with government. A second track works with CSO intermediaries, but with the same goal of influencing the behaviour and operations of government.	Limited contribution. Direct contribution to specific audit objective observed, but the project was stopped. Contribution to official oversight and monitoring mechanisms from general budget support arguable particularly in early part of CS period. Contribution via support for institute indirect. External factors prevented improvements at the level of the objective.

Objective	Specific Objectives	Effectiveness findings & contribution argument	Sustainability	Conclusion
NEPAL	In Nepal contributions were either localised to project beneficiaries (water and sanitation, forestry), or limited due to difficulty to institutionalise progress (environment, law and human rights, water), because of the narrow nature of the intervention relative to the objective (forestry). Good contribution in education arguable, and foundations for good contribution in environment laid through establishment of a model.			
Capacitated, strengthened and transparent public institutions, public administration, CSOs and inclusive policy-making processes	• Capacitated, accessible and accountable justice, security and human rights institutions • CSOs representing women and vulnerable groups have the capacity to contribute to democratic development, policy definition processes and accountability of public administration • Strengthened capacity of government organizations and CSOs to provide services in priority sectors (water, education and forest)	According to the mid-term review the contribution of the Rule of Law and Human Rights (RoLHR) programme to the objectives is modest compared to the project's magnitude. The MTR recommended undertaking a complete revision and reprioritization of the outputs of the RoLHR. Similar conclusions were drawn from the Support to National Human Rights Commission, which ended in 2014: the project did not manage to build a sustainable core capacity in the commission to protect and promote human rights. The CSOs are engaged in the implementation of the CS in the RoLHR and UN Women projects, in the water and sanitation and environment sector projects as well as in the implementation of the local cooperation funds, but it remains unclear how their capacities have been assessed and addressed. Promising results are found in water and forestry sector projects where the representation of women and disadvantaged groups in local level forest management and decision-making has been increased. In education the team found that the Finnish contribution through the sector plan as well as to establishing a national assessment system to capacity in the education sector was significant.	Across the programme the evaluation found sustainability issues with regards to the institutionalisation of structures and building of capacity.	Limited to strong contribution. Specific capacities built in forestry. In environment capacity was built in local authorities. In education contribution was found to be significant. In the law and human rights programme some, but limited, contribution found.

Objective	Specific Objectives	Effectiveness findings & contribution argument	Sustainability	Conclusion
NEPAL				
Capacitated, strengthened and transparent public institutions, public administration, CSOs and inclusive policy-making processes		While a contribution from the forest resource assessment database to the capacity to manage forest resources is arguable, it is yet to materialize, with limited knowledge of the resource by stakeholders. Investment towards a national forest entity through a joint donor programme however is unlikely to result in this entity being established and Finland is withdrawing. Capacity has been built through the establishment of a functional regional environmental laboratory in one region. Furthermore, there is evidence that the programme to build local authority environmental management capacity was successful.		
Equal and universal access to relevant quality education	Effective implementation of education sector policy and plans leading to full participation and quality education for all (including marginalized groups)\n\nSoft Skills training for young people facilitates the transit from school to work	The evaluation team found a plausible contribution from the Finnish intervention to participation in education and gender parity, but also notes that the objective regarding marginalized groups has not been achieved. Also, concerns about quality remain. The attempts to promote quality and relevance of education through the technical assistance to technical and vocational education have reached only a fraction of teachers who also need capacities to address a variety of educational support needs. In the soft skills programme intervention results are not yet advanced far enough to deliver contribution.	The education sector support (SSRP) operates within the framework of the government's regular planning and reporting cycles, policies and structures, but strengthening capacities further will be crucial to long-term technical and institutional sustainability of achievements.	Contribution to objective through participation and gender parity.\n\nNo contribution yet through soft skills to the objective.

Objective	Specific Objectives	Effectiveness findings & contribution argument	Sustainability	Conclusion
NEPAL				
Equal and sustainable access to safe and potable water in rural areas	Water systems are working and reach all rural populations in project working areas Sustainable sanitation available at all institutions and households in project working areas	The evaluation team was able to argue a contribution from the interventions to the specific objectives targeted, as they were formulated at the same level as the project results. Contribution through Finland's own intervention to deliver water, sanitation, hygiene and livelihood activities in specific areas to the objective was in place, but only for the areas in which the interventions were delivered. Finland's projects and influence in the sector brought a focus on sanitation.	Considerable efforts have been put into incorporating measures to ensure sustainability of systems. This has been done by working through government WASH systems and strengthening the capacity of WASH institutions. Actual sustainability will be primarily dependent on the functioning of these institutions and the continued collection of water user fees to allow operations and maintenance to continue.	Localised contribution through Finland's own-managed interventions to the water systems objective. In sanitation some leveraged contribution through policy dialogue.
Economic empowerment, especially for women and easily marginalised groups	Development of entrepreneurial activity and employment generation, especially women's entrepreneurship, and improved livelihoods for easily marginalized groups.	The leasehold forestry and livestock development intervention produced localised results that contributed to the specific and overall objectives, but only for the beneficiaries reached.	Sufficient resources have not been allocated to the set-up of institutional arrangements which would ensure that Leasehold Forestry becomes sustainable.	Localised contribution. Sustainability uncertain.

Objective	Specific Objectives	Effectiveness findings & contribution argument	Sustainability	Conclusion
NEPAL				
Inclusive management of forest resources and environmental administration	Government and non-state actors define and implement inclusive forest sector policies, strategies and plans at national, district and local level that contribute to climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction.	Finland's interventions in forestry and local environmental administration achieved their objectives partially. A number of sector policies and plans were defined and are being implemented. Limitations to the participation of non-state actors in policy and strategy definition are reportedly due to the hesitation of the government towards participation of the non-state sector in policy and strategy level decision-making.	Evaluation reports of forestry sector interventions have indicated issues of sustainability in more or less all the programmes.	Localised contribution in forestry and good contribution to the specific objective in environment. Contribution to the objective in principle.
	Rural communities benefit from local forest management, processing of forest products and forest-related value chains.	The forestry development project reached pilot communities in four districts successfully and developed value chains, but contribution to the objective is localised.		
	National Model for local environmental administration demonstrated through functional pilots in project areas.	In the environmental sector the localised environmental management project demonstrated a national model for local environmental administration and was successful in the administrations targeted. There is therefore the potential of significant contribution to the objective.		
		While contribution to the specific objectives is in place – as a function of the level at which they were formulated – contribution to the objective can only be argued in principle.		
Strengthened WASH policy, planning and management	Development of WASH sector policy, strategy and establishment of sector coordination framework and joint review practices that recognize the importance of rural WASH	The UNICEF WASH programme has made progress towards a sector-wide approach, but it is too early to assess the contribution of this investment to the objective.	As the sector approach is still not in place, sustainability is not clear. The institutionalisation of the water resources management structures is needed, and there is evidence that this may not be the case.	Limited contribution to the objective.
	Integrated water resources management institutionalised at district and Village Development Committee levels in project areas	Overall the interventions in the water sector had some success in promoting integrated water resources management in project areas, but the team found little evidence that this was institutionalised at the district level and some evidence of institutionalisation at the village level.		

Objective	Specific Objectives	Effectiveness findings & contribution argument	Sustainability	Conclusion
TANZANIA	While many interventions were effective at that level, contribution to the higher level objectives was often limited by difficult contexts for the interventions, or could only be argued in principle due to a long contribution distance from intervention to specific objectives, or specific objectives to the overall objective.			
Good governance and equitable service delivery	Improved state accountability and transparency

Reduction of inequality through improved service delivery | The overall effectiveness of general budget support in enhancing state accountability and transparency, and in reducing inequality through improved service delivery, declined for all donors during the CS implementation period, and was reduced to nil for Finland when it withdrew in 2015. The support was found to be effective at the technical level and changing the architecture of the system, but not to be engaging with or influencing the top level of policy to ensure progress at the level of outcomes. Support to the Uongozi Institute as an independent think tank delivered results, but the evaluation could not show contribution to the specific objectives except possibly in principle. | Sustainability is compromised by institutional weaknesses in central and local government. However, high ownership of the public financial management reform programme suggests sustainability. | Limited contribution. |
| Sustainable management of natural resources and access to land | Improved planning and implementation of policies, laws and programmes

Sustainable use of natural resources by communities | The private forestry programme and the national forestry and beekeeping programme have so far made only modest contributions to objectives in the field of policies, laws and programmes, and to progress at community level for the latter, limited by the context. Stimulated by significant local demand, more immediate progress has been made in community planning for commercial forest development. Design of these interventions promises sustainable modes of resource use, but this is a future contribution in principle only.

The programme intervention in sustainable land and environmental management (in Zanzibar) was argued to have made a contribution to strengthening the institutional and procedural foundations for land management, with a plausible contribution to the objective. | Sustainability is compromised by institutional weaknesses in central and local government.

Forestry and natural resources management projects have striven to enhance environmental sustainability in the rural sector, but positive results are not yet assured: the forces of unsustainable exploitation are powerful. | Limited contribution or contribution in principle. |

Objective	Specific Objectives	Effectiveness findings & contribution argument	Sustainability	Conclusion
TANZANIA				
Promotion of inclusive, sustainable and employment enhancing growth	Increased employment opportunities in agriculture and forestry especially for women and youth. Strengthened role of information technology and innovation systems for economic growth.	The information and technology intervention to develop the sector and Tanzania information society made only a preliminary contribution to strengthened public institutions, due to context factors, but has strengthened local innovation capacity. The agribusiness support project faced challenges in relevance and design that limited its achievements at the outcome level, but contribution is arguable for the businesses and livelihoods directly affected by the project. The seed potato project helped to enhance the technologies and capacity to support expanding employment through potato production and since project closure the government programme has continued, promising sustainable contribution to the objective. The Dar es Salaam electricity project fits uneasily under this objective, but was found to be likely to achieve its objective of enhancing the reliability of power supply in the city; its monitoring and management system will remain operational even when demand again exceeds supply.	Sustainability is compromised by institutional weaknesses in central and local government. While awareness has grown, it remains debatable whether government will show the ongoing ownership and entrepreneurial commitment that will be needed for sustainable results in the ICT sector. The seed potato project offers at least some scope for sustainability through private sector agencies, and its completion report offers a detailed and convincing seven-point plan for sustainability.	Limited and localised contribution.

Objective	Specific Objectives	Effectiveness findings & contribution argument	Sustainability	Conclusion
VIETNAM	In Vietnam the innovation partnership programme made a strong contribution to a basis for a knowledge-based society, but little as yet to an enhanced green economy. In the natural resource and climate change sector strong or some contribution was made through leveraging models in forestry and water and sanitation sectors, beyond which contribution was more limited or localised.			
Improved basis for a knowledge-based society	Increased openness and access to information, knowledge and innovation for all Enhanced green economy that creates entrepreneurial activity and decent jobs	The innovation partnership intervention was found to have made a strong contribution to the specific and overall objective. It contributed to instituting the innovation concept in Vietnam and indirectly leveraging large-scale investment by other donors and enhanced awareness among Vietnamese stakeholders; it has created new forms of cooperation with private sector and academic and research institutions, albeit still on a small scale; it has supported the establishment of provincial innovation clusters. There is emerging evidence of IPP II positively influencing the behaviour of groups/entities beyond the project sphere. But it cannot yet provide examples of new enterprises it has helped to create, or joint ventures with Finnish companies that would somehow be linked to the green economy.	Sustainability of IPP is positively influenced by its policy and legal development work, capacity building and creating models/ideas for replication and adoption. Partnerships created are likely to continue.	Strong contribution argued through leveraging and specific beneficiary groups.

Objective	Specific Objectives	Effectiveness findings & contribution argument	Sustainability	Conclusion
VIETNAM				
Sustainable use and management of natural resources and improved climate sustainability	Improved sustainability, inclusiveness, equality and climate sustainability of the use and management of forest resources Sustainable and equal access to improved water supply and sanitation services	The forestry information platform intervention has established a shared forest resource information systems platform supported by a range of information services, which are to help with improving the sustainability of forest resource use and management. But because the system is not yet fully mobilised there is not yet evidence on FORMIS being used to improve the quality of public sector decision-making to contribute to the sustainability objective. The forestry trust fund supported by Finland was successfully integrated into a new national fund, which is a major contribution to financing sustainable forest management. Through financing specific projects it also contributed directly. Limited contribution through the local cooperation fund projects to climate sustainability, but this was found to be localised. The institutional cooperation project to the hydro-meteorological service was effective, but the team could not assess the contribution to the result area. The water and sanitation project made significant contribution to the well-being of tens of thousands of people who benefited from the project, but this is localised contribution as its assumptions about scaling up and funding being taken over by other donors were not realistic. Contribution was argued through strengthening of regulatory frameworks and partially successful strengthening of local involvement in the management of water and sanitation.	The trust fund model has been taken up by government in setting up its own fund, supporting sustainability. While the ownership of the forest information system is good and increasing demands will contribute to sustainability, the major sustainability issue is linked to capacity constraints at the level of the central IT unit, and in the provinces and districts. Overall sustainability of the water (supply) component of the project is judged to be good, but with concerns around the sustainability of the sanitation component being voiced by all stakeholders and being evident from the field work.	Strong contribution through leveraging of a financing model for financing sustainable forest management. Limited contribution through the information project to date. Localised contribution in water and sanitation, with very limited leveraging through improved regulatory environment and a model for local involvement.

Objective	Specific Objectives	Effectiveness findings & contribution argument	Sustainability	Conclusion
ZAMBIA	In Zambia the CS interventions were found to make strong contributions in the private sector and social protection objectives, but only limited or localised contribution in the agriculture and environment sectors. Limited intervention effectiveness in these sectors affected the contributions, but the team argued that contribution could be leveraged particularly in agriculture through the establishment of models and approaches.			
Increased agricultural production and productivity among smallholders contributing to improved household income.	Improved access to resources and use of improved and sustainable agricultural technologies by smallholder farmers in areas supported by Finland. Sustainable, efficient and professionally managed small-scale irrigation schemes for smallholder farmers developed in areas supported by Finland.	Intervention effectiveness varied depending on the modality used, but overall fell short of expectations, with the majority of targets across the agricultural areas not met, with the exception of support to the farmers' union that led to increasing numbers of farmers accessing services and financing, which would in principle contribute to the objective of an improved agricultural sector and food security. The country evaluation acknowledged limited success in establishing an example of a public-private partnership model through the small-scale irrigation project that could feasibly contribute to a diversified and competitive agricultural sector. The rural agricultural programme similarly was found to have made modest progress towards such a sector.	The sustainability of the small-scale irrigation and smallholder productivity projects depends on whether the implementing multi-lateral partner will continue with the project after Finnish funding ends, as the results are not yet clear and the ones that are emerging not yet sustainable.	Very limited contribution due to slow or non-achievement of intervention objectives. Leveraged contribution through the establishment of models and approaches.
Increasing inclusiveness of the economy by promoting the growth and competitiveness of MSMEs.	Decent green jobs created in competitive enterprises. Improved access of MSMEs to e-services, business development and financial services through continued support to business environment reforms. Increased growth and competitiveness of MSMEs through participation in research, development and inclusive innovation process.	Interventions had shown good progress, through the creation of green jobs, strengthening the business environment and the development of laws and regulations, and increasing financial inclusion. The financial sector development programme was effective with a significant increase in financial inclusion and strengthening of the regulatory framework, and government has continued with some activities from the programme, giving it high priority. The green jobs programme made a contribution through affecting the lives of the specific beneficiaries. The private sector development programme's progress was mixed, but has made some contribution to streamlining and modernising business and investment procedures.	Efforts were made to design the programmes to ensure sustainability, although there is little evidence that this will occur in practice in the case of programmes that were implemented by the government (financial sector, private sector). The integration of these initiatives did not seem to translate into high levels of ownership.	Strong contribution arguable in some respects, through demonstration and leveraging government support. In others the contribution was more localised to the specific beneficiaries.

Objective	Specific Objectives	Effectiveness findings & contribution argument	Sustainability	Conclusion
ZAMBIA				
Improved capacity of environmental and forestry administrations, CSOs and communities for sustainable management of natural resources and pollution control	Improved integrated sustainable forest and other natural resources management and livelihoods at district and community levels. Strengthened monitoring and reporting systems for environmental protection. Enhanced role of civil society organisations to implement sound environmental management projects and promote sustainable development.	In Zambia most of the results in the sector were not achieved, with no results for decentralization of natural resources focus. The forestry and natural resources data base was established which is now starting to yield data, but with limited access, limiting its contribution. The civil society environmental fund was partially successful through building CSO capacity, but less so in promoting coordination because of the competitive funding environment. The contribution of the decentralized environmental management programme still has to materialize given the long start-up phase, and the team found it too early to make an assessment of effectiveness. Finland's policy dialogue has contributed to a strengthened legal environment.	Support to CSOs has been important to ensure a voice for them in environment. However, the sustainability of the support is judged as weak. Interviews underscored the level of dependence that CSOs have on external funding. Sustainability of the other projects faces challenges in terms of financial commitment, which are compounded in the case of the land use assessment, by technical complexity.	Very limited contribution, mostly as intervention results were slow to materialise.

Objective	Specific Objectives	Effectiveness findings & contribution argument	Sustainability	Conclusion
ZAMBIA				
Efficient revenue collection, good and transparent governance of public procurement and efficient mechanisms of participation	Integrated Financial Management System developed into an efficient and transparent mechanism. Zambia Public Procurement Agency (ZPPA) oversight and regulatory role and the capacity of procurement entities strengthened. Increased effectiveness of revenue administration. Social protection mechanisms strengthened for vulnerable groups. Strengthened civil society capacity to protect the rights of vulnerable groups, influence policies and promote transparency, accountability and public participation.	In Zambia support for public financial management reform progressed very slowly and had not achieved the objectives expected: however, twinning support between the Zambia procurement authority and the Finnish Institute of Public Management yielded restructuring of the Zambia authority, contribution to the related specific objective. The interventions in revenue administration may have contributed to increased revenue collection, although other factors also contributed such as economic growth. Work undertaken with the national assembly has brought about pressure for good audit reports and accounts. The contribution of GBS to good governance declined over the period and was reduced to nil when Finland and other donors withdrew in 2014. The social protection intervention was effective and contributed directly and through leveraging other contributions to the specific objective. There is however an uneasy relationship between the specific objective and the overall objective in this area.	Sustainability of the core programme not clear as while the programme was implemented by the ministry of finance, not clear that the project had sufficient influence to ensure sustainability.	Strong contribution to specific objective through the social protection programme. Good contribution to the specific objectives of public governance, but contribution to the overall objective limited to the institutions affected.

ANNEX 6: RBM COUNTRY PROGRAMMING PRACTICES OF SELECTED OECD DAC DONORS[10]

Component	Irish Aid	Switzerland (SDC)
Context		
Guiding frameworks for development cooperation	**Structure/overview:** The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) is responsible for Ireland's overseas engagement, and comprises a number of sub-divisions each charged with specific responsibilities. The Development Cooperation Division (DCD) (known also as Irish Aid) manages and delivers Ireland's overseas aid programme, with specific responsibility for bilateral relations with Africa (the Trade Division oversees the Asia Pacific Unit, and the Political Division oversees the Middle East Unit). Furthermore, a number of stand-alone units (reporting directly to the Secretary General) support on development cooperation/results management (notably the Policy Planning Unit, the Strategy and Performance Unit, and the Evaluation and Audit Unit). Overall, DFAT activity is guided by Ireland's foreign policy, which is translated into a Statement of Strategy and implemented at unit and mission level through business plans/risk registers, and is monitored through performance management and development systems. **2006–2012:** Between 2006 and 2012, Ireland's development cooperation was guided by the *White Paper* on Irish Aid which placed Ireland's commitment to supporting development 'at the centre of [their] foreign policy'. The 2006 *White Paper* outlined the overarching objective of Irish Aid as being *'to reduce vulnerability and increase opportunity'*, and was framed to serve as both a guide to development cooperation expenditure and future directions and as a benchmark against which partners could measure Ireland's performance. The *White Paper* outlined the focus of Ireland's development cooperation in its partner countries in targeted areas (including governance, health, education, rural development) as well as relief and recovery efforts, gender, peace and security.	The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) developed a 2013–2016 Dispatch, which is a single comprehensive strategy for SDC and SECO, the economic cooperation arm of the Swiss government. The strategy also provides a common framework with a shared set of sub-goals, high-level results and cross-cutting themes. The Dispatch was unanimously agreed by the Swiss parliament after two years of consultation, and is linked to the decision to spent 0.5% of gross national income as ODA by 2015. The Dispatch has one overarching goal, namely to contribute to sustainable global development and to reduce poverty and mitigate global risks. This breaks into five strategic sub goals: • Anticipating and responding to crises and conflicts and natural disasters • Providing universal access to resources and services • Promoting sustainable economic growth • Supporting the transition to democratic, market-based systems • Contributing to the globalization that favours development, environmental protection and social justice.

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[10] Details of documents referenced and consulted are provided at the bottom of the table, with full references provided in the reference section.

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Component	Irish Aid	Switzerland (SDC)
Context		
Guiding frameworks for development cooperation	In addition, the *Irish Aid Operational Plan (2008–2012)* and the *Foreign Affairs' Statement of Strategy (SoS) (2008–2010)* provided guidance on the approach to country programming, and emphasised the importance of Ireland's country programmes for delivering on commitments to reduce poverty. The Operational Plan provided the framework to manage and implement the programme outlined in the policy paper. **2013–current:** Following a review process, a new policy – *One World, One Future (OWOF)* – was published in 2013, outlining the priorities of Ireland's overseas development assistance against three goals: 1) reduced hunger, stronger resilience; 2) sustainable development, inclusive economic growth; and 3) better governance, human rights and accountability. The OWOF policy sets out Ireland's 'Whole-of-Government' approach to development, and provides a framework to guide all development efforts undertaken in countries, acknowledging that development cooperation forms only one component. This includes, for example, commitment to build links between the aid programme and sectors where Irish companies bring expertise, as well as strengthening of trade and investment links. *OWOF* serves as an articulation of specific outcomes and areas identified in Ireland's revised foreign policy, Global Island, which was launched in 2015. Global Island provides an overall framework, reaffirming Ireland's engagement in international development and efforts towards a fairer, more just, secure and sustainable world. Furthermore, the 2015–2017 Statement of Strategy outlines the high level DFAT goals, outcomes and outputs, as well as strategic partnerships, in order to deliver on the Global Island and OWOF policy commitments. It provides the framework against which divisions undertake annual business planning and reporting. The recently launched Framework for Action *(FFA)* for the *OWOF* policy provides a corporate-level results framework and serves as a management instrument to measure performance, demonstrate accountability and ensure effective delivery of planned results. The *FFA* states that it will underpin policy and programming decisions (until 2017) including decisions on resource allocation. It comprises three components: (1) three goals (as outlined above) and their high level outcomes; (2) priority outputs (in global hunger, fragile state situations, climate change, trade/economic growth, essential services, human rights/accountability, humanitarian assistance; and (3) plans to strengthen structures and systems (including 'a broader vision for engagement with Partner Countries').	The Dispatch includes two cross-cutting themes: gender equality and governance. The five goals are supported by four pillars, namely Humanitarian assistance; Technical cooperation and Financial assistance; Economic and trade policy; and Transition assistance. The number of themes governing Swiss ODA under the four pillars is 14, and altogether 37 countries are listed as priority countries for SDC and SECO. The Dispatch does, however, prioritise the themes of its global programmes – water, food security, climate change, migration, and finance and trade – and SDC and SECO will allocate a greater share of their budgets to these themes (OECD DAC 2013).

Component	Irish Aid	Switzerland (SDC)
Context		
Guiding frameworks for development cooperation	**Africa Strategy:** The above frameworks – and Whole-of-Government approach – are further supported by an *Africa Strategy* (launched in 2011 by DFAT) to further focus efforts across the continent whilst responding to the diverse contexts of countries where Ireland engages. The *Africa Strategy* draws together different elements of Ireland's engagement across countries in Africa – to ensure coherence between the different strands of work (development partnerships, political relations, trade and economic relations) – and details commitments to shape future engagement (including a strengthened mandate to Irish Embassies in Africa and staff to support/pursue opportunities in their areas of operation; consideration for funding new initiatives for two-way trade and investment; and options to support research collaboration between Irish and African institutions).	
Evolution and purpose of RBM	**In policy:** Decisions were made by Senior Management in 2006 to adopt a results-based management approach to development cooperation and country planning. Following this, a focus on results was embedded in the policies for development cooperation, with the *White Paper* outlining a commitment to achieving results (in line with the Paris Aid Effectiveness Principles) and the *OWOF* outlining a commitment to focusing efforts on achieving sustainable results 'even more intently' (p.2). OWOF states: *'the achievement of real and lasting results will be central to the way we plan, make decisions, implement, monitor, evaluate and provide accountability for our actions and programmes'*, making evident that results are envisaged to be used throughout the engagement cycle. In 2007 an Inter-Departmental Committee on Development (IDCD) was established, with a mandate to monitor and evaluate activities in areas that had implications for developing countries. The IDCD specifically monitors, analyses and reports on policy coherence across Ireland's areas of activity. The 2015–2017 SoS articulates that the department's goals and outcomes are to be reflected in business plans (approved by the Management Advisory Committee (MAC)), which form the basis of goal-setting, performance management and development. Units are therefore required to report against the SoS on the implementation of their own activities towards the high-level outcomes/goals.	Switzerland has been using country strategies – called cooperation strategies – as the instrument to manage country programmes since before 2009. At that time the country strategies were the main instrument through which Switzerland managed development cooperation, besides the credit frameworks and annual plans presented by Swiss country offices within framework credits approved by the Swiss parliament, which specified particular geographic and thematic priorities for development assistance. The aim of the system, including country strategies, was to provide opportunities to reinforce strategic results-oriented budgetary allocation and programme management to achieve the results set by SDC and SECO. Since 2009 SDC has revised its country strategies within a more structure RBM system. The improvements were driven by Switzerland's commitment to aid effectiveness, by the Swiss parliament striving for more and better results reporting, and by SDC's internal interest in improving its results orientation.

Component	Irish Aid	Switzerland (SDC)
Context		
Evolution and purpose of RBM	**In practice:** Corporate-level commitment to RBM principles was translated into practical guidance to inform processes and build coherence across department-wide activities. In the early stages less attention was given to integrating RBM in the processes and tools for development results at corporate level. At HQ level (DFAT-wide), a 'lighter' approach to including RBM in business processes was rolled out from 2009. However, at DCD mission level, materials developed (A Results-based Management Approach to Country Strategy Papers) gave RBM a robust, practical orientation, guiding the country-level aid programme. Thus, strategic planning, through development of Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) was the primary mechanism through which RBM was incorporated into the department's operations.

Current developments: Ireland's commitment to RBM continues to evolve, and DFAT is currently undergoing a process of strategic review and development of new guidelines for RBM (including for the development of CSPs) in order to bring consistency and coherence to management systems, and to embed approaches to RBM across other areas of the organisation (e.g. in financial procedures and human resource management). The strategic review builds on recommendations and findings emerging from internal progress reviews and from the most recent OECD DAC Peer Review (see sections below). | In 2010 SDC introduced a common results framework, and more recently an annual report. Now, according to the OECD DAC 2013 Peer Review (OECD DAC 2014a), standardised results planning and monitoring tools such as country level results frameworks, annual country results reports, and management responses to these reports have been rolled out in SDC and SECO. However, despite these tools and despite having embarked on more focused results orientation since 2010, Switzerland is still engaged in strengthening its results culture, the quality of indicators and baselines, and monitoring and reporting how results from individual projects contribute to expected results at country level (OECD DAC 2014a, 13).

Importantly, the SDC includes a Quality Assurance Network that provides quality assurance for results-based management. Its function is to provide support for line management. It provides dedicated training for staff on RBM.

Switzerland has strengthened its whole-of-government approach, particularly in fragile contexts and in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: this influenced the design and management of cooperation strategies. This was however not without cost and further streamlining can be done (OECD DAC 2014a). |

Component	Irish Aid	Switzerland (SDC)
Context		
Approach to country programming:	**Overview:** Irish aid targets bilateral development cooperation to nine focus countries (Key Partner Countries): with eight of these being in sub-Saharan Africa and one in southeast Asia. Alongside work in its partner countries, Ireland also supports five countries affected by or recovering from conflict (Liberia, Palestine, South Africa, Timor-Leste (previously a partner country), and Zimbabwe). Ireland's support to its Key Partner Countries has been longstanding in the majority of cases, and as far back as the 1970s (e.g. in Lesotho and Tanzania), the 1980s (e.g. Zambia) and the 1990s (e.g. Uganda, Ethiopia, Mozambique). More recently, aid programmes have been established in Sierra Leone (2002), Vietnam (2005) and Malawi (2007).	Prior to the 2013 Guidelines, which revamp the country strategy system, country strategies were loosely managed, with different country offices using different approaches to developing the strategies. These earlier strategies provided the framework for Swiss support in the medium term, defining thematic and geographic (where appropriate) priorities for cooperation in the country, as well as an approximate mix of modalities.
	Development: Implementation of CSPs has formed a component of Ireland's development cooperation since the early 1990s. However, with the shift of focus to results-based management in 2006, guidelines and processes were developed to embed a results-focus in the planning, implementation and monitoring/evaluation of the CSPs. Between 2007 and 2008, results-based management in CSPs was piloted in Lesotho and Ethiopia and subsequently rolled out to all countries through development of new country strategies.	Country offices led the preparation of these strategies, involving key country stakeholders such as government, donors and civil society. Headquarters approved the strategies, and determined the volume of aid per country. Once a strategy was agreed, the country offices implemented the strategy through annual plans, prepared by the country offices and approved by headquarters.
	CSPs are developed on a five-year, multi-annual basis to guide programming in country. The documents are published on the Irish Aid website, as well as on internal systems, with the published versions constituting shortened versions of the full, approved CSPs. They are used to define context-specific, country-level outcomes to be achieved in line with (and contributing to) the overarching SoS and FfA. Until the development of the FfA, however, there was no institutional/corporate level framework for RBM (see challenges section below). Following the 'Whole-of-Government' approach, and in line with recommendations emerging from various reviews/evaluations, CSPs are intended to take into consideration not only support channelled through bilateral mechanisms but also the mix of modalities (trade, political etc.).	Monitoring the strategies was the responsibility of each country office, with no binding guidance from headquarters. In view of this, country strategies used very different results frameworks, while some had none. This did not support aggregating information from the field at headquarters.
		The introduction of a common results framework in 2010 and the 2013 Guidelines revised this system significantly. These Guidelines were again revised in 2015. The rest of this discussion is based on the 2015 revisions.
		SDC cooperation strategies are now much more tightly prescribed with clear guidance on the format, process for developing them and for reporting against them.

Component	Irish Aid	Switzerland (SDC)
Context		
Approach to country programming:	**Strategic vs. operational:** The existing guidance material defines the CSPs as both a plan and a process, to be utilised by staff both at Embassy-level and at HQ-level in order to guide the strategic direction of support to Key Partner Countries through all phases of the support cycle. As such, CSPs are intended both as strategic documents and also as tools to measure and report on performance. The guidance material outlines key stages, including development of monitoring and performance measurement frameworks (identifying indicators; setting targets; monitoring results; reviewing and reporting results; integrating evaluations; and using performance information). They define a logic model and accompanying results framework, with a hierarchy of objectives, from goals to outcomes, objectives, outputs and activities. These are connected through the logic model to a results framework, which in turn has an associated performance measurement framework, which should serve as a management instrument and which outlines baseline data and the timing/frequency and responsibility for reporting against each of the components (e.g. goal-level, outcome and output-level). The results framework provides baseline statistics (e.g. against goal, outcome and objectives) for each of the output areas, as well as identifying risks and critical success factors. Outcomes identified in the CSPs are designed to be broadly measurable, with Ireland's country-level interventions/activities intended to contribute to these. The outputs identified are intended to be more directly attributed to the activity of Irish Aid-supported interventions. **Development cycle:** The development of CSPs takes place periodically, with strategies linked to the partner-country planning cycles (rather than being on the same ministry cycle across all countries). For example, the current CSP in Ethiopia runs from 2014–2018, whilst Uganda has just completed the process of developing its new CSP (2016–2020). The plans are developed in consultation between HQ and Embassy staff. In addition, Annual Business Plans are prepared which provide further 'operational' guidance on the resources and deliverables required to obtain outcomes and outputs. The CSPs are not updated annually, whilst the Annual Business Plans are (and are to be considered as 'living documents' that respond flexibly to changing contexts in country and at corporate level).	Importantly, by 2015 the strategies were aimed at: • Improving a results-orientation; • Greater decentralisation; and Greater alignment of SDC objectives with Swiss foreign policy objectives in the partner countries. Various internal SDC and Federal Department for Foreign Affairs units are now involved in formulating and implementing the country strategies, a significant shift from 2009 when the strategies were far more country office-driven and specific to development cooperation. The country strategy is now developed taking into account other Swiss foreign policy objectives. It also serves to define the cooperation with government offices, civil society, private sector, other donors, and multilateral or private organisations in the partner country. A country strategy is drawn up for each priority country or region. The country strategies are conceived as: • a strategic document that defines the objectives and effects to be achieved by Swiss development and humanitarian cooperation with the country or region, and sets out the ways; • a coordination instrument for different Swiss government offices involved; and • serving as a medium for communicating Switzerland's develop policy and/or humanitarian aid to the country.

Component	Irish Aid	Switzerland (SDC)
Context		
Approach to country programming:	Current developments are under way to streamline not only the processes for developing CSPs but also the documents themselves (outlined below). The current strategy review and revised guidelines intend to move CSPs firmly away from being operational documents towards being more strategic tools to guide high-level direction (goal-setting etc.), taking out details on which projects will be supported etc. This is in line with wider developments to build business processes to factor in results-management and allow for more manoeuvrability around grant-making etc.	Country strategies contain a planning matrix (also called a results framework) as the basis for monitoring and results-oriented steering. Country strategy implementation and steering is reported in Annual Reports, which also contain information on the planning priorities for the coming year. Head office assesses and approves the planning priorities of the country strategies in a management response.

Cooperation strategies must be focused on no more than three 'domains' of intervention that must be closely linked to SDC priority themes.

Specific requirements for cooperation strategies in fragile contexts are provided. |
| Country programme/ strategy planning, reporting processes (as defined)

Roles and responsibilities | The OECD DAC Peer Review of Ireland in 2003 made recommendations for strengthening the approach to country programming. This led to a review of processes, including: emphasis on results and performance management; developing an MTR instrument; and improving guidelines on CSP planning/reporting. Current guidance outlines the CSP cycle, as set out in key phases, as detailed below. However, processes for CSP planning, implementing and reporting s are being refined and updated and these are detailed to the extent possible.

• **Evaluation/lesson learning:** external evaluation of existing CSP.
• **Planning:** undertaking a country context analysis; development options for discussion and approval; undertaking detailed programming and design; formulating the results framework; and drafting the CSP documentation.
• **Appraisal and approval:** internal and external appraisal (of the options paper and draft document).
• **Implementation:** inception/launch, annual review, business planning, mid-term review. | Responsibility for the process and the strategy lies with the relevant geographical division at the head office, which draws up the cooperation strategy jointly with the corresponding field office, other SDC units involved in the country programme, and even other government offices if they are engaged in development activities and deploy resources in the country.

An early decision is always taken as to whether the country strategy is a joint strategy (with one or more other federal offices) or an SDC strategy subject to consultation with other offices. A joint strategy requires a joint elaboration of a results-oriented Annual Report as well as an integrated Management Response to the Annual Report. The main agreements between SDC and other federal offices are discussed in detail, drawn up for the medium term and, if necessary, defined in a separate document as the basis for the joint steering of the collaboration. SDC is responsible for the coordination of the process. |

Component	Irish Aid	Switzerland (SDC)
Context		
Country programme/ strategy planning, reporting processes (as defined) Roles and responsibilities	**Reporting:** Quarterly and annual performance reports are generated by embassies. The annual report provides the main summary statement of performance. This report is largely narrative and structured around the outcomes and objective levels of the CSP. There has reportedly been a shift towards reporting on quantitative data, and reporting more systematically against indicators outlined in the performance management framework. Results frameworks (and performance assessment frameworks) are set up to capture quantitative baselines where possible. However, issues have arisen with reporting where it has been more speculative and difficult to assess what contribution there had been in practice or where the baseline statistics have not been available. The ability of the embassy to report against results is reflective of the extent to which the embassy in country has been able to work with/collect information from partners delivering projects. In addition to periodic reporting, guidance states that Mid-Term Reviews (MTR) should be undertaken in line with the approved MTR instrument (in place since 2006), and should provide a formal assessment of performance at the mid-point. MTRs should involve HQ as well as Embassy staff, and make assessments of performance against OECD DAC evaluation criteria. **Roles and responsibilities:** The guidance material sets out the key functions in terms of developing a CSP and states that 'successful development and implementation (…) depends on each of the various Irish Aid sections (HQ and Embassies/Missions) and staff members playing a clearly defined role at the appropriate stage'. Some key functions are summarised below: • **Heads of Programme** (context awareness; supervision and sign-off on CSP stages); **'The Desk'** (coordinator and focal point at HQ on country programme issues; overview of CSP development); **CSP Support team** (support to meet requirements/on quality assurance etc.); • **Head of Mission** (oversight role, development of CSP); **Head of Development** (key role in CSP development/country context; day-to-day management etc.); **Specialist support** (including country specialists); **National Advisers; Other Irish Aid sections** (civil society section, emergency/recovery section etc.); **Political division; Coherence Group.** • **Project Appraisal and Evaluation Group** (final external appraisal of the CSP); **Senior Management Group:** IDCD (final approval).	A country strategy is drawn up through a series of steps: First, an opening note is submitted to the SDC Board of Directors, to outline a few important aspects for the new cooperation strategy. The note sets out the domains of intervention and the corresponding themes. The opening note is followed by a workshop in the partner country, to discuss the proposed themes and domains of intervention. A concept note is submitted to the SDC Board of Directors in consultation with other actors. The minutes of the Board will indicate the main indications for formulating the final strategy. The assessment of the Board comprises three responsibilities: to assess (1) whether Switzerland's planned engagement will add value; (2) whether the proposed strategy is feasible and realistic; and (3) whether the outcomes to be achieved are sufficiently defined at the end of the strategy term, as well as how they can be monitored. The approval of the concept note provides the SDC regional unit and the country office, in coordination with other federal offices, to prepare the country strategy. This usually involves engagement with counterparts at country level. The final version of a CS is signed by the Director General of SDC and – in the case of a joint CS – by the directors of the directly involved federal offices, and thus takes effect. In the case of a joint Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) CS (e. g. SDC and the Human Security Division), the document is also signed by the State Secretary of the FDFA, in addition to the SDC Director.

Component	Irish Aid	Switzerland (SDC)
Context		
Country programme/ strategy planning, reporting processes (as defined) Roles and responsibilities	Key phases envisaged in the new guidance are: Context analysis (including development of a Context Analysis Paper, and establishment of a Reference Group); Direction setting (development of a Directions Paper); Detailed planning (refining indicators and resource requirements); Implementation; Completion/learning (further detail provided in final section).	The SDC country office is responsible for implementing the CS and achieving the defined objectives and results. The geographic divisions at headquarters are responsible for coordination of development policy and humanitarian activities and support the field office. The field office is responsible for setting up a monitoring system, which must cover: the development outcomes; the contributions of the Swiss programme; performance/implementation modalities; and context. This is supported by the results framework that is set out in three levels. Each domain selected is set out as a country development or humanitarian outcome, as a Swiss portfolio outcome. The contribution of the one to the other must be discussed explicitly in the framework, through the identification of factors that describe how the one contributes to the other and the setting out of risks. The third level is the lines of intervention. Resources and partnerships are identified, as well as management/performance results related to the inputs that each partner in the strategy will provide. Field offices issue annual reports on the implementation status of the cooperation strategy, and inform head office of the steering decisions and priorities for the following implementation year. CSs must be subjected either to an end-of-term evaluation or to a review. Mid-term reviews are not required. The annual reports and the steering decisions recorded in them are.
Evaluations and reviews of RBM approaches?	Findings and recommendations from the following key evaluations and reviews of Ireland's approach to RBM are detailed in relevant sections above and below: OECD DAC Peer Reviews – 2003, 2009, and 2014. Evaluation of the Irish Aid Ethiopia Country Strategy – contribution of an RBM approach (2012). DFAT Evaluation and Audit Unit Internal Progress Review (2013).	Findings and recommendations from the following key evaluations and reviews of Switzerland's approach to RBM are detailed in relevant sections above and below: OECD DAC Peer Reviews – 2009 and 2013.

Component	Irish Aid	Switzerland (SDC)
Lessons learnt and challenges		
What have been important benefits of country programming/ strategies?	Since the adoption of the RBM approach in 2006, there have been important lessons learnt both about the benefits of the approach and about areas for further development. Incorporating RBM in systems and processes has supported an institutional shift towards an 'RBM culture'. Indeed, the 2009 OECD DAC Peer Review acknowledged Ireland's commitment to developing a culture which emphasises results, and the mechanisms put in place to ensure a focus on results at the centre of their planning and reporting. It outlined, however, the need for sufficient capacity to monitor performance both at country level and at HQ, and the need for training and incentives to ensure sustainable and useful approaches to performance management/ strategic planning. It recommended that the results-based approach to country strategies (internal, essentially, to DCD (Irish Aid)) should be expanded to guide all of Ireland's interventions through all channels and instruments.	A commitment to results-based management has led to Switzerland's whole-of-government approach. While this approach comes with transaction costs it improves coordination between interventions from SDC and other federal offices of government.
What support to quality of Interactions between HQ and embassies on reporting/monitoring		A key lesson from Switzerland is not to over complicate templates. RBM is not about filling out forms: it is about closely looking at results, so the forms and documentation are just to support this.
Use and effect of country strategies (including building a 'results-based management culture')?	Building on the OECD DAC Peer Review 2009, the DFAT Evaluation and Audit Unit undertook an internal Progress Review in 2013 to assess what steps had been taken towards implementing the commitment corporately to RBM. The review identified a number of areas where further development was needed. Notably, the internal review highlighted that guidance on RBM had focused on the development of CSPs without consideration for other processes, and therefore RBM was not integrated into how results collected were used to manage for results, make decisions and make budget allocations, or to report on the department's effectiveness in delivering results (being, rather, narrowly focused on results in the country context). The most recent OECD DAC Peer Review undertaken in 2014 stated that Ireland had made significant progress in terms of institutionalising management for development results into processes and structures, and that there was commitment to continue strengthening results systems. The review highlighted that there were challenges faced in implementing RBM approaches given confusion and complexity around various components and that processes could be resource-intensive exercises.	The quality assurance for results-based management is focused on line management, as it is here that RBM is anchored. The system should build it up from this level, as this is also where country strategy accountability lies. It is important to continue to build capacity for RBM as staff rotate out of positions. The Country Director is a key figure in the development and management of the cooperation strategy and it is important that s/he is capacitated. In the nine years since the implementation of cooperation strategies there have been only two revisions, one in 2013 and the other in 2015. The 2015 one was to introduce a focus on fragile contexts, acknowledging that these are different, and to formalise a whole-country approach. This has been highly important, as Switzerland needs to act 'as one in a country', in other words not as individual Swiss state institutions acting individually.

Component	Irish Aid	Switzerland (SDC)
Lessons learnt and challenges		
What have been important benefits of country programming/ strategies? What support to quality of Interactions between HQ and embassies on reporting/monitoring Use and effect of country strategies (including building a 'results-based management culture')?	Reportedly, the country programming strategies have been useful in shifting thinking around what development cooperation is doing in countries and how it contributes to what Ireland is trying to achieve corporately. As Ethiopia was one of the earliest countries to roll out the RBM approach to its CSP, there was an evaluation undertaken of the contribution of a results-based management approach to strategy development there, based on the CSP 2008–2012. Amongst various findings, staff at embassy and HQ level said that the CSP had provided a good structure against which to plan and make decisions in view of resource cuts etc., but that results were only one element considered alongside policy considerations in terms of decisions about financing for specific projects. The evaluation recommended that Ireland's full mix of modalities be better considered and strategic choices made based on available budget of what areas to support. It also made specific recommendations regarding the inclusion of indicators from the logic model in the performance measurement framework, and to ensure linkages between outcome indicators agreed for partner projects and those captured in the CSP.	
What have been greatest challenges? And why?	The most significant challenges that have been faced in implementing an RBM approach are outlined above and expanded upon here: • The **absence of a corporate level framework** for results. A significant weakness was the lack of a corporate framework for results to feed into, limiting the upward function and utility at a corporate level. Initially, RBM was considered primarily through the CSP processes, with strong emphasis in guidance materials on the planning phase but less attention given to how results should be used. • Furthermore, given the **absence of a strong RBM focus in other business processes** – including human resource management, budgeting processes and knowledge management at a corporate level – strategic planning for results at country level operated, effectively, in isolation. This gave rise to issues around coherence, as well as a disconnect in using RBM in key processes. For example, the absence of RBM in annual budgeting processes has meant resourcing decisions have been made without systematic assessment of evidence collected (and are, therefore, susceptible to other factors (opinion/media demands etc.) overriding decision-making).	The implementation of cooperation strategies faced challenges of • The lack of a clear corporate frame for developing cooperation strategies and coordination across Swiss components of government working in developing countries. • Limited human resource capacity and the quality of result frameworks and indicator development. The experience showed that constant guidance and specification of requirements was needed so that the developers of strategies could develop the right levels of results and targets. • Difficulty in coordination to develop and monitor the strategies across Swiss government units and offices;

Component	Irish Aid	Switzerland (SDC)
Lessons learnt and challenges		
What have been greatest challenges? And why?	• At country level there has been acknowledgment of a need to prepare strategies that reflect the whole-of-mission activities in planning and implementation, and to avoid challenges of overlap and parallel planning/reporting. • There have been **challenges around process** and related to capacity, human resource management, and the consistent use of tools. Development of CSPs has reportedly been time-consuming (taking around 18 months) and labour-intensive (involving around 25 people), with missions reporting that a more efficient process is required. Planning, reporting and budgeting cycles have not been aligned, meaning that there has been disconnect between monitoring/ results and annual business planning processes for the following year. Furthermore, quite complex and dense tools for CSP planning have contributed to different interpretations and application of various frameworks, and given rise to inconsistencies between countries.	• The risk of becoming too focused on mechanistic result reporting and filling out forms; and the challenge of ensuring that the cooperation strategies resulted in more strategic development cooperation. The first set of guidelines included far too many methodological requirements, with the result that instead of assisting country offices to be more strategic, the process of complying with the requirements ran the risk of losing sight of the bigger picture. • The difficulty of separating strategic level and project level in reporting of results.
What lessons have been learnt and how has or might the instrument be adjusted?	As outlined above, the main challenges and lessons learnt are guiding the strategic review, which seeks not only to build RBM institutionally but also to make country programming processes more streamlined and higher level (and to shift the operational components to annual plans and other business processes, such as grant management processes). As such, recent developments have sought to embed CSPs in an overall RBM framework, with the development and roll-out of the FfA being a significant step forward. Both corporately and at country level, there are challenges around indicators and measuring the performance of country strategies, and Ireland has made the decision not to apply standard indicators across all countries/ programmes or to aggregate results. The FfA will be used to collect 'high-level' information against top tier outcomes and results. Work is still under way to determine exactly how information from country level will be mapped into the corporate framework; however, it should serve as a valuable 'linking' tool.	Key lessons are: The need to reduce complexity so that the cooperation strategies can be functional RBM instruments. The Agency needed to make a transition to manage for rather than by results. The key lesson was that RBM is not about being 'a tool factory': the focus should not be on RBM formats and models and forms, but on actually managing for the results. The focus has therefore shifted from tracking results to steering programmes for results. This means using the room for flexibility; joint assessments of results and the steering implications; clear communication and processing of steering decisions through annual reports; and periodic adaptations of interventions based on agreement of all stakeholders. This has meant focusing on outputs and outcomes at country level and at SDC/Swiss level. There is a need to have not only quantitative indicators, but also qualitative indicators and indicators of progress.

Component	Irish Aid	Switzerland (SDC)
Lessons learnt and challenges		
What lessons have been learnt and how has or might the instrument be adjusted?	Acknowledging constraints related to human capacity, and challenges emerging from staff turnover in HQ and mission-level posts, there is consideration being given to how human resource planning can be made more strategic. Considerations for instituting this include planning of staff needs and rotations against longer time horizons and development of strong ICT systems to capture knowledge and limit the loss of institutional memory when individuals move on. Similarly, RBM is being built into processes linked to annual budgeting and grant management more systematically, with efforts to move away from budget allocations being made on the basis of what is detailed (e.g. projects, partners, activities over the period) in the CSPs. This requires shifts away from viewing the CSPs as planning/operational tools to making them more top-line indications of plans over a period, thus giving greater flexibility/ responsiveness to country context and increasing the decision-making function of the country mission head. There are efforts to develop grant management frameworks (planned to be rolled out in 2016), to build consistency in grant-making decisions.

Updates are also under way to address some of the challenges faced around process. Guidance material is not yet finalised; however, phases included aim to reduce the number of people involved and make the process faster by limiting the number of comment rounds during the approval/appraisal phase. Under the revised guidelines, the planning and approval phases are designed to take around 6.5 months. Once the CSP document is ready to be appraised, external and internal reviewers are asked to provide an objective opinion before going to a recommendation meeting where a decision is given as to whether the CSP should be approved (or revisions required). Previously this phase had included a series of back-and-forth commenting rounds, with external reviewers sent the document at a later stage and responses at that point difficult to consider/address, with limited guidance provided to the Embassy on what opinions should/should not be taken into account. Furthermore, there are efforts to better ensure consistency/ standardized formats for reports etc. Uganda has recently completed a CSP update utilising new processes and within the revised institutional context, and this will provide valuable experience. | An important element but a remaining challenge is having clear result statements for each area that different units contribute to, and being able to produce meaningful synthesis and progressive reporting.

The need for coordination and consultation across Swiss government units. This meant periodic and joint assessment of result achievement, in addition to joint development of the strategies.

The need to have formal human resource development and continuous support. The quality assurance network provides coaching and training on demand, and has developed a field handbook and e-learning platform for the cooperation strategies

The need for RBM to be part of the organisational culture. This meant focusing discussion in the Agency on results, developing a more explicit corporate level result framework and reporting that can show up result patterns for taking up at country level and that allows alignment of planning, monitoring and evaluation with envisaged results. |

ANNEX 7: SUMMARY OF KENYA COUNTRY CONTEXT, CSM PROCESSES, CS AND APPLICABLE FINDINGS

Overview of the country context and key development challenges

Economic and social situation. Kenya was classified as a lower middle income country (LMIC) in 2014, having experienced sustained economic growth in more recent years, supported by lower energy costs, and investment in infrastructure. Despite being at a low rate in 2008 (0.2 percent), annual GDP growth has averaged 5.2 percent over the period 2006–2014 (WB Data, 2014) and World Bank projections indicate that GDP growth is set to rise to 5.9 percent in 2016 and again to 6.1 percent in 2017 (WB Data). However, although Kenya's economy is one of the fastest growing economies in East Africa, it has generally been thought to have fallen below its potential in terms of actual performance, and Kenya's GDP growth has been lower than neighbouring countries (such as Tanzania, which experienced 7 percent growth in 2014) (WB Data). The private sector is increasingly becoming an important area, yet the country has scored poorly in terms of being an attractive environment for investments, and there are issues of corruption.

Furthermore, persistent development challenges remain, including poverty and inequality, and there is significant regional variation in development outcomes and in social and economic indicators. Kenya ranks 145th out of 187 countries on the UNDP Human Development Index (UNDP 2015), and inequality is pronounced despite a slight reduction from 57.5 to 47.7 on the Gini Index between 1992 and 2005. According to 2005 data, the poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines was 47 percent, a figure which has reportedly remained relatively unchanged over the past couple of decades. The rural population and especially those living in the arid and semi-arid counties (which account for over 80 percent of Kenya's land), are adversely affected, with acute poverty experienced in the northeast at a rate nearly double the level of that experienced in areas of medium/high agricultural potential.

Coupled with these challenges, Kenya has a fast growing population (2.6 percent annually, around 1.2 million per year) (WB Data 2014), and issues around rising youth unemployment (with a high proportion of the population – estimated at 75 percent – under the age of 30) (Youth Policy 2014).There has been progress in access to health care and education, with interventions supporting this. This has included provision of free health care for under-five-year-olds and free primary education (and an increase in enrolment from 5.93m to 10.2m children between 2000 and 2013) (UNDP 2015). However, despite provision of free maternal health care, progress in relation to maternal health has been very poor and rates of maternal mortality remain high at 488/100,000 live births (2009 data, MoDP 2013). There are significant disparities across regions, and the arid and semi-arid regions lag behind with limited service provision and poor access (including barriers arising from poverty, and on account of nomadic lifestyles).

The economy is highly dependent on agriculture (around 30 percent of GDP) (WB Data). Kenya is highly vulnerable to climate shocks, and experiences high levels of food insecurity, with recurrent droughts (and floods) undermining efforts to achieve development targets. Furthermore, challenges to gender equality remain and Kenya is ranked 126th out of 155 countries in the Gender Development Index (scoring 0.552) (UNDP 2015).

Political situation. Following the 2007 elections, violence broke out. In response, in 2010, a new Constitution was approved which included a progressive Bill of Rights (setting out protections for fundamental rights and freedoms) and which provided for the separation of powers through institutionalisation of a devolved system of government (GOK 2010). The elections in 2013 marked the formal launch of Kenya's decentralised, two-tier system of government. Forty-seven counties were established, each with a county executive and a county assembly, and representatives were elected in each. Under the devolved system, county governments have increased responsibility for service delivery and public finance (notably in health, agriculture, infrastructure and pre-primary education). The shift represents a significant step forward, and is recognised as being potentially transformative, but there are significant challenges around weak institutions and governance.

Overview of national development strategies and donor policies

National development strategies. Kenya's *Vision 2030* (GOK 2007) is the strategic underpinning which guides the country's long-term development goals. The document was launched in 2008, guiding the development of a five-year Medium Term Plan, with the overall goal being 'to create a globally competitive and prosperous nation with a high quality of life' by transforming Kenya into a newly industrialised nation. *Vision 2030* is focused around three pillars which form the basis of a comprehensive national development agenda with economic, social and political pillars:

- The **economic pillar** looks to improve prosperity of all regions of the country and achieve 10 percent GDP growth rate by 2017 (with agriculture as a key mechanism for achieving this).

- The **social pillar** seeks to invest in the people of Kenya to improve the quality of life; and

- The **political pillar** aims to move towards a future as one nation, focusing on the rule of law, democracy, public service delivery, transparency and accountability.

The three pillars are anchored in macroeconomic stability, continuity in governance reforms, enhanced equity and wealth creation, with reforms across eight key sectors that form the foundation of socio-political/economic growth.

The 2010 Constitution also serves as a guiding framework in Kenya, notably through the Bill of Rights which guards fundamental rights including freedom of expression, conscience and belief, rights to equal opportunities for men and women, freedom of the media, rights of arrested people and rights of the accused. As outlined above, it also institutes a devolved government system, marking a significant transition.

Other key development strategies and plans of significance in relation to Finland's development cooperation include the National Action Plan 1325 (which outlines efforts to enhance gender equality and promote women's participation in peace and security); the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) 2010–2020, which aims to develop an innovative, commercially orientated and modern agricultural sector; and those related to building climate resilience, notably the National Climate Change Action Plan 2013–2017 (and associated programmes such as the Kenya Adaptation to Climate Change in Arid and Semi-Arid lands (KACCAL).

Donor assistance and directions. The country's growing GNI has decreased the relative importance of ODA, from 5.3 percent in 2012 to 4.4 percent in 2014 (OECD 2016). However, in 2012 Kenya was still ranked as the world's eighth largest recipient of ODA, and in 2014 net ODA totalled USD 2,665.1m. Over the period 2008–2014, the United States was the main donor (28 percent of total ODA), followed by IDA (12 percent). On average between 2013–2014, the largest proportion of ODA went to the Health and Population sector (56 percent), followed by provision of Humanitarian Aid (12 percent) and support to social infrastructure/services (11 percent) (*ibid*).

Other donors are starting to 'look ahead' to transition away from ODA, and with an increasing appreciation of the importance of economic and commercial cooperation. For example, the Netherlands aims to move from aid to trade, envisaging bilateral aid to end in 2020 with intentions to support the transition by acting as an investor in key sectors. Similarly, for Denmark, strengthening of the trade and commercial relations is key, with increasing support – as partners – to private sector cooperation in agricultural value chains as well as water and energy envisaged.

Finland has provided, on average, 1.0 percent of Kenya's total ODA over the 2008–2014 period, and although its ODA has fluctuated, it increased from USD 17 m in 2009 to USD 56 m in 2014 (see below on current strategy plans).

Figure 19: ODA flows to Kenya 2008–2014

Source: OECD DAC data

Overview of Finland's development cooperation in Kenya

Historical overview. Finland's engagement in Kenya dates as far back as the 1960s and was initially channelled through the Nordic cooperation programme. Kenya became a partner country in the 1980s and was one of the largest recipients of Finnish ODA up until the 1990s when the overseas development aid budget to Kenya was drastically reduced, along with overall reductions to Finnish aid at the same time. Support was initially provided through large-scale infrastructure projects, before a shift in the mid-1990s to focusing on poverty reduction and sustainable management of natural resources. On account of a deteriorating human rights context in Kenya, 'new' bilateral cooperation was suspended in 1998, but support to ongoing projects continued. During this period, the thematic focus of Finland's development cooperation shifted to supporting efforts focusing on good governance, democracy and human rights especially (through UN agencies and NGOs). There was also support to the forestry, agriculture, health and water sectors through a series of projects. By 2002, a changed political context in Kenya led to re-establishment of the bilateral cooperation programme and in 2004 agreements between the Government of Kenya and MFA were made to focus on three sectors: forestry, energy and good governance. This reflected continuity with earlier interventions (including continued support to the Miti Mingi forestry project) as well as 'streamlining' of the programme (with projects in water, health and agriculture either discontinued or supported under one of the three broader, thematic areas of focus), and the introduction of new interventions.

Kenya is now the only country in Africa to which Finland provides development cooperation which is not a least developed country. Finland states that continued support is being provided during Kenya's process of transition (and following its major shift towards decentralisation) because it 'promises a better future for Kenyans' whereby gains made can be consolidated and real progress can be achieved (especially relating to political and social challenges) (Embassy of Finland Nairobi n.d).

Country Engagement Plan (CEP) 2008–2011. In 2007, Finland developed a CEP (known in Kenya as the Plan for Participation) to guide the country programming over a four-year period. The plan was prepared in a highly volatile political climate (with violence erupting after the elections in 2007), and it emphasised that long-term commitments to development cooperation were difficult to make. The CEP consolidated the focus of Finland's development cooperation in Kenya in the three sectors outlined above (forestry, energy, good governance), linking these to the three objectives of the 2007 DPP (environmentally, economically, and socially sustainable development). These were also aligned to Kenya's Economic Recovery Strategy, comprising three pillars (economic recovery, gender equality and poverty reduction). Finland made commitment to cross-cutting objectives linked to the recovery strategy (notably in HIV/AIDS and gender equality). The CEP was predicated on the assumption that the political context would stabilise, but it outlined a number of scenarios/alternatives and the potential responses, e.g. no change/or worsening of the volatile context, freezing of aid, and limited Finnish aid channelled to selected interventions.

The planned budget by sector is outlined below, and totalled EUR 94.55 m over a five-year period, with the biggest proportion of the budget allocated to the social development (good governance) interventions. The CEP stated that programmes would be implemented within a framework of a joint aid strategy, and that alternative mechanisms (multilateral/bilateral cooperation, public-private, NGO) would be utilised as appropriate.

Table 13: Kenya Initial CEP budget 2008–2012 (EUR m)

Objective (Sector)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total
Environmental development (Forestry sector)	2.55	4.3	8.3	11	10.5	36.65
Economic development (Energy sector)	0.5	1.8	4	5	5.5	16.8
Social development (Good governance – Law, Order and Justice)	5.4	9.6	11.4	8.9	5.3	40.6
Other (programme design)	-	0.3	0.1	0.1		0.5
Total	**8.45**	**16**	**23.8**	**25**	**21.3**	**94.55**

Source: MFA 2008

Transition from CEP to CS and overview of strategy. In 2010, a revised version of the Plan for Participation was prepared: the 2010 Development Cooperation Plan (DCP). This followed bilateral negotiations and agreements made in 2009 (and in view, again, of the political context in Kenya). The 2010 Development Cooperation Plan shifted the focus on the energy sector to rural development (and allocated funds through PALWECO); it also reduced the planned allocation to the social development sector against the 2008 outline. Total planned budget for 2009–2014 was EUR 63.9 m (social development = EUR 6 m; economic development = EUR 23 m; ecological development = EUR 34 m).

The 2013–2016 Kenya Country Strategy does not represent a significant shift in terms of areas of emphasis from either the 2008 CEP or the 2010 DCP. However, it 'reviews' Finland's development cooperation with Kenya against the background of redefined priorities set out in the Finnish Development Policy Programme of 2012. It highlights that key components forming the 'redefinition of Finland's engagement

with Kenya are: 'an added emphasis on human rights, democratic ownership and accountability, and results-based management'. The table below outlines the country development results, in three areas of focus – good governance/human rights; agriculture and rural development; and natural resource management.

The Country Strategy aligns with Kenya's *Vision 2030* and the new Constitution and envisages providing support to Kenya's priorities through targeted interventions which follow a human-rights-based approach. Related to results-based management, the strategy outlines a 'more systematic application', through monitoring/reporting of the contribution of interventions to development results as well as Finland's strategic objectives. As such, the Kenya Country Strategy is designed to 'feed up' into realisation of MFA's development objectives. The CS stated that the number of bilateral and multilateral interventions funded through the CS would be reduced from seven in 2013 to four in 2016.

Table 14: Kenya CS objectives

Country Development Result	Finland's Objective	Specific Finnish Objective	Instruments, inputs and resources (as outlined in CS)
Governance and human rights An issue-based, people-centred, result-oriented, and accountable democratic political system	A democratic and accountable society that promotes human rights	• Capacity of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) increased • Opportunities for women, youth, minorities and persons with disabilities • Participation in the electoral process improved, and organisation of civic education • Capacity of National Human Rights Institutions strengthened to promote access to justice • Capacity of strategic Kenyan actors increased to promote gender equality	• Political and policy dialogue/ bilateral consultations • Basket fund to support IEBC oversee 2013 elections • Support to URAIA (CSO network – civic education) • Support to oversight agencies • Support to UN Women • FLC – support to CSOs
Agriculture/rural development To maintain a sustained economic growth of 10% per annum over the next 25 years	Poverty reduction through inclusive green economic growth in the agricultural sector	• Improved livelihoods for the poor in Busia County • Increased agricultural production and food security in Busia County • Promotion of business development, innovation and knowledge sharing in the • Agricultural sector	• Agriculture and rural development sector policy dialogue participation • Support to PALWECO (Busia County) – a multi-sector programme geared towards poverty reduction • Support to ARD through regional research programmes, institutional cooperation, and support to NGOs • Promotion of innovative activities in ARD (including trade-related/private sector links)

Country Development Result	Finland's Objective	Specific Finnish Objective	Instruments, inputs and resources (as outlined in CS)
Natural resource management A just and cohesive society enjoying equitable social development in a clean and secure environment	To improve the management and use of forest and water resources with increased participation of communities, civil society and private sector	• Progress in forestry sector reform and strengthened forestry governance, including • improved capacity and performance of key institutions • improved contribution of forests to rural livelihoods, including more equal benefit sharing, and • environmental sustainability • Improved water and sanitation services for the rural poor and more sustainable and • efficient water resource management	• Policy dialogue on forestry and water • Miti-Mingi Maisha Bora (2009–2014) – project supporting forestry sector reform (with Finnish support channelled through Kenya Forest Service) • Support to the rural window of Water Services Trust Fund

Source: MFA 2013b

Developments and main interventions. Unlike some other countries, there was not a second iteration of the Country Strategy prepared in Kenya; however, some changes have been made to the content of the Country Strategy, to reflect updates to the Development Policy Programme in 2016 and to respond to a changing context in country (e.g. support provided to the Kenya Devolution Partnership Facility from 2015, which was not previously detailed in the Country Strategy). Furthermore, following the evaluation of the Kenya Country programme 2007-2014 which was finalised in 2015, the logical framework was revised.[11]

Table 15 below provides an overview of the current interventions and activities being supported by/through Finnish development cooperation with Kenya (highlighting both continuity in various programmes and the introduction of new programme areas of support). In total, across three sectors, six programmes are supported (with four of these indicating planned periods up to or beyond 2016). Additionally, eleven projects are supported through the FLC mechanism.

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[11] However, the revised document is not public and was not available to the evaluation team.

Table 15: Summary of main interventions in Kenya

Sector	Programme	Period / Total budget	Implementing agency/ies	Description
Good Governance and Human Rights	Support to the Realisation of Human Rights and Access to Justice in Kenya	2012–2015 **EUR 3.2 m**	UNDP and Kenya National Commission on Human Rights; National Gender Equality Commission on Administrative Justice	Focus on capacity building, to increase national capacity in government and civil society to promote and protect human rights and access to justice. UNDP manages the programme, with the commissions that are supported being mandated to ensure the constitutional provisions related to human rights. The programme of support outlines six strategic and inter-linked results, including: capacity strengthening of commissions; capacity strength-ening of government; a strengthened framework for access to justice; and capacity of state/non-state actors to deliver on human rights processes.
	Support to UN Women Kenya Strategic Plan	2013–2016 **EUR 3.9 m**	UN Women	Support to UN Women since creation, with Finnish support not ear-marked but given to support the strategy as a whole. The strategic plan has five key result areas (including that women lead and participate in governance; that economically empowered women benefit from public procurement and agriculture value chains; and that women and girls live free from violence).
	Rooting democracy in Kenya through an informed citizenry	2013–2015 **EUR 2 m**	Uraia Trust and other non-state actors	Continuation of earlier programme concentrated on civic and electoral education (in 2013). Based on three pillars to promote and strengthen: civic education, civic engagement and institutional strengthening.
	Support to Kenya Devolution Partnership Facility	2015–2017 **EUR 2 m**	World Bank (with Kenyan central Government and county governments)	The main objective is to strengthen the (recently) devolved system of government and to build the capacities of county-level governments, to provide: 1) good quality services for all citizens; and 2) all Kenyans with the opportunity to participate in county government planning and policy making. The programme builds on a long-standing relationship between the World Bank and the Government of Kenya focusing on public adminis-tration and public financial management.
	Support to Good Governance to Strengthen Integrity and Accountability in Kenya	2015–2016 **EUR 2.8 m**	GIZ and national partners	The programme aims to address corruption and abuse of power in public administration, through support to the chain of anti-corruption institu-tions and actors to prevent, investigate, and report corruption as well as to improve mechanisms for judicial redress, supervision and execution of the laws.

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Sector	Programme	Period / Total budget	Implementing agency/ies	Description
Natural Resource Management	Miti Mingi Maisha Bora (MMMB) – Support to the Forest Sector Reform in Kenya	2009–2015 **EUR 22.7 m**	Ministry of Environment, Water and Natural Resources Kenya Forestry Research Institute	Bilateral programme of support building on long-standing focus of Finnish interventions in the forestry sector in Kenya. MMMB supports forest reform and is implemented nationally, with an overall objective to reduce poverty through a strengthened forest sector in line with Vision 2030. The programme consists of four components: 1) Support to forest sector policy development and coordination processes; 2) support to implementation of KFS institutional capacity change processes; 3) support to management and utilisation of gazetted forest reserves; 4) improved livelihoods in arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) through sustainable production and trade in bio-energy and other forest products.
	Joint water programme funded by Finland and Sweden	Joint programme since 2014 **Approx. EUR 17 m (EUR 3 m on technical assistance)**	Water Services Trust Fund (WSTF)	Support through WSTF since 2009, which builds on previous interventions by Finland independently in Western Kenya and its long-standing support to the water sector (since 1980s). Support is directed to improve water and sanitation services of poor, rural areas and the protection of water resources. Since 2014, a joint programme has been implemented and funded by Finland and Sweden to bring water services to poor, rural areas. The programme is implemented throughout counties, with planning and coordination implemented by county governments and local water service companies. The aim of the joint programme is to build the sustainability of the water service sector, including economic sustainability, through introduction of tariffs for water use. To work towards this, the programme supports well organised and regulated water service maintenance by strengthening the operations of the WSTF as a financer/supporter of water sanitation services and water resource management. Finland provides the technical assistance component, which is provided through Orgut Consultancy.

Sector	Programme	Period / Total budget	Implementing agency/ies	Description	Period	Budget	Implementing organisation
Agriculture	PALWECO – Program for Agriculture and Livelihoods in Western Communities of Kenya	2010–2016 EUR 30.5 m	Ministry of Devolution and Planning	The programme is implemented in Busia county, with the aim to decrease poverty and improve livelihoods and the income of the population. The programme focuses on three areas: improving sustainable livelihoods; improving sustainable incomes and food security; and strengthening capacity to plan and monitor development activities.			
Projects supported through the FLC							
	Mainstreaming Human Rights and Cross-Cutting issues in the Agricultural and Natural Resource Sectors in Kenya				Apr 2015–Mar 2016	EUR 100,000	Kenyan National Farmers Federation
	Taking a step towards achieving Tax Justice in East Africa through citizen-driven actions				Aug 2015–Jul 2016	EUR 100,000	Tax Justice Network
	Access to Justice programme				Jul 2015–Jun 2016	EUR 89,000	Centre for Rights Education and Awareness
	Strengthening local Natural Resource Management (NRM) institutions and empowering local communities advocate for improved Governance of Natural Resources and Livelihoods in Machakos County				Aug 2015–Jul 2016	EUR 80,000	Green Resources Initiative (GRI)
	Peace Building and Conflict Resolution				Aug 2015–Jul 2016	EUR 60,000	Pastoralist community development organisation
	Further Strengthening Governance and Forest Rights through Piloting of Inclusive Benefit Sharing Business Model among CFAs				Aug 2015 – Jul 2016	EUR 78,300	Help Self Help Centre
	Enhancing human rights through strengthened National and Community Based Protection Interventions for Human Rights Defenders				Apr 2015–May 2017	EUR 193,000	National Coalition of Human Rights Defenders
	Improving legal and Human Rights in Wajir County				Apr 2015–Mar 2016	EUR 70,000	Arid Lands Development Focus Kenya
	Developing an effective and equitable forest landscape and livelihood restoration & investment plan in and around Embobut forest, Cherangany Hills				Aug 2015–Jul 2016	EUR 90,000	International Union for Conservation of Nature
	Upscaling Torture Prevention and Response Mechanisms in Kenya				Jun 2015–May 2017	EUR 182,000	Independent Medico Legal Unit
	Upholding Journalists' rights in Uganda through legal empowerment and training				Jun 2015–May 2017	EUR 120,000	Human Rights Network for Journalists

Source: Embassy of Finland Nairobi n.d

CSM process findings

This section outlines key findings from analysis of available secondary documentation and interviews with staff members of the Kenya Embassy and MFA. The focus of the analysis is on the contribution of the CSM to the CS in Kenya rather than on an analysis of the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of the CS (through the programmes supported under it) at country level. However, the assessment draws on an understanding of the Kenyan context, history of Finnish engagement in the country and understanding of the specific sectors/programmes supported through Finnish development cooperation as outlined in the previous sections. Furthermore, details of the CS portfolio implementation are incorporated here to the extent that they are relevant for understanding the findings against the CSM processes in Kenya.

Relevance

Assessing the relevance of the CSM considers whether it met the needs of MFA management and country programme managers, and whether it contributed to strategic choices and the relevance of these choices to key stakeholders/the country context.

In terms of meeting manager needs, the CS was considered to be useful in bringing greater focus to what development cooperation was aiming to achieve in Kenya. Staff members at embassy and MFA level indicated that the CS has been a useful tool for planning, implementing, monitoring and reporting on interventions. Notably, the reporting processes have provided opportunity for dialogue and joint decision-making between the embassy and MFA staff. The report process begins with a meeting, with the counsellors and coordinators then collecting information and writing the material before it is sent to Helsinki for discussion and a management response. The Ambassador reviews the reports prior to them being sent. Country programme staff highlighted, however, that whilst the CS made the need for changes in the CS portfolio more obvious and has provided a 'guide' of where the programme is/should be going, its relevance as a management tool to guide strategic thinking has been limited given that programming takes place all the time. (See discussion in effectiveness section below.)

In terms of its contribution to strategic choices – and the relevance of those choices more widely – the CS was considered to be relevant in terms of providing a framework for concentrating on specific areas. However, it did not contribute to increasing the strategic relevance of the CS itself. As the analysis of the evolution of the CS portfolio in Kenya highlights, there has been a strong degree of continuity since the beginning of Finnish engagement and especially since the introduction in 2010 of the DCP, following bilateral agreements made in 2009, on the areas of programme focus. Thus, the strategic focus of the CS was driven from, and aligned to, government priorities and the wider country context from an early stage, and processes leading to development of the CS built on previous decisions rather than redirecting priorities. As such, the CS was developed to justify an already relevant programme against the 2012 DPP.

Period	Comment	Focus
Early 1990s		Poverty reduction, sustainable natural resource management
Late 1990s		Good governance, democracy and human rights
2004	Bilateral negotiations	Forestry, energy, good governance
2007	Introduction of CEP	Forestry, energy, good governance
2009	Bilateral negotiations	Forestry, rural development, good governance
2010	Development Cooperation Plan	Forestry, rural development, good governance
2012	Introduction of Country Strategy	Governance and human rights, agriculture and rural development, natural resource management

Effectiveness

Assessing the effectiveness of the CSM for the CS involves considering whether the processes of introducing the CS were managed inclusively, and whether the CSM programming, monitoring and reporting practices facilitate learning and better targeting/measuring of results, as well as whether this has contributed to more effective country programming.

The effectiveness of the CSM for facilitating inclusivity was limited given that the production and development of the CS was largely undertaken as an internal process in Kenya. This was reported as a key finding in the Kenya Country Programme Evaluation (2015) which stated that there was limited input from external Kenyan stakeholders (Agrer 2015). It is perhaps unsurprising that this was the case, given that the CS inherited and was built to house an existing set of programmes. And, indeed, the influence of previous dialogue with government as far back as 2004 and notably through the bilateral negotiations in 2009 was strong, firmly establishing forestry, rural development and good governance as the focuses of Finland's engagement. Thus, whilst it could be argued that the CS effectively continued to take these agreements/consultations into account by not deviating from them, it was considered to be a lost opportunity for strategic dialogue and engagement and potential innovation/strategic directioning (*ibid*). Individual programmes supported through the CS are implemented and agreed in collaboration with government partners, as well as other development partners. However, it is not evident how or if the CS supported any change in how these processes were managed with various of the partnerships being long-standing and existing prior to the introduction of the CS (e.g. the MMMB programme, implemented by the Ministry of Environment, Water and Natural Resources has been supported by Finland over many years).

The CSM has supported more effective practices for programming, monitoring and reporting. The CSM processes encouraged strategic objective setting and development of a results framework to measure and report against outcomes and outputs. As outlined, these elements were previously missing from or vague in planning documents in Kenya. Indeed, an early evaluation of Finnish bilateral development cooperation noted: '*effectiveness was difficult to assess as the set of objectives set in the documents were often vague and over-ambitious*' (Scanagri 2002). Furthermore, the CEP and DCP only provided broadly defined objectives and no indicators or targets. Country staff expressed the view that the CS and the results framework had helped in thinking about what had been achieved, with the reporting processes providing valuable opportunity for discussion and identification of critical issues. However, whilst representing a shift towards more effective monitoring/reporting, there are weaknesses in the strategic objectives outlined in the CS and the indicators to report against them, as well as a significant contribution gap between the specific objectives and the strategic objectives. This has limited the utility of the strategy as a results-based management tool because the attainment of these objectives cannot necessarily be attributed to Finland in any meaningful way (thus making decision-making based on these reports less effective). Furthermore, the reports are largely narrative-based.

Whether CSM processes have contributed to more effective country programming is a complex area to assess. However, the effectiveness of the CSM has been limited in terms of determining the programmes to implement. As outlined, this was largely because Finnish engagement in Kenya even prior to the CS reflected strong continuity and limited fragmentation, with a preference to go for fewer, larger strategies than to have too many smaller ones. Thus, the scope for the CS to enable more/better concentration was already limited. However, in order to further reduce fragmentation, the CS outlined intentions to reduce the programmes supported (bilaterally and through multilateral institutions) over the strategy period. Yet, the number of programmes supported has not reduced significantly, with six supported in 2016 (down only one from seven in 2007, based on information available at the time of reporting). The embassy remains largely focused on operational, day-to-day management, and primary responsibilities involve having to make (relatively) quick decisions and choices on programmes/projects in response to contextual and implementation challenges/opportunities. For example, devolution in 2013 had a major influence on thinking and priorities (although outlined in the CS, there was no specific programme indicated) with decisions made subsequently to support the Devolution Fund through the World Bank and GIZ. This means that country programme managers are constantly adjusting the portfolio whilst also honouring existing commitments. In reality, and linked to budget cycles, planning of CS portfolio interventions happens twice yearly (for the budget forecasting in the autumn and annual budget setting in April), and with reduced funding, decisions have to be made on where things can be cut, rather than introduced. Whilst the strategy is used to guide these decisions (with cuts made where results are limited, e.g. the budget for rural development has been reduced) they also have to be made pragmatically (e.g. given that many funds are tied to multi-annual budgets and cannot be released). And, in some instances, programming decisions have to be made before analysis/reporting is ready. Thus, the effectiveness of the CS in guiding new strategic directions and supporting more effective programming is limited.

However, the limitations imposed by the CS (i.e. a focus only on bilateral development cooperation) were reported to have enabled more effective programming in Kenya. Although, on the flip side, the effectiveness of programming was considered to have been enhanced by doing things together and in a complementary/joined-up way, it was also considered to be challenging. Given the work load on staff overseeing/supporting development cooperation activities, there was a sense that the CS had established useful boundaries by delimiting responsibilities. This had made clear lines of accountability, with – for example – NGOs being under the responsibility of KEO-30 and regional programmes not falling to the responsibility of the embassy to report on. For example, setting indicators and targets for private sector activities in line with development cooperation targets would be problematic because of business sensitivities during planning stages and sensitivity of business data given limited openness and concerns around market competition (with an example from a Finnfund-supported wind farm project). Despite some sense that the updated CS could adopt a more holistic approach, by taking other instruments/channels into account, this should not change the embassy's mandate (or that of the ministry/department) to be responsible for foreign policy relations nor in any way reduce the flexibility around bilateral cooperation. Instead, a mechanism to improve information flows and the financial reporting system in order to update the country team on everything happening in the country on an annual basis was considered to be valuable – but not as something to report against.

Impact

Assessing impact involves looking at whether the CSM processes (templates, instructions) provide guidance to build CS impact pathways and identify/report impact indicators.

It is too early to determine whether the CSM process has provided guidance to build impact pathways in the logic model of the CS. As noted under the effectiveness section, in the CS as designed there is a significant contribution gap between the specific objectives and the strategic objectives, as well as between the goal and the strategic objectives outlined, meaning that tracking the pathway from Finland's devel-

opment cooperation to achieving specified outcomes is difficult. Furthermore, final evaluations and/or impact evaluations of each of the individual programmes are lacking,[12] meaning that there is very limited evidence to link the interventions under the CS to the goal/strategic objectives to which the CS aims.

Efficiency

Assessing the efficiency of the CSM involves considering how efficient the processes and guidelines are, as well as how the CS has contributed to risk management.

The 2015 evaluation concluded that the guidelines for developing the CS were 'potentially inappropriate' in the Kenya context, because they required rationalising an existing programme to align with and justify a new policy (Agrer 2015). Furthermore, the limitations imposed by the guidelines for CS development on the number of sectors that could be included and the level of background analysis included were found not to be useful by the evaluation. However, this would seem to counter arguments for defragmentation and efficiency in terms of the preparation process. The evaluation also concluded that at the time of developing the CS, there were no clear guidelines on how to incorporate human rights and cross-cutting issues into project planning and activities (which meant the human rights approach had not been fully operationalised in the Kenyan development cooperation) (ibid).

According to country team members, although reporting processes were considered to be valuable, they required significant inputs from staff. Regarding semi-annual report processes, staff considered that the 'light' report requirements provided a useful check point to track progress against recommendations in the management response to the annual report. For semi-annual reports the level of inputs required was considered realistic and appropriate for a relatively small embassy team to manage (especially given that the timing of the report submission fell during the Kenyan Embassy staff's summer holiday period). However, the efficiency of processes around the annual reporting was hampered given both that processes themselves are quite demanding/ heavy, but also that the CSM reporting cycles are those of MFA and are not aligned with the reporting cycles of programme implementing partners in Kenya. There were suggestions that pushing back the annual report submission slightly (from February to mid-March) would enable the embassy to filter in development partner reporting (and reduce the burden of trying to separately gather information) whilst still meeting the MFA budget planning cycles and development policy days in April. It was acknowledged however that finding the 'optimum' time is a challenge given ongoing demands and the need, in country, to link also with Ambassador planning, but it was thought that this would increase efficiency.

Whilst the CS identifies risks, the contribution of the CS to risk management during implementation is not evident from the analysis. Furthermore, the CEP for Kenya had already moved towards outlining potential risks (development scenarios) given the volatile context in which it was developed, and analysis of the two documents does not make clear how the CS 'goes beyond' in any tangible way in terms of supporting risk analysis and mitigation.

Sustainability

Assessing the sustainability of the CSM requires considering whether it has contributed to more sustainable Finnish development cooperation and whether it supports ensuring CS responsiveness to better ensure sustainability.

An evaluation of the country programming in Kenya prepared in 2002 indicated that the sustainability of results was a major problem in most of the projects and programmes covered. It also highlighted that interventions had 'tended to extend the same project over a number of subsequent phases...which has made realistic planning of the project activities, and eventually implementation of an effective phas-

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[12] Evaluations reviewed included of Finnish support to development of local governance in Tanzania and Kenya (2012); an evaluation energy sector (where Kenya is a case country) (2011); and an evaluation of support to agriculture (where Kenya was a case study) (2010). None of these constituted impact evaluations.

ing out strategy difficult' (Scanagri 2002). It is not evident whether and how the CSM processes have contributed to overcoming these challenges and to more sustainable Finnish development cooperation in Kenya. Sustainability of outcomes is the responsibility of the individual programmes, and these are implemented by partner agencies/organisations.

However, the current CS does not discuss sustainability issues either in terms of the individual programmes or in terms of the CS as a whole, or how final/impact evaluations will be used to verify results. Furthermore, it is not evident whether the CS – or the CSM processes – have overcome the issue of outlining an effective phasing out strategy, with the CS continuing to support programmes that were supported in the much earlier stages of Finland's engagement. However, the CSM emphasis on reporting and the ways in which reporting has been utilised to inform decisions could be argued to have built responsiveness to some degree. However, for these processes to be sustainable, a much stronger culture of results-based management and embedding of reporting into systems and structures is required. One recommendation to facilitate this was for the updated CS to develop thematic – rather than sectoral – objectives to enable greater responsiveness and flexibility, whilst still working strategically.

ANNEX 8: COUNTRY EVALUATION SUMMARIES

Ethiopia

Background and purpose of the evaluation

This country evaluation is part of a study commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFA) to evaluate a results-based Country Strategy Modality (CSM) introduced in 2012, while also evaluating Finland's country strategies in six partner countries. The country evaluation thus has a double purpose:

    a) As an evaluation, for both accountability and learning purposes, of Finland's bilateral cooperation with Ethiopia since 2008. As such, this is a free-standing report, to be published separately, and it will elicit a separate management response from the country team.

    b) As part of the multi-country study (Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nepal, Tanzania, Vietnam and Zambia) of Finland's country strategy modality (CSM).

The evaluation aims to explain the strengths and weaknesses of past performance and to make forward-looking recommendations at country level, as well as providing inputs to formative CSM recommendations.

Approach and methodology

The evaluation covers the period of 2008–2015. Although there is particular interest in the country strategy modality which was introduced only in 2012, it is necessary to consider a longer period in order to understand context and because many of the interventions taking place during the post-2012 period were designed and commenced earlier.

The evaluation considers Finnish bilateral funding to Ethiopia in the context of Finland's development funding portfolio as a whole and Finland's role as part of the donor community. However, it focuses directly only on the instruments that come within the scope of the Country Strategy (CS), and it is an evaluation of the CS portfolio as a whole, not of its individual components.

The evaluation uses a theory of change (TOC) approach, which involves elaborating the implicit theory of change that is reflected in the Country Strategy. A key point is to identify the main assumptions about how Finland's bilateral cooperation will contribute to results, and then to test the validity of these assumptions in practice. The study answers a series of evaluation questions, both about the Ethiopia programme and about the CSM, that were agreed with the MFA during the inception phase.

The evaluation drew on various sources of information and evaluation tools to triangulate the evaluation findings including: document review, analysis of financial and other statistics, semi-structured interviews based on the evaluation questions (covering individual interviews, group interviews and focus group discussions), and site visits to observe results on the ground and elicit beneficiary and local stakeholder feedback. The evaluation took place from September 2015 to June 2016, with a visit to Ethiopia in January/February 2016 that was preceded by interviews in Helsinki. The preliminary findings of the Ethiopia country study were presented to the MFA in Helsinki in March 2016.

Context and content of the Ethiopia programme

Finland has had a long engagement with Ethiopia. It has been the only donor supporting Special Needs Education (Inclusive Education) and has also built up a strong reputation on community managed rural water supply. An evaluation of the 2000–2008 programme was very positive on the quality of the programme, although noting that it was not at that stage guided by any explicit strategy document.

More recently two interventions in rural economic development have been added, focused on land registration and on a value-chain approach to the promotion of agriculture. The main geographical areas of focus of the CS portfolio have been Amhara region, in Ethiopia's heartland, and Benishangul Gumuz, one of the developing regions, although many activities are wider in scope.

The programming has characteristically been guided by aid effectiveness principles with emphasis on country ownership, use and support of country systems and collaboration in joint sector approaches. It emphasises the wider influence (on sector policies and programme design) that can be achieved by linking Finnish projects to sector dialogue and participation in sector programmes.

Introduction of the Country Strategy

The first formal country strategy was a Country Engagement Plan (CEP) for 2008–2012, but this was a very light document and not results-oriented. The Country Strategy documents prepared from 2012 onwards were very different from the CEP, but there was strong continuity in the composition of the country programming.

Nevertheless, participants agree that preparation of the CS was a deeper process with significant effects on subsequent management of the portfolio of interventions. Although there were elements of consultation with government and with other stakeholders, this was primarily an internal MFA process, mainly involving dialogue between the Embassy and the Africa department. Key informants felt that there was no need to change what Finland was doing in Ethiopia, and in any case resources for the next few years had already been committed. However, in contrast with the CEP, the CS represented a new level in terms of providing a framework for results-based management (RBM) and monitoring results.

Findings, conclusions and recommendations

Against this background, the evaluation found that the Ethiopia programming has continued to be very effective, with Finland "punching above its weight" in several of its areas of engagement. Given that the portfolio was already strong, introduction of the CSM did not make a major difference; it is nevertheless a worthwhile approach which is likely to help maintain and improve the quality of the CS portfolio in future. The evaluation's recommendations are listed below. The table which follows provides a summary of findings, conclusions and their links to the recommendations.

Recommendations

The following recommendations address the Ethiopia programme itself:

R1 Persist with the existing sectors, paying attention to strategic issues this evaluation has identified, and continue to work towards the further integration of Finnish initiatives into government systems and joint sector approaches and to follow other aid effectiveness principles.

R2 Continue the rights-based approach, combining projects that focus on economic and social rights with wider dialogue and monitoring in regard to democratic rights, and continued support to the Fund for Local Cooperation to help maintain space for civil society organisations.

R3 If more resources become available, use them to deepen engagement in the existing sectors, and to adapt that engagement to a changing domestic resource situation.

R4 **Use other,** trade and investment related, **instruments in parallel with the bilateral programme,** not to substitute for it.

R5 Explicitly consider the balance between finance, TA and the supervision provided by the Embassy and country team. Take particular care to **maintain the capacity and professionalism of the development specialist roles.**

R6 **Continue to work within common donor frameworks,** while recognising that Finland will continue to need a separate Country Strategy that highlights accountability to Finland.

R7 **Support studies as to whether land certification in Ethiopia does indeed have the anticipated effects** on farmers' willingness to undertake long-term investments, and hence on their subsequent prosperity.

The remaining recommendations concern issues beyond the remit of the Ethiopia country team in MFA, and are included as an input to the overall CSM evaluation.

R8 **Continue the CS approach and improve it** by:

a) **Strengthening the approach to results** (by more precise definition of intended results, and by a clearer distinction between the roles of impact monitoring at sector and national level, and outcome and output monitoring at intervention level).

b) **Making more explicit use of the theory of change** in preparing, and then monitoring the next iteration of the CS.

c) **Incorporating other modalities more systematically:**

- as a minimum, for information – include description, so that the CS does a better job of explaining Finnish aid both to Ethiopian and to Finnish stakeholders;

- preferably with a more organic link, so that those responsible for other instruments at least have to explain how the use of the instrument in Ethiopia supports and complements the country strategy. (A corollary is that they will need to be more involved in the consultation around the CS preparation.)

d) **Strengthening gender analysis and monitoring.**

R9 **Strengthen the preparation process by:**

a) making it **more consultative** with GoE and other stakeholders;

b) revising the CS at **multi-year** intervals (not annually).

R10 **Review the way MFA manages humanitarian aid vis-à-vis development aid**, with a view to improving the consistency between the two. Consider other donors' experiences in this review.

Summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations

Main Findings	Conclusions	Main Recommendations
The CS portfolio is highly relevant in all dimensions (beneficiary needs, government priorities, Finland's policies and priorities and relevance to donor partners).	Continuing relevance has been assured by focusing on a few sectors where there is clear Finnish comparative advantage, reinforced by long-term engagements which deepen Finland's expertise. Future relevance will depend on continuing to adjust intervention design to a changing context.	Persist with the existing sectors, paying attention to strategic issues this evaluation has identified (which identify issues to be addressed in order to ensure continuing relevance and effectiveness). (R1) If additional funds are available, focus on existing sectors and intervention areas, rather than taking on new things. (R3) Use other, trade and investment related, instruments in parallel with the bilateral programme, not to substitute for it. (R4)
The Ethiopia CS portfolio is generally effective to direct outcome level. This applies especially to the long-established education and WASH sectors. Land and agriculture interventions are still in their early stages. Nevertheless, for all sectors there are clear examples of wider effects that add additional value (in terms of policy effects and influence on other government and donor programmes).	Adhering to aid effectiveness principles has paid dividends in making the programme more effective (and sustainable).	Continue to put aid effectiveness principles explicitly at the centre of strategic planning. (R1)
Sector by sector review of the potential for impact shows that Finland can be confident of impact through its education and WASH interventions. Land and agriculture interventions are at an early stage, and therefore subject to more uncertainty, but their intended impact pathways are plausible.	CS impact expectations are generally credible, but it would be useful to link results monitoring more directly to more specific country results. Arising from both effectiveness and impact findings, need for care in choosing and interpreting results indicators	Refine the results focus of the CS (requires action at CSM level). Support studies as to whether land certification in Ethiopia does indeed have the anticipated effects on farmers' willingness to undertake long-term investments, and hence on their subsequent prosperity. (R7)

Main Findings	Conclusions	Main Recommendations
The evaluation finds that the CS portfolio is generally efficient, based on the absence of conspicuous waste together with a number of programme features conducive to efficiency, namely: lack of fragmentation, continuity which promotes learning from experience, and limited geographical footprint. This is reinforced by the leveraging of domestic resources (most notably in WASH), and influence on wider sector policies and programme design in WASH, education and land registration. Efficiency and effectiveness are reinforced by strong coherence within the CS portfolio.	Efficiency (and overall effectiveness of the CS portfolio) depends on achieving an appropriate balance between finance, TA and management staff. The role of the Embassy's development specialists is crucial in linking the different elements of the programme and achieving added value.	Explicitly consider the balance between finance, TA and the supervision provided by the Embassy and country team. Take particular care to maintain the capacity and professionalism of the development specialist roles. (R5) Continue intelligent use of aid effectiveness principles. (R1, R6)
Coordination with other donor programmes is thoroughly built into the programme. Even where Finland is implementing bilateral projects these operate within common sector frameworks.	The Finnish programme displays a good blend between independent and joint activities, benefiting from economies in shared knowledge and joint action, while maintaining a distinct Finnish value-added.	Continue to work within common donor frameworks, while recognising that Finland will continue to need a separate Country Strategy that highlights accountability to Finland. (R6)
There is strong complementarity between the bilateral instrument and the Fund for Local Cooperation. Complementarity with other Finnish aid instruments is limited and largely accidental.	Thus far, the Country Strategy has been a missed opportunity for strengthening complementarity among Finnish aid instruments. The disconnect between development aid and humanitarian aid is a long-standing issue in Ethiopia.	Greater complementarity between the bilateral programme and Finland's other instruments would require purposive action at MFA level, as would better coordination between the bilateral programme and humanitarian aid.
Most Finnish interventions are designed with sustainability in mind (e.g. community management approach for WASH, working with government systems and supporting government capacity), but sustainability of project interventions is not assured.	Overall strong country ownership supports sustainability, but further integration with government systems may be required (e.g. mainstreaming of inclusive education, integration of community management approach for rural water); institutional sustainability not yet assured for REILA and AgroBIG.	Maintain Finnish involvement across the current portfolio, and continue to work towards the further integration of Finnish initiatives into government systems and joint sector approaches. (R1)
Finland's CS portfolio is soundly based on collaborating with GoE and other stakeholders to advance economic and social rights, especially for poor and marginalised people. At the same time Finland continues dialogue with GoE on political rights, and participates with other donor partners in the joint monitoring of human rights in Ethiopia.	Finland has struck an appropriate balance in pursuing the human rights-based approach in Ethiopia.	Continue the rights-based approach, combining projects that focus on economic and social rights with a wider dialogue and monitoring in regard to democratic rights, and continued support to the FLC to help maintain space for CSOs. (R2)

Mozambique

Background and purpose

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFA) introduced the country strategy modality (CSM) in 2012 to promote Results-Based Management (RBM) in country programming, and to enhance Finnish aid effectiveness and accountability. Under the CSM process Country Strategies (CSs) were developed, which defined objectives and a framework to monitor results. The MFA has contracted this independent evaluation of the CSM and CSs in six of Finland's seven key bilateral cooperation partner countries, including Mozambique. The scope of the evaluation covers the period 2008–2015, comparing the results-based CS introduced in 2012 with the preceding Country Engagement Plans (CEPs).

The purpose of the overall evaluation is twofold: to improve the results-based management approach in country programming for management, learning and accountability purposes; and to improve the quality of implementation of Finnish development policy at the partner country level. The country-level evaluation focuses on evaluating the CS which entails assessing the performance of programmes and projects and other interventions anchored by the CS objectives and results areas, but it is not an evaluation of the individual projects and aid instruments.

Approach and methodology

The evaluation uses a Theory of Change (TOC) approach, where the critical assumptions linking inputs, outputs, outcomes and impacts are tested through the evaluation. The study answers a series of evaluation questions on the CS and the CSM agreed with the MFA during an inception phase, including several Mozambique-specific questions.

The evaluation took place from September 2015 to April 2016, with a visit to Mozambique in February 2016 that was preceded by interviews in Helsinki. Various sources of information and evaluation tools were used to enable triangulation of research findings including: document review, analysis of financial and other statistics, semi-structured interviews based on the evaluation questions and a site visit to Zambézia Province to observe results on the ground and elicit beneficiary and local stakeholder feedback. The preliminary findings and emerging conclusions and recommendations were presented and discussed in separate feedback meetings with the Mozambique country team, development partners in Mozambique and MFA in Helsinki.

Findings on the Country Strategy

Relevance. The CS is highly relevant to national policy as defined in the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PARP 2011–2014). However, national ownership of the PARP was weak and the Government of Mozambique (GoM) stressed the relevance of donor support to small and medium enterprise development – along with increased commercial ties and direct investment by Finnish companies. The poverty reduction focus of the CS is highly relevant to the national development context as Mozambique remains one of the world's poorest countries. The improvement of both education and rural livelihoods is essential to sustainable poverty reduction. There is wide agreement that systems and institutions of governance offer inadequate standards of accountability, transparency and integrity, and require support.

The CS clearly reflects the Finnish 2012 Development Policy Programme (DPP) priorities and is particularly relevant to addressing two of the four DPP priorities: democracy and accountability, and human development. The main Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) partners perceived Finland's bilateral aid as relevant and providing added value.

The CSM was found to contribute to the relevance of Finland's bilateral aid by facilitating periodic reflection on the country context. However, the CSM process is not inclusive of external stakeholder inputs, which could stimulate further strategic innovation.

Effectiveness. Results at the level of Finland's Specific Objectives varied by sector. In the agriculture sector results were registered amongst individual beneficiary households, but it is hard to demonstrate links to aggregate outcomes at the District level – let alone the Provincial or National level. In the education sector progress has been made in reducing regional and gender disparities in basic education and in a strategy for bilingual basic education. Under the enhanced state-society accountability goal Finland has contributed to improved public financial management and audit function through the Tribunal Administrativo and General Budget Support (GBS), while the new Good Governance Programme has been slow to start.

To some extent Finland has been able to successfully leverage results from the relatively modest amounts of bilateral aid through policy dialogue and advocacy. This process can influence the decision-making and use of more significant resources by the GoM and other donors. However, influencing objectives and strategies for implementation were inadequately defined and results poorly monitored or reported on. It was noted that the effectiveness of policy influence is closely associated with the quality of advisors and staff placed in the Embassy.

There is some evidence that the introduction of an RBM approach through the CSM has encouraged more effective aid programming with a greater focus on the results of bilateral aid and an improved emphasis on monitoring the effectiveness of interventions over time.

Impacts. While progress has been made towards several of Finland's Specific Objectives, it is not possible to demonstrate the links to higher level impacts. Increases in aggregate agricultural production are explained by increased area of cultivation, rather than increased productivity. Access to education has improved but the quality of basic education has not, with poor teaching standards and standards of school management. Indicators show no clear improvement in governance and human rights and a decline in the rule of law over the 2012–2015 period. At the goal level, a lack of recent, key data makes it hard to draw conclusions on progress towards the Development Goal of reducing poverty – and assessing Finland's contribution to any change appears impractical.

The attempt of the CSM to define a results chain that links the interventions all the way to Country Development Goal has proved problematic. Limited data availability, the relative scale of Finland's contribution and time lags in responses have all proved major constraints.

Efficiency. A number of good practices in the CS have promoted efficiency including the choice of implementing partners, participation in basket funding arrangements, the efficient use of staff resources and reasonably good disbursement rates. Conversely, heavy, rigid and slow procedures for appraising and approving new projects and programmes – along with inadequately defined decision-making responsibilities – have significantly reduced overall efficiency. Cost efficiency is also deteriorating in line with a reduced country aid allocation.

Significant gaps in risk identification and mitigation planning in the CS were identified – with consequences for loss of efficiency – and the CSM could contribute to improved efficiency through strengthened risk identification, mitigation and management.

Complementarity, coherence and coordination. The internal coherence of the CS was found to be at an appropriate level, with strong inter-sectoral coherence, but limited opportunities for coherence between the CS sectors. The CS is strongly aligned to government systems, while active participation in a range of donor coordination structures ensures good harmonization.

The CS interventions are found to have limited complementarities to, or with, other forms of Finnish development cooperation. In particular, there appears to be strong potential for mutual reinforcement between the CS and Finnish NGO projects and the various trade and commercial instruments. The CSM has not provided an effective platform for developing more meaningful complementarities between these different instruments.

Human rights–based approaches and cross–cutting objectives. The CS acknowledges the importance of Human Rights-Based Approaches (HRBA), gender, equality and climate sustainability in underpinning the goals and objectives. These commitments are reflected to varying degrees in the actual interventions and are least evident in promoting climate sustainability. The CSM appears to have added little over the DPP in ensuring the integration of human rights and the cross-cutting objectives.

Sustainability. It is too early to draw conclusions regarding the sustainability of the CS results. However, the evaluation found that the design and implementation of the CS has adopted approaches in each of the sectors which were designed to promote sustainability. The evaluation did not find that the CSM influenced the sustainability of the CS.

Findings on the Country Strategy Modality

The CSM is relevant to a range of needs of managers in the country teams. It encourages a reflection on the strategy and more clearly defines the scope of the bilateral aid programme to facilitate managerial decisions. It promotes communication between the Embassy, the MFA regional department and senior managers in MFA. It improves overall accountability, and increases the visibility of development aid in Finland as a way of protecting a declining and vulnerable area of expenditure. The relevance of using the CSM to promote RBM was mixed, as the principles of RBM were already more firmly embedded in some sectors.

The CSM improved results reporting and accountability by introducing a 'serious reporting system'. The processes associated with the CSM are not seen as particularly onerous by staff and it is not clear that they impose any additional costs over alternative report formats.

The use of the CSM for managing by results is limited. It provides a useful instrument for following up on progress in the programmes as the CSM has introduced the system of processing reports. But significant limitations were also found, especially the feasibility of linking interventions to higher level results. However, the CSM does not give sufficient or credible evidence of results to drive decision making. The summary mode of RBM currently used – the matrix of indicators appended to the annual CS report – is not a substitute for thorough mid-term and final evaluations of each constituent project, carried out with rigorous adherence to standard evaluation criteria.

Adopting the results-based management approach requires a continuous investment in capacities for Results-Based Management at the country level. However, the evaluation also found that further investment is needed to reinforce problematic areas of the process: the formulation of objectives, results chains and indicators and risk management.

Summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
The current sectors are relevant, It is also apparent that there is an added value from the experience and knowledge gained through a sustained engagement in a sector. However, with budget and staff cuts, remaining in all sectors will affect the portfolio efficiency and effectiveness. The evaluation did not find obvious synergies in operating simultaneously in multiple sectors and there seems little intrinsic advantage in terms of added value. Introducing new sectors is not likely to result in a more effective or relevant aid portfolio.	Overall Finland's bilateral aid portfolio has been – and remains – relevant to Mozambique. However, a significant degree of variation was found in the relevance and effectiveness between sectors. Budget and staff cuts the current sector spread is likely to become less effective and efficient. (Conclusions #1 and #8).	1) The number of sectors supported in the CS should be reduced to maintain meaningful levels of finance and ensure adequate technical capacity to engage in policy influence.
Improving education is a highly relevant to the overall goal of poverty reduction. National data indicate progress in reducing regional disparities and in girls' access to education. A bilingual education strategy is in place, but there are differing views on the relevance of the goal of promoting bilateral education given the huge investment (and associated opportunity costs) needed to develop materials and train teachers.	Finland's sector support to the education sector has been particularly effective with demonstrable results. However, the absorptive capacity of the Ministry is a constraint. (Conclusion #5)	2a) The education sector should remain at the core of the bilateral aid programme, principally through a continuation of sector support to the Ministry of Education to promote equal access to quality, basic education.
Whilst imperfect, some progress can be seen in improving public financial management and audit functions, including improved functioning of the institutions supported. The withdrawal of Finnish support from the audit institution on account of irregularities in project implementation has affected national audit coverage and results achieved up to withdrawal were promising. The Institute for Social Studies is judged by informants to be making a valuable and high-quality contribution to policy debates.	The continued investment in governance systems is relevant to building accountability, transparency and integrity. Finland may have an added value in this area, but needs to adapt administrative and processes and be tolerant of the associated risks (Conclusion #6).	2b) Support to good governance should be continued along the lines of the previously identified programme components.
Finland's interventions in the agriculture sector have results mainly at the individual beneficiary/household level including interventions to develop farmers' clubs and support for laboratory facilities. The evaluation found limited results of support to sector level programmes due to design and implementation challenges.	The long-standing engagement in the agriculture sector has so far failed to deliver meaningful results at scale. Prospects for future results and sustainability of impacts are poor (Conclusion #7).	2c) Support to the agriculture sector should be phased out following the completion of existing contractual commitments.
GBS has been evaluated as broadly effective in Mozambique. It, and the sector budget support in education, offered the most effective means to Finland to play a role that is larger than its financial contribution. The current political and economic context implies that GBS will again become more important as a source of financing for public services.	The decision of Finland to leave the GBS group will diminish the visibility and influence of Finnish aid. There is an important 'window of opportunity' to use GBS to influence governance and build the institutions of accountability (Conclusions #3 & #4).	3) Finland should carefully consider re-engaging in GBS with a primary objective of maintaining high-level policy influence with the GoM in promoting good governance and human rights.

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
The five-year national plan emphasizes economic development. The government has expressed a desire to increase commercial ties with Finland and direct investment by Finnish companies. There is very little attention given – either strategically or practically – to links with Finland's private sector support instruments, insofar as they exist, and to their potential for reinforcing the country strategy objectives.	Finland's new DPP, the interests of the Mozambique government and the economic context suggest that a much stronger emphasis should be placed on economic development (Conclusion #2).	4) The new CS should prioritize a comprehensive private sector development plan that clearly states how trade and commercial instruments should work in conjunction with bilateral aid.
The Embassy lacks a flexible tool to directly finance NGO and civil society projects in country. Several of the Finnish NGO projects managed directly from Helsinki have potentially important interactions with the country strategy. Planned support to CSOs in the bilateral portfolio appears to have significant similarities to support already provided through KEPA via the CSO instrument.	NGO operational experiences and perspectives are an important input to developing the policy positions and advocacy work undertaken by the Embassy. Integration of Finnish NGO projects into the objectives and implementation of the CS could generate synergies and reduce overlaps and inefficiencies (Conclusion #10).	5) The embassy should consider reintroducing the Fund for Local Cooperation to selectively finance strategic NGO projects that complement CS objectives and activities.
A number of interventions were terminated early on account of irregular use of Finnish Funds, affecting both portfolio effectiveness and efficiency. The evaluation found cases where the design and implementation might benefit from improved risk analysis. Risk analysis in the CS was cursory.	A more comprehensive risk analysis and mitigation plan could have helped reduce the number of interventions terminated early (Conclusion #9)	6) Risk management processes within the Country Strategy should be strengthened.
Finland has been able to influence government and donor partners and leverage its financial contributions though policy dialogue. The most consistent perception of Finland's added value is that Finland contributes through leading donor coordination. The quality of its Embassy staff and willingness to take on leadership positions is seen as a key driver of yielding influence disproportionate to its financial contributions.	Combining sector-based financing with policy influence is essential to achieving leverage and impact. In turn, influencing depends on experienced, well-qualified and effective technical staff (Conclusion 8).	7) Development cooperation experience should be introduced as a core selection competency for appointing relevant MFA positions within the Embassy.

Nepal

Background

Following its Country Engagement Plan for Nepal 2008–2012, Finland launched its first Country Strategy (CS) in 2013. In the CS, the existing portfolio of projects was organised under four sectors: education, water and sanitation, and forestry, with a plan to close the support to the environment sector. In addition, projects were supported under the theme of Peace Building and Human Rights. The total four-year budget for the CS was estimated at EUR 80.8 million, with an average annual budget of EUR 20 million. Further budget cuts have reduced the budget for the CS in the current year to EUR 13.0 million, and to 12 million in the years 2017–2018.

Purpose of the evaluation

This is part of an overall evaluation by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) of its Country Strategy Modality (CSM) and accompanies similar country-level evaluations in six of Finland's other key bilateral cooperation partners. It is intended to provide evidence-based information and practical guidance for the next update of the CSM on how to improve the results-based management (RBM) approach in country programming and the quality of implementation of Finnish development policy at the partner country level. Its objective is to provide evidence on the successes and challenges of the CS. It covers 2008–2015, with focus on the CS period from 2013 onwards.

Approach and methodology

The study answers a series of evaluation questions on the CS and the CSM that were agreed with the MFA during the inception phase. Various sources of information were used. They included document review, analysis of financial and other statistics, semi-structured interviews based on the evaluation questions, focus group discussions and site visits. The evaluation took place from September 2015 to April 2016, with a visit to Nepal in November 2015 that was preceded and followed by interviews in Helsinki.

Findings, conclusions and recommendations

Country Strategy

Relevance. The Nepal CS was found to be relevant in view of Nepal's development policies and needs and Finland's development policy priorities. The selected sectors and key interventions are well aligned to the country context and development needs. The CS was developed in a collaborative manner and the Government of Nepal (GoN) and development partners were well aware of it. The relevance of the CS is constrained by the fact that it does not cover civil society organisation (CSO) support which complements the CS implementation.

Effectiveness. CS implementation has made contributions to education sector development and provision of access to water and sanitation as well as in establishment of forestry and environmental management in Nepal. The Finnish interventions have contributed to wellbeing of their beneficiaries through increased income and empowerment, and they have improved the access to education, water and employment, as well as to the improved forest management and coverage. Implementation of the CS has contributed positively to the presence of women and to some extent Dalits in decision-making at local levels. The CS has served in the MFA as a tool for creation of a more analytical approach to Finnish development cooperation in Nepal. It has furthered the results-based monitoring. The CS did not significantly influence the programming as most of the interventions were inherited from the previous period. The CS goal of working towards fewer interventions and towards a more coherent portfolio has been achieved. The stakeholders consider that the Finnish contribution in policy influencing has been significant.

Efficiency. There is evidence of achievement of intervention results, but delays in project implementation have also been reported. Many projects have been provided with no-cost extensions or new phases to complete planned activities, and as a sustainability measure. In many cases the decision on the extension has been made based on the findings of a Mid-Term Review (MTR) and not on the actual outcomes of the intervention towards the end of the project cycle. Therefore, the impacts of these measures remain unclear.

Impact. Finland's continuing long-term engagement in education, forestry, water and sanitation has made an impact. There are a number of external factors which need to be in place before sustainable impacts can be made, including the establishment of legal and institutional frameworks.

Complementarity, coherence and coordination. Cooperation in education, forestry, water and sanitation sector is well coordinated. However, the introduction of the CS has not had visible impacts on improving complementarity, coherence and coordination of Finnish development cooperation. There has been some internal coherence within the sectors but there is less coherence between the sectors.

Cross-cutting objectives and human rights–based approach. Cross-cutting objectives, particularly gender, have been incorporated in project designs and reported on at CS level. Multiple means are used to promote gender and human rights, including targeted interventions, mainstreaming and policy dialogue. Little evidence is available on how social inclusion works in practice and whether discriminatory practices are still applied. Attention needs to be given to enhancing the competencies and self-confidence of women and persons from disadvantaged groups. The CS has targeted most rural areas as means of reducing inequality. Climate sustainability is less well addressed in the interventions.

Sustainability. The implementation of the Federal system significantly influences the sustainability of achievements. Education sector support is well integrated into the existing systems and the bottom-up approach starting from school level plans is applicable in the Federal system. Considerable efforts have gone into incorporating measures to ensure sustainability of water systems by working through GoN WASH systems and strengthening the capacity of WASH institutions. Future sustainability will be primarily dependent on the functioning of water user committees (WUCs), and the continued collection of water user fees to allow operations and maintenance for district planning functions to continue.

Country Strategy Modality

Relevance. The CSM has contributed to the relevance of the country portfolio by contributing to a relevant multidimensional strategy and a good mix of projects and implementing agencies, as well as policy dialogue in coordination with other development partners that responded to the Nepal's development needs.

Effectiveness. The CSM format does not contribute to providing effective assessment of country portfolio effectiveness. The CS logic model contains too many layers of objectives. The monitoring framework contains indicators which are not relevant for tracking the achievement of CS objectives. At the same time, policy dialogue, which is a key part of achieving effectiveness and impact beyond direct intervention results, is not effectively targeted or tracked in practice.

Efficiency. There are concerns about efficiency for several reasons. CSM implementation has been constrained by staff turnover in the MFA. The result reporting is hindered by inadequate monitoring indicators. The CSM and the related CS planning process and country negotiations are not adequately linked with each other. Risk management of the CS is underdeveloped. The CSM is not fully integrated and institutionalised into the programme cycle, and vice versa. Evaluations usually do not make reference to the CS. The Embassy has initiated a reporting format which provides a narrative on each intervention.

Summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
The CS focus on improving good governance and rule of law, economic empowerment and service delivery, and natural resource management is essential to poverty reduction and relevant to Nepal and at the CS objectives level. Promoting social inclusion of women and vulnerable groups is a common result for both GoF and GoN. However, the background analysis to justify the target groups did not consider Human Rights issues.	Overall Finland's bilateral aid portfolio has been – and remains – relevant to Nepal. The CS responds to the priority needs of the GoN and priorities and policy goals of the MFA.	The MFA should continue supporting the existing sectors (education and water sectors) and the Rule of Law and Human Rights (RoLHR), with close monitoring of realization of Human Rights in the Finnish-supported interventions.
The CS was developed in a collaborative manner and the stakeholders were well aware of the Finnish portfolio and CS. The CS did not significantly influence the programming as most of the interventions were inherited from the previous period.	The CS(M) is a useful mechanism to engage different partners in analysing the development results. The CS(M) has served to create an analytical approach to Finnish development cooperation in Nepal. It has furthered the use of RBM. The goal of working towards a more coherent portfolio has been achieved.	MFA should continue the CSM in a participatory manner, engaging stakeholders at early stage of the development process.
The CS logic model contains a complex set of results, linked to GoN developed results. Risks are defined at each result level for each sector but the definition of the risks is vague.	The CS monitoring framework contains too many layers of objectives and there is a contribution gap between the higher level objectives and Finnish objectives. Policy dialogue, which is a key part of achieving effectiveness and impact beyond direct intervention results, is not incorporated effectively in the monitoring framework. The narrative reporting format developed by the Embassy is a useful management and communication tool.	The MFA should simplify the logic model and monitoring framework. Policy dialogue should be included in the CS narrative reporting and monitoring framework. A risk management system should be included in every intervention and in the CS and used in CS level reporting.
The CS interventions have delivered most of their planned outputs with a few exceptions. Challenges have been faced when project designs were too complex and when there were limited implementation capacities. The contribution path to CS objectives is difficult to verify because limited outcome information is available. Significant inputs that are provided to policy dialogue have contributed to positive outcomes from this dialogue.	The Finnish interventions and the CS have contributed to wellbeing of the programme beneficiaries through improved access to basic services in Nepal, particularly in rural areas. There is sufficient evidence to suggest, specifically in the education sector, that policy dialogue has been an effective instrument in the CS. New development needs or gaps may be identified in the course of the implementation of the new Constitution. .	The forthcoming CS period should be used to analyse the implications of the new Constitution and for preparation of the needed changes arising for instance from the Federal system.

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
Multiple means are used to promote gender and human rights, including targeted interventions, mainstreaming and policy dialogue. In particular, gender has been incorporated in the project designs and reported on at CS level. Less attention is given to Dalits and other marginalized groups, such as persons with disabilities. So far, little evidence is available on how social inclusion works in practice and whether discriminatory practices are still applied.	In addition to increasing the participation of women and Dalits, the MFA needs to pay attention to strengthening their competencies and self-confidence so that they can fully participate in and contribute to policy dialogue and development activities. Persons with disabilities should also be considered in all interventions.	The MFA should ensure and follow up that the HRBA is applied at all levels of CS implementation and that the objective of meaningful participation is realized.
There is evidence of efficient achievement of intervention results, but delays are also reported. No-cost extensions or new phases are used to complete planned activities, or as a sustainability measure. Overall the efficiency is good: according to the stakeholder interviews, review of meeting minutes and other documentation and the team's observations good staffing has contributed to it, though high turnover in the MFA has weakened this contribution. Not much experience exchange between the long term partner countries has occurred in terms of CS development.	There is little evidence either way as to what extent phasing extensions and additions have an effect on the achievement of impact or sustainability. High turn-over of staff in the MFA has had a negative impact on the efficiency of the programme. Clearer instructions are needed for the CS, including instructions on how the CSM will be used for learning.	The MFA should ensure that there are sufficient qualified staff available both in the Embassy and in the MFA. Sufficient capacity building relating to the CSM, RBM and HRBA should be provided. Disaster Risk Reduction should be included in the staff training agenda. The MFA should promote experience exchange between the long-term partner countries concerning CS and CSM.
Finland complements the support of other partners in all sectors where it is working The evaluation did not find obvious synergies between sectors and there seems little intrinsic advantage in terms of added value. While there is some degree of complementarity and coherence within the sectors, less coherence is observed across the sectors.	The CS instrument does not facilitate more complementarity or coherence between sectors. Synergy benefits are not sought.	The CS could be used more to establish synergies and complementarity within the CS portfolio.
Both the CEP and the CS emphasise the need to develop stronger synergies with Nepalese and Finnish NGOs towards common goals. Currently, the CSO support (both FLC and CSO) is not included in the CS, though it accounts for 22 percent of the Nepal portfolio. FLC (Fund for Local Cooperation) funding was ended in 2014.	The CS monitoring does not capture achievements made, or complementarity of the CSO (and FLC) work. As a result of ending FLC funding, the Embassy's direct contacts with civil society are limited.	The MFA should seek ways to recognize the CSOs in the CS (and CS monitoring framework) in a meaningful way and maintain contacts with civil society.

Tanzania

Background

The United Republic of Tanzania remains a predominantly rural society and economy, many of whose people still suffer severe poverty. However, recent economic growth rates have been substantial, and a new dimension of growth is now anticipated, as major new revenues from offshore gas fields come on stream over the coming decade. The country is beginning to aspire to lower middle-income status. Good governance and natural resource degradation (in a context of climate change) are major development challenges. Tanzania has generally enjoyed political stability, apart from periodic unrest in Zanzibar, where disputes over the 2015 general election led to new political uncertainty at the time of this evaluation.

For some decades, Tanzania depended heavily on official development assistance, to which Finland, the country's oldest development cooperation partner, made a small but significant contribution. Relations go back to the 1960s, which is why the concept of friendship is intertwined with more conventional notions of donor support. After some decades of mostly project-based support and fluctuating budget levels, Finland added general budget support contributions from 2001 and began supporting the Local Government Reform Programme in 2005. By 2009 the overall value of the bilateral portfolio reached EUR 40m. Forestry was and remains a core theme.

Following its Country Engagement Plan for Tanzania, 2008–2012, Finland launched its first Country Strategy (CS) in 2013, with a second edition in 2014 for the period to 2017. Keyed to the national development objectives set out in the poverty reduction strategy, the CS aimed at three country development results: good governance and equitable service delivery; sustainable use and management of natural resources and access to land; and promotion of inclusive, sustainable and employment-enhancing growth. The existing portfolio of projects was organised within the consequent three clusters under the CS, whose total four-year budget was estimated at EUR 119.9m in the 2013 edition and EUR 99.9m in the 2014 edition. Further budget cuts have reduced the annual budget estimate for the CS in the current year to EUR 13.0m.

Purpose of the evaluation

This is part of an overall evaluation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of its CS modality (CSM) and accompanies similar country-level evaluations in six of Finland's other key bilateral cooperation partners. It is intended to provide evidence-based information and practical guidance for the next update of the CSM on how to improve the results-based management (RBM) approach in country programming and to improve the quality of implementation of Finnish development policy at the partner country level. Its objective is to provide evidence on the successes and challenges of the CS. It covers 2008–2015, with more focus on the CS period from 2013 onwards.

Approach and methodology

The evaluation uses a Theory of Change (TOC) approach to assess the contribution of CS portfolios to country observed results, CS to CS portfolios, CSM to CSs, and CSM to MFA RBM overall. The critical assumptions underlying the TOC are tested as part of this process. The study answers a series of evaluation questions on the CS and the CSM that were agreed with the MFA during an inception phase. Various sources of information and evaluation tools were used, enabling triangulation of research findings. They included document review, analysis of financial and other statistics, semi-structured interviews based on the evaluation questions, and site visits. The evaluation took place from September 2015 to April 2016, with a visit to Tanzania in January – February 2016 that was preceded by interviews in Helsinki.

Findings, conclusions and recommendations

Relevance. The objectives of the CS are directly relevant to the national context, development policies, priorities and programmes. In both general and specific terms, the objectives of the CS were relevant to the rights and priorities of partner country stakeholders and beneficiaries, and, among them, to the interests of easily marginalised groups. The CSM enhanced relevance by improving thematic focus in the CS portfolio.

Effectiveness. Although the CSM has made RBM more systematic and effective in guiding programme monitoring and management, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the CS as a whole because of the contribution gap within its logic model, which hinders any demonstration of how the outcomes of CS portfolio interventions affect the status of indicators at the upper levels of the model (Country Development Results and Finland's Objectives). Evaluation of effectiveness is also hampered by the limited amount of outcome data being reported from these interventions. The climate for aid effectiveness deteriorated, and the aid effectiveness of the CS portfolio (for example through general budget support (GBS)) declined during the review period. The worsening political and governance context hindered achievement of development results. Some interventions were effective in establishing promising paradigms, but not in implementation at scale. In the upstream area of enhanced governance, the Public Finance Management Reform Programme (PFMRP) was effective, but more at the technical level than at the policy level.

Efficiency. Low disbursement rates, downward revision of output targets and project extensions are indicators of poor efficiency in some interventions. Overall, efficiency was impaired by institutional and bureaucratic conditions on both the Tanzanian and the Finnish side. The introduction of the CSM did not significantly improve risk management in the portfolio, which did not adequately identify implementation risks or indicate how they might be addressed. However, the strengthening of RBM through the CSM has had a positive impact on efficiency, with tighter checks on performance at output level.

Impact. Not surprisingly at this early stage, there are no clear or convincing signs of development impact yet from activities carried out under the CS; although future evaluations might identify some if the initial promise of private sector forestry, the seed potato project and the Information Society and ICT Sector Development Project (TANZICT) proves sustainable. A number of bold assumptions in the implicit CS theory of change will have to hold true for the planned impact to be achieved by the CS portfolio overall.

Complementarity, coherence and coordination. Complementarity with other Finnish development cooperation instruments, channels and programmes could be greatly strengthened by more explicit presentation of the full range of these, and explanation of how they interlock, in the CS. Coherence is beginning to develop within the CS, but – because the CS was initially fitted around an existing portfolio of activities – it would take further cycles of CS design and implementation to be achieved in full. As before the CS was introduced, coordination of Finnish development interventions with those of other donors has been good. Coordination of the CS itself has not, in the sense that development partners are only slightly aware of it.

Cross-cutting objectives and human rights-based approach. Economic, social and cultural rights are meant to be addressed in all CS interventions, but in most cases the effectiveness of this commitment cannot be directly measured. Withdrawal from GBS and the termination of Finnish involvement in the Local Government Reform Programme (before the CS even began) reduced opportunities to affect these issues through policy dialogue. More focused support was given on gender issues through a women's political participation project implemented by UN Women, but this intervention only partially achieved its intended outcomes. The HRBA and cross-cutting objectives are also pursued through support to the Uongozi Institute, but data on the effectiveness of this intervention are not available.

Sustainability. Ownership and inclusivity are key foundations for sustainability. They have varied across the CS portfolio but have typically been higher in 'upstream', policy-level interventions like the (now terminated) GBS and the PFMRP than in projects where technical assistance teams have had a leading role. Long Finnish engagement in the forestry sector has helped to build ownership there, although it would still be premature to confirm sustainable results from the CS's forestry interventions. Sustainability also depends, as always, on domestic Tanzanian institutional, political, social and economic factors – none of which are fully conducive to sustainability of these interventions' results.

The table below summarises the principal results of the evaluation. This is a simplified presentation that does not reflect the overlaps and interrelations between some of the findings, conclusions and recommendations.

Despite the uncertain political climate in Tanzania at the time the evaluation was completed, the recommendations assume that the governments of the two countries will remain committed to a development cooperation programme. Overall, it is clear that a second CS for Tanzania can be built on two strong foundations: the instructive and productive experience gained from the first CS, 2013 – 2016; and the ongoing strong friendship between Finland and Tanzania, derived from Finland's good reputation as a reliable and competent partner over many years.

Summary of principal findings, conclusions and recommendations

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
Tanzanians feel little ownership of the CS as a whole. There was only a limited amount of consultation and briefing with the Government of Tanzania (GoT) during CS preparation, and although occasional updates on the CS are still provided, levels of awareness are low and of ownership lower. This is seen as a Finnish strategy that is appropriately linked to Tanzanian objectives. At sectoral level, the CS portfolio did achieve significant levels of Tanzanian ownership of the policy directions and implementation mechanisms being developed.	The sustainability of the Tanzania CS is influenced by the degree of ownership that Tanzanians feel. This is limited for the CS as a whole, but fairly strong for some of the individual interventions, roughly in proportion to the degree of integration of the project with local leadership, institutional and policy frameworks.	1. The next CS should be developed on a more consultative basis and offer a more inclusive approach to the GoT. It should retain its character as a strategy of the Government of Finland; but there should be a stronger commitment to ownership and alignment.
The objectives of the Tanzania CS are directly relevant to national development policies, priorities and programmes as stated at the time it was formulated. In both general and specific terms, the objectives of the CS were relevant to the rights and priorities of partner country stakeholders and beneficiaries, and, among them, to the interests of easily marginalised groups.	The CS and its component interventions are relevant to the context in that country and to the rights and priorities of partner country stakeholders. Its concern with good governance, equity and the promotion of employment offers some support to easily marginalised groups.	2. Like the current one, the next CS should be keyed as directly as possible to GoT development objectives, provided that these are broadly concordant with Finnish development policy and allowing for the fact that the new GoT objectives, as stated in the forthcoming five-year development plan, may still be in draft at the time of CS preparation. This is likely to mean reference also to the implementation of the global Sustainable Development Goals at national level.

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
The CS refers briefly to the need for "new development instruments" and mentions some of them. But it does not offer a structured explanation of the proposed complementarity between these instruments and initiatives. It also makes no active effort to promote complementarity between the bilateral programme and another major area of Finnish intervention, through NGOs.	The complementarity of the CS and its programme with the other Finnish channels and instruments for engagement with Tanzania is not strong.	3. The next CS should set out a comprehensive description and explanation of all modes of Finnish engagement with Tanzania, including the bilateral cooperation programme directly managed through the CS. This does not mean altering funding or management responsibilities for these different modes of engagement within the Government of Finland. It does mean optimising complementarity between the various mechanisms, instruments and modalities so that the CS gives an integrated rationale for the full spectrum of Finnish development cooperation with Tanzania.
		4. Being at the forefront of evolving modes of collaboration between Finland and Tanzania, but with less reliance on bilateral project funding, the equitable growth cluster in the new CS should make particular efforts to emphasise complementarity with other instruments for Finnish support and cooperation with the Tanzanian private sector, its employees, its promoters and its regulators.
The CS logic model of the CSM reveals a substantial contribution gap: the effectiveness of CS portfolio interventions in helping to achieve the three Country Development Results, or even Finland's objectives at strategic choice level 2 in the second column, can at best be partial and is impossible to demonstrate empirically. The annually updated results monitoring framework on CS performance against this logic model is inevitably an incomplete and unconvincing attempt to measure the overall effectiveness of the CS.	Assessment of the overall effectiveness of the CS is hindered by the contribution gap in its logic model, which makes it difficult to draw convincing conclusions from the annual results monitoring framework data.	5. The logic model and corresponding results monitoring framework for the new CS should be revised to deal with the contribution gap that has afflicted overall evaluation of the performance of the current CS.
Risks were discussed in just under one page of the CS, in a narrative format that failed to specify mitigation measures for each identified risk. The major risks inherent in the Tanzanian institutional, policy and economic environment were, overall, poorly identified and poorly addressed.	Risk identification and management remains a challenge to the efficiency of the CS and its programme. However, the CS made a more positive contribution to efficiency with its emphasis on results-based management. More careful assumptions and assessment of risk would strengthen the next CS.	6. The new CS should present a more detailed analysis of risks and assumptions, specifying the implications of both and how the former would be addressed.

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
The budget for the bilateral cooperation programme with Tanzania has been much reduced, and there is no guarantee that it will not be reduced further. Specialist adviser posts at the Embassy will also be cut. Finland has a strong reputation in the forestry sector. It has laid the foundations for enhanced approaches in community-based forest management and made encouraging progress at the start of its Private Forestry Programme. The equitable growth sector offers the strongest potential for expanding Finnish cooperation with Tanzania through a variety of instruments and mechanisms. Issues of governance and accountability are increasingly important in Tanzania, and for the country's relationship with Finland.	Given recent and possible further budget and staff cuts, it would seem logical to recommend a reduction in the number of CS clusters and Country Development Results from three to two. Such a recommendation would be inappropriate for three reasons: there are ongoing and/or imminent project commitments in the NRM and growth clusters; excluding the good governance field from the next CS would send the wrong signals to Finnish and Tanzanian society; and the new CS should maximise complementarity across the full spectrum of Finnish engagement with Tanzania.	7. The new CS should focus on the sustainable NRM and equitable growth clusters, while maintaining the current projects in the good governance cluster (Uongozi Institute and PFMRP; UN Women closes shortly) but emphasising complementarity with Finnish engagement through NGO channels and the role of the Fund for Local Cooperation (FLC) in the governance sector. FLC support for work in the other two clusters should be reduced, so that good governance activities receive at least half of FLC funding.
Project managers tend to focus much more on output delivery and reporting, and in many cases data at outcome level are thin or absent. For some projects, it is of course premature to offer performance data at outcome level.	Assessment of the effectiveness of CS interventions is hindered by the fact that management and reporting of these interventions has focused more at output than at outcome level. As far as can be ascertained, effectiveness has varied, but sound institutional and policy foundations have been laid in some fields.	8. Both the new community-based forest management project and the Private Forestry Programme should be intensively monitored during the next CS period, required to collect and report outcome-level performance data, and subject to final evaluation.
The CS makes multiple commitments to inclusive approaches that seek to assist the marginalised and underprivileged as well as those more readily able to benefit from development interventions, and makes numerous references to promoting gender equality and the empowerment of women. Some of the indicators in the CS results monitoring framework refer specifically to geographical equity (reduction of inequality through improved service delivery) and gender.	CS implementation has seen convincing commitment to human rights-based approaches, gender equality and the reduction of inequality in society, although the outcomes achieved have not been clearly measured.	9. The new CS should make explicit reference to those interventions that will directly address one or more of the current Development Policy Programme (DPP) cross-cutting objectives, and briefly explain how. Where appropriate, it should also explain how other Finnish development and engagement instruments are likely to help meet these objectives.

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
No impact evaluations of Finland's Tanzania CS interventions are available. No final evaluations are available either, with one explanation being that so few projects actually end without being rolled into another phase.	Introduction of the CSM has not strengthened the approach to evaluation in the Tanzania programme.	10. The governments of Finland and Tanzania should prepare for a final evaluation in 2017 of their joint support to the Uongozi Institute, in order to determine whether further support is warranted and what form it should take.
Outcome level reporting on the performance of the Uongozi Institute is inadequate; the effectiveness of the intervention cannot be adequately judged.		11. The MFA should commission a final evaluation of LIMAS that also assesses the lessons learned during previous programmes in those Regions and the extent to which they remain relevant.
LIMAS was the latest in a series of Finnish support programmes in the Lindi and Mtwara Regions dating back to 1972.		

Vietnam

Background

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFA) introduced the country strategy modality (CSM), a results-oriented country strategy (CS) planning and management framework, in 2012 in the context of the 2012 Development Policy Programme (DPP). From 2013 onwards the CSM has been implemented in the seven long-term partner countries of Finland, including Vietnam,

This Vietnam country evaluation is part of an overall evaluation by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) of its CS modality and accompanies similar country-level evaluations in six of Finland's other key bilateral cooperation partners. Before 2013 (during 2008–2012) country programmes were set out as Country Engagement Plans (CEPs). This evaluation covers the period 2008–2015, with more focus on the CS period from 2013 onwards.

Purpose of the evaluation

It is intended to provide evidence-based information and practical guidance for the next update of the CSM on how to improve the results-based management (RBM) approach in country programming and to improve the quality of implementation of Finnish development policy at the partner country level. The objective is to provide evidence on the successes and challenges of the CS.

The evaluation covers the following processes and structures:

- a country-specific context from 2008 to 2015, consisting of an analysis of the overall country development context, the Finnish bilateral assistance and its contribution to Vietnam's development strategies and plans, Finland's development funding portfolio as a whole in Vietnam, and Finland's role as part of the donor community;

- the CS 2013–2016: achievement of objectives to date taking into account the historical context of the strategies and changes in the objectives from 2013 onwards; and

- the CSM, as applied in Vietnam, answering the question what changes resulted from the introduction of the CS compared to the "without CS" baseline.

Importantly, this evaluation focuses on the overall CS which entails assessing the performance of individual programmes and projects and other interventions anchored by the CS objectives and results areas. This is not an evaluation of its individual projects and aid instruments.

Approach and methodology

The evaluation uses a Theory of Change (TOC) approach to assess the contribution of CS portfolios to country observed results, CS to CS portfolios, CSM to CSs, and CSM to MFA RBM overall. The critical assumptions underlying the TOC are tested as part of this process. The study answers a series of evaluation questions on the CS and the CSM that were agreed with the MFA during an inception phase, including Vietnam-specific questions.

Various sources of information and evaluation tools were used to enable triangulation of research findings including: document review, analysis of financial and other statistics, semi-structured interviews based on the evaluation questions (covering individual interviews, group interviews and focus group discussions), and site visits to observe results on the ground and elicit beneficiary and local stakeholder feedback. In addition, a simple benchmarking exercise was carried out to assess the CS approach to transition against good practices. The evaluation took place from September 2015 to June 2016, with a visit to Vietnam in December 2015 that was preceded by interviews in Helsinki.

Findings, conclusions and recommendations

Country Strategy

Relevance. The Vietnam CS was found to be relevant in view of Vietnam's development policies and needs and Finland's development policy priorities. The selected sectors and key interventions are well aligned to the country contexts and development needs. This relevance has been enhanced through Finland's identifying specific sectors where it has a comparative advantage and can provide added value. However, CS ownership is largely with the MFA; the Government of Vietnam (GoV) and donor partners do not really know it well. The relevance of the CS is constrained by an incomplete coverage of MFA aid interventions and not explicitly addressing transition issues.

Effectiveness. CS implementation is providing valuable outcomes and contributing to the development results areas, but there is no visible evidence that the CS as a whole would have brought about more results and impacts than the sum of the individual elements of the portfolio. At a sectoral level, important intermediate outcomes and results have been delivered under both the CS and the CEP. CS implementation has made important contributions to the development of the innovation policy and the science and technology sector to create a stronger foundation for a knowledge-based society, improved access and quality of information in forest sector to enhance sustainability of forest management, and improved access to quality water supply and sanitation services. Implementation of the CS has contributed positively to the wellbeing of the poor and also of marginalized groups through support to water and sanitation and through some of the local cooperation fund projects, but otherwise it is difficult to demonstrate effectiveness in poverty reduction. Policy influencing has not contributed much to the CS objectives.

There is not yet any visible evidence that the CS has contributed effectively to transitioning or to preparing ground for new types of partnerships based on institutional cooperation and economic and trade cooperation beyond what had already been done before the CS.

Efficiency. CS portfolio resources have not been used fully efficiently to deliver planned outputs and intermediate outcomes. There have been problems with overall budget planning (unused funds) and also with disbursements especially in the water and sanitation sector and in water and sanitation related concessional credit projects. The introduction of the CS has not influenced overall efficiency; management still takes place primarily on a project basis.

Impacts. Finland's long-term cooperation in the forestry, water and sanitation, and innovation and science and technology (S&T) sectors has had positive development impacts. The Innovation Partnership Programme IPP (I and II) have raised awareness of the importance of innovation development, and improved policy and the legal basis for innovation and S&T development. The Development of Management Information System for Forestry Sector project (FORMIS) has had a positive impact on attitudes and awareness by the forestry administration concerning data sharing and open access, and has created a platform that will enable openness. FORMIS is also having an impact on standardisation of data management and reporting, which is expected to make forestry data management more efficient and improve its quality and usability. The support to the Trust Fund for Forests (TFF) had the important (originally unplanned) impact of creating a foundation for a national sustainable forestry fund (VNFF), and demonstrated how payments for ecosystem services could be developed and used to make the VNFF sustainable. The project Water and Sanitation Programme for Small Towns (WSPST) has had a substantial contribution to the quality of life through improving access to water and sanitation services, and improving the quality of these services.

Finland's continuing long-term engagement in forestry, water and sanitation, and innovation policy, and its focusing on areas where others have not been working, have enabled the delivery of added value, and the visible influencing of the development of the sectors. The Finnish support in these sectors was highly valued by the government stakeholders interviewed at all levels and by beneficiaries. This finding was supported by related evaluation reports, including for example the report by Reinikka (2015).

Complementarity, coherence and coordination. The introduction of the CS has not had visible impacts on improving complementarity, coherence and coordination of Finnish development cooperation in Vietnam. Cooperation in forestry, water and sanitation, and innovation policy sectors has been well coordinated with other donors.

Cross-cutting objectives and human rights-based approach have not been consistently addressed with targets and resources in the CS and in project planning and implementation, and hence it is difficult to report contribution. Introduction of the CS itself has not had an impact on addressing cross-cutting objectives.

Sustainability. All the key projects face challenges concerning sustainability. Phasing out bilateral project cooperation without adequate phasing in of new types of cooperation based on partnerships poses significant risks concerning the sustainability of Finnish-Vietnamese cooperation and partnerships. Not much progress has been made in terms of pushing the transition agenda forwards. There are good reasons to predict that the existing project portfolio will not have major impacts on facilitating the transition by 2018.

Recommendations concerning the Vietnam country strategy

1) Develop a transition plan with clear and realistic objectives, a sufficiently long timeframe, and a monitoring framework with progress indicators.

2) Increase funding and appropriate human resources to enable effective transitioning towards more commercial partnerships through instruments such as TEKES Business with Impact Programme (BEAM), Institutional Cooperation Instrument (ICI) and the Fund for Local Cooperation (FLC), and the new instrument replacing concessional credits to accelerate the transitioning.

3) Study the possibility of introducing a broad, high-level partnership agreement between Finland and Vietnam following the Danish model.

4) Improve the coverage of FORMIS to include information relevant for the private sector and make FORMIS accessible also to the private sector, CSOs and academia.

5) Further strengthen attention to sustainability of existing key projects and ensure their successful completion and hand-over.

6) In the case of IPP II, pay special attention to capturing and reporting the achievements and results which have been or will be catalysed by IPP II beyond the direct project interventions.

7) Strengthen capacity building and human resources of Embassy and regional department staff for results-based implementation of Finland's updated partnership-based strategy in Vietnam.

8) Update the CS and results framework based on new guidelines to simplify the CS framework objective setting, and bring indicators closer to the Finnish-supported interventions.

Summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
Most of the CS portfolio was inherited and, apart from IPP, was not meant to support transitioning. When the CS was being planned it was used more to justify the existing portfolio, which was itself relevant but did not leave room to allocate significant funding for instruments and interventions to facilitate transitioning. According to the interviews with the MFA staff involved with the CS planning, they did not have much freedom to influence the portfolio during the CS formulation towards more private sector-related cooperation.	The relevance of the CS is constrained by having an incomplete coverage of MFA aid interventions and not explicitly addressing transition issues. There is not yet visible evidence that the CS has contributed effectively to transitioning, or preparing ground for new types of partnerships based on institutional cooperation and economic and trade cooperation beyond what was done already before the CS.	1. Develop a transition plan with clear and realistic objectives, a sufficiently long timeframe, and a monitoring framework with progress indicators.
The CS does not have any concrete objectives, targets or indicators for guiding the work to facilitate transitioning. There has been no major change in the scope and volume of support for transition-related activities under the CS. The CS planned only for bilateral development cooperation, in other words setting the objectives that rationalised the ongoing interventions rather than strategically planning for transitioning.	There are good reasons to predict that the existing project portfolio will not have major impacts on facilitating the transition by 2018, Not enough resources have been allocated to support transitioning. Phasing out bilateral project cooperation without adequate phasing in of new types of cooperation based on partnerships poses significant risks concerning sustainability of Finnish-Vietnamese cooperation and partnerships.	2. Increase funding and appropriate human resources to enable effective transitioning towards more commercial partnerships through instruments such as BEAM, ICI and FLC and the new instrument replacing concessional credits to accelerate the transitioning. 3. Study the possibility of introducing a broad, high-level partnership agreement between Finland and Vietnam following the Danish model.

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
The private sector has not been involved with FORMIS design and does not see much use for the current services provided by FORMIS. FORMIS has been developed mainly to be an instrument for the government forestry administration at different levels. Representatives of academia and (I)NGOs interviewed stated that they could not easily access FORMIS.	The CS is very relevant in view of Vietnam's development policies and needs and Finland's policy priorities. All projects are relevant but FORMIS is currently not fully relevant from the private sector perspective. FORMIS II is not yet a truly open, shared system.	4. Improve the coverage of FORMIS to include information relevant for the private sector and make FORMIS accessible also to the private sector, CSOs and academia.
FORMIS II is being rapidly expanded nationwide to new areas with limited capacity. The major sustainability issue is linked to capacity constraints at the level of the central IT unit, and in the provinces and districts. This issue was raised by the GoV representatives and project staff interviewed, the recent MTE and the project performance audit. There are concerns around the sustainability of the WSPST sanitation component being voiced by all stakeholders and which are evident from the field work. Currently half of the water systems that are completed can fully cover the depreciation and operation and maintenance costs from the revenues generated. Sustainability of IPP is positively influenced by its policy and legal development work, capacity building and creating models/ideas for replication and adoption. However, it is difficult to demonstrate at this stage how these results will be realised in the future.	Sustainability prospects of the key CS interventions are fair. All the key projects face challenges concerning sustainability. Interventions facing serious sustainability challenges are sanitation work under WSPST III and the entire PFG project. FORMIS II has very good national ownership but sustainability requires major attention to capacity building during the remaining three years. IPP II is a complex and ambitious project but a promising and innovative initiative which may require more time to deliver lasting results and also more diverse and innovative ways of monitoring results delivery.	5. Further strengthen attention to sustainability of existing key projects and ensure their successful completion and hand-over. 6. In the case of IPP II, pay special attention to capturing and reporting the achievements and results which have been or will be catalysed by IPP II beyond the direct project interventions.

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
There have been enough staff to manage the CS work both in Helsinki and in the Embassy, but staff turnover has been a major problem and has caused inefficiencies. For example, the work on transitioning was slowed down in 2010–2013 because of staff changes both in the Embassy and in the regional department. During the CS period the effectiveness of policy influencing has been reduced partly by rapid staff turnover, especially in the early 2010s. In interviews, references were made to the need for having different types of skills and experience, with more focus on private sector.	Human resource development needs more attention. Staff turnover reduces the sustainability of work and causes problems related to CSM human resource capacity.	7. Strengthen capacity building and human resources of Embassy and regional department staff for results-based implementation of Finland's partnership-based strategy in Vietnam.
Despite improvements in both 2014 and 2015 results frameworks, it is not always easy to establish a systematic link between country development results, Finland's objectives and instruments/ projects/interventions and the level of inputs/resources. For example, it is difficult to identify what really is the concrete impact pathway to an increase in partnerships for a green economy and green employment.	There are major challenges in creating an overall view of CS performance as regards achievement of the CS development results and aggregating indicators. There are some indicators which are difficult to understand in terms of Finnish contribution and for which it is difficult to obtain data. The focus should be more on those indicators to which Finland can truly contribute.	8. Update the CS and results framework based on new guidelines to simplify the CS framework objective setting, and bring indicators closer to the Finnish-supported interventions.

Zambia

Background

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFA) introduced the country strategy modality (CSM) – a results-oriented country strategy (CS) planning and management framework – in 2012 within the context of the 2012 Development Policy Programme (DPP). From 2013 onwards the CSM has been implemented in the seven long-term partner countries of Finland, including Zambia.

The Zambia country evaluation is part of an overall evaluation by the MFA of the CSM which includes country-level evaluations in six of Finland's key bilateral cooperation partners. Before 2013 (in 2008–2012) country programmes were set out as Country Engagement Plans (CEPs). This evaluation covers the period 2008–2015, with a focus on the CS period from 2013 onwards.

Purpose of the evaluation

The purpose of the evaluation is to provide evidence-based information and practical guidance for the next update of the CSM on how to improve the results-based management (RBM) approach in country programming and to improve the quality of implementation of Finnish development policy at the partner country level. Its objective is to provide evidence on the successes and challenges of the CS.

The evaluation covers the following processes and structures:

1) the country-specific context from 2008 to 2015, consisting of an analysis of the overall country development context, the Finnish bilateral assistance and its contribution to Zambia's development strategies and plans, Finland's development funding portfolio as a whole in Zambia, and Finland's role as part of the donor community;

2) the CS 2013–2016; achievement of objectives to date taking into account the historical context of the strategies and changes in the objectives from 2013 onwards; and

3) the CSM, as applied in Zambia, answering the question what changes resulted from the introduction of the CS compared the "without-CS" baseline from before its introduction.

Importantly, this evaluation focuses on the overall CS. It assesses the performance of individual interventions anchored by the CS objectives and results areas. This is not an evaluation of the individual projects and aid instruments that fall under the country strategy.

Approach and methodology

The evaluation uses a Theory of Change (TOC) approach to assess the contribution of CS programmes to country observed results, CS to CS programmes, CSM to CSs, and CSM to MFA RBM overall. The critical assumptions underlying the TOC are tested as part of this process. The study answers a series of evaluation questions on the CS and the CSM that were agreed with the MFA during an inception phase, including Zambia-specific questions.

The evaluation drew on various sources of information and evaluation tools to triangulate the evaluation findings including: document review, analysis of financial and other statistics, semi-structured interviews based on the evaluation questions, and site visits to observe results on the ground and elicit beneficiary and local stakeholder feedback. The evaluation took place from September 2015 to June 2016, with a visit to Zambia in February 2016 that was preceded by interviews in Helsinki. The preliminary findings of the Zambia country study were presented to stakeholders as part of the Zambia field visit in February and to the MFA in Helsinki in March 2016.

Findings, conclusions and recommendations

Relevance. The Finnish CS for Zambia is clearly relevant to the Zambian and Finnish priorities, and to the priorities of Zambian people. It combines a focus on poverty with a focus on economic growth, which mirrors the priorities in Zambia's National Development Plan (NDP). The choice to include social protection was particularly relevant as it enhanced the focus on addressing issues around equity and scores high on key cross-cutting objectives (CCOs) (gender and human rights). It is also highly relevant to the continued poverty challenges in the country. Challenges with implementation have reduced the relevance in practice of some of the interventions. The relevance of the CS is constrained by having an incomplete coverage of MFA aid instruments, and not addressing explicitly transition issues which arise from Zambia's lower middle income status.

Effectiveness. In agriculture the effectiveness has fallen short of expectations, with a number of initiatives underperforming and/or being terminated. The support to the Zambia National Farmers Union (ZNFU) was by far the most effective. Through the Programme for Luapula Agriculture and Rural Devel-

opment (PLARD) there were some gains in access to resources by smallholder farmers, which has contributed to improved productivity for beneficiaries. Little progress towards objectives was made in the high-budget Small Scale Irrigation Project which became one of the most expensive interventions if calculated by average cost/ha. Private Sector Development was a new area of the portfolio under the CS. Overall, the various interventions in this area have made good progress towards achieving their purpose through the creation of green jobs and improved access to e-services for businesses. However, less progress has been made in increasing the competiveness of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs). In environment most of the expected outcomes have not (yet) been achieved. There has been progress towards building a national data base on forestry and other natural resources. However, access to the database, and usability of the data are still challenging. There has been an increase in civil society organisation (CSO) involvement in environmental initiatives through direct funding. There are no results yet for decentralized forestry and other natural resources projects. In the area of good governance and accountability there has been mixed progress across the range of different projects. The social protection programme has been effective; it has been scaled up with an increased number of beneficiaries and is now 80 percent government funded. Through other initiatives there is evidence of increased revenue collection, and improvement in public procurement. General budget support (GBS), while effective in increasing government funding to social sectors, performed poorly toward the end. There is some evidence that the CS strengthened the focus on policy influencing by Finland in the key sectors that it has supported but not on aid effectiveness which was already an ingrained way of working for donors in Zambia. Examples of influencing include high level government decisions related to farm subsidies, and increased funding for the social cash transfers (SCT). The policy influencing is attributed to the long-standing role that Finland has played in key sectors and to characteristics of Finnish development aid, including neutrality and being a fair player.

Efficiency. Disbursement rates under the CS have improved over time from 23 percent in 2012 to 82 percent in 2015. Efficiency gains have been made through the reduction in the size of the portfolio, increased emphasis on RBM, good complementary use of newer Funds for Local Cooperation (FLC), and the leveraging of additional support of Finnish partnerships. The decision to scale back the number of projects predated the introduction of the CS and can therefore not be attributed to the CSM. The real efficiency gains will likely take place into the future, given the reduced portfolio. The gains are offset by considerable challenges, including: insufficient focus on risk identification as part of the CS design and at the level of individual projects; over-optimistic design and underestimation of technical complexity across various projects; issues related to modalities and implementation partners; limited ownership, financial commitment and slow approval processes by the government; geographical spread vis-à-vis project resources; time and resources needed for scaling down the inherited portfolio; insufficient support from the MFA in Helsinki on the CS design and implementation; and a significant turn-over of staff.

Sustainability. Overall sustainability is not guaranteed. Sustainability is variable across the different interventions in the portfolio. Commitment, ownership and resources are key constraints. There is a strong sense of ownership for some of the governance projects – social protection, procurement reforms – and selected activities in agriculture (ZNFU). In environment, ownership and commitment at national level continue to fall short, although there is evidence that extensive consultation around the Decentralized Forestry and Other Natural Resource Management Programme (DFONRMP) has created a stronger ownership at decentralized levels.

Impact. In the absence of systematic mid-term and final reporting as well as (impact) evaluations it is difficult to ascertain what the contribution of individual projects is to the higher level development goals, and to establish the impact of the Zambia CS interventions. The exception to this is the social protection programme which in its design included a gold standard impact evaluation, the findings of which presented a convincing case to the Government of Zambia (GoZ) to scale up its funding and as a result of which the social protection expansion programme is now part of the GoZ Medium-Term Expenditure

Framework (MTEF). The impact evaluation findings have also been used effectively as part of efforts by Finland and other cooperating partners (CPs) to influence GoZ farm subsidy policies. Other areas where there is some evidence of impact (although not with the same standard) are agriculture, private sector development (PSD), and governance.

Complementarity, coherence and coordination. The introduction of the CS has not had visible impacts on improving complementarity, coherence and coordination of Finnish development cooperation. Alignment with country systems and coordination predates the introduction of the CS and reflects values to which Finland subscribes. There is no evidence that the CSM contributed to more aid-effective country programming. Complementarity with other Finnish aid instruments has not been strong, although there have been a few exceptions. Coherence in design within different results areas has been good, with some exceptions which reflect the retro-fitting of projects under the CS. In practice coherence has not always been possible because of delays in implementation. Coherence between results areas is less evident. Shrinking budgets raise questions about how the three remaining results areas can be maintained in a coherent manner.

Cross-Cutting Objectives. The introduction of the CS resulted in a stronger focus on CCOs for a number of projects, e.g. social protection. At the CS level there are no specific targets set for addressing the human rights-based approach (HRBA), gender or climate change. There has been attention to gender in most of the interventions, although not consistently reported. Disability has been targeted through the social protection programme. HRBA has been inconsistently included across the portfolio. Environment has been mainstreamed to some degree (agriculture and PSD) and addressed through the environmental results area.

Country Strategy Modality. The evaluation finds that the CSM has been a relevant tool for planning, monitoring and reporting. It has been used as a tool for discussion and accountability with the individual projects. However, both its relevance and its effectiveness are diminished because the CS is not owned by all stakeholders. The relevance is also reduced because it is limited to bilateral cooperation only. Efficiency of the CSM has been reduced because of insufficient support to the implementation of the modality, a lack of focus on reporting and evaluations, and a lack of attention to risk management. The CSM has, however, improved the communication and dialogue with headquarters around results. The CSM in its present form is not in itself sustainable.

Recommendations concerning the Zambia country strategy

1) Like the current one, the design of the next CS should include careful consideration of relevance to country, beneficiary and Finnish priorities. Continued levels of poverty in Zambia suggest that the next CS should have a strong focus on prioritizing poverty alleviation and inclusion. This is in line with the Finnish DPP which has the overall goal of 'reducing poverty and inequality'.

2) The new CS should cover the full range of Finnish instruments. It should clearly highlight how the different instruments will contribute to the goals that Finland has for its engagement in Zambia. This should allow for business expertise and soft power (e.g. education expertise, technical assistance, scholarships) to be part of its menu of options for engagement under the CS.

3) The next CS should more explicitly recognize the transition context in Zambia and the multiple roles of the Embassy as a facilitator in a longer-term transition from official development assistance to facilitating business partnership and trade opportunities. It should therefore be formulated with a longer 10-year vision in mind which clearly outlines Finland's overall role and interests in Zambia. The vision should guide the choices for the next period.

4) The new CS should present a detailed analysis of risks and assumptions and how these will be addressed. This should move beyond the somewhat mechanistic way in which this has been presented (when done) in the project designs so far.

5) The next CS should build more strongly on ownership and commitment, and be developed in a more consultative and inclusive manner.

6) The next CS should be more streamlined and focus on a maximum of two results areas with a manageable number of projects (we suggest a maximum of 4–5 projects).

7) The next CS should build on the areas where Finland has achieved results and that are in line with the evolving (transition) context. This should include a continued focus on policy influencing. There is a strong justification for continuing support to social protection given the results achieved and the strong poverty focus. There is also a clear justification for continuing to engage in those areas of PSD that have been particularly successful.

8) To guide the further engagement in the private sector, the MFA should commission an evaluation of the engagement in PSD which should inform the support to the longer-term transition from Official Development Assistance (ODA) to facilitating business partnerships and trade opportunities.

9) The CS logic model for the next phase of programming should be revised, as should the results monitoring framework, to bring the different levels closer to the actual interventions by Finland, thus reducing the contribution gap.

10) There should be strong support for the Embassy in programme management and budgeting. The support should be demand-driven to be most effective. There should also be more attention to the role of desk officers as a conduit for requests from the Embassy to ensure that the facilitating support that is needed is provided.

11) The next phase of support should include specific targets for cross-cutting objectives. It should explore whether there are opportunities for more explicit prioritizing of environmental concerns as part of the social protection focus. This could cover training of social protection staff on mainstreaming of environment and resilience, sensitization of the village committees and recipients of grants, and the inclusion of environmentally specific targets and indicators in project planning.

12) The new Finnish strategy for engagement with Zambia should explicitly maintain a strong level of engagement with the Government of Zambia. The CS period included a significant and successful investment of time in policy dialogue across a range of Finnish priority areas. The human resource allocation for the Embassy should include resources for this type of engagement which have been shown to have an impact beyond the direct areas of intervention of Finnish projects.

Summary of principal findings, conclusions and recommendations

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
The objectives of the Finnish CS are directly relevant to national development policies, priorities and programmes and combine a focus on poverty and economic growth which mirrors priorities of Zambia's NDP. Some projects are more directly relevant to poor and marginalized populations.	The CS and its component interventions are relevant to the context in that country and to the rights and priorities of partner country stakeholders.	1. Like the current one, the design of the next CS should include careful consideration of relevance to country, beneficiary and Finnish priorities. Continued levels of poverty in Zambia suggest that the next CS should have a strong focus on prioritizing poverty alleviation and inclusion. This is in line with the Finnish DPP which has the overall goal of 'reducing poverty and inequality'.
The CS did not provide a comprehensive framework for the full range of instruments that Finland has at its disposal. It focused on the bilateral instruments.	The use of and synergies with other instruments have been limited as these were not explicitly included in the CS. The relevance of the CS was constrained by having incomplete coverage of the MFA aid interventions and not explicitly addressing transition issues. Lack of inclusion of non-CS instruments meant that CS instruments were not fully tailored to suit the environment.	2. The new CS should cover the full range of Finnish instruments. It should clearly highlight how the different instruments will contribute to the goals that Finland has for its engagement in Zambia. This should allow for business expertise and soft power (e.g. education expertise, technical assistance, scholarships) to be part of its menu of options for engagement under the CS.
The environment in Zambia has seen considerable changes. Zambia has moved to lower middle income country (MIC) status. Economic growth has been sustained, although there are continued challenges with population pressure, environmental concerns, energy challenges and governance issues. The overall aid environment has changed with a reduction in harmonisation and alignment, and a reduction in the volume of ODA and the number of donors.	The CS provided a framework for taking into account key characteristics of the context. It could not anticipate many of the changes that took place. It did not specifically plan for or consider the transitional context.	3. The next CS should more explicitly recognize the transition context in Zambia and the multiple role of the Embassy as a facilitator in a longer-term transition from official development assistance to facilitating business partnership and trade opportunities. It should therefore be formulated with a longer 10-year vision in mind which clearly outlines Finland's overall role and interests in Zambia. The vision should guide the choices for the next period.
The risks related to the overall policy, institutional, economic and political environment in Zambia were poorly identified and addressed at the level of specific projects.	The CS did not provide a strong enough framework or sufficient guidance on risk identification and mitigation.	4. The new CS should present a detailed analysis of risks and assumptions and how these will be addressed. This should move beyond the somewhat mechanistic way in which this has been presented (when done) in the project designs so far.
The CS was drafted as an internal document for Finland. It is owned by Finland but not as a strategy by the Zambians.	Ownership of the CS is strong on the Finnish side, in particular of the revised version (2014–2017), but weak on the Zambia side. Sustainability of the Zambia CS is weak.	5. The next CS should build more strongly on ownership and commitment, and be developed in a more consultative and inclusive manner.

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
The CSM provided an opportunity to address fragmentation and to improve focus, thus addressing a major shortcoming from the CEP period. The CS brought together existing projects with a focus on reducing the size of the portfolio. There was limited room for strategic changes. Much time and energy during the CS period was spent closing down projects and stream-lining the portfolio. The budget for bilateral cooperation has been much reduced and will be even less under the next CS.	The CSM provided the framework for focusing after a period of fragmenta-tion. It did not offer the possibility to radically change the CS programme because of the time it took to close down existing projects and for much of the period the number of project continued to be high. Efficiency gains from the reduced portfolio are likely to become more obvious under the next CS which now offers a real opportunity for redesign. Shrinking budgets raise questions about how the three remaining results areas can be maintained.	6. The next CS should be more streamlined and focus on a maxi-mum of two results areas with a manageable number of projects (we suggest a maximum of 4–5 projects).
Effectiveness of the CS has been highest in selected areas of Govern-ance and PSD. There are strong examples of policy influencing by Finland in the key sectors that it has supported. Through various other governance initiatives there is evidence of increased revenue collection and improvement in public procurement. The social protec-tion programme has contributed to increasing resilience and reducing poverty and is now 80% government funded. In PSD, there has been good progress towards creation of green jobs, in key areas of doing business, i.e. the law and business regulatory reform and one-stop shops (auto-mation and e-government), and financial inclusion. In general targets were not met for agriculture. In envi-ronment, many of the results have not yet been achieved in spite of long-term engagement, and national level government commitment has been lacking. Environment contin-ues, however, to be a major concern for Zambia.	Effectiveness across the portfolio has been mixed. PSD and govern-ance have shown good performance overall, although with variations between projects which suggests further analysis is needed to identify the most appropriate areas of focus and entry points, also in light of areas where Finland can specifically add value. The social protection programme has been particularly effective. The evolving context, the findings from this evaluation, and the guidance from the new Finnish DPP with respect to Zambia suggest that PSD should be a second area of focus.	7. The next CS should build on the areas where Finland has achieved results and that are in line with the evolving (transition) context. This should include a continued focus on policy influencing. There is a strong justification for continuing support to social protection given the results achieved and the strong poverty focus. There is also a clear justifica-tion for continuing to engage in those areas of PSD that have been particularly successful.

8. To guide the further engagement in the private sector, the MFA should commission an evaluation of the engagement in PSD which should inform the support to the longer-term transition from ODA to facilitat-ing business partnerships and trade opportunities.

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| The CS logic model has a substan-tial contribution gap. The extent to which the CS interventions contribute to the Country Develop-ment Goals is partial and cannot be demonstrated empirically. There is insufficient evidence to be able to make statements about impact, with the exception of the social protec-tion programme. | The contribution gap in the CS logic model means that the CSM does not provide a convincingly integrated structure to link the performance of individual interventions with the status of the sectors to which they seek to contribute. | 9. The CS logic model for the next phase of programming should be revised, as should the results monitoring framework, to bring the different levels closer to the actual interventions by Finland, thus reduc-ing the contribution gap. |

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
Efficiency gains were made through the reduction in the size of the portfolio, increased emphasis on RBM and good complementary use of the newer Funds for Local Cooperation. There has been progress in improved disbursement rates. Challenges have included insufficient focus on risk identification, over-optimistic design of projects, poor choice of modalities and implementation patterns, limited ownership, insufficient support from the MFA on the CS design and implementation, and significant turn-over of staff.	There have been efficiency gains as well as challenges over the period. Some of the efficiency challenges relate to an inherited portfolio that predated the CS period. There has been insufficient attention to programme management and related skills.	10. There should be strong support for the Embassy in programme management and budgeting. The support should be demand-driven to be most effective. There should also be more attention to the role of desk officers as a conduit for requests from the Embassy to ensure that the facilitating support that is needed is provided.
HRBA and gender were explicitly integrated in the Zambia CS. However, there were no specific targets for addressing the cross-cutting objectives. Environment was not addressed as part of the social protection programme.	The introduction of the CS resulted in a stronger focus on cross-cutting objectives for a number of projects, but there is room for improving the extent to which this is done across the portfolio and to ensure that specific targets are included.	11. The next phase of support should include specific targets for cross-cutting objectives. It should explore whether there are opportunities for more explicit prioritizing of environmental concerns as part of the social protection focus. This could cover training of social protection staff on mainstreaming of environment and resilience, sensitization of the village committees and recipients of grants, and the inclusion of environmentally specific targets and indicators in project planning.
Policy influencing has been part of the CS, including in high level government decisions related to farm subsidies, social cash transfers, and influence on regulations and laws in agriculture and environment.	There is evidence that the CS strengthened the focus on policy influencing in and across selected sectors. The current CS has allowed the Embassy to be more strategic in its engagement and to influence policies.	12. The new Finnish strategy for engagement with Zambia should explicitly maintain a strong level of engagement with the Government of Zambia. The CS period included a significant and successful investment of time in policy dialogue across a range of Finnish priority areas. The human resource allocation for the Embassy should include resources for this type of engagement which have shown to have an impact beyond the direct areas of intervention of Finnish projects.

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        Annex 2. Template with guidance 5-2012

        Annex 3. Formulation process of a Country Strategy 5-2012

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    Annex 9.2 Results monitoring framework 6-2012

    Annex 9.2 Results monitoring framework 12-2013

    Annex 9.3 Risk management table 6-2012

    Annex 9.4 Semiannual report template 6-2012

    Annex 9.5 Annual management response template 6-2012

    Annex 9.6 Template for Monitoring of financial resources 12-2013

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EVALUATION

SYNTHESIS REPORT
2016